ORBIS

a quarterly journal of world affairs

Volume XV Spring 1971 Number 1

Fifteenth Anniversary Issue

World Politics and U. S. Foreign Policy in the 1970's

with articles by

G. A. Arbatov
Ross K. Baker
Donald G. Brennan
Benjamin J. Cohen
Samuel T. Cohen
Michael Curtis
James E. Dougherty
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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

ORBIS, a quarterly journal of world affairs
published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association.

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ORBIS is published four times a year, February, May, August, and November, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Editorial and business address: 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Subscription rates: one year, $7.50; two years, $13.00; three years, $18.00. Single copy, $2.50. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

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Reflections on the Quarter

An Outline of the 1970's

THIS special fifteenth anniversary number of ORBIS seeks to examine many of the issues that will influence international relations in the 1970's and to assess their implications for American foreign policy. It seeks to shed light on the forces for change generated by technology and social expectations which will affect this decade independently of power conflicts and confrontations. The problems posed by these issues and forces are discussed in relation to the global system, the major geographic regions, the continued American-Soviet military and political rivalry, and the increasing influence of China in global calculations.

The societal and technological milieu of the 1970's and the changing structure of the international system will shape the objective framework in which the decision-makers in Washington and other world capitals must operate. Many of the factors they must take account of have received increased attention as forces in their own right, as "independent" variables whose influence must be considered in the formulation of foreign policy. The ongoing surge of the scientific-technological revolution is perhaps the most powerful and the most upsetting of these independent forces. The accelerated pace of technological advance has made the maintenance of a strategic military balance more uncertain and tenuous; the potential for disruptive change is greater in the present decade than previously. This factor at once underlines the need for greater progress in strategic arms limitation yet renders the limiting of the strategic arsenal more difficult and dangerous.

The major effect of technology has been to augment the physical power of the nation-state while reducing its ability to use its power to achieve political ends. Although the quantitative gap between the two superpowers and other nations and groupings has grown wider in the past decade, the United States and the Soviet Union have had incommensurate success in promoting their policies in the Third World. Technological superiority has not enabled the United States to conclude the Indochina conflict or the Soviet Union to control the political destinies of its client Arab states. The approximate equality of the superpowers that developed during the 1960's provides greater freedom of action for the other actors in the international arena.

The balance between an expanding world population and the capacity to support the new multitudes now appears to be more favorable as a result of the "green revolution." Though this may help to satisfy the most basic of human needs it does not presage balanced economic development or political tranquillity. The increased abundance of foodstuffs will more sharply highlight the lack of success of most developing countries in accommodating rising expectations for other goods and services. The provision of minimal human needs combined with increased communications may result in a higher level of politicization of larger masses of people with accompanying turmoil.

The unevenness of economic development will exacerbate the already huge North-South disparities. Chronic political instability coupled with inadequate economic development contributes to poverty in the less developed areas, a situation that is unlikely to wane in this decade or even this century. The absence of success attending most efforts at cooperation, union and integration among regional groups in Asia, Africa and Latin America indicates that few significant changes in boundaries or in economic relationships may be expected. The efforts of the developing nations to act jointly on trade and aid issues have met with only limited success and no better prospects for them are in sight.

The continuing strength of virulent nationalism, xenophobic racialism, and numerous linguistic, social, religious and class antagonisms will frequently dominate the international stage. Nationalism, though showing some slight signs of erosion in the developed countries, appears to be increasing in other areas as the newer states seek to foster national identification and extend the sway of government into previously remote areas. The catalog of racial and other antagonisms is so immense that it defies summary. The resulting insurgencies, revolutions and other periods of violence provide the raw material for a galaxy of conflicts which will in varying degrees intrude into international affairs. As with rising economic expectations, the revolution in communications will enhance the power of these "isms." By the end of this decade the disruptions and upheavals of the entire world are likely to be brought within reach of all by television.

While many of the forces mentioned above are divisive in character, they may at the same time provide an impetus toward interdependence. Global economic interdependence has come to the fore as a desirable goal although economic nationalism still dominates. Domestic economies are increasingly affected by international events yet the mechanisms for economic cooperation remain embryonic. Additionally, the threats to the global ecology created by expanding industrialization require concerted efforts on the part of all nations, perhaps through new United Nations affiliates, to maintain the essential conditions for human existence. Multinational corporations, which will serve as primary instruments in furthering industrialization and productivity, may also be called upon to play a major role in minimizing the harmful side-effects of advanced technology.

II

Frequent assertions of the demise of the nation-state system will prove to be as premature in the 1970's as they have over the past generation.

One may foresee expanding cooperation in numerous functional areas through an intergovernmental approach yet without basic changes in national sovereignty. In particular, three major actors—China, a more closely integrated Western Europe and Japan—will probably play an ever greater role in the present decade. The diplomacy of the People's Republic of China seems to have broken out of the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution. The triangular relationship of the United States, the Soviet Union and China will influence events in Asia and perhaps in the Middle East and Africa. China's re-emergence and the tentative gestures toward a Sino-American rapprochement offer as yet uncharted potential for both conflict and cooperation in pursuing policy aims. If the trends toward European integration are reinforced by the entry of Great Britain into the European Common Market, Western Europe might begin to evolve toward an integrated political force sometime in the 1980's. Altered security arrangements will result from Europe's increased unity and from probable reductions of the United States' defense commitment.

Japan will become a greater economic giant before the decade is over, and the disparity between her economic power, already dominant in Asia, and her military and diplomatic weakness will become more acute. The comparison between populous but poor China equipped with nuclear power and a dynamic, lightly armed Japan housing a fraction of China's population suggests an inherently unstable condition. A greater Japanese diplomatic and military capacity may be predicted but its direction and dimensions remain obscure.

Other nations may assume more influential roles in global, or at least regional, politics during the decade. If Brazil is able to maintain domestic stability and economic growth, she might become a significant factor in the international arena. Australia is already moving toward a larger role in Asia as American and British interests decline. India, on the other hand, seems likely to concentrate on domestic problems.

The military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union will provide the strategic backdrop against which the policies of the decade will unfold. At the beginning of the 1970's, the balance of military power appears to be shifting in favor of the USSR. Massive new strategic arms expenditures and military penetration into new areas are the most obvious manifestations of this Soviet drive for dominance. Moscow now has far more military options than ever before. The uncertainty associated with the approximate nuclear equality makes it increasingly difficult to check a calculated, incremental extension of Soviet interests and commitments. Even the most cautious of policies that may be foreseen for the USSR in the present decade presumes the growth of power and influence in areas from which historically it has been excluded.

Yet the United States has both

the resources and the time to reverse this trend if its leadership has the will to do so. The prodigious effort the Soviets have made in overtaking the United States in strategic power will call for serious debate of national priorities during the 1970's. But for the time being, there is no reason why the Soviet Union cannot maintain its present pace against the sluggish U.S. competitor.

III

The interaction of these actors and the forces earlier discussed will help to delineate the major tension areas and issues of the decade.

The principal issues in contemporary European politics will continue to derive from the division of the continent following World War II. They embrace (1) the German question and the status of Berlin; (2) political trends in NATO Europe, including West European integration and the existence of political difficulties such as those plaguing Italy, Greece and Turkey, which may create formidable problems for NATO's southern flank; (3) political and economic problems in Eastern Europe, especially those endangering communist political systems as in Poland and Czechoslovakia; and (4) the threat to NATO's southern flank and Europe's energy sources posed by the loss of Western influence in the Middle East. The reduced efficacy of NATO's flexible response strategy and Europe's rising interest in political accommodation with the Soviet Union will contend with further efforts at European integration.

Middle Eastern affairs will continue to revolve around the Arab-Israeli confrontation and big-power backing of the protagonists. The current cease-fire along the Suez Canal and emphasis on negotiation appear to promise but a temporary equilibrium which could move in either direction. Persistent political instability in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world will present opportunities for expanded Soviet influence with which the West is ill-equipped to deal.

The waning British influence in the Indian Ocean basin has not been replaced by limited American activities or by a collective Commonwealth arrangement. The Soviet Union has moved to assert its own position in the area with significant naval forces and base arrangements. Chinese activity in East Africa and the Persian Gulf has increased and Peking's *de facto* alliance with Pakistan survived that country's civil war. The implications of the Pakistani war are as yet unclear, as is the significance of the recent Indian elections.

In Southeast Asia a four-sided series of relationships is likely to emerge as the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan compete and cooperate in varying degrees. The American experience in Viet Nam, the manner of withdrawal, and the success of "Vietnamization" are of crucial importance to the entire region and to the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. A political defeat for the United States in Southeast Asia, at a time when she faces formidable problems both at home and in other regions, would further undermine Asian confidence in her. Several nations, including Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, are reassessing their foreign policies, perhaps in view of the uncertainty over the American reductions. The region is apt to remain a primary arena for "wars of national liberation," which have afflicted virtually every Southeast Asian state in the past fifteen years, although none has succumbed.

In the Pacific basin there is some justification for American optimism: Japan, South Korea and the Republic of China are stable and booming economically. The American movement toward a two-China policy will require delicate adjustment of previous commitments with present realities. Peking's emergent diplomacy has continued to emphasize caution while the regime seeks to develop advanced strategic capabilities. As in Southeast Asia, the United States and the Soviet Union may both find themselves working toward the containment of the Chinese People's Republic.

The severe economic, social and political problems of Latin America, the continued deterioration of U.S.-Latin relations, and the results of the failure of the Alliance for Progress will mark the present decade in South and Central America. Nationalism, accompanied by anti-Americanism, has become more virulent in many nations, leftist military juntas hold power in Peru and Bolivia, and a Marxist president leads the coalition government of Chile. Soviet naval power has penetrated the Caribbean. The decline of the old regional security arrangements, lack of success in intraregional cooperation and chronic instability will probably keynote the coming years as they have the past.

IV

Three competing doctrines are likely to influence the 1970's: the Nixon Doctrine, the Brezhnev Doctrine and Lin Piao's "People's Warfare Strategy." There is reason to suggest that the basic tenets of these doctrines will remain even if the persons for whom they are named pass from political predominance. The Brezhnev and Lin Piao formulations promote well established precepts of their respective countries' policies; the Nixon Doctrine reflects strong bipartisan feelings for a reassessment of U.S. ends and means in international affairs.

President Nixon's February 1970 report to Congress, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,* sets forth the basic premise that the age of American global supremacy has ended. Appropriate to this change of circumstance, the new policy emphasizes that treaty commitments will be maintained but perhaps redefined, allied states will be granted military and economic assistance against nonnuclear aggression provided they take primary responsibility for their own defense, and a nuclear shield will be provided if a vital area or allied nation is threatened by a nuclear power.

The Nixon Doctrine is implicitly based on the expectation that a series of power centers can be created to supplement, or even to replace, the existing situation of American pre-eminence. Chief among these must be Western Europe and Japan with their present economic wealth and future military potential. It has already been suggested that new directions in European security arrangements will emerge, especially if Western Europe is engaged in preparing for eventual unification. This development, or successful negotiations with the Soviet Union for bilateral force reductions, may permit the withdrawal of some American troop strength in Europe, perhaps before the middle of the decade. There is, however, no immediate prospect of a replacement for the American nuclear guarantee which has shielded Europe since the inception of NATO. The question of Japan's ability to provide an alternative to a continued large-scale American presence in Asia remains unanswered. The success stories of South Korea and the Republic of China may lead to an optimistic assessment of the future of the East Asian flank, but the uncertainties of the post-Viet Nam era are too great to permit the easy projection of future trends.

The most obvious manifestations of the Nixon Doctrine have been the withdrawal of American troop strength from Viet Nam and other Asian countries and the program of Vietnamization. The reduction of American forces to less than one-half their 1968 level and their removal from almost all ground combat roles has been accompanied by marked success in the pacification program and widespread improvement in South Vietnamese forces. The Cambodian action of May-June 1970 and subsequent South Vietnamese operations proved successful in cutting Hanoi's supply routes and shoring up the new Cambodian regime. The Laotian invasion encountered extremely heavy resistance as the North Vietnamese sought to preserve their sole remaining supply line, yet this action appears to have been a strategic success by reducing the flow of supplies from North Viet Nam to the South. The stability of South Viet Nam through the elections this fall and the critical dry season next year will affect to a considerable extent the prospects for Vietnamization.

If one may be cautiously optimistic about the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine with regard to Viet Nam, it is less easy to say the same for other areas, especially the Middle East. The new Soviet military might vastly increases the options available to Moscow and the risks for the United States inherent in any confrontation. If, as the Nixon Doctrine maintains, U.S. resources devoted to foreign affairs must be pared, then the United States will have to concentrate its resources more closely on those areas and nations deemed most vital. However one may draw a "vital interest" map, it will include areas with little prospect for significant self-support in matters of defense. This is the essential dilemma of the Doctrine: Will the friendly nations of vital interest wax strong enough to cope with increased external threat and accelerating societal change as the American role is reduced?

The Brezhnev Doctrine justifying Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe will undoubtedly remain unchallenged by the West. The absence of Western response to Soviet repression in Eastern Europe in earlier periods (1953 in Poland and East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, 1961 in Berlin and 1968 in Czechoslovakia), under conditions of a favorable military balance, precludes any thought of change in the 1970's. Possible societal aspirations in the communist world may make the application of Soviet power more difficult, but it is improbable that they would alter either the will or the effectiveness of Soviet supremacy.

Moscow's expanded options in areas traditionally closed to Soviet influence have been mentioned. Increased Soviet efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere may, to some extent, be viewed as a corollary to the Brezhnev Doctrine's prescript for Eastern Europe. The groundwork is being laid for a wider definition of vital Soviet interests that may pose a direct challenge to Western security. Whatever mix of caution and opportunism the Soviets adopt, they will come into conflict with the alliances the United States seeks to maintain. The implication is for a continued period of U.S.-USSR competition, if not confrontation.

The third major doctrine which will influence the 1970's is that of people's warfare advocated by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his heir-apparent Lin Piao. The societal forces of discontent throughout the world presage a wide variety of limited conflict and political violence from which no country can be certain of immunity. China's proclaimed policy is to encourage and support many such movements. While "liberating" actions have thus far enjoyed a relatively low percentage of success, their occasional breakthroughs, e.g., Cuba, have had wide ramifications.

At the same time, China is moving toward a more traditional diplomatic role and on occasions, as in the case of the Pakistani Civil War, has pursued a policy of alignment with a friendly government rather than support for "people's liberation." The current situation in Africa and parts of the Middle East suggests that China may continue to combine doctrinaire and pragmatic policies.

V

Many books have been written in the past two decades indicating that the denouement of the confrontation between the variety of communist regimes and the societies of the West will probably occur before the end of this century. During the 1970's, problems as yet unforeseen will confront the West. The recurring patterns of conflict in the postwar era have been heightened by the accelerated pace of developments and the altered strategic balance. The course of international relations in the present decade may be decisive in determining the ultimate outcome.

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TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE CRISIS OF WISHING

by William R. Kintner and Harvey Sicherman

TECHNOLOGY – "the power of invention and science" – is recognized as the prime source of national strength in developed states, as the best hope of economic growth in developing states, as the basis of twentieth-century civilization.

The ecological crisis, arms control talks and the exploration of outer space emphasize technology as a force in its own right, an "independent" variable, whose driving power must be calculated if international agreements and relationships are to be secure and stable. The Atlantic Alliance, for instance, is strained because of the widely publicized "technology gap" between Europe and the United States. Yet this is but one symptom of a worldwide phenomenon. Technology also influences the strategic balance, political and economic development, social integration and the exploitation and conservation of the world's resources. Technology affects not only the nation-state but the substance of international politics. But what is the meaning and character of technology and its precise effect upon international politics?

I

Although the benefits of a practical juncture of science, industry, society and military strength were appreciated before the atomic age,[1] the complex nature of this juncture is peculiar to our time. Jerome Wiesner points out that "The nature of modern scientifically based technology [is] the deep dependence . . . upon fundamental scientific knowledge and the interplay that must exist between scientist and technologist as new scientific information is employed for useful purposes."[2] "Technology" implies more than the application of scientific ideas to methods and products; it also includes the stimulation of these ideas. Organization of this process, called research and development, is now occurring on a grand scale. In the United States, R&D expenditures, both governmental and private, amount to more than $25 billion yearly. The R&D budgets of most OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries approximate between 1 and 3 per cent of GNP. Soviet R&D in space and military fields exceeds the American in cost and has been growing by between 8 and 14 per cent annually since 1960.[3]

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[1] See Sanford Lakoff, editor, *Knowledge and Power* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

[2] Jerome B. Wiesner, *Where Science and Politics Meet* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 32.

There have been three opinions of the general influence of technology on human affairs. The first received its most powerful impulse during the nineteenth century:

> Technology is seen as the motor of all progress, as holding the solution to most of our social problems, as helping to liberate the individual from the clutches of a complex and highly organized society, and as the source of permanent prosperity; in short, the promise of utopia in our time.[4]

Twentieth-century history in the form of catastrophic world wars, the great depression and the ecological crisis has tarnished this doctrine. In the course of these events, a reaction to progress arose; it was feared that technology might engender retrogression:

> Technology is said to rob people of their jobs, their privacy, their participation in democratic government, and even, in the end, of their dignity as human beings. It is seen as autonomous and uncontrollable . . . as threatening, ultimately, to poison nature and blow up the world.[5]

The third opinion is that "technology, as such, is not worthy of special notice."[6] Technology represents neither progress nor regress. Whatever effects it has cannot be measured properly anyhow.

For various reasons each of these views is insufficient. Events have largely refuted the doctrine of absolute progress. We must also reject the gloomy view of technology as a monster, unleashed by a bumbling and collective Prometheus, that must be restrained at all costs if man is to survive. Technology is not to be characterized as "autonomous" merely because no one wants to be responsible for its unsettling consequences. Lastly, we can hardly accept the judgment that a vital concern of the most powerfully developed and the most aspiring developing states should be treated as a factor of little consequence. The foundation for this position rests in academic inability to measure research as an input factor and failure to distinguish between the scientific technology of the Industrial Revolution and modern research and development.[7]

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[3] See the OECD (Paris) science policy case study series, 1963-1968; UNESCO, *National Science Policies in Europe* (Paris, 1970) and C. Nader and A. B. Zablan, editors, *Science and Technology in Developing Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970). For Soviet figures see OECD, *Science Policy in the USSR* (Paris, 1969).

[4] Emmanuel G. Mesthene, "The Role of Technology in Society: Some General Implications of the Program's Research," in *Program on Technology and Society, Fourth Annual Report, 1967-68* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 4. Saint-Simon, Comte and even Marx were adherents of this general view.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 42. Jacques Ellul, Lewis Mumford and Herbert Marcuse subscribe to this view or variations of it.

[6] *Ibid.* The dearth of political science analysis on the influence of technology is presumably based on this opinion or on the difficulty of measuring that influence.

Napoleon once urged playwrights to employ political events as their vehicle for tragedies, declaring: "It is politics which leads to catastrophe without there being any real crime."[8] Technology, like the process of politics in this respect, has good and bad implications without necessarily having good and bad intentions. It cannot be regarded today as a mere manipulative tool, because its production and usage require certain resources. This being so, we can approach it as a process that affects society but which society in turn affects, as a governor that is also governed. Whether technology inherently produces utopias, purgatories or miscalculations, "Scientific and technological sophistication is increasingly seen as a critical factor in industrial 'modernization' as well as in sheer commercial viability and national prestige."[9]

Can we estimate accurately the implications of technology for international politics by taking just a crude measure of changes in national resources? What have the requirements and products of technology done to the relationships among states in a broad historical sense?

The crucial significance of research and development is the controlled transfer of scientific discovery into practical devices, within or between countries. Discovery and application, the first governed by curiosity or efforts to solve specific problems, and the second by the economies of scale and subsidy, may be viewed as the two operating characteristics of modern technology. These two characteristics bring in their train two effects, or "working principles" — uncertainty and efficiency.

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[7] See Lester C. Thurow, "Research, Technical Progress, and Economic Growth," *Technology Review,* March 1971, and *Bibliography on Science and World Affairs* (Washington: GPO, November 1964).

The geopolitical analysts are the only major school in international studies who view technology as a prime "factor" in international politics, and they see it primarily as a clue to nation-state resources. See, for instance, *International Affairs,* Vol. 33, 1967, "Science as a Factor in International Relations," speech at Chatham House, October 23, 1956, B. K. Blount; and Harold Sprout, "Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective," *World Politics,* January 1963. See also Karl Deutsch's article in *Daedalus,* Fall 1959, pp. 669-685 for an example combining a little of each of the above approaches.

[8] Christopher Herrold, *The Mind of Napoleon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 149.

[9] N.J. Vig, *Science and Technology in British Politics* (London: Pergamon Press, 1968), p. 2.

If we stimulate discoveries by establishing new requirements, our discovery rate normally increases as does our uncertainty about "what comes next" (although not necessarily in proportion). If we exploit the discovery of ideas by a clever organization capable of converting these ideas into useful products, then we can transfer the uncertainty of discovery from the realm of scholarship to the labor and works of the world. This transfer of discovery into products, with its attendant quality of uncertainty and requirement of efficiency, constitutes the industrial revolution of our day. That research and development works well, can be managed effectively, and turns a profit in cash, weapons, prestige or well-being, remains an abiding assumption of both developed and developing societies.

Although technological ideas and experiments originate in the mind or the laboratory, the world is affected by them through the agency of a particular product or instrument, whether this be an atomic weapon, a synthetic seed or a contraceptive. In tracing technology's influence on international politics, we examine the effects wrought by these products on the dominant international themes which, in the words of Charles de Gaulle, "command our epoch: self-development, scientific, technical, economic, . . . the advance of retarded peoples as well as maintenance of the peace."[10]

II

Technology has influenced international politics primarily in four areas: international security, integration, development and new resources. Traditional concepts of security have been undermined by the intrusion of nuclear technology. The nuclear bomb, the first product of large-scale, organized research and development, attained the maximum of destructive power in its fusion (hydrogen) form. On one hand, the bomb's efficiency tantalizes the military faction; on the other hand, everyone trembles at the thought of the consequences of misused efficiency.

The potential destructive power of nuclear weapons is so momentous that reason prevents their employment until conditions of high probability of the results are obtained. Since both the United States and the Soviet Union acquired the nuclear capacity for mutual obliteration, attention has been focused on weapons delivery systems, where the natural or autonomous quality — the uncertainty of technological innovation — continuously undermines confidence in one's position. It is this unsureness in strategic programming, born of technology, that sustains the "posture" problem, the fear of momentary advantage or disadvantage, the "lead-time" deployment danger, the action-reaction sequence of an apparently irrational arms race. It is this ambiguity, maintained by the competition of American and Soviet R&D establishments, that constitutes the delicacy of superpower deterrence and the strategic balance of power.

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[10] Edmond Jouve, *Le Général de Gaulle et la Construction de l'Europe* (Paris: Libraire Général de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1967), p. 23.

Intrinsically, technology assures neither a clear nor a stable strategic balance — only, through technological competition, an uncertain and fluctuating "balance of terror." Such a balance is perceived in delicate psychological gradations — inferior, equal or superior — of technological efficiency mitigated by technological uncertainty. Thus, atomic weapons confer ultimate physical strength while simultaneously paralyzing the political imagination of their usage. The history of strategy in the nuclear age reflects various attempts to convert these nuances into political advantage.

There have been three attempts to deal with this situation: arms control and disarmament talks (of which the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are the latest), the strategy of limited wars, and the Nonproliferation Treaty. The first may be stymied by technology: "the rate of technological change has continually outstripped the pace of negotiation."[11] Unless the technological factor (the rate of change) is stabilized, a permanent arms settlement is foredoomed. Such innovations as MIRV, improved ABM, silent submarines, fractional orbital bombardment systems and various penetration aids are but an indication of military possibilities for the next decade which can undermine any settlement that depends on a technological freeze. Meanwhile, the international political struggle, the real issue between states, is being conducted on "lower levels" of violence. The phenomenon of limited wars, wars by proxy in the Third World, wars of limited powers against each other, or wars of great powers muscle-bound by their strength (as in Viet Nam), illustrates the practical constraints upon war and peace fashioned by technology in the twentieth century. For the great powers are assiduously avoiding the supreme challenge and last resort to nuclear weapons, while the limited war, "cold" or "hot," becomes the field of tactics.

[11] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1961), p. 279.

B. H. Liddell-Hart, the military strategist and historian, called this a "revolution": "mutual restraint for mutual security," which alone "can control the outbursts of temper over political and social issues [that] may lead to mutual destruction in the atomic age."[12] Nuclear weapons have reduced international military operations to eighteenth-century restraints before the French Revolution, and nineteenth-century procedures after the Napoleonic wars — the limited war and incremental advance. This is precisely the reverse of the first half of the twentieth century's military and political history, in which uncompromising ideals, total mobilization and total warfare held sway.

In historical perspective nuclear capacity is unique, yet short of nuclear confrontation nations act as if they were in the eighteenth century. This oddity is perfectly expressed in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1969) in which the nonnuclear states are asked to abjure nuclear weapons in the name of "rationality" by those already possessing them. To phrase it bluntly, for the benefit of the politics of the (nuclear) powerful, the (nonnuclear) feeble must remain feeble. Nonnuclear powers such as India, however, are demanding nuclear protection in exchange for their oaths of abstinence, a demand the nuclear powers find difficult to fulfill, because it would complicate their efforts to avoid direct confrontations. The Nonproliferation Treaty, if it is to work well, should result logically in two great empires, touching directly in security pacts across the globe — which would add up to the confrontation diplomacy should avoid.

Thus, of the three attempts to ameliorate or alter the strategic facts of war and peace in the nuclear age — arms control and disarmament talks, limited warfare, and the Nonproliferation Treaty — the first is not consonant with the development of technological processes; the second is beset (much more in the West than in the Soviet Union) by a divorce between diplomacy and military strategy; and the third seeks earnestly to produce results with unwanted consequences. As matters stand, no nation is more secure than before, while the global system of nations is more menaced than ever.

The economic consequences of military-oriented technology on the nation-state have been tremendous. Directly related to atomic deterrence are the aerospace and electronics industries, the backbone of prosperity in most advanced states, which owe much of their growth and sustenance to their governmental, militarily-inspired origin. In addition, Japan's attainment of the third largest economy in the world is sustained by skillful adaptation of the latest innovations, many of them "spin-offs" or by-products of military or civilian improvements developed elsewhere.

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[12] B. H. Liddell-Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 119.

While the relationship between research and technical innovation is a ratio beyond precise calculation, "technical progress is . . . the basic ingredient that makes economic growth possible."[13] Thus, the prosperity and progress of modern economies are connected directly to efficiency in transmitting theoretical discovery into practical advantage. This, in turn, challenges customary practices in management, trade unions and government. The multinational corporations (MNC's), for instance, whose ownership and operations are global, have already stolen a march on the normal political restraints imposed by nation-states. Besides being important transmitters of advanced technology, the MNC's set policies which are vital to many national economies, in both developed and developing countries. Thus far, no formula has been devised to handle the MNC's implications for national independence to maximum advantage, nor is it clear that the best commercial performance can be extracted from the MNC *without* some concession of independence.[14]

Until the 1970's, because of the enormous sums and the complicated organization involved, only the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to indulge themselves fully in the complex preparations for nuclear war. In the Western alliance at least, the result is strained relationships between the United States and her colleagues, as the smaller states struggle with their financial and organizational incapacities. This is the real source of the "European technological gap": the West European countries, in full flush of economic recovery, find themselves still dependent on the American deterrent, with their ability to compete in aerospace and computers hampered not only by European disorganization but also by alliance politics.[15] While the Europeans are experiencing this problem first, the same difficulty will soon surface in Japanese-American relations. The Japanese have prospered under the American security system, but how long will the United States continue to assume these burdens when Japan is becoming the chief competition to American industry through technological advances? The Nixon Doctrine can be seen as an attempt to adjust these circumstances before the issue becomes dangerous. The growing Japanese defense budget is a harbinger of the change.

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[13] Thurow, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

[14] See, for example, Raymond Vernon, "Economic Sovereignty at Bay," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1968, pp. 110-122.

[15] The Europeans have been trying to exclude the United States from their military market (as in the Multi Role Combat Aircraft project) while simultaneously entering the U.S. commercial market (the Concorde SST). Both these attempts have been dogged by political problems, e.g., the German financial offset agreement for costs of U.S. troops in Germany, which compels West Germany to purchase American military equipment. In addition, serious management deficiencies plague both American firms and their European business partners. In the United Kingdom Rolls Royce became a major supplier to Lockheed, the largest U.S. defense contractor, just as Lockheed's own financial situation suffered

Paradoxically then, while the United States struggles with the domestic consequences of a generation-old military-industrial complex, her European allies pursue policies that appear to aim at acquiring a similar complex, and her Asian ally may soon be forced to do the same. Yet the "complexes" the European states are constructing remain national rather than European-wide. The European integration movement, confined heretofore to coal, steel and agriculture, has yet to face the necessity of providing for technological unity to attain maximum competitive efficiency. In the meanwhile, the inherent integrative tendencies of technology are being met neither by the European integration movement nor by the policies of the Atlantic Alliance.

Another broad influence of the technological age is belief in the possibility of a society radically transforming its condition and destiny through technology. This prospect has had acute consequences in both the developing and the developed countries. In the developing societies the process must take the form of absorption, application and subsequent production, sustained by the equipment and example of the developed states. In the developed societies the rehabilitation calls for purpose, distribution and conservation, sustained by the feeling that the "quality of life" is declining, although national goods are more abundant.

In their successful struggle to discipline and overcome nature, to "produce" technology, the developed countries have suffered some "uninvited guests"[16] or by-products of technology: pollution

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a devastating blow in the C5A project. Lockheed's inability to recoup losses in the C5A made a renegotiation of the Rolls Tri-Star Airbus engine contract impossible. Rolls was then faced with bankruptcy because of underestimates of cost on the engine developments. The French armaments industry is succeeding on the basis of exports to other than European states. None of the current European military establishments is large enough to support its native industry, but none of them will "relinquish" a broad aerospace capacity in the name of integration or division of labor. See *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* March 8, 1971, for European prospects.

[16] The phrase was coined by Robert Strausz-Hupé in "Social Values and Politics: The Uninvited Guests," *Review of Politics,* January 1968. See also Strausz-Hupé, editor, "Society and Ecology," *American Behavioral Scientist,* July-August 1968.

is a good example. But in the industrially backward countries, the unwelcome guests are the people themselves. During a period of rising material production, both agricultural and industrial "takeoffs" have been checked fatally by population explosions — resulting from better medicine and health care. Application of agricultural science has barely equaled public health improvements. The consequent difference between produce and progeny has resurrected the Malthusian prediction.[17] The issue is not whether the earth can support large populations. It can, but erratic concentrations of excessive population in areas of insufficient resources may erode the foundation of a tolerable basis for humane existence. The politics of a beehive and loss of individual choice would be a cruel and tragic result of man's application of his scientific intelligence to the needs of society. Birth control programs have failed to alter the birth rate, and the only known "cure," a tremendous improvement in individual welfare, is forestalled by the "illness" of population growth.

Meanwhile, the developed countries have conquered nature almost to the point of defiling her. Their precious mineral — and aesthetic — resources are depleted. If the rest of the world approaches the North American consumption rates in raw materials there is a possibility that the more accessible natural resources will be exhausted.[18] Furthermore, if the Third World attains to the consumption rates of the industrialized countries, the chances of global pollution of oceans and the atmosphere will grow.[19]

As men strove once to overcome geography, so they must now strive to preserve it. Internationally, this will require a timely revision of the first and best working principles of international law — those rules governing freedom and use of the seas[20] — and the incorporation of conventions to control international pollution of all types. The exploration of outer space, already fruitful in communications and observation satellites, cannot only aid in curbing pollution but promises weather control and discovery of new mineral resources on the earth. A great experiment in international organization, the International Satellite Corporation,[21] may be a harbinger in the political field of what exists already in many commercial endeavors — the multinational corporation. This new form of enterprise is suited to the needs of a transnational era bursting the boundaries of the nation-state system.

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[17] See, for example, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, *Population/Resources/Environment* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1970). Malthus' prediction was that population would multiply geometrically while food production increased arithmetically.

[18] See M. King Hubbert in *Resources and Man,* by the Committee on Resources and Man, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1969).

[19] Gladwin Hill, "Global Air Pollution," *New York Times,* December 12, 1970.

[20] Both redefinition of old legal terminology and principles, and the establishment of an international authority to administer exploitation, have been considered necessary. See, for example, W. T. Burke, *Towards a Better Use of the Oceans,* a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute monograph (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1969).

By the same token, however, governments are supporting science to such an extent that both the scientists and their work have been invested with power and international prestige. In this context, the "space race" is acknowledged simultaneously as a grand exploration of the unknown, a possible military advantage, a means to lucrative benefits from international communications via satellites, and a potential demonstration of national superiority of organization. This fusion of interests elevates scientific expertise over lay comprehension and connects the supposedly disinterested endeavors of pure science to government policies, with all the chances for odious controversy now being experienced particularly by universities in the United States.

These developments and their effects all parallel the uncertainty-efficiency characteristics of the technological process itself. (1) The military results of rapid and incalculable change sustain the "balance of terror" but encourage the limited war. (2) The economic results expand national economies and provide the promise of development but endanger available resources. (3) The ecological results provide more usable goods but threaten familiar forms of life and aesthetic pleasures. (4) The scientific results enlighten man about his universe while opening a fresh field for military and political rivalry in outer space. (5) Maximum efficiency demands integration of resources, but the protection of sovereignty within alliances requires national or regional technological independence.

The pressure of these effects and the general inability to control the nastier consequences have raised basic questions about the international system and the nation-state component. For reasons of finance and scale in modern technology, the nation-state's inefficiency looms large in commercial and military aspects. Most states can no longer pretend to protect or succor their populations without yielding much of their sovereignty. Regional cooperation or integration, based upon cooperation with competitors and a division of labor among the members, would seem the logical solution.[22] But by the same token, the availability of new technological processes to convert low-grade fuels and poor soil into valuable and usable resources spurs the nation-states into more efficient conversion of their assets than ever before. At the moment of their greatest political inadequacy, their capacity to exploit their territories has never been higher.

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[21] The Intelsat System, serving 77 countries, is run by COMSAT, a public-private U.S. corporation. Both control and management of Intelsat are being debated in a classic case of international technological politics. See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, March 8, 1971.

III

The explosion of national military and economic capacity through technology has thus been accompanied by an expansion of problems no single nation-state can resolve. What direction will the international political system take in order to deal with these urgent difficulties?

There is a good case to be made for the theme of global "convergency" as the international tendency and aspiration of the generation that will rule men's destinies until the year 2000. Marshall McLuhan, for instance, thinks that the ubiquitous electric technological medium suffusing man's senses will alter the composition of the nation-state system by altering the individual citizen's self-consciousness. His supposition is that technology reduces or overpowers the human will, rather than being at its service. "Any technology gradually creates a totally new environment. Environments are not passive wrappings but active processes."[23] McLuhan claims that literacy through the printed word led to the specialized political organism called the nation-state. But the change of the "eye for the ear," he says, will create a new tribal era, a global one, an era of general integration and comprehensive world-view.[24]

The doctrine of "necessary convergences" in outline seems to propound that the dangerous pressures of world politics must issue into general reconciliation from the force of technological advance itself. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the late Jesuit philosopher and paleontologist, expressed this theme by proposing that man as a species was evolving into a higher and finer type as a consequence of the infolding (something like McLuhan's implosion) of his spirit or intelligence. Because of global technology, Teilhard de Chardin asserted that the question was not whether the world would unite, but how?

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[22] See Walt W. Rostow's "Domestic Determinants of U.S. Foreign Policy — The Tocqueville Oscillation," *Armed Forces Journal*, June 27, 1970, p. 160, for a lucid advocacy of more effective regional cooperation in the long-term interests of all major powers and all peoples.

[23] Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: Signet, 1964), p. viii.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 55-59.

> . . . Spirit of force or spirit of love? Where shall we place true heroism, where look for true greatness, where recognize objective truth? . . . the first . . . may well have attracted poets, but only the second . . . presents itself to the reflective mind as capable of conferring upon a universe in motion its full spiritual coherence. . . .[25]

Necessary convergency for human survival in the *peaceful form,* as declared by Teilhard de Chardin, is stressed in a remarkable document composed by the eminent Soviet physicist, Andrei Sakharov. Sakharov examined what he declared to be similar managerial classes in both the socialist and capitalist systems.

> The facts suggest that on any other course except ever-increasing coexistence and collaboration between the two systems and the two superpowers, with a smoothing of contradictions and with mutual assistance, on any other course, annihilation awaits mankind. There is no other way out.[26]

According to Sakharov, progress can only be attained through intellectual freedom – the spirit of science – in an environment of coexistence, as both the "capitalist" and "socialist" systems grow alike. Thus, the conflict of the dialectic will be resolved through scientific quest, while the danger of the change is minimized by "the will" of the participants.

Similarly, scientist Jacob Bronowski expects the desirable convergence to arise from the blending of the spirit of science with the spirit of government in the sense of tolerance for mistakes and education through error.

> . . . the dilemma of today is not that the human values cannot control a mechanical science. It is the other way about: the scientific spirit is more human than the machinery of governments. We have not let either the tolerance or the empiricism of science enter the parochial rules by which we still try to prescribe the behavior of nations. . . . The body of technical science burdens and threatens us because we are trying to employ the body without the spirit; we are trying to buy the corpse of science.[27]

It is necessary to be practical as well as visionary. The difficulty with the "necessary convergency" thesis is that it requires the major components of the international system to permit or encourage their own dissolution into some new political organism. As McLuhan admits: "Today we appear to be poised between two ages — one of detribalization and one of retribalization. . . . To live with both of these technologies at the same time is the peculiar drama of the twentieth century."[28]

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[25] Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Spiritual Repercussions of the Atom Bomb," *Études,* September 1946.

[26] A. D. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (New York: Norton, 1968), p. 74.

[27] Jacob Bronowski, *Science and Human Values* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1970), p. 64.

It is also unwise to expect that the spirit of science will redeem international politics. Unlike scientists, statesmen cannot measure their progress by education through error, for it is more important to succeed in international politics than to possess the right reasons. This is the true source of the scientist's naïveté in foreign affairs. A dosage of scientific method for international politics, unless indulged by all states, is unlikely to aid the transformation of the system. The greater need is for "a new burst of liberated creative energy, a new form of society; or mankind may all but exterminate itself and desolate this planet."[29]

This situation, which provides the potential for drastic change, is due, as we have shown, to the technological process itself. It inspires paradoxical or contradictory effects. Some of these effects demand the end of international politics as we know it. Others confirm old habits or create new confidence in the privileges nation-states have long proclaimed in the name of "sovereignty." Sovereignty in the sense of autarchy remains the ideal for the nation-state. The technological environment and scientific culture, to paraphrase McLuhan, change the message by being the medium. The message is constant innovation. The medium is the efficient introduction of discoveries and acceptance of the accompanying uncertainty. But the international political system and the nation-states seem generally impervious to change. We cannot expect technology to be controlled willingly by sovereign states when that control requires a global view rather than a sovereign view. As a consequence, the dialectic of the international system seems stuck, for the cost of control requires a self-transformation. Thus, the hope of containing these global problems is made doubtful.

In the words of Paul Valéry:

> A *modern man*, and this is what makes him modern, lives on familiar terms with many contraries waiting in the penumbra of his mind and coming by turns onto the stage. . . . the extraordinary number of novelties introduced into man's world in so few years . . . have cancelled values,

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[28] McLuhan, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-299.

[29] A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures and Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 276.

> dissociated ideas, destroyed sentiments which seemed unshakable . . . *boundless hopes (justified by our incredible achievements) and immense disappointments or sinister expectations (equally justified by our incredible failures and catastrophes)*.[30]

It is easy to see why observers fluctuate between despairing rage and glossing faith. We feel helpless while the corridors of maneuver constantly close, narrowing our chances for successful revision. This psychological depression is one of the most baffling consequences of technological change.

IV

"Civilized order survives on its merits, and is transformed by its power of recognizing its imperfections."[31] Perhaps the most important future effect of technology will be our recognition of the imperfections of the international system, without whose transformation man's future is jeopardized.

It is too much to expect that the generation which grew up in the age of technological production will realize an accommodation of politics to technology. The very plenitude of technology and its promise have overwhelmed consideration of what is *desired,* not to speak of what is *required.*

> It may well be that one of the basic diseases of our time is a crisis of wishing and that for this reason all of our fabulous technical achievements seem to be of no use whatsoever . . . we do not know what to do with it, because we lack imagination for inventing our lives.[32]

In the meanwhile, the great powers stand in a hostile atomic dilemma. The states and citizens of old imperial Europe and Japan vibrate between their recently perished glories and their recently renewed potential for playing positive roles in the design of the future. The developing nations eagerly ascend the technological road, their collective awakening, from China to the mini-states, attended by luxuriant calamities they mistakenly assume "technology" will cure.

So long as national states continue their careers the controls required for maximum efficiency in using technology for human needs will be impaled upon sectarian interests whose legitimacy can only be corroded by compromise, refuted by war, or dissolved by "integration." This process has already yielded, under technological imperative, the existence of two vast ensembles and the embryo of at least three others (a united Europe, Japan, and China). How these titans will game with one another one shudders to consider.

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[30] Paul Valéry, *The Outlook for Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 93-94.

[31] Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[32] José Ortega y Gasset, *History as a System* (New York: Norton, 1960), pp. 120-121.

Until now, the major effect of technology has been to expand the nation-state's physical power while contracting its political power to resolve the ensuing problems. The future effect of technology must therefore lead to an erosion of the nation-state's sovereignty and a corresponding change in the international system.

"In the long run," quipped Lord Keynes, "we are all dead." Technology is now having its long run. Having established his empire over his physical environment through technology, man is finally being brought by the agency of his success to a more important consideration: mastery of himself. If the long run of technology in international politics is to end in life rather than death or perversion, this ultimate question of world political organization, be it imposed empire or some form of cooperative self-mastery, awaits resolution.

ORGANIZING NATIONS IN THE 1970'S

by Philip E. Jacob

INTERNATIONAL organizations proliferated faster than nations in the quarter-century after World War II, although the birth rate of new nations itself hit a record. They grew in numbers, in activities, in personnel at work for or with them, and in budgets. By 1970 there were over 200 full-fledged intergovernmental international agencies in operation, not counting any of the over 2,000 semi-official or private agencies organized across national boundaries.[1] On the basis of its reproductive capacity, this new breed of political institution would appear potent and destined for a decisive role in the conduct of international affairs.

However, there are those who argue that a high birth rate does not assure a healthy population (in fact, it may mean that a lot of babies will die before maturity) ; and spending more money no more guarantees soundness of performance than an inflationary increase in GNP reflects a sound economy. Protagonists of international organizations of every variety are confronting a severe crisis of confidence in the 1970's; one would be tempted to forecast imminent bankruptcy were it not that alternatives of unilateral and bilateral action in coping with major world problems have already gone into receivership.

The truth is that we, the peoples and the governments of the 1970's, have yet to learn how to live in today's kind of world, or even to understand and admit what kind of a world it is. This being so, we are not effectively using the embryonic international institutions that in a strange and expediential manner have been devised to deal with crises in interstate relations. Because they were conceived piecemeal, with little relationship to each other, and as a kind of appendage to the existing state system, awareness of the truly innovative nature of these institutions has come slowly, to statesmen as well as the general public. They have often been seriously *mis*conceived — sometimes as supergovernments, but more often as alliances under a different name.

When used as supergovernments they have failed in most instances, because most of the world is not prepared to exchange life under a national government of whatever political system for life under the control of a regional or world regime, no matter how benign. We stand committed to a pluralistic, politically divided world, with decentralized authority. This is one of the inescapable realities.

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[1] *Yearbook of International Organizations* (12th edition; Brussels: Union of International Associations, 1969).

Alliances have not worked either, even when camouflaged as international organizations. They have failed to recognize adequately the reality of global interdependence. In attempting to build cohesion around a common interest among countries within the alliance, they have underestimated the degree to which both the security and the welfare of their "in-group" has become intertwined with the destinies of peoples outside. When international organizations have been used as alliances, and their conduct manipulated to serve the national interests of only one segment of the world, they have exacerbated international conflict and rigidified political and social cleavages across the world. Paradoxically, they have usually been unable to achieve a sufficiently profound consciousness of interdependence among themselves to sustain long-continued and costly commitments to common action.

There are signs, however, that experience may be catching up with illusion, and that in the 1970's we shall openly face the problem of reconciling political pluralism with technological and social interdependence in the world arena. If this occurs, the role of international organizations will become critical, for they are of all available institutions the most peculiarly adapted to the task of engendering collaborative action on common needs among a multiplicity of governments, none of which is ready to give up final control over the people and resources in its territory. Assuming we all survive, these institutions should emerge as the great political innovation of our times, an instrument of political integration accomplishing what federalism set out to do two centuries ago, but by different processes, and much more extensive in scope.

WHAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS *CANNOT* DO

Experience suggests that international organizations are usually incapable of performing the customary functions of government. When they are pushed into doing so, they fail in the immediate task and are weakened for other assignments. They should not be expected to *legislate* in the sense of mandating rules binding on their constituent states or on persons under national jurisdictions.

They should rarely be called upon to *adjudicate* conflicts in the sense of rendering a verdict that the parties are obligated to accept. Above all, they are basically unqualified for the *enforcement* function of the executive, whether in the traditional form of a well-armed professional police force or through the incongruous device of "collective security."

Let us face it. Governments are jealous of the prerogatives of governing. Leaving aside the exceptional adventure of the European Economic Community, the founders and members of international organizations have been unwilling to delegate real governing powers to these institutions, even though they often pretended to do so. This is what particularly confuses the uninitiated about actions in and toward international organizations: votes are taken, resolutions passed, demands made, and even armed forces deployed to be shot at and sometimes to shoot, as though these were the actions of a legitimate governing authority. They are at best the expression of a voluntary consensus reached by a group of autonomous decision-makers. Far more likely, they represent a perversion of the machinery of international organization to give the appearance of legitimacy to a power-play by one group of states seeking to impose its will on others.

For international organizations to fulfill the vital role required of them in the management of international relations in the 1970's, it is necessary first to strip away the delusion that they can govern, and to thwart any attempt to misuse them as though they were governments. Specifically, this means: (1) to declare invalid and without force any resolution that purports to order a state to do something it has not agreed to; (2) to declare invalid and without force any judicial-type decision (whether by a formal tribunal or a political body like the United Nations General Assembly) unless parties to a dispute have agreed they want it settled that way; (3) to declare inoperative all coercive provisions of international organization charters, where the object of coercion is a member-state of the organization.[2]

All this no doubt appears to many as a scandalous betrayal of international organizations to the jungle politics of contending nationalisms. But if the underbrush of misplaced expectations, compounded by hypocritical perjury on the part of official spokesmen who know better, cannot be cleared away, the capacity of these organizations to do the things for which they are really fitted will be stifled. The starting point for redirection toward the integrative tasks that should be their central mission is frank and full acknowledgment that they are not governments, are not likely soon to be transformed into governments, and should not be used as a smokescreen to hide the responsibility, or evasion of responsibility, of real governments. That path leads to total futility.

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[2] The latter step absolves so-called regional organizations from the ban on "security" operations against outsiders, but rips away the pretense that they are in any sense performing acts of "collective security" on behalf of the world community. They emerge in their true colors as straight-out power alliances — *unless* they are willing to abide strictly by the letter of Article 53 of the United Nations Charter and subject their actions to Security Council authorization except in repelling outright armed attack.

PIVOTAL MISSIONS OF MULTILATERALISM

The essential functions of intergovernmental multilateral institutions, for which they are uniquely qualified, are, first, *to harmonize the actions of states* in the attainment of common ends, as aptly expressed in the United Nations Charter; second, to develop and implement a special kind of *regulation appropriate to international interchange*; and third, to program and coordinate the *cross-national mobilization and utilization of resources* for human welfare, that is, to manage international development.

(1) The *harmonization function* implies the reconciliation of conflict by methods of what Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld called "preventive diplomacy." The objective of action is the accommodation of interests, rather than a finding of who is right or wrong. The diplomacy is problem-solving. It seeks alternatives to positions in impasse, and tries to persuade governments in dispute that such alternatives are more to their interest than a confrontation of force. In the process it injects the element of interdependence, making disputants aware that other countries feel their interests are also deeply at stake, and calling on each side to justify its position beyond its own borders. Sometimes, payoffs can be engineered as inducements to mutual agreement, outsiders undertaking to offset sacrifices by one or another disputant. If the situation is too tense, the presence of observers or a peacekeeping force as a physical demonstration of "community interest" may successfully freeze the conflict and allow additional efforts to unravel it. The range of potential actions is great, and the flexibility of preventive diplomacy, in choice of practitioners as well as in form, has been a source of strength.

Two principles, however, appear fundamental. Compulsion must be eschewed, and third-party initiative must be persistent. Failure to observe either of these caveats has frustrated and sometimes wrecked the conciliation efforts of the United Nations and other organizations. The first principle recognizes the insistence of national states to be self-determining at whatever cost — the reality of the pluralistic international system. The second principle is the expression of organized interdependence, and a response to the fact that interdependence is *not* self-implementing. It takes an international institution to bring out and channel the convergent interests of states, and a skilled, impartial corps of preventive diplomats to focus the influence of interdependent interest effectively on interstate conflicts.

(2) The *regulatory function* of international institutions is different from the authoritarian restraint usually involved in typical governmental regulation. From the standpoint of *making* regulations, an intricate process of negotiation replaces legislation in the common sense of the term, leading to general agreement on "rules of the road" applicable to interstate communication and exchange. There are two kinds of input: on the one hand, a variety of proposals by or through national governments representing their initial preferences; on the other, a transnational technocratic initiative representing the results of study and forward planning by experts from different countries working jointly. The international "legislative process" bounces these ideas back and forth until consensus materializes among a large enough number of states to make the new set of rules practicable among themselves. Others may come to accept them later if they seem beneficial. What emerges is a growing body of *convenience law,* responsive to the problems created by increased interdependence. The process has become more continuous and systematized and there is every indication that it will be used much more regularly and extensively in the future.

Administration of this kind of law has followed three courses. It has frequently been left up to each state to apply the regulations, within its own jurisdiction, on a self-enforcing basis. The second approach has conferred general policing authority on one or more of the national governments that subscribe to a regulation. This practice, long since applied to combat piracy, is now customary in the execution of fisheries conservation agreements. The third method is to entrust regulation to an international agency with specific administrative powers — the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Commission of the European Economic Community, to mention a few examples. The latter approach seems to be gathering momentum as these agencies acquire specialized competence, demonstrate impartiality, delicately finesse past the sensitive issue of sovereignty, and remain clearly accountable to organs representing the collectivity of states which established the regulations in the first place.

The absolute condition of effective international administration, that is, of the third method of implementing international regulations, is its separation from the rule-making power. Its ultimate potential lies precisely in the fact that it is the only one of the three patterns in which this separation is complete. There is no mixture of rule-making and rule-administration as when one or more states themselves undertake to administer an international regulation. The international administrator knows he is a civil servant employed by governments to do what *they* have decided they want to have done. He is no budding new sovereign, claiming to share in the powers of decision.[3]

(3) In the *mobilization of resources for economic and social development* international organizations have acquired their most direct and extensive impact upon human welfare.

We are now at the point where the balance of responsibility for programs of international assistance is shifting from individual donor countries to multilateral institutions. This is partly in response to growing disillusionment with the results of unilateral and bilateral management. The resource gap between givers and receivers has widened. So has a policy gap. Lines between have and have-not have hardened; positions have become more unreasonable and mutually incompatible. Bitterness has replaced cooperation, as givers perceive ingratitude and irresponsibility, and would-be receivers bridle at conditions they consider ignominious and an infringement of their national sovereignty. The

[3] Complaints are occasionally leveled against international officials for exceeding their proper powers; witness the famous Soviet challenge to Dag Hammarskjöld over the conduct of the United Nations operation in the Congo. While the limit of administrative competence can be variously interpreted, it is significant that in this and almost all similar cases, the complaining state has failed to win general support from the policymaking organs. The secretariat has in effect served as a lightning rod, attracting and also in part deflecting the anger of a frustrated government unable to bend the entire organization to its will.

The European Communities have built into their institutions procedural safeguards to prevent abuse of administrative power, the most significant being the Community Court to which decisions may be appealed by affected governments or enterprises. This has the secondary consequence of protecting the international administrators from the effects of head-on collision with one or more of their multiple masters. The issue is simply transferred to a special body empowered to interpret the treaty constituting the organization.

reputation of unilateralism and bilateralism has also suffered because they have often mixed politics with welfare, allocating resources where they would shore up reliable allies or entice new ones, rather than where human need was greatest or development plans the best laid. Compound all this with the wastage that accompanies overlapping programs and with the day-to-day insensitivities of a huge bureaucracy operating largely in self-contained enclaves out of close touch with the people whose welfare is at stake, and one can understand the pall that has settled over national handling of the immense development effort.

Multilateral management, by contrast, has fared much better, granted that to date it has had less to manage. The World Bank group of lending agencies, the United Nations Development Program linking and integrating the efforts of specialized agencies with sections of the United Nations proper, the United Nations Children's Fund, have all channeled resources through national governments under conditions that assured efficient utilization, avoided political favoritism, and at the same time carefully respected each government's autonomy.

Multilateralism on a global scale has probably outclassed regional efforts in the effective mobilization and coordination of resources for development in the most impoverished areas of the world. It has been difficult for regional organizations to overcome the sense of dependence felt by the weak and the poor on one or two dominant rich and powerful members.

On the other hand, Western Europe has dramatically demonstrated how close integration of resources management among a group of well-endowed countries can make them boom into unprecedented prosperity. Whether their experience is transferable to other regions less advanced industrially and with fewer basic resources to start with appears doubtful, however, as first reports trickle in from attempts to follow suit. There is also the problem of forging a sufficiently unified political commitment to sustain the economic merger against the barrage of special interests in each country that are necessarily disadvantaged. After all, the Common Market itself almost foundered on the political power of French farmers, who in the end had to be bought off by subsidy out of the "equalization" tax and other levies paid by more loyal participants in the "community." Furthermore, the European Market has to date built its success at least in part on blatant protectionist discrimination against outsiders. It is a club of the privileged; so far it has insisted that any new member must itself be privileged, and bind itself to be equally discriminatory, no matter how close its ties to countries not in the club.

All this has made the global institutionalization of development management more and more appealing to the components of two-thirds of the noncommunist world that would like to find substance in the euphemism that they are "developing" countries. They see their main hope of assistance on tolerable terms coming through agencies in which they have a voice, preferably a voice whose strength is measured in numbers rather than capital. The lure of UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, was that for a brief moment of ecstatic delusion the have-nots thought they could transform voting power into resource commitments. (They fell into a trap of their own imagination that an international organization could *govern*.)

Actually, the discovery that the privileged have as yet no intention of turning over the management of their resources to the dispossessed, painful as it was, helped to set the stage for a major expansion of more meaningful multilateral operations, especially through the World Bank and its affiliates. Here the formula of decision calls for both the needy and the various custodians of capital to recognize a common interest in the most careful possible programming of the development process, with an emphasis on putting the resources at points of maximum human potential. Both planning and execution require the full cooperation of both sides, because the fact is they *are* interdependent. As Siamese twins, neither will survive if one dies.

Fortunately, confidence seems to be growing in the capacity of the Bank and other agencies of the United Nations to pull together resources and architect policies that will make the Second Development Decade as notable an achievement in man's material progress across the world as the First Decade was a false start.

EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Technology is now opening two immense areas where no national jurisdiction exists, thus giving nations an opportunity to explore patterns of joint action and collective responsibility while they press forward the physical exploration of outer space and the deep floor of the oceans.

The nature of these new worlds is sufficiently strange that their utility is uncertain, and national governments have not yet asserted the old "territorial imperative" with customary vigor. To be sure, the United States has implanted its flags on the moon (but with an explicit disclaimer of American "occupation"). Space vehicles are carefully pedigreed by the countries which launch them. With reference to the seabed, the U.S. National Petroleum Council and other interests continue to lobby for policies that would place at least 20 per cent of the ocean floor under the jurisdiction of one national state or another. But the general mood is still one of restraint and caution on the part of the explorer's club of space and ocean powers, as well as of bystanders. In this atmosphere, tentative moves have been made toward establishing outer space and the seabed as preserves of the "international community."[4]

World Law in Outer Space

Though the exploration of space has been the monopoly so far of American and Soviet scientific acrobats, its repercussions were quickly seen to involve the fortunes of everyone. The potential for exciting developments in communication; the prediction and maybe even the control of weather; knowledge about the earth, the atmospheric cocoon in which it thrives, and about the physique of man himself and his adaptive capacities—these were of global import. So was the new dimension of destructive capacity that was opened up; the perils of the nuclear age, already so great as to threaten annihilation of a third of mankind by a moment of miscalculation or loss of cool, might now be brought through orbital weaponry to the point where all of life could be pushbuttoned out of existence. The most spectacular of human achievements, it was recognized, put the entire race but one step from extinction.

The grandeur of the problem has not yet called forth a heroic solution. But painstakingly, working for once through UN machinery, national governments have laid a few building blocks. One of the first was the Outer Space Treaty providing for internationalization of the right of use and for demilitarization. The United States and the Soviet Union, joined by over 100 other states as of 1970, agreed that (1) outer space and celestial bodies would be free for exploration and use by all states on a basis of equality, and (2) all states would refrain from orbiting or stationing in space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and from establishing military installations, testing weapons or conducting military maneuvers on celestial bodies. Coupled with these two basic principles was an explicit commitment that the exploration and use of outer space "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind"; and a rather more equivocal obligation to refrain from activities potentially harmful to other states at least until "appropriate international consultations" had been undertaken.

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[4] Groundwork for such a community approach was laid when, spurred by the cooperative scientific explorations achieved in the International Geophysical Year (1957), a treaty was negotiated that successfully bypassed conflicting national claims to the Antarctic continent and declared it open to all nations for scientific and other peaceful purposes. The arrangement falls short, however, of full-scale international regulation, a fact deplored by some leading authorities who feel that an opportunity was lost for a creative experiment in administration by international organization on behalf of the whole world community. See Howard J. Taubenfeld, "A Treaty for Antarctica," *International Conciliation,* January 1961; also, R. D. Hayton, "The Antarctic Settlement of 1959," *American Journal of International Law,* April 1960.

Internationalization was in several respects carried farther than in the Antarctic Treaty. Most obvious was a categorical ban on "national appropriation" of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. This means no nations may claim sovereignty or in any other way assert unilateral control. But the treaty is silent on who does have the right to appropriate. It fails to designate the United Nations or any other international body as the proper custodian of space in the name and interests of all mankind.

For the moment, effective control clearly rests with those who have the technical capacity to send projectiles into space, although the treaty sets out the curious formula that *all* parties to it "bear *international* responsibility for national activities in outer space. . . ." While this might imply that each country is deputized to serve as policeman for the world community (as in the case of maritime piracy), the immediate intent was to place all space activity under some governmental authority and thereby make it possible to hold governments fully accountable for observing the terms of use set by the international community and for any damages that ensued from space exploits.[5] If activity should be undertaken by an international organization, both the organization and its individual member states are held responsible.

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[5] The likelihood of indiscriminate injury from the debris or misfire of space missions was sufficiently recognized to incorporate a specific provision making a state internationally liable for damage caused by objects launched from its territory, or component parts thereof. Drafting of a detailed convention on liability was urgently undertaken through the United Nations Outer Space Committee, which encountered knotty problems as it tried to make explicit the basis of compensation to be paid, limitations of liability, the legal position of international organizations engaged in space activities and similar terms, all in advance of much practical experience. Prospects for the imminent conclusion of such a convention are promising, however.

Compliance with the exceptionally specific demilitarization provisions, as well as the other principles of outer space use, is subject to verification by *reciprocal* inspection of all facilities stationed on the moon and other celestial bodies. Again, responsibility rests with national governments, not an international body; it is restricted to the active space powers willing to accept inspection on a basis of reciprocity. But this was as far as the Soviet Union was ready to commit itself in formal treaty to the unpredictable consequences of international policing of its prospective space colonies. Noticeably omitted from the scope of inspection are orbiting or other mobile space stations.

Much is said in the treaty about promoting international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space; but there is no real commitment to undertake the organization of multinational activity. Even the international sharing of information is dependent upon the space powers' discretion: they agree to inform the United Nations Secretary-General, the public and the international scientific community — "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable" — of the nature, conduct, locations and results of their activities. They will "consider on a basis of equality" requests to observe their space flights. While outer space "shall be the province of all mankind" according to Article I, the world community, at least for now, must be content to leave exploitation exclusively in the hands of the technologically equipped, and trust in their benevolent trusteeship.

On the other hand, the active involvement of many states in the legislative process for outer space, through the United Nations, has generated a mounting momentum of concern that augurs an expanding role for international organization as well as the further evolution of a world law of space.[6]

World Community on the Ocean Floor

When Ambassador Arvid Pardo, from the seabound state of Malta, proposed to the United Nations in 1967 that it declare the deep bed of the sea, beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction, to be "the common heritage of mankind," he directly challenged the hallowed doctrine that states and states alone could be proprietors of the earth. Though the claim of common ownership on behalf of the entire world community was mainly to an ill-defined, lightless area where no human had ever set foot, spectacular advances in submarine technology had suddenly made the bottom of the oceans a potential source of riches — and of strategic dangers. Portents of a race by nations "to grab and to hold" were sufficiently grave to cause President Johnson, already in 1966, to warn against "a new form of colonial competition" and to associate his administration with the attempt to treat the lands under the high seas as "the legacy of all human beings."

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[6] The gestation of United Nations involvement with the space problem is summarized by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Outer Space and International Cooperation," *International Organization,* Summer 1965. For an exhaustive and searching treatise on the regulation of space see Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Ivan A. Vlasic, *Law and Public Order in Space* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). See also an acute critique by the British scholar, C. W. Jenks, *Space Law* (New York: Praeger, 1965). The current scope of applicable law is reviewed by Gyula Gal, *Space Law* (New York: Oceana, 1969).

The move toward world community for the bed of the sea, possibly with full international regulation under a United Nations Sea-Bed Authority and even the return of some revenue to be used internationally for economic and social development, has gathered momentum, official and private.[7] But it has also encountered strenuous opposition, official and private. The prospect of sequestering choice mineral deposits and living resources is tempting to governments and industries with the potential technical capacity to gain access to them.[8] Security fears, projected to the ocean floor along with new sets of weapons systems, have also pushed in the age-old direction of trying to maximize national control and have undercut the campaign for internationalization.[9]

On the issue of demilitarizing the seabed, debate polarized those that pressed for a complete ban on any military uses, as in the Outer Space Treaty, and a group led by the United States which

[7] Resolution 2574 of the Twenty-fourth General Assembly, December 15, 1969, specifically sought proposals for an international regime to regulate exploitation of the seabed. The 19th and 21st Reports of The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea* (published by the Commission, New York, March 1969 and February 1970) present a strong case for comprehensive regulation by an international agency constituted for the purpose. The 21st Report includes a draft statute for a United Nations Sea-Bed Authority, and was submitted to the Secretary-General and the permanent UN Committee on the Sea-Bed, where it received intensive consideration.

[8] National rather than international regulation of economic exploitation is vigorously urged by American oil interests, among others, in advocating maximum extension of national jurisdiction over the seabed under the Continental Shelf Convention. See, for instance, Luke W. Finlay, "The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf," *American Journal of International Law,* January 1970.

[9] The problems of developing anti-submarine defenses as well as protection for strategic missile installations have led military technologists generally to support a policy of unrestrained national supremacy over the continental shelf (with a broad interpretation of the limits of the shelf), and freewheeling exploitation of the ocean floor beyond by anyone with the technological capacity to do so. The rationale for this posture is defended by John P. Craven, "The Challenge of Ocean Technology to the Law of the Sea," *Judge Advocate General Journal,* September-October-November 1967. The position dovetails neatly with a concern to see that the private investor harvests the major return from exploitation of marine and sub-marine resources.

argued that this would raise insuperable verification problems. The Soviet Union supported the broader position,[10] but a number of small coastal states joined the United States, wary of anything that would limit their various underwater defense facilities. They would accede only to a prohibition of nuclear weapons installations on the ocean floor. Canada suggested a compromise that would ban all "offensive" weapons from the seabed but allow coastal states to plant the continental shelf with submarine detection devices. But this too was rejected. The least common denominator finally prevailed: on February 11, 1971 the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain were among sixty-two nations which signed to bar the placement of weapons of mass destruction, and structures for such weapons, on the ocean floor or its subsoil. Each party may inspect for violations. Complaints go to the United Nations. Meanwhile submarines of all kinds, with or without nuclear projectiles, can roam the seas at will, and each country can arm its piece of seabed as it pleases in the hope of finding some "defense."

Progress toward the community of man on the seabed is at present more promising on the scientific than on the strategic-political front. The International Decade of Ocean Exploration is the culmination of an extraordinary outburst of cooperative international activity as oceanographers and ecologists have come to grips with the vital import of the oceans and what lies beneath them. This ambitious program, directed by UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, cuts across both national and disciplinary boundaries to knit together a coordinated attack on major problems of physical exploration, the development and conservation of resources, and determining the effects of how man exploits the seas. The ability of scientists from different countries to work and even live together, given tasks that they find demanding and challenging, has somewhat tempered the struggle for national advantage that has hamstrung creation of an adequate international regime.[11]

Of peculiar significance is the convincing demonstration by science that boundaries are an anachronism in the oceanic world.

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[10] The Soviet Union would accept inspection, however, only on a basis of reciprocity, as with the demilitarization of outer space. UN Doc. ENDC/240, March 18, 1969. The United States called for observation by all parties to the agreement. UN Doc. ENDC/249, May 22, 1969.

[11] The experience and capacity of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission is carefully appraised by Margaret Galey, *The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1970).

There is a geophysical and biological unity which defies efforts to carve jurisdictional lines between what is on the sea, in the sea, on the seabed or under it; equally nonsensical is cutting up laterally what belongs to a coastal state from what could be the "common heritage of mankind." What exists or happens in one sector intimately affects the others, whether in a sequence of nature or due to the intrusion of human engineering. The alarming discovery of recent scientific exploration is that men, working behind the shield of a political order which frustrates a community approach to the regulation of this activity in the oceans, can easily destroy the unity that maintains the balance of life. Pollution by oil, radioactivity or industrial waste, or the unrestrained scooping up of living resources whether from waters and bed considered territorial or open — these are obvious dangers calling for a global approach to human control which would match the integration inherent in the natural order of the seas.

It is of some consolation that both experts and politicians are beginning to talk to this effect and even to pass relevant resolutions, within the United Nations and the appropriate specialized agencies. In 1968, the General Assembly established a permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. Carefully circumscribed though its assignment originally was, both in the area of concern (witness its title) and what it should do (mainly study), the committee moved vigorously to recommend action on pollution, conservation, exploration and indeed the whole question of setting up effective international machinery to deal with the exploitation of marine resources.

But technological, political and military events are moving so quickly that they may carry us beyond a point of no return, as the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace has warned in urging vigorous action "to avoid the evils of a new era of submarine imperialism and colonialism in the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and also to capitalize upon the great opportunities for international organization inherent in a regime for the sea-bed."[12] This point evidently struck home with the U.S. government, which became the first of the big oceanic powers to associate itself firmly with the proposal to have all coastal nations waive claims to the ocean floor beyond the continental shelf, and thereby preserve it as "the common heritage of mankind." President Nixon, in a comprehensive policy statement on May 23,

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[12] 21st Report, *op. cit.*

1970, called for an international regime, established by treaty, to authorize and regulate exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental shelf; and he went against the oil interests in specifying a definite and relatively restrained geophysical boundary separating shelf from the deep seabed — a depth of 660 feet (200 meters), whether or not a coastal state had the technical capacity to exploit beyond that depth. However, the "trustees" for the international community would be the coastal nations, rather than the UN, each receiving a share of the international revenues from the zone where it acted as trustee. This is thus a mixed regime, in which a few national governments are the operators, but subject to internationally agreed ground rules to insure the stake of others in the exploitation, including a part of any profit.

So, world community may be on the way, in one form or another, carried on the tip of the Glomar Challenger drill into the Sigsby Knolls 5,000 meters deep in the Gulf of Mexico, scrawled on a license by U.S. or similar international authority to tap some other ocean floor for a mineral deposit or a new oil dome, or in a set of marine laboratories studying the hazards of ecological changes precipitated by man's use and abuse of the seas.[13]

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY: REGIONAL VS. GLOBAL POTENTIALS

Our prognosis is for a major swing toward multilateralism in the 1970's in all of the areas of international relations we have been discussing: harmonizing the actions of states, regulating interchange among them, managing resources for human development, and seeing to it that the conquest of new frontiers is turned to the benefit and not the destruction of all mankind. But there is a serious question of institutional capacity. Are international organizations, as presently structured and equipped, competent to handle these immense responsibilities?

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[13] For further discussion of these issues, and the range of proposals under consideration for the regulation and development of the seas and seabed, see Edmund A. Gullion, editor, *Uses of the Seas: A Report to the American Assembly* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968). Note especially the chapters by Gullion, "New Horizons at Sea," and Henkin, "Changing Law for the Changing Seas." See also Louis Henkin, *Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources* (New York: Columbia University Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, Monograph No. 1, 1968) and Lewis Alexander, editor, *Law of the Sea: Future of the Sea's Resources* (Kingston: University of Rhode Island, 1968).

U.S. policy was the object of a major study by the President's Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, the results of which were released in the Stratton Report, *Our Nation and the Sea* (Washington: GPO, 1969). The policy finally adopted follows closely recommendations of the American Assembly, especially the views of Professor Henkin, but seems to fall short of the full world regulatory authority envisaged by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, which would have the power to license, and probably to itself undertake considerable operational functions.

In process is a definitive study of the role of international organization in relation to the regulation and development of ocean resources by Professor Daniel Cheever, University of Pittsburgh. For a preliminary statement, see his article, "The Role of International Organization in Ocean Development," *International Organization*, Summer 1968.

For a systematic analysis of national positions on the major issues, as expressed in committee deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly, 1968-1969, see R. L. Friedheim and J. B. Kadane, "Quantitative Content Analysis of the United Nations Seabed Debate," *International Organization*, Summer 1970.

Infirmities of Globalism

Despite the note of optimism in some of the previous observations, we must admit that serious shortcomings have been revealed in the experiences of the UN "family" of global institutions. For one, they are paying the penalties of universalization. The policy of open-end membership, coupled with the epidemic proliferation of new states eager for visibility on the world stage, has flooded these agencies with bodies that occupy chairs, make speeches, clamor for appointments and cast votes. The principle of "sovereign equality" has so far defied attempts to introduce disciplined delegation of responsibilities to relieve the operational inefficiency that almost drags proceedings to a halt, even when issues are vital and urgent. (In fairness, one must not pin blame facilely on the smallness or newness of members for these troubles. Constructive leadership has come from tiny newcomers; big oldtimers often cause the most serious obstruction.)

On the other hand, global agencies are not yet universal enough to function with full effectiveness. The isolation of Communist China severely limits their outreach. However difficult companionship with the Peking government might be, its continued ostracism contradicts the central reality of interdependence that underlies the whole rationale for global international organization. The problem is accentuated by exclusion of divided states, such as the two Koreas, the two Viet Nams and especially the two Germanys, from United Nations institutions. Another anachronism is the abstention of the Soviet bloc from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, thus reducing these important organizations to subglobal status. This acknowledges the contemporary reality of two worlds rather than one in financial and trade relations, each part operating according to quite different principles. But the division appears increasingly artificial as economic relations become closer across the systemic divide. Technology presses constantly toward interchange, if not integration, especially among advanced industrial countries. Hence the need for fiscal and trading agencies of universal scope to negotiate and implement practicable arrangements for functional cooperation linking the differing systems and enabling them to do business with each other.

A third factor that obstructs the performance of global institutions is their fragmentation. Bloc politics impedes formation of a working consensus on critical issues, all the way from getting an item on the agenda to adopting a budget to pay for something to be done about it. Organizations are split not only along ideological lines, but by differences of wealth, region, color, religion, and pragmatic political ties. This encumbers the search for sound solutions to problems with extraneous considerations. Countries will oppose a proposal because it will benefit parties they do not like, or perhaps merely because another bloc is for it. An equally serious consequence is the division of appointments, from committee chairmen and rapporteurs to key jobs in the secretariats, according to "geographic" criteria (meaning, in fact, what bloc a man belongs to). Whether a person has the diplomatic, administrative and technical skills for the extraordinarily difficult tasks that face the organizations becomes secondary.

This is partly responsible for the weakness of leadership in the United Nations and many of its affiliated agencies, weakness that afflicts both the international secretariats and national missions. Because political availability rather than statesmanship or craftsmanship in multilateralism is the primary qualification, governments have tended to put forward candidates who were dispensable, keeping top talent to staff their own cabinets and bureaucracies. Sometimes a UN assignment is a convenient honorific for a has-been, an also-ran or a financial angel in home politics. Caution amounting to timidity, concern for protocol that reaches the point of sycophantism, personal pride in office that overshadows disciplined commitment — these are earmarks of a sufficiently large number of those entrusted with major responsibilities in and for the UN family to induce institutional atrophy. In the secretariats, the problem is aggravated by tenure. The guarantee of job security was actually expected to stimulate independent, creative initiatives by protecting international civil servants against pressures to serve the interests of particular states. They could boldly put forward what they thought would advance the interest of the whole organization without laying their jobs on the line. Unfortunately, as observed by one who saw what went on from a position of major policy responsibility, "lifetime employment in an international bureaucracy produces the same Parkinsonian tendencies, and the same cautious time-serving, that are so evident in national career services."

The financial nightmare that has beset the United Nations, especially as an outgrowth of its peacekeeping activities, is a symptom, not so much of mutiny on the part of some members but of a profound misunderstanding by most members of the proper rules of behavior in international organizations. Neither those which refused to pay their "assessments" for activities they disapproved, nor those which voted the assessments and legitimized them by appeal to the International Court of Justice, really grasped the inescapably consensual basis of action through such an institution. If anything, the "mutineers" were closer to action consistent with the lessons Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had derived from the peacekeeping experiences. *Consent at every point* was the condition of such operations — by the governments on whose territory the UN presence was established, by the countries contributing personnel, supplies and services, by the nations that agreed to stay out of the trouble zone, by the member-states which voted for the action by the authorizing organ, *and by the governments paying the money side of the bill.*

At several points in the confused and unpredictable unfolding of these totally unprecedented experiments in international conflict management, minorities and majorities in the UN forgot that they were not running a government. They went mandatory. A majority voted to do something and then sought to impose it on an unwilling minority, at least to the extent of paying a share. For its part, the minority, as well as declaring it would not be "taxed," tried in various other ways to frustrate the action approved by the majority. Even portions of the secretariat sometimes lapsed and became infatuated with the prospect of governing: witness Conor Cruise O'Brien leading the charge of "Blue Helmets" into Katanga (apparently without authorization from the Secretary-General or anybody else).

The point of all this is that global institutions suffer in performance and in reputation because the governments that control them persist in misusing them. It is not that they are weak because they are limited to consensual action. Consensual action is what they can and should be concerned with — *and nothing else.*

Failure of member nations to understand this and act accordingly is the straitjacket that most constricts these agencies.

Illusions of Regionalism

Regionalists urge that cutting back the membership spread of international institutions would bypass many of these problems. Smaller size would make them less cumbersome. Greater unity of purpose would forestall fragmentation. Catering more directly to some of the dominant national interests of members would enhance their prestige and attract higher-level leadership. At a certain point, the community of important interests might become so close that the members would readily let integration go the length of quasi-government, and adopt procedures which would enable the institution to act collectively for the participating nations. The European Economic Communities earn first prize in this, of course. NATO, the Warsaw Pact, COMECON, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity have their advocates, varying in assurance from those who are convinced that these institutions have already amply proved their effectiveness and durability to those who cautiously see them as capable of limited but useful activities at the moment.

Frankly, this author holds a dim view of both past performance and potential future of most regional institutions in terms of the missions of multilateralism previously discussed.[14] Their segmental character tends to disqualify them from coping with inter-regional problems. The nature of regional perspectives, instead of facilitating the process of negotiation and consensus-building across regions (as was anticipated in the United Nations Charter provisions for regional arrangements), has more often hardened irreconcilable positions. The firmer and more comprehensive their regional ties, the less likely are countries to be sensitive to interests of states outside the region. Experience has shown that a country will often yield to pressures from its regional partners, even when its own interest on a particular issue might be better served by agreeing to action more universally acceptable. The monolithic rigidity of the Soviet bloc is a case in point. Whether within the UN, or operating directly through the mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, these countries must toe the line of the "socialist commonwealth." Regionalism, at least in this form, has only served to obstruct the search for action that would be generally beneficial, for "mutuality" is conceived in exclusive rather than inclusive terms.

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[14] These reservations are elaborated at some length with reference to both management of conflict and promotion of economic cooperation by various regional organizations in Philip E. Jacob and Alexine Atherton, *The Dynamics of International Organization* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1965), especially Chapters 5, 6, 14 and 15.

A searching symposium has recently been published on *Regional Integration: Theory and Research,* edited by Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold for *International Organization,* Autumn 1970. Some of the views expressed by contributors to this symposium appear to corroborate some of the basic conclusions on regionalism presented in this article.

The result is similar even when the regional group is not united by ideological doctrine and so strictly disciplined by a dominant power. NATO, OECD and the European Communities all look inward rather than outward in devising their approaches to international problems. Hence they appear as competitors to other nations and generate hostility and resistance even if they genuinely believe they are only acting "defensively." NATO cannot avoid provoking counter-"deterrence" in its rivalry with the Warsaw Pact; OECD is inescapably tagged as the caucus of the wealthy when it consolidates common policies toward the have-nots among the capital surplus countries; EEC is envied and feared as the self-serving protectionist club it is.[15] Only the Commonwealth of Nations has been able to maintain fairly congenial cross-regional relations, largely as a result of the cross-ties of most of its members with other regional groupings.

Other limitations impair the capacity of regional institutions to provide adequate solutions for major problems of interdependence, unless their efforts are closely coordinated with those of other countries through some more universal facilities. Conditions of effective action vary from area to area. For instance, the pattern of economic integration that grew up in Western Europe may be region-specific, nontransferable to other parts of the world. To assume that the success of the European Economic Communities proves the general utility of their institutional format may be a ghastly mistake, as South and Central America and some of the African states are apparently finding out in their experimentation with "Common Markets."[16]

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[15] For a strong indictment of EEC's exclusivist policies, charging that they tend to heighten tensions in Europe and elsewhere and foster a brand of regional patriotism, see David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., editor, *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968). This view is largely substantiated by the study of Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970). See also Scheingold's concluding article, "Domestic and International Consequences of Regional Integration," *International Organization,* Autumn 1970, especially pp. 987-998, in which he is particularly skeptical of the effects of the EEC on the progress of the less developed countries.

The Organization of American States seems to be moving toward expressing distinctive Latin Americanism, after a period when it served as a major instrument to devise and implement policies of mutual cooperation between the United States and the Latin republics. Indications are that this subregionalization of OAS is associated with a revival of the traditional antagonism of Latinos for the Yankee. But it is also symptomatic of the generally divisive influence of regionalism that the Latin American states are adopting much more inflexible stands on issues involving non-American states as well (laws of the sea and control of the seabed, for instance). As they tie themselves closer together regionally, and the cross-regional associations weaken, they become more ornery in their relations with the rest of the world.

Regional organizations are also turning out to be function-specific, contrary to early expectations that there would be a "spill-over effect."[17] Even the European Six have not yet been able to match their degree of economic integration with a parallel regionalization of defense systems and political processes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is probably the stronger for having specialized in the military sphere; efforts to broaden its functional base have been singularly unsuccessful. Multiple functions within a regional framework seem to disperse rather than reinforce energies.

The Achilles heel of regional institutions is the very same commitment of member-states to having final, independent say over their actions that global agencies have encountered. They have to confront the same reality of pluralism in international relations, even within the narrower confines of a region. Few governments have gone on record as ready to merge their sovereignty in a regional "community." Consensual cooperation instead of centralized decision-making is just as much the practice in regional organizations as in the United Nations, except possibly for the EEC.[18] Significantly, when such organizations have yielded to the temptation to "strengthen" themselves by moving even a little toward a hierarchical structure of control, they have provoked dissension that undermined their internal cohesion, leading sometimes to outright rejection of decisions reached and boycott of the decisional processes.

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[16] See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model," *International Organization,* Autumn 1970; also, Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," *Journal of Common Market Studies,* June 1967.

[17] The experience of the European Coal and Steel Community that fostered this expectation was the subject of Ernst Haas' seminal work, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

[18] Penetrating studies of the practice of the European Economic Communities indicate that there, also, consensual processes are the foundation of effective action, even when the final format of the action appears authoritative. See Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); Lindberg's "Decision-Making and Integration in the European Community," in *International Political Communities: An Anthology* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1966); and Lindberg and Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity, op. cit.,* Chapters 1 and 2.

For a comprehensive evaluation of decision-making processes in regional organizations, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," *International Organization,* Autumn 1968; and his *International Regional Organizations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

In short, regionalism has not replaced nationalism as the dominant force in the political organization of the world. The nation-state, not the region, remains the pivot of action. Meanwhile regionalism has done nothing to change the essentially global dimension of most of the problems that have to be solved. Interdependence operates within regions, to be sure; but it is just as powerful a reality across regions.

Power by Consent

This turns us back to the "globals" as the center of gravity for the organization of multilateral action to grapple with transnational problems. The immediate task is to find a strategy that will improve their capacity. Our contention is that this must rest on consent, and need involve little structural tampering.

Many current proposals for structural reform aim to streamline procedures of decision-making and gear them to power and other considerations in a way that would further "governmentalize" the operation of international organizations. This would only confuse the essentially consensual nature and tasks of these institutions. To the extent that such proposals require constitutional changes, they also run afoul of the difficult amending provisions of most international charters. Amendments to *reduce* the powers of individual states (even in the form of delegating partial responsibility) find few sponsors. The same is true of changes designed to formally increase the overall powers of the "Organization" or of its secretariat. What sometimes do get through are arrangements to give limelight to more states in the name of democratizing the institutions (for instance, increasing the size of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and mandating a rigid formula for regionalizing the seats). Such an outcome runs directly counter to the desires of those advocating strength through streamlining.

But steps that will substantially improve the functioning of global institutions can be taken without jangling the nerves of national pride.[19] The World Bank and its affiliates have already vastly increased their funding of development efforts and overhauled their policies and administration under the leadership of Robert S. McNamara, following the bold lines laid out by the Commission on International Development headed by Lester Pearson.[20] Agencies associated in the United Nations Development Program are in process of implementing some of the far-reaching recommendations of Commander Jackson's *Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System.*[21]

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[19] Richard N. Gardner, in "Can the United Nations be Revived?," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1970, proposes action in ten areas to make the UN more effective. Most of the steps could be undertaken within the present structure of the organization but would admittedly "require almost every member to modify one or more of its present positions."

No breakthrough of comparable proportions yet seems in sight to revivify the UN's unique peacekeeping potential and give new impetus to its mission of securing peaceful settlement of major international conflicts. However, the United Nations remains the principal vehicle of collective action by big states and small to tamp down the Arab-Israeli conflagration and find some basis of live-and-let-live in that hotbed of violence. Egypt at least has had second thoughts since 1967 about the utility of a UN peacekeeping force, as evidenced by President Sadat's call for its return (no doubt with Soviet concurrence).

On the score of universalization, it seems likely that within the year the General Assembly will move to find some formula for representation of the Chinese People's Republic.

With respect to leadership, much hinges on the quality of the new UN Secretary-General to be appointed this year, and of a whole series of replacements for the aging directorate of the Secretariat. This is an opportunity for strengthening that depends almost entirely on the priority given the tasks of the United Nations by its member governments. There are no structural hurdles to prevent their agreement on men and women of outstanding competence, vision and commitment to serve the international community in the decade ahead.

What is most needed is an approach to the use of the United Nations that will allow members to act when they share a common concern, even if they cannot persuade the entire organization to go along. Too often, action through the UN has been blocked by states simply because they saw no payoff in it for themselves, and objected to any undertaking carrying an implication that they would be held partly responsible. If it were clearly understood that a "*consortium of the concerned*" would voluntarily assume the full burden of a program, including its financing, while working through the United Nations and reporting to it, a great expansion of significant cooperative action could occur.

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[20] Commission on International Development, *Partners in Development* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

[21] UN Doc. DP/5 (Geneva: United Nations, 1969).

There are some precedents for such an approach: the voluntary funding of UNICEF, the Special Fund and now the UN Development Program; participation in the activities of the Geophysical Year and now the International Decade of Ocean Exploration; and to an extent the contributions of states that agreed to furnish contingents to UN peacekeeping forces (though regrettably their voluntary participation as concerned states got entangled with the attempt to treat these operations as obligations of the whole organization).

The genius of this strategy is that it is completely consensual, dedicated to multilateralism, functionally flexible, and, of vital importance, open-ended. Any government can opt into any "consortium," whenever and wherever it decides that the kind of cooperative action being undertaken is to its benefit. This would soften bloc lines, for it would encourage coalitions to form around many different interests, each state joining those promising it a useful payoff. A state might play an active role in one peacekeeping consortium and not another, take a hand in one kind of development program, but forgo other efforts.

One basic condition for successful evolution of the consortium strategy is that members agree to the coexistence of multiple consortia. In return for permission for one group to use the international organization's machinery to promote its particular concern, it must let others form consortia to forward their interests and have comparable access to the organization's facilities. Permissiveness is the watchword: I won't block you, if you don't try to harness me into something I don't want to do; I won't challenge the legitimacy of your proposal, if you're willing to pay for it, and will let me do my thing too. Vetoes are abandoned, unless some consortium forgets the rules and tries to make its program mandatory when others find it unacceptable.[22]

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[22] The idea of developing a "consortium of the concerned" is forcefully urged by Harlan Cleveland, President of the University of Hawaii and formerly Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, as a means of building up an international executive to keep the peace and mediate disputes of less than global magnitude. He envisages such a consortium working *outside* the established machinery of the UN, however, with its own arrangements for fact-finding, mediation, and quick mobilization of peacekeeping forces. See "Can We Revive the U.N.?," paper prepared for the Hoover Institution United Nations Conference, Stanford, California, January 12, 1971.

There might be a danger that such a consortium would be misinterpreted as a form of alliance bypassing the UN. Keeping the consortium *within* the UN framework would guard against its being so construed but might hamstring its freedom of action.

There is an immense unexplored potential in multilateral cooperation. It remains unrealized in part because nations have deep and bitter conflicts and are in no mood to cooperate, even if rational consideration dictates that they should, in their basic long-term interests. Part of the problem, however, is the persistent "governing complex" that has misguided the development and use of international organizations. Government in the 1970's will surely be kept the prerogative of national governments. International organizations must be directed to the vital function of promoting *inter*government, that is, the process of enabling states to work together in pursuit of common interests – their interests in surviving in a world where they simply cannot live by themselves and by their own devices.

THE PERILOUS CONJUNCTURE: SOVIET ASCENDANCY AND AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM

by Barry Goldwater

A United States Senator's view of the course of Soviet foreign policy in the decade of the 1970's might vary to some degree from that of the professional Kremlin-watchers and other close students of Russian foreign policy down through the years. Because a Senator's view must encompass legislative considerations of an immediate nature, his approach is necessarily pragmatic. Moreover, it must focus on the reality of the world power balance. That balance is shifting radically and dangerously away from the United States in favor of the Soviet Union. Hence, we need now to be concerned with the question whether the United States will be able to match the USSR's developing "first-strike" capability.

In the following remarks, little weight will be given to the wishful thinking of those influential Americans who are so desirous of reaching a détente with Moscow that they appear blinded to the actuality of Soviet aggression in pursuit of an overall and long-standing policy aimed at making the Soviet Union the dominant world power.

I

At the outset, let me make it clear that I believe only limited success can come from the Helsinki-Vienna negotiations occupied with developing an agreement to limit the use of strategic arms while, at the same time, the Soviets probe our purpose and will in almost every important area of the world.

I favor negotiations. I believe it does no harm to keep talking with our acknowledged adversary. I believe it is important to try to measure the Soviet willingness to cooperate in the reduction not only of strategic arms but of tension. I believe it to be prudent to meet on a regular basis with Soviet negotiators, even if nothing more develops than an increased knowledge of Soviet intransigence.

However, there is danger in U.S.-USSR negotiations if they raise false hopes of peace among the American people. I believe there is an even greater danger that fruitless or questionable negotiations will deflect us from taking some vitally needed steps toward strengthening American defense.

The following example will illustrate my concern: During the Senate debate over whether the United States should embark on the construction of the ABM, those opposed to the ABM argued, time and again, that affirmative action would annoy the Soviet Union and render more remote the chance of successfully negotiating a strategic arms limitation treaty in the SALT talks. Those who advanced this argument did not explain why our relations were so tenuous that the starting of an ABM system to match the USSR's would wreck the negotiations. Nor did they explain why the Senate's determination to proceed with an ABM system would not strengthen our bargaining at the talks.

Again, let me emphasize my belief that at this point in history negotiations with the Soviets should be taken for exactly what the Soviets consider them to be, namely, a tactic in the conduct of power politics. We must be alert to the possibility that some sincerity might eventually shine through the various maneuvers and techniques which Soviet negotiators employ at any conference table, but we should not hope for far-reaching agreements until there is a basic and fundamental change in the Soviet approach to East-West problems. We must never forget the experience at Panmunjom where communist negotiators wrangled over Korean peace terms for two years while taking every advantage of battlefield lulls. The conferences at Panmunjom perhaps were a classic exercise in communist usage of negotiation as a tactic in political warfare.

In my view, there will be no mellowing, no softening, no changing in the Soviet foreign policy of aggression during the 1970's. I believe Moscow will intensify its pressure against the United States and the West at every advantageous tension point and strategic location in the world. Several factors will determine this policy of pressuring and testing us in widely separated areas such as Viet Nam, the Middle East, Berlin, Cuba and Latin America, the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. These factors will include (1) the success or failure of the powerful isolationist bloc in the Congress of the United States, and (2) the degree of military and strategic arms superiority the Soviets are able to build up.

II

The new isolationist bloc in the Congress consists of two groups.

Some do not believe in the balance of power system: in Professor Eugene Rostow's words, "they find both the phrase and the idea odious."[1] This is because power politics outside the United States are seen to be unpleasant. Not least of the unpleasantness is the support we must tender a government of which these moralists do not approve, as part of our national interest. The other group is concerned above all about the size of commitments. Their formula remains simple: reduce them. But these pundits are always short on the details of how to reduce commitments, and where to reduce them, and when to stop reducing them in the national interest. To quote Professor Rostow again: "They admit that a general American withdrawal could lead to neutralism or reorientation, both in Europe and in the Far East, but are willing to risk even so drastic a change in the balance of power, rather than face the alternative."[2]

It should be apparent that if the neo-isolationists in the Senate and House succeed in forcing U.S. withdrawal from world affairs on a massive scale, the Soviets will win the game of world supremacy by default. If the United States once again turns her concern inward and "holes up" within the limitation of two oceans and friendly neighbors to the North and South in the Western Hemisphere, the Soviets will attempt to increase their influence in regions from which the presence of U.S. power has excluded them for the past generation.

The argument for a new turn to shortsighted isolationism is increasing in direct ratio to public frustration with the war in Viet Nam and intensified agitation for all kinds of multibillion-dollar social engineering and improvement projects on the domestic front. Pressure is mounting for a withdrawal from Viet Nam so precipitous that it would signify the first outright military defeat in U.S. history. At the same time, the same isolationist sources are pressuring for the withdrawal of more and more American troops from Europe. American neo-isolationists have become increasingly vocal in advocating that the United States back out of her international defense commitments such as those involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the SEATO pact and forty-odd other mutual defense agreements we maintain with foreign governments.

If the isolationists win the day, or even obtain a partial success in their present campaign, they will create an American default on a global scale. Then, the peoples of the world would be persuaded that this nation, which cared and paid so much for the rebuilding of whole continents in the wake of the devastation wrought by World War II, had announced its wish to shirk responsibility for the welfare of less fortunate nations. We would be announcing, in a perverse fit of national selfishness, that America had decided to reduce herself to the status of a second-class power.

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[1] "L.B.J. Reconsidered," *Esquire*, April 1971, p. 60.
[2] *Ibid.*

Should any of the apparent objectives of the isolationist bloc prove successful, the course of Soviet foreign policy would be inexorable, accelerating in the direction in which it has always been moving: toward undisputed domination of the civilized world. It would be unhindered in its quest to reorder the world along the doctrinal lines laid down in Moscow. It might then perhaps shift its major concern away from the United States and concentrate more and more of its attention on thwarting Communist Chinese ambitions.

Any appraisal of Soviet foreign policy in the 1970's must give considerable weight to the emergence of China as a nuclear power, unhampered by restrictive treaties and deeply hostile to the policies made in Moscow. If American observers of the assorted communist-controlled countries can afford any kind of wishful thinking about the present decade, I believe they can do so with least risk in the matter of relations between the USSR and China: these will grow steadily worse — no matter what the United States decides to do.

Despite the Sino-Soviet conflict, I can see nothing but deep, deep trouble for the United States and for the forces of freedom throughout the world if we pursue an isolationist foreign policy in the 1970's. Yet, I still take the optimistic view. I hold that the forces of isolationism will be defeated, and that President Nixon and whoever comes after him will succeed in guiding this nation toward the fulfillment of its international responsibilities. For, indeed, we have no choice other than to maintain our power to deter the Soviets from those expansionist ventures that have already begun to tilt the precarious world balance. Soviet policy will be determined by Moscow's assessment of its military power versus that of the United States. I expect the Soviets to become bolder and more aggressive as their naval power builds and moves into almost every strategic waterway of the world and as their deliverable nuclear capability surpasses ours.

A good indication of the dangers ahead is the present situation in Cuba, fraught with the possibility of a showdown at some future date with the Soviet Union over the construction of strategic nuclear submarine bases only ninety miles off the southern tip of Florida. It is significant that, when the Nixon Administration first called attention to the possibility that the Soviets were building such a base at Cienfuegos Bay, members of the isolationist bloc in the Senate immediately warned against a confrontation such as President Kennedy ordered in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Their reasoning was that, this time, it would not be easy for Washington to force Moscow into backing down, for had the Soviets not acquired a superiority in strategic weapons which they did not hold when Kennedy faced down Khrushchev? It was as though the isolationists, to support their policy recommendations, were shifting from an argument based on diplomacy and logic toward one based on the relative capability of the USSR and the United States to use force. Prior to the Cienfuegos incident, the Senate isolationists had argued that it was in our own interest to withdraw from our worldwide commitments and cut our defense expenditures; they had never candidly acknowledged that, because of growing American weakness, we might have to eschew firmness in the defense of our own security. But no other interpretation can be placed on their recent warnings. In effect they said: beware of antagonizing the Soviets over what they do in Cuba because they have more military muscle than they had in 1962.

These isolationists are almost identical with those factions which, over the past decade, have continually urged this nation to take the lead in disarmament moves. Implicit in their appeals was the belief that the Soviets were reasonable people who wanted us to set an example so that they could quickly follow suit, and that thereafter East-West tensions would subside and the Cold War would end. At that time, they did not allude to the possibility that unilateral disarmament by this country would quickly place us in the position of having to yield to Moscow in incidents such as the Cuban submarine-base controversy because we no longer possessed a superior potential for countering international violence.

III

Stripped to its fundamentals, the course of Soviet-American relations in the 1970's will depend in large part on the United States and the way our nation reacts to isolationist pressures at home and Soviet military pressures abroad. We can expect no great shift in direction from Moscow. The only discernible change in this decade will be by degrees.

In other words, I expect the Soviet Union to continue to apply pressure on the sore points in her relations with the West. Whether this application of pressure and this constant reaching for an indisputable edge of power is accelerated and intensified will depend to some extent upon the trend of world events and developments within the Soviet Union itself.

One factor that might affect this "intensity of Soviet aggression" is a question of leadership and power control within the Kremlin and the communist hierarchy. At present, there are numerous factions within the USSR known to be maneuvering and jockeying for positions of high governmental influence. How this internal competition resolves itself in the years ahead will be important domestically but it will not be conclusive where Soviet foreign policy is concerned. Many factors of international importance, such as how much risk the Soviets are willing to incur in attempting to tip the balance of power their way, will depend ultimately on who holds the reins of power in Eastern Europe. Involved are questions not only about the degree of risk but about the timing of such risks and the areas of the world in which they will be taken. But throughout whatever kind of power struggle might take place in the months ahead, the aggressive nature of Soviet policy as it relates to the United States will remain constant.

This policy has not altered under any Soviet premier since it was declared during the Cold War reign of Joseph Stalin. Except for some semantic window dressing, the foreign policies of the genial, back-slapping, jocular Nikita Khrushchev were, in substance, the same as those of his dour patron and predecessor. It must never be forgotten that, while Khrushchev was showing all outward signs of moving closer to the West and of attempting to reduce international tensions, he was also preparing to make Moscow's boldest move to upset the world power balance. It was Khrushchev who attempted to place missiles on the island of Cuba and aim them at this country's strategic targets. His departure from Stalin's style was merely a different kind of aggression. It might have been called "Russian imperialism with a smile."

Since the Khrushchev era, despite the negotiation of such instruments as a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the recent International Seabed Agreement, the Soviets have embarked on perhaps their most determined drive to overcome the United States' military superiority. Whether Brezhnev and Kosygin remain or fall from power is not important in gauging the long-range thrust of Soviet foreign policy.

Most knowledgeable observers of Soviet policy are inclined to place little importance on American isolationist claims that the Soviet Union is mellowing and seriously desirous of a rapprochement with the United States. For example, Max Beloff, Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration at All Souls College, Oxford, believes Soviet policy will change very little in the 1970's. Writing in the February issue of *Interplay,* a magazine of international affairs published in New York, he stated:

> No radical change is . . . possible within the existing set of assumptions, and since the interests of the present ruling group and of any likely successors are also involved in maintaining a status quo, and since there is no reason to believe that strong countervailing forces could be organized, given all the instruments of coercion in their hands, they will do their utmost to stay in power and keep things as they are, and will probably be successful in their endeavors.

Although some students of U.S.-Soviet affairs like to use the word "chilly" in assessing East-West relationships, my own view is that the Cold War is now moving into a new and different phase. For one thing, the growing Soviet naval strength is beginning to free landlocked Russia from its former geographical containment. Previously, Russia has been regarded essentially as a nation whose expansion was limited to the areas contiguous to its own frontiers. As Professor Beloff noted:

> The changes in naval armament, the longer range of nuclear powered submarines, the possibilities of refueling and servicing at sea with a corresponding decline in the importance of fixed bases such as served the once dominant British naval power—all these have helped the Soviet Union to escape from its geographical limitation. It is a naval power in the Mediterranean . . . and also in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. One must assume that there is no ocean of space where Soviet naval power cannot act.

It is impossible to divorce the Soviet Union's growing naval power from its foreign policy. Military power, whether naval or otherwise, is an essential arm of any nation's diplomacy. One thing is certain, the extension of Soviet influence throughout the waterways of the world is essentially offensive in nature. It does not foreshadow any drawing back, any easing of Soviet pressure on the West or any reduction of Soviet ambition to dominate the world. Because of the USSR's growing naval strength and far cruising range, the world could be in for another round of "gunboat diplomacy" — an international device we have long regarded as outdated.

IV

Certainly it takes no supreme intelligence to map the direction of the Soviets' future course. Most military observers believe Moscow will acquire access to additional bases along the southern shore of the Mediterranean to facilitate the mobility of its naval forces and their transit into the Indian Ocean and toward the Western Hemisphere.

Some advocates of détente take solace in the fact that the Soviet Union's emergence as a strong, far-flung naval power will place a tremendous added burden upon her people. This quaint argument — "the Soviets are getting weaker because they are getting stronger" — is being advanced by many an isolationist when he feels compelled to come to grips with Soviet military power. Are we expected to believe that this added burden will goad the Russian people into overthrowing their communist masters? Anyone who believes in such a possibility when estimating Soviet foreign policy in the immediate future is, to say the least, naive. Whoever reigns in the USSR, there is little likelihood that the Kremlin will not be able to enforce its rule. The absolutism of Soviet rule remains as constant as does the aggressive nature of Soviet foreign policy.

The same cannot be said for the United States. U.S. foreign policy is in a state of flux. For example, in February 1970 President Nixon outlined what amounted to the first basic change in the orientation of U.S. foreign policy since the Truman Doctrine was advanced in 1947 to contain communism. The President's redefinition, now known as the Nixon Doctrine, will have an important and, perhaps, decisive effect on Soviet-American relations in the 1970's. Much will depend on the Administration's implementation of the three primary points of the new doctrine — strength, partnership and negotiation.

From the senatorial viewpoint, unless American strength — military, economic and political — is maintained at a high level, the two other points become almost meaningless in the real context of foreign relations as they are conducted throughout the world today. I have already touched on the possibility of the United States becoming a second-class power with a military capability far below that held by the Soviet Union. I state unhesitatingly that if, through some ill-conceived idea that we can "live alone and like it" in the nuclear space age, we allow this to happen, we will have nothing to offer prospective partners in other areas of the world. In the process the idea that the 1970's might become an era of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and other powers interested in the development of what President Nixon hopefully refers to as a "generation of peace," would have been emptied of all rational content.

From the beginning of recorded history no power has negotiated successfully in the international arena unless it negotiated from a position of strength. Should we enter an era of negotiation with the Kremlin leaders while possessing only secondary strength, we would be negotiating our own demise. Experience has taught us that in negotiating with a totalitarian regime one must have at least equal military strength or else accept the dictates of the totalitarians.

V

Thus, as we move farther into the 1970's, we find this nation faced with a determined isolationist drive to cancel out or cut down many expenditures necessary to the maintenance of an adequate defense system — and this at a time when the Soviets have accelerated their drive to establish a clear-cut strategic military and naval superiority over the United States.

I do not think we can afford to be confused concerning Soviet intentions. The objectives of the Soviets are possessive and aggressive, in keeping with the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime. U.S. intentions are overly idealistic: their goal is the development of equity and fair play among nations so that tensions may be reduced and a basis for a lasting peace may be found.

It is encouraging to know that we now have in the White House a man who is well grounded in Soviet tactics and who understands the present situation in all of its alarming ramifications. In his State of the World address to Congress on February 25, 1971, President Nixon acknowledged that the United States no longer holds a clear-cut nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union; he warned against the dangers of isolationism which I have sought to define; he pledged continued efforts to maintain American power on a "second to none" basis; and he said an assessment of U.S.-USSR relations at this time "has to be mixed." In summing up U.S.-Soviet relations, he reported:

> There have been some encouraging developments and we welcome them.

> We are engaged in a serious dialogue in the SALT talks. We have signed a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons from the seabeds. We have both ratified the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have entered negotiations on the issue of Berlin. We have taken the first step toward practical cooperation in outer space.
>
> On the other hand, certain Soviet actions in the Middle East, Berlin, and Cuba are not encouraging. Taken against a background of intensive and unrestrained anti-American propaganda, these actions inevitably suggest that intransigence remains a cardinal feature of the Soviet Union.

In another section of the statement he acknowledged the enormous recent increase in the Soviet strategic arsenal.

If there is fault to be found with the President's long report it perhaps rests with his tendency to be overly optimistic about what he terms "hopeful signs" in our relations with the Soviet Union. Actually, he had to strain considerably to find a list of developments he could place on the plus side of the ledger.

The mere fact that the talks on strategic arms limitation are going on is a small, small step in the direction of world stability. Nor are the treaties signed with Moscow much more important – given the USSR's habit of breaking any and all treaties any time they seem to get in the way of basic Soviet policy. On the other hand, Soviet assistance to North Viet Nam, Soviet arming of the Arab nations in the Middle East, Soviet actions in Latin American, are real and dangerous. They seem to bespeak the USSR's awareness of her new status in strategic weaponry. As the President pointed out, the world has changed and "today neither of the superpowers any longer has a clear-cut nuclear advantage."

Concerning the drive for a new isolationism in this country, President Nixon had this to say:

> We have learned in recent years the dangers of our overinvolvement. The other danger — a grave risk we are equally determined to avoid — is underinvolvement. After a long and unpopular war, there is temptation to turn inward — to withdraw from the world, to back away from our commitments. That deceptively smooth road of the new isolationism is surely the road to war.
>
> Our foreign policy today steers a steady course between the past changes of overinvolvement and the new temptations of underinvolvement.
>
> We will maintain our commitments, but we will make sure our own troop levels or any financial support to other nations is appropriate to current threats and needs.
>
> We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

The President warned American isolationists that it would be "the ultimate error" to try to cut America's defense forces below the level of sufficiency. "It serves no purpose in conflicts between nations to have been almost strong enough," he said in pledging his efforts to keep American armed forces at a level of strength to "prevent us and our allies from being coerced."

VI

It seems to me that our objective foreign policy requirements are the same today as they were in 1962, i.e., when President Kennedy and his band of defense intellectuals and willing consultants started shuffling national priorities and world political equations. At the outset, President Kennedy asked the American people if they had the fortitude to act as the great nation their great power had made of them, and which they could cease to be only at their peril and the world's. This question is still *the* question. I do not think that it can be left unanswered for long, or that it can be sidestepped by compromise formulation, however ingenious.

It is a truism to say that other countries – the West Europeans, the Japanese and the Chinese – have now accumulated resources of their own, usable for pursuing power political objectives, and that the two former can now "share our burden." We helped to put Europe and Japan again on their feet and did a better job than we perhaps meant to; the Soviets assisted China to grow strong enough to contest with them. But does it follow that, because other powers have come up in the world, we need now *less* power, relative and absolute, to "check and balance" the power, actual or potential, arrayed against us presently or in the future? Since the Soviets have achieved enough "parity" to "check and balance" us, the sum total of power distributed throughout the world seems to be weighted against us.

"Style" and "subtle diplomacy" will not suffice to mask for long real power relationships. The Venetians, the Spaniards, the Austrians and, later, the British tried, for some time quite successfully, to do with mirrors what in their prime they had done with "blood and iron." In the end, confronted by determined opponents, they lost their status as dominant powers – either because they were loath to shed "blood," or because they had not made adequate provisions for "iron."

I agree, in principle, with the wisdom of keeping our profile "low." A great power, sure of itself, does not need to throw its weight about or, worse, to ingratiate itself by paying off that constant band of blackmailers that scavenges the international arena. If, however, "low profile" means that we can and should deploy less power than is needed to "check and balance" the sum total of power actually and potentially arrayed against us, then I venture to disagree with this conception. By simple arithmetic, I calculate the resources required by our national security and foreign policies to be appreciably larger than those allocated during the last twenty years.

Unless this nation begins to understand how much the isolationists and the defense critics have undermined our future security, I believe we will face deep and lasting trouble. For the first time, I note that serious students of world affairs are asking themselves what the Kremlin will do when it finds itself in possession of more usable power than any other nation on earth. For the future, the question may well be how the Soviets would use such power to enforce their will throughout the world.

Once the USSR gains a powerful superiority, what is to prevent her from ordering us to evacuate Viet Nam or to keep hands off the Middle East — or to withdraw our support of NATO or run the risk of annihilation? We should think seriously about what Soviet "brinkmanship" might be like if the Soviets hold the top strategic hand in the 1970's. It is already later than we dare to think.

THE COURSE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S

by Hubert H. Humphrey

IN order for an analysis of the development of Soviet foreign policy to be a useful aid in assessing Soviet policies for the future, we must avoid an overreliance on doctrine and ideologies to provide the answers. We in the United States have for too long equated communism with the Soviet Union, and as a result failed to recognize the fundamental nationalist behavior patterns of communist countries. Once it becomes common knowledge that communist states are nation-states at the same time they are communist, the pattern of our relations with these countries may change radically. Looking forward to that day, we should reconsider the development of Soviet foreign policy in the light of its nationalist motivations.

I am not suggesting that the communist orientation of the Soviet Union be disregarded. The ideology of communism has been and will continue to be a significant factor in Soviet-American relations. It cannot be otherwise when the Soviet Union continues to hold fast to the doctrine of communism and, thus, to its inherent hostility toward countries that are not of the same ideology, particularly the United States. Communism is a twentieth-century religion, and the Soviet Union has not yet shown a willingness to relinquish her claim to embody the communist faith.

I

But while ideology continues to play a varied role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, it is not the only factor. Equally significant is the USSR's goal of pursuing her national self-interest in a way not dissimilar to that practiced by other nation-states. Consider what the leadership in the Soviet Union, since Lenin, has defined as its national self-interests: the similarity to the czars' territorial ambitions for their country's national security is remarkable.

Nevertheless, there has been a significant change in Russian leadership and society of which we have to take account. In the last five years, life without Khrushchev and with Brezhnev and Kosygin has brought some extremely important developments in Soviet foreign policy. While the new leaders have made a more low-keyed presentation of their international ambitions than their predecessor, they seem even less inclined than Khrushchev, despite his histrionics, to solidify a climate of East-West détente. In fact, the Kremlin's return to orthodoxy has had a direct bearing on recent Soviet policy choices.

In Eastern Europe we face what is euphemistically called the "doctrine of the socialist community," which, as applied to Czechoslovakia, means the enforced practice of limited sovereignty, as defined by the Soviet Union. In the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean we face a buildup of the Soviet navy, the like of which not even Czarist Russia could have hoped for or imagined. Most recently the USSR has made startling advances in the Arab world where she has expanded her political and military influence to the point where the independence of the regimes in the Middle East is now in question.

The Sino-Soviet conflict, which has become more acute in the last decade, has, perhaps, more than any other single force served to reinforce the new regime's tendencies to conservatism. The Chinese threat has provided an excuse for a tighter mobilization of Soviet society and for turning the screws in Eastern Europe. It has probably been the principal source for intense naval activities and Soviet backing for Hanoi.

In other areas of Asia, however, the Chinese threat has created the potential for at least a partial convergence of Soviet-American interests. It is no mere accident that Moscow has not yet diplomatically recognized the Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia under Prince Sihanouk. The Soviet Union has shown a parallel interest to ours in encouraging the creation of strong governments in Asia to resist any Chinese-inspired interference within the framework of a possible regional collective security system.

Western Europe's relations with the USSR have undergone some interesting developments. The new Soviet approach to Western Europe, however orthodox in motivation, is much more conducive to accommodation, as demonstrated by the treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union signed in August 1970 by Chancellor Brandt and Chairman Kosygin.

In their efforts to stabilize and secure their western flank, the

Soviets are now apparently seeking a confirmed status quo through treaties such as the one between Moscow and Bonn and by renewed pressure to hold a European security conference. They have made similar proposals in the past, but this time they clearly demonstrate a willingness to accept the present situation in Western Europe.

With regard to the strategic-military rivalry that has plagued Soviet-American relations since World War II, changes in Soviet attitudes are perhaps less perceptible than in the other areas of traditional Soviet-American competition. Soviet leaders have continually endorsed a heavy investment in weapons programs in an effort to attain a position of parity with the United States. As they have advanced in this field, they have shown a greater willingness to reach agreements on arms control. In the past nine years, there have been a variety of agreements with the Soviets concerning the control of nuclear weapons: total disarmament in Antarctica; a nuclear test ban under the sea, in the atmosphere, and on the ground; an atomic quarantine for Latin America; a nuclear nonproliferation treaty to curb the spread of weapons and technology; a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons in outer space; and, most recently, a treaty barring nuclear weapons and launching installations from the ocean bed.

Although they continue to push ahead with their strategic weapons programs, they have shown a readiness once again to enter into negotiations over arms control. For over a year and a half the Soviet Union has been meeting with the United States on a regular basis at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in an effort to reach a mutually satisfactory arms control agreement. As before, these negotiations have moved very slowly, with each side questioning the other's intentions. We in the United States have often felt that the Russians have been creating smokescreens in an attempt to avoid any commitments that could lead to negotiations, and maybe they have. There is, however, sufficient evidence for the opposite conclusion based on the latest Soviet offer to negotiate on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) weapons systems.

In this quick overview of the course of Soviet foreign policy, the possibility seen is a reduction in Soviet obstructionism and belligerence toward the United States in areas where the leadership estimates that the national interests can best be promoted by more moderate positions. At the same time, there is a conservative bent in the Kremlin that inclines it to be doctrinaire in its domestic policies and relations with other communist states and suspicious and hesitant in its relations with the United States.

II

Germane to any discussion of foreign policy, even as it is formulated and implemented in the Soviet Union, is attention to the domestic situation. While it has been noted that Brezhnev runs a more orthodox, or closed, shop than Khrushchev, Soviet leadership has not been able to reverse the tide toward greater liberalization. With the general improvement in material conditions for Soviet citizens, emphasizing the shortages in consumer products and the lags in industrial technology, there are internal pressures to bring about shifts in economic orientation that would require significant adjustments in Soviet communism. The Soviet leaders may well be in favor of an intense modernization program. But because such a program inherently involves a liberalization within the Soviet Union and an opening of the country in order to benefit from the experiences of capitalistic countries, they probably will be reluctant to move too far too fast since the opened gates might threaten their very existence. For now, the signs point to a controlled receptiveness, as demonstrated in their economic relations with Western Europe and the United States, to improved contacts with noncommunist countries. In terms of Soviet foreign policy this will undoubtedly mean a movement in stops and starts toward greater accommodation with the United States and its allies.

The United States, for its part, may be more inclined to accept a reduction in tensions with the Soviet Union due to its own domestic pressures and the changes since the early postwar period in the international political configuration. Because of the Viet Nam involvement, the United States should and hopefully will be inclined to be more cautious in its military undertakings, and thus less likely to clash with the Soviets. There has finally been a recognition of the need to readjust priorities so that more attention is given to our domestic requirements without forsaking our role of international leadership.

Congress and the public have already evidenced their concern over the enormous outlays called for in our annual defense budgets. Pressure has been mounting to realign our defense posture so that it serves more appropriately a rational foreign policy which enhances our own national security while concurrently advancing the cause of world peace. If this kind of sentiment gains momentum to any large degree, our foreign policy would be more receptive to accommodation with the Soviet Union on points of friction in the superpower relationship, with the hope of moving toward substantial agreement in such areas as arms control and the Middle East.

III

Changes in the international situation are also likely to be conducive to a reduction in the tensions between Washington and Moscow. Immediately after the war a country other than the United States and the Soviet Union defined its security in terms of its alignment with one of the two superpowers. While that interrelationship has not completely changed, we are now witnessing the atomization of world power through individual definitions of national identity. Rather than facing a totally bipolar world, we now find subsystems of regional forces and emerging third powers — Western Europe and Japan in particular — which buffer the potential confrontation between the United States and the USSR. Military power can no longer be equated with political influence by either superpower. As a result, competition between these two great powers can with good management be kept to the non-military sector.

What we have, then, are internal pressures and new external factors, which together leave room for more accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. This accommodation can be foreseen as devolving from a coincidence of interests, although these interests are not identical and most likely never will be because the two superpowers have different cultures and traditions, as well as disparate ideologies. Based on this analysis, any overly optimistic predictions about Soviet-American relations would lose sight of what can realistically be expected. The two countries can, nevertheless, attend to the issues that immediately affect their own national interests.

While points of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union are interrelated to a certain degree, attempts to link them too closely will delay the negotiation process. Issues should be and are separable. Take, for example, the Viet Nam war. Although the war has done little to reduce suspicions between Americans and Soviets or to improve their overall relations, it has not impeded a variety of agreements in sectors to which both parties attached a high degree of importance.

A combined effort on the part of Washington and Moscow to exercise restraint and induce a settlement in the Middle East is in their mutual interest. Direct confrontation in Viet Nam was avoided because of factors that inhibited active participation by the Soviet Union; in the Middle East the same inhibitions would not apply since the Soviet Union is so deeply committed to the Arab countries and the United States to Israel. Both countries have, however, a responsibility to themselves and the world to do everything in their power to bring about an equitable settlement.

A parallel effort must be made to halt the arms race. Both nations have expressed an interest in reaching an agreement; it is imperative that they try to accommodate each other. We know in the United States the tremendous waste in human resources of an expensive weapons program. We also know how little stability can be achieved by an upward spiral in the arms race, especially since the Russians are unlikely to give up their hard-won position of parity with the United States. The Soviet Union is clearly not a pluralistic society by our definition. As I have attempted to describe, there are, however, people in the Soviet society and government who share our concerns with both the risks and the costs of the arms race. Even conservative Soviet leaders cannot fail to realize that the benefits of a continued arms race are minimal and dubious at best. If they are seeking, as I think they are, a stabilization of relationships in certain parts of the world so that their attention is not distracted from what they deem to be a Chinese threat, they will be ready to reach an agreement at SALT.

Of course, such an agreement is predicated on the assumption that the United States will be flexible and accommodating in her own approach toward these negotiations. Both sides must want to reach an agreement in order to have that agreement.

Another possible area where changes can be expected in Soviet-American relations of the future is Europe. While Moscow is likely to retain its phobia about bridge-building between Eastern and Western Europe, significant improvements can be made through tacit understandings that move to remove artificial barriers left over from the most acute years of the Cold War. Progress can be made with respect to an understanding on Berlin, mutual balanced forced reductions from Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union, and a normalization of relations between Eastern and Western Europe and between the United States and Eastern Europe.

IV

There are other areas where Moscow and Washington have more compatible interests. Trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, has increased over the years, but their commercial relations should be developed to a much greater extent in the future. Economic relations of trade and commerce can serve as a vehicle for political cooperation. The same holds for cultural relations. The interest in cooperation created by recent scientific, technical and educational exchanges must be encouraged. Such functional relationships contribute to a climate of confidence and understanding.

Aside from their bilateral relations, the two superpowers are slowly recognizing the possibilities of cooperation within multilateral institutions in programs designed for developing countries. The Soviet Union has demonstrated a greater desire than previously to work within international organizations. The American foreign economic assistance program is likely to be substantially reformed within the next few years with more aid to developing countries being channeled through international organizations. If both countries continue in this direction, they will be working side by side within the international organizations receiving their support. They will in this case be working together in areas determined to be outside their own conflicting national interests.

Whether or not this pattern of Soviet-American relations develops in the next decade will depend upon the open-mindedness of Soviet and American leaders and their willingness to reduce tensions and, thus, minimize the chances for open confrontation. It is not necessary for the decision-makers in Moscow and Washington to love each other or make extraordinary sacrifices. It is just essential that they act rationally and never lose sight of their countries' interests and, hence, the interests of international society.

AN AMERICAN VIEW OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1970'S*

by Foy D. Kohler

THE question most frequently put to me by my fellow citizens is: "Why does the Soviet Union continue to be so relentlessly hostile and aggressive toward the West and, in particular, toward the United States?" They say they cannot understand why this vast and still developing country does not turn inward and devote its energies and resources to its internal development, as the United States did in the last century.

I reply that the answer is to be found in the nature of the Soviet political system. It is essential to understand that the USSR is ruled by a political minority that seized power some fifty-odd years ago and has hung on to it ever since. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has fourteen million members, or about 5 per cent of the population. In a sense Marxism has been "Russified" or "Leninized" to the point that, as a political system, it could be described as simply a more ruthless and efficient version of the authoritarian rule of the czars. But the czars ruled with the authority of the accepted doctrine of the divine right of kings. Today's Soviet rulers must find legitimacy for their minority rule in Marxist-Leninist doctrine—materialistic in concept, authoritarian in practice, conspiratorial in action, messianic in spirit—which proclaims as a matter of historic inevitability that the communist system is destined to rule the world, but also teaches that it is communist duty to give this historic process a shove on every possible occasion. Thus the doctrine requires an outside "capitalist-imperialist" force to struggle against—and the only suitable candidate is capitalism's chief representative, the United States.

It is true that Marxist-Leninist ideology has declined in effectiveness as an instrument of political power. Even in the Soviet Union it has not been able to prevail against the continuing influence of the great literature of the nineteenth-century "en-

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*Much of the material in this article has been drawn from the author's recent book, *Understanding the Russians—A Citizen's Primer* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

lightenment," which exalted the individual, or against the growing awareness of the Soviet peoples—through wartime contacts, foreign radio broadcasts, exchange programs—of a "better" world outside. And in that outside world, the doctrine has generally lost out to the greater force of nationalism. The more the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology declines, the more frantically the Kremlin leadership feels impelled to proclaim the ideology's validity and force its acceptance. Thus we witnessed the Kremlin's alarm and tragic decision to suppress the movement toward "liberalization" and "humanization" of communism in Czechoslovakia and the new efforts to suppress and control intellectuals in the USSR itself. But while ferment in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be temporarily checked, it has gone too far to be dissolved completely.

II

There are other fundamental forces at work in Russian society which have had a decisive influence on Soviet foreign, as well as domestic, policies in the past and which continue to operate. The first of these arises out of the nature of the Russian environment. In their millennial struggle for existence on the vast, flat, open Eurasian plains, the Russians have been attacked repeatedly and from all sides, by Mongols, Turks, Swedes, Poles, French, Germans. The long Mongol occupation not only left its ethnic and political imprint, but also engendered a lasting antipathy toward the Mongol-Chinese. Two frightfully destructive invasions in the last half-century instilled a fear of any resurgence of German might.

The historic insecurity of the Russians' homeland is largely responsible for their concept of "security-in-depth." This accounts not only for the "strategic retreat" and "scorched earth" policies followed during the Napoleonic invasion and World War II, but for the constant Russian drive to expand the country's borders, to create and control buffer states, and to reach outlets to and room for maneuver in "the warm seas." Herein lies the source of czarist expansion into Siberia and Central Asia; of Soviet wartime demands for territorial concessions in the Far East and for a part of Mussolini's Italian Empire; of Stalin's postwar attempt to wrest lands from Iran and Turkey, his takeovers in Eastern Europe, his support of aggression in Greece and Korea; of Khrushchev's effort to seize West Berlin; and of the Soviet drive into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is little wonder that the Marxist doctrine of the inevitability of one communist world fits like a glove the traditional Russian obsession with "security-in-depth."

This sense of perpetual insecurity is also a factor underlying Moscow's concept of the relativity of power. The Soviet Union is stronger if its potential opponents are weaker: hence the development and support of foreign communist parties, of pro-Soviet "front" organizations; the endless efforts to sow discord among the Western capitalist allies; the proposals for the liquidation of overseas bases and the withdrawal of U.S. forces stationed abroad (while Soviet forces on the great Eurasian land mass remain contiguous to a huge proportion of the world's population and riches).

Finally, the concept of the vulnerability of their sprawling domain to outside attack goes far to account for what we refer to as the "defense-oriented thinking" of Soviet civilian and military leaders. This outlook helps to explain, for example, the early priority they gave to radar systems and fighter aircraft, and their decision to develop and deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system at a time when the Pentagon's computers judged such an investment to be an unwarrantedly costly means of deterrence.

Another constant—and perhaps the most difficult problem with which the Soviet leadership has to cope on a day-to-day basis—is a simple and harsh economic reality. The Soviet Union covers more than two and one-half times the area of the United States. True, much of the land lies within the Arctic Circle and considerable portions are barren. But much more of this vast area is simply underpopulated and underdeveloped and cries out for development capital. Yet the Soviet leadership is driven by doctrinal concepts to rival the United States in military and space programs, spending on them roughly the same as the United States—and it is trying to do this on a 1969 Gross National Product of $425 billion against the United States' $890 billion. Moscow, with its total control, can concentrate its resources on priority projects to a degree the United States can normally match only under conditions of war mobilization. However, the operation of this system has led to a striking imbalance in Soviet social and economic development. The contradictions we see in Soviet society, in particular the contrast between the accomplishments of advanced science and the poverty of everyday life, are largely a result of deliberate policy decisions by the Soviet rulers.

Under the command system of economy, Stalin could establish the priorities to create a heavy-industry base: more oil, more coal, more electric power stations, more iron, more steel, more heavy machines and machine tools. The best of the country's human and material resources, its scientific and technical skills, and practically all investment funds went to these priority projects. The peasantry was milked for food and raw materials, and the consumer was left to fend for himself. But inevitably, as the basic industrial plant was built up, and particularly after it was restored and expanded following World War II, the economy automatically became more complex and difficult to manage. Diverse interest groups began to compete for their share of the budgetary pie and applied increasing pressures against the country's narrow resource base.

This imbalance in the economy helps to explain some aspects of Soviet policies in relations with the West: the desire to import industrial plants and machines incorporating advanced technology; the effort to establish agreements and arrangements for scientific and technological cooperation; and the frequent recourse to industrial espionage. Desire for access to technical and scientific education and experience is also a factor in Soviet willingness to conclude broad "cultural" exchange agreements, despite the resulting penetration of the closed Soviet system. Even more important, the Kremlin's growing realization of Soviet financial, economic and technical limitations relative to the United States has been a major factor in bringing Moscow to agree to such developments as the partial nuclear test ban treaty, the ban on weapons of mass destruction in space and on the seabed, and acceptance of the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

All of these factors—the doctrinal imperatives, the historic compulsion to expand Russian presence and influence, the need to contain social and economic pressures without sacrificing party control or priority political objectives—will continue to influence the decisions of Soviet leaders in their foreign policy in the 1970's. The degree of their influence will be affected by developments in the outside world and particularly by the posture and policies of the United States.

III

It seems clear to me that the Kremlin leaders have already made one fundamental decision regarding the Soviet role in the international arena which will continue to dominate their policies in the 1970's: to try to "overtake and surpass" the United States in military prowess and in scientific pre-eminence.

Americans tend to forget—if they were ever aware of—the feeling of humiliation engendered in the Kremlin by the American intervention in the Middle East in 1958, the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962, and the success of the Apollo moon-landing missions. In his period of "Sputnik diplomacy," Khrushchev had taken public credit for frustrating the ill-considered British-French-Israeli foray into Egypt in 1956 and had immediately moved with military and economic aid programs to project Soviet influence into the vacuum created by the collapse of British and French power in the area. In the face of this challenge the United States proclaimed the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, authorized by a Congressional Resolution of January 30, 1957, under which American marines were landed in Lebanon in 1958. Khrushchev ranted and accused, demanding a summit meeting "to stem the beginning military conflict"; but when he was rebuffed, he did not act.

When Khrushchev then turned to the West with his missile-flexing tactics, his attempt to browbeat President Kennedy at Vienna and his challenges to and harassments of the Western allies in Berlin goaded us into action. NASA was given a moon mission and increased funds; a crash program was launched to produce and deploy our Minuteman missile force, and our ground and air forces in Europe were reinforced. By 1962 the Soviets had been faced down in Berlin and the world was discovering that the actual missile gap was on the Soviet side, not ours. And when Khrushchev was caught trying to redress the balance by surreptitiously introducing IRBM's into Cuba, he suffered the ignominy of being obliged to withdraw them.

These humiliations were certainly among the factors leading to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, but it is clear in retrospect that even before his ouster he had himself ordered a speedup in Soviet production and deployment of ICBM's. His successors have carried this decision forward and are clearly determined to achieve overall military parity with the United States. The basic thesis was stated in Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's report to the session of the Supreme Soviet on July 10, 1969, when he said: "The Soviet Union, which, as a large world power, has widely developed international connections, cannot take a passive attitude toward those events that might be territorially remote but that touch on our security and also on the security of our friends."[1]

We have already seen many indications of the persistent application of this basic policy decision. It is evident in the rapid buildup of the Soviet ICBM force, in the top priority being given to the Soviet navy, especially in submarine strength, in the creation of a naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and in a renewed Soviet interest in long-range supersonic aircraft. Soviet fleet units have ostentatiously sailed down the American coast to pay a number of visits to Cuban ports. Soviet naval craft have reappeared in the Indian Ocean, and Soviet naval maneuvers have taken place simultaneously in the Atlantic and in the Pacific.

When Khrushchev visited the United States in 1959, he boastfully presented to President Eisenhower a model of Lunik I, and for a good many years Soviet officials let it be understood, both publicly and privately, that the USSR expected to be the first to land a man on the moon. There was visibly widespread popular disillusionment in the Soviet Union when an American astronaut got there first. There is reason to believe, however, that in face of the large-scale and concentrated effort the United States was making toward this goal, the military-scientific leaders who run the Soviet space program abandoned this particular objective in the mid-1960's in favor of a broader-based program which they undoubtedly calculate will pay greater scientific-technological dividends in the long run. They did not reduce the scale of the Soviet space effort, despite the relative burden on the national economy more than double that of our own program. In the past two years the Soviets have achieved new firsts in mechanical exploration of the moon's surface and in the duration of manned flights in earth orbit. With their experiments in simultaneous orbiting and maneuvering of spacecraft they have also forged well ahead of us toward what must be the next major step in space: the establishment of permanent manned space stations to test man's biological capabilities, develop further earth application techniques, conduct exoatmospheric astronomical research and provide exoatmospheric launching platforms. It has been reported publicly that they are experimenting with satellite destroyer missiles and with fractional (FOB) and multiple (MOB) orbit bombardment systems. We may be sure that they are seeking other military applications of missile and space technology.

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[1] *Pravda,* July 11, 1969.

While the United States is drastically cutting back NASA and federal support of science and even reducing funds for military research and development, Soviet efforts in military and civilian space technology move steadily onward. The published Soviet budget for 1971 provides 13 billion rubles ($14.3 billion at the official rate) for "science," a considerable jump from the 11 billion rubles shown for 1970 and 3.5 times the level of ten years ago. In a recent interview, Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Development, disclosed that Soviet investment in R&D will actually exceed ours by nearly 50 per cent during the current year.[2] He expressed the opinion that the scientific and technological lead we had comfortably estimated in the 1960's to be two or three years in our favor may be reversed by 1975.

The reasoning behind the Soviet effort was set forth by both Party Secretary Brezhnev and Prime Minister Kosygin at the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU in March-April 1966 and has subsequently been reflected in innumerable speeches, articles and—more importantly—budgets. The case was succinctly summarized in an article in *Pravda* on April 5, 1970: "In our time science is increasingly becoming a decisive productive force, even a strategic productive force determining the level of the material-technical base of society. It has also become the main base for the competition of the two systems. . . ."[3] This basic thesis was restated and reaffirmed by every major speaker at the recent Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU and we may confidently expect that the effort will be pushed forward vigorously to regain the image—and perhaps this time the reality—of military-scientific-technical superiority achieved with the original "Sputniks."

IV

All in all, the principal feature of Soviet foreign policy in the 1970's will be an increasing assertion of a global presence and influence on a par with that of the United States, not by bluff on the basis of potential power *à la* Khrushchev, but by initiatives and actions backed by forces-in-being and power accruing.

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[2] *U.S. News & World Report,* November 30, 1970.

[3] "The Strength of Leninist Ideology," by P. Masherov, First Secretary, Communist Party of Byelorussia.

The nature of some of the implications for the world scene and for U.S. policy is already becoming evident in such developments as American acceptance of the concept of "sufficiency" in lieu of "superiority" in nuclear weapons; Washington's silence regarding any invocation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the continuing Middle East crisis (Soviet forces might well get there first this time); and the "reconfirmation" by the White House and the Kremlin, in connection with the recently reported establishment of a Soviet nuclear submarine-tender base in Cuba, of the mutual restraint "understanding" of October 1962, which was in fact disavowed at the time by the United States because of Soviet nonperformance on the conditions.

However, I am not suggesting that the corollary to this Soviet drive for superpower equality will be a campaign of adventurism. The present bureaucratic leadership is deliberate and relatively cautious. The decision-making process is complicated. While Brezhnev is *primus inter pares* in the Politburo as General Secretary of the Party and has steadily strengthened his position, he still has to reckon with Kosygin as head of government, and Podgorny as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, not to mention such others as senior party ideologist Suslov, Party Secretary Kirilenko and even the presently downgraded but still ambitious younger member, Shelepin. Long a political commissar in the army, Brezhnev is also obviously solicitous toward the armed forces, as represented by Marshal Grechko. While we know too little about the goings-on in the Kremlin to label certain individuals "hawks" or "doves," it is clear that differences exist in the inner councils between "militants," who concentrate on Soviet state power and the spread of Moscow's influence, and "liberals," who are more concerned with unsolved economic and social problems at home.

Illustrative, I think, is the history of the SALT talks. The United States first advanced the proposal for them in December 1966. The Soviet government accepted "in principle" in February 1967. However, despite repeated prodding from Washington, Moscow avoided any discussion of specific dates for over a year and the talks did not actually start until November 1969. By that time, the USSR had produced and deployed several hundred ICBM's, to bring its total to nearly 1,200 against a U.S. total of 1,054. Clearly, Moscow's acceptance "in principle" involved a deal, between those leaders wanting to curtail the arms race for economic reasons and the power-minded elements in the Politburo and the military apparatus, to defer substantive negotiations until the Soviet side considered itself in a reasonable "position of strength."

I would suppose a comparable process has brought about virtually unanimous agreement on the decision to achieve an overall global power position strong enough to ensure against the Soviet Union having to back down in future conflicts. We have probably had our first indication of what this means in Moscow's obstructive tactics in the issue of the Suez missiles and its sanction of the United Arab Republic's refusal to remove them.

In addition to the nature of Soviet leadership and the Kremlin's decision-making process, other forces in the communist world—notably economic backwardness and the need for Western science in the Soviet empire, the rise of nationalism and the decline of ideology—will continue to restrain the militancy of Soviet foreign policies.

V

Moscow will continue to be preoccupied with its conflict with Peking, and all policy decisions will be considered in the light of their possible effect on that struggle. While the conflict has its ideological and global aspects in terms of control of the world communist movement and of influence in the Third World, it is essentially national in character, involving an age-old antipathy between neighboring peoples who have suffered at each other's hands and the longest unsettled and disputed frontier in the world today. Not that the Soviets fear a direct Chinese military attack. Actually China will be no match for Soviet power for a long time to come. But Moscow is acutely conscious of China's potential as it develops nuclear missile capabilities, and of the inexhaustible Chinese manpower. Even today, Soviet generals in the Far East must have many nightmares: What would they do, for example, if Mao should suddenly decide to send a few hundred thousand unarmed men, women and children across the border to settle in the unpopulated reaches of Siberia that the Soviets have still been unable to develop?

Soviet policy toward Southeast Asia has from the beginning been a function of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Khrushchev was ready to wash his hands of the whole area. It was such an unhandy place to reach from the Soviet Union without freedom of movement across continental China that he apparently felt Moscow could not hope to compete with the closer-by Chinese for influence in Hanoi. His successors reversed this policy and decided to try to vie with the Chinese even in their own backyard. Aid to North Viet Nam was increased from about $100 million to nearly $1 billion per year, and high-level efforts were undertaken to win over Ho Chi Minh. A corollary decision was taken to exploit the Viet Nam war as an instrument for rallying the badly fractured world communist movement—or as much of it as possible—to Moscow's banner under the slogan of "unity against American imperialist aggression." This latter purpose was served, after some setbacks, when representatives of seventy-five of the world's communist parties were mustered in Moscow in June 1969. However, the gathering did not include either the Chinese or the North Vietnamese (or other important Asian parties).

Since Ho Chi Minh's death and Peking's action in taking ousted Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia under its protection, it seems clear that China's influence in Hanoi and Southeast Asia generally has increased relative to the Soviet Union's. There have been many indications that Moscow now considers that prolongation of the hostilities—on the pattern of "protracted people's war," as Mao urges—can benefit only Peking, and that it continues to fear further Chinese involvement. The USSR can accordingly be expected to favor a negotiated end to the conflict, but will not take any measures or exert any influence toward this end which would seem to justify Peking's repeated accusation that "Soviet social-imperialists" and American imperialists are conspiring to frustrate the revolutionary process.

VI

In Europe, Moscow's objectives have been for some time and will continue to be the confirmation of the status quo, acceptance of World War II border changes, weakening or even elimination of NATO and reduction of the American presence and influence on the Continent. At the same time, the Soviets want to retain access to West European science and technology and to secure European assistance for Soviet economic development, preferably on a bilateral basis and in ways that might impede further integration of the West European countries economically, financially and politically. Since Khrushchev was frustrated in his efforts to change the power balance in Europe by forcing the Western allies out of Berlin, Soviet efforts have been directed toward securing general acceptance of "the two German states" and thus of the partition of Germany. Beginning with the "Declaration of Bucharest," issued by the heads of parties and governments of the Warsaw Pact states in July 1966, these efforts have focused on a call for an all-European security conference in which both the Federal Republic of Germany and the "German Democratic Republic" would participate as equals. While the proposal was originally designed to exclude the United States and Canada from European councils, this aspect was eventually dropped in the face of the opposition it evoked from the European NATO countries.

The conclusion, on August 12, 1970, of the "normalization" treaty between the new government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, in which the Federal Republic accepted existing frontiers, renounced the threat or use of force and pledged increased cooperation in economic, scientific, technological and cultural fields, seemed a long step toward some of Moscow's main goals in Europe. However, Chancellor Brandt's linkage of the ratification of that treaty and of further progress toward the convocation of an all-European conference to improvement of the situation in West Berlin—a condition backed by the NATO Ministers' meeting in December 1970—has considerably annoyed Moscow and underscored a basic dilemma in Soviet policy. For, much as the Kremlin leaders want to achieve their objectives in Western Europe, they are fearful of any loosening of grip on Eastern Europe, as they brutally demonstrated in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In this respect, East Germany is even more important than Czechoslovakia, for it is the keystone in the arch of the Soviet East European empire that must at all costs be kept intact.

Walter Ulbricht, the Soviet puppet ruler of the "German Democratic Republic," fears not only the magnetic forces that may flow into Eastern Europe from Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* but, more specifically, West German and allied influence located inside his tightly controlled and walled-in communist state. Since Soviet concern with the East requires a tidier Western front, I think it likely, provided the West holds firm, that Moscow will, in due course, bring Herr Ulbricht along toward a reasonable compromise arrangement on Berlin—short of a satisfactory solution, but acceptable in a period of uneasy détente.

VII

Moscow's commitment to the "progressive" Arab states is firm and irrevocable. The relationship has enabled the Soviet Union to project its influence and power into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, an historic focus of Russian "aspirations." It is noteworthy that the renewed interest in this region (and with it the establishment of the first Soviet military and economic aid programs) was stimulated in significant measure by Moscow's concern about Peking's growing influence with the emerging Afro-Asian nations at and after the Bandung Conference in April 1955; and that Moscow is still uneasy about continuing Chinese influence in the area, particularly with the Palestine guerrilla organizations.

However, I believe the Soviets were shaken enough by the disastrous Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967—when for a time they thought they had lost their Mideast position—not to want that kind of thing to happen again. Certainly Moscow would not risk a confrontation in the region in the foreseeable future. Not only is the U.S. Sixth Fleet a formidable deterrent, but NATO Mediterranean forces would inevitably become involved and the pursuit of Soviet objectives in Europe would be halted. Moreover, the Soviet Union has suffered more than any other major power from the closing of the Suez Canal, and it has a large stake in the early restoration of a shorter route from the Black Sea into the Indian Ocean. Moscow can therefore be expected at this stage to exercise a measure of restraint on its Arab associates. Although Soviet representatives have taken the position that an arrangement to restrict the shipment of arms to the opposing sides in the Middle East could only be considered after a total withdrawal of Israeli forces, I would not rule out an eventual change in this posture.

In South Asia, Soviet influence will be used to keep the peace between India and Pakistan, and the latter will be given enough political attention and aid to keep it from turning toward a closer association with Peking. However, Moscow's main attention and a heavy investment of Soviet resources will continue to be directed toward promoting the development of India as a potential counterweight to Communist China. There is in fact a parallel here between Soviet and American policies, although Soviet aid and influence is aimed at developing the state sector of the Indian economy and thus strengthening India's "socialist" orientation.

Khrushchev's confidence that anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist propaganda, increased trade and military and economic aid would draw the emerging African nations into the Soviet orbit is gone. After serious setbacks and the loss of considerable investments in such places as the Congo and Ghana, the present Soviet leadership is taking a harder look at its aid expenditures and a more realistic view of the results to be expected. While continuing to pay lip-service to the thesis that the newly liberated states are an allied third force in the world revolutionary movement, Moscow is likely to continue trying to take advantage of targets of opportunity to extend its influence in the black continent—even when its actions are inconsistent with the basic doctrine, as in the instance of supplying the Nigerian government with arms during the Biafran rebellion.

When Castro decided he had been a communist all along and elected himself into the communist camp, it was a great thing for Moscow—a homemade revolution that had not been exported by the Red Army and a communist base on the doorstep of the capitalist capital. But when Castro later decided he knew more about communist revolution than his adopted mentors and promoted premature violence and guerrilla warfare in Latin America, the relationship became for the Soviets a costly and painful experience. Because of Castro's setbacks in subversion abroad and economic failures at home, Moscow has finally been able to bring him to heel. The Soviet Union is now free to promote its interests and spread its influence in Latin America by developing state-to-state relations, which offer an alternative to "Yankee imperialism," and at the same time keeping the old-line communist parties functioning until what the Leninists call "objective conditions" are more favorable for a takeover. It is steadily expanding its diplomatic and trade relationships in the continent. Moscow has been greatly encouraged by the peaceful advent of a communist-dominated government in Chile. Kremlin ideologists have also praised the leftist-oriented military coups in Peru and Bolivia as a new phenomenon, and Soviet analysts see the possibility of further development of Nasser-type, anti-imperialist, socialist revolutions. It is a process Moscow will certainly encourage as infinitely preferable to the now defunct Castro-Guevara concept of a series of Viet Nams in Latin America.

VIII

In the 1970's Soviet-American relations will be shaped against a background of these sometimes contradictory Soviet purposes. Despite the hostility of the Soviet communist system toward the capitalist United States and the incompatibility of our basic purposes, there has been, from time to time, an adjustment of interests between the two superpowers. Soviet willingness to seek mutual accommodation has usually been enhanced when the Kremlin leaders are preoccupied with domestic concerns or are retreating from real or probable confrontations. This was the case after the death of Stalin in 1953, when the principal contenders for power were engaged in the struggle for the succession. It was again the case after Khrushchev was faced down in Berlin and in Cuba and wanted to regain his international footing. Whether or not we can expect similar breathing spells within the next decade is not presently predictable. They could conceivably result from a crisis in the Middle East or from a leadership change in the Kremlin. The generation gap in the Soviet leadership is pronounced; the oldsters have clung to their control and power to a degree unparalleled in the Western world. The average age in the Politburo is now about sixty-five. Brezhnev himself is sixty-five, Kosygin is sixty-seven, Podgorny is sixty-eight. Certainly one or more of these individuals will have to be replaced within the foreseeable future, and the process might well bring about another period of preoccupation with the succession.

Even without such contingencies, however, some measure of accommodation of interests will continue. The SALT talks will inevitably be complex and long drawn out, but the very fact that they are going on will tend to dampen the undertaking of vast arms programs. And I am sure that there is a real interest in the Kremlin, especially among the economic managers, in avoiding a new, costly but fruitless spiral in the nuclear missile race.

While the basic Soviet posture in space will continue to be one of rivalry with the United States, the field is too vast to be exploited by any one power; here, too, Soviet economic stringencies will play their role. After a series of rebuffs of American overtures, Moscow has now at least agreed to discuss our proposal for more cooperation in the next major phase—the establishment of permanent space stations—by working toward compatible docking arrangements for the craft orbited by the two countries. If such arrangements could be made, they might lead to some increasing collaboration, or some division of labor, in civilian space programs in the later 1970's.

If the international climate does not deteriorate from its present level of supportable tension, and particularly if the arrangements with respect to Germany are finally concluded, Moscow might also move toward acceptance of a few more partial disarmament measures, such as a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe.

Despite the disparity in U.S.-Soviet economic productivity and standards of living—the prospect is that the Soviet GNP will remain at about one-half the American—the USSR, to the discomfiture of the men in the Kremlin, has become one of the "have" nations. Moscow today rejects "the theory of rich and poor nations" as "anti-scientific" and "false," since it contradicts the Marxist view of a world divided along class lines. The concept is described as a bourgeois idea put "on a practical basis [by] the modern ultra-leftist 'theoreticians' of the Peking Doctrine [who] call on the peoples of developing countries 'to rise up in a great mutiny' and who incite the so-called 'world village' to encircle and capture the 'world city'."[4] Such theoretical treatment of a real problem is likely to sound hollow to leaders of the less developed countries, and pressures from them, especially from the Chinese, will certainly be exerted increasingly against the Soviet Union and the East European countries as well as against the capitalist nations of the West. Thus, despite its present doctrinal opposition, Moscow may eventually be obliged to move toward more cooperation with the West in meeting this challenge from the "have-nots."

In the final analysis, the principal influence on Soviet policies and actions in the 1970's will be the posture and policies of the United States. Other restraints on adventuristic tendencies in the Kremlin will not be effective if this basic restraint should be significantly weakened or withdrawn. I have assumed in making this assessment—and am still optimistic enough to believe—that, despite our present confusion and doubts, the United States will continue in the 1970's to meet the basic responsibilities for its own security and for world order which history has thrust upon this country.

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[4] B. Bogoslavsky, "Beggars in Spirit," *Sovietskaya Rossiya*, February 13, 1970.

THE USSR: BEYOND ITS ZENITH?

by Stefan T. Possony

SHORTLY after the Foreign Policy Research Institute was established in 1955, several of its Associates drafted a paper concerning a *modus vivendi* in Germany. Our purpose was not to find a back door to reunification. Most of us believed that reunification would ultimately occur but that a final settlement of the German question could be achieved only if and when new international conditions had arisen, especially in Europe. Our objective was to find ways through which the immediate dangers a divided Germany posed could be deflected. We believed a lessening of friction would be in the common interest of the USSR, the United States and NATO.

Furthermore, we felt that the two Germanys shared a number of concerns which required interim solutions, such as intra-German trade, rail and road traffic, electric power distribution and population movements. Assuming that such mutuality of concern existed, it should be possible to establish a few institutions to facilitate accommodation and ensure that minor quarrels would not degenerate into threats to the peace. There was also the special problem of Berlin, which had provoked several conflicts that had inched the world to the brink of war.

Our findings were never translated into operational policies, yet our apprehensions about the dangers inherent in the German situation were not unfounded. Fortunately no major conflagration has occurred, but since the mid-1950's the Berlin crises have followed one after another. A culmination point was marked during the construction of the Berlin Wall, when both sides deployed troops. Although Berlin is only a speck on the map, its uncertain status has influenced strategic developments as far apart as Manchuria and the Caribbean – and even New Left activities in the United States. The Berlin imbroglio was tied to the Cuban missile crisis. In 1969, as a follow-up to their invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviets were ready with plans to instigate another confrontation over Berlin. When at this point the Chinese resorted to open fighting on the Ussuri and along other parts of the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviets quickly shelved the new artificial Berlin crisis.

Our assumption that it would be to the mutual interest of the two world camps to find a *modus vivendi* for the two Germanys and the two Berlins was justified. This is corroborated in Khrushchev's memoirs, where the former First Secretary of the CPSU and former Prime Minister of the USSR disclosed that the German Democratic Republic "has yet to reach a level of moral and material development where competition with the West is possible";[1] where, in other words, the communist regime in East Germany would feel secure enough to forgo morale-building through aggressive encroachments against the Federal Republic.

It does not matter whether Khrushchev provided a wrong rationale for East Germany's inability to compete with West Germany. The point is, he recognized that it would be useful to achieve a relatively satisfactory arrangement which would "uphold the rights of everyone involved." In retrospect, however, this relative mutuality of interests applied only to the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany and the Soviet Union. As for East Germany, the Ulbricht regime would have been severely damaged by a regularization of its relations with Bonn. Ulbricht could think only in orthodox Stalinist terms. Since his failures in social and economic reconstruction were glaring and since his people were "voting with their feet," he had no choice but to isolate the East from the West as much as he could. Consequently, he torpedoed every attempt at normalization.

Yet Ulbricht was not the only culprit. The extensive correspondence of 1959-1960 between Khrushchev and Adenauer shows that the Kremlin was swayed by contradictory policies: one aimed at good economic relations with West Germany, the other designed to destroy Bonn and the NATO alliance. The Soviets also stepped up a propaganda campaign against the West Germans, accusing them of "revanchism" and of being unreconstructed Nazis.

Since the socialist-liberal coalition ascended to power in the Federal Republic during 1969, Moscow and Bonn have been negotiating over more satisfactory arrangements for the German situation. The problems, structurally speaking, have not changed much, except that the East European states have become more detached from Moscow; the USSR now has a far stronger requirement for trade; and the Brandt Government is anxious to come to terms with the Kremlin, and for this purpose is willing to accept the partition of Germany as a *fait accompli.* Moreover,

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[1] *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 456.

Bonn is prepared to make concessions on West Berlin to East Germany, provided some of the abuses at the wall and with respect to land access to West Berlin, and some restrictions on intra-German travel and communication are abandoned.

When the talks began, the hope was that the USSR would finally waive her claims to special rights against West Germany. The Soviet Union still contends that Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter permit her to intervene in the Federal Republic. It also was hoped in Germany that the situation would be brought in line with the provisions of the various UN declarations and covenants on human and civil rights, of which the USSR is a signatory. Moscow indicated that it would cooperate, providing Bonn made the concessions the Kremlin wanted. The Soviets seemed to negotiate in good faith, particularly because their conflict with China made it advisable for them to improve relations in Europe. Yet as soon as the Chinese crisis eased, the Soviet attitude hardened. At this writing Moscow has reverted to zigzagging between hard and soft lines. Once again, it is interested only in getting concessions from Bonn and is withholding any *quid pro quo.*

As a matter of note, Moscow for years has insisted that Bonn recognize the Oder-Neisse line. The wisdom of this insistence is doubtful, even within the framework of a Soviet desire to preserve the present borders in Eastern Europe. If the German Democratic Republic is deemed to be a sovereign state, the Federal Republic cannot make commitments on the GDR's boundaries with Poland. The GDR's contentment with its eastern border should suffice, unless it is assumed either that the FRG would run the GDR's policies or that the GDR cannot make a legitimate commitment. Both interpretations imply that Moscow regards reunification as a distinct possibility. Even so, unification would be best negotiated together with the boundaries of a single Germany.

The reasons for the Soviets wanting to extort a commitment from West Germany can be traced to a precept of Russian policy dating from the czars, which the dictators have faithfully continued — that is, to ensure that Poland and Germany never draw together and that through German resentment of Poland, and Polish fears of Germany, the Poles will remain firmly within the Russian orbit. On this principle, Stalin seized the opportunity, by the end of World War II, to move the whole of Poland westward, deep into defeated Germany.

It is true that the Poles had no valid claim on Ukrainian and

Byelorussian lands and that as a nation-state they needed more space and greater access to the sea. But Soviet seizure of some of the suitable German territory created unnecessary complications. A policy of peace would have aimed at a Polish-German territorial compromise. Now, by insisting on the Oder-Neisse line (the western Neisse, not the eastern Neisse that had been agreed upon as a provisional line), Moscow aims to perpetuate Stalin's imperial foreign policy.

Warsaw has recently shown some interest in cooperating with the Federal Republic, notably in economic affairs, while the scope of its relations with East Germany remains limited. The Polish government has always been uncertain about the longevity of the East German communist regime; its relations with Ulbricht were far from cordial. Yet the Poles, internally weak themselves, have been anxious to stabilize their western border. Whether or not Gomulka asked the Kremlin to insist on a West German guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line, as an element of a broader settlement, or whether Moscow told Gomulka that it would extract this concession from the Germans, does not particularly matter. On December 7, Bonn signed the commitment as requested.[2]

Within a week, though, following bloody riots in Gdansk and other cities, Gomulka was ousted, at the moment of his greatest diplomatic success. Allegedly the upheaval occurred because labor was protesting low wages and high food prices, as it has frequently done in the postwar period. Such riots must be viewed suspiciously, especially if they are not quelled promptly. Suspicion heightens as pertinent facts about the revolt are examined. First, the unrest occurred almost exclusively in former German cities such as Danzig, Zoppot and Stettin. Second, after Gomulka's exit, it turned out that some of the generals had not been eager to suppress the rioting, and that one general who had "butchered" the "workers" was later removed from his job. Third, and even more interesting, is the fact that General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Polish Minister of Defense, whom Gomulka had installed, refused to obey an order to arrest Edward Gierek, who subsequently became Gomulka's successor. It is not known why Gomulka wanted Gierek arrested, but General Jaruzelski would hardly have acted in this way if Gierek had not plotted against the Gomulka regime. These incidents indicate that Communist Party control of the military is not as firm as before.

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[2] In the West German-Polish treaty, the parties renounced the use of force to settle disputes, recognized the Oder-Neisse river boundary as Poland's western frontier, and acknowledged the transfer to Poland of 40,000 square miles of former German territory.

All this may be mere coincidence or rumor. But Prime Minister Gierek is not too popular in the Kremlin. There must have been some leading members in the Polish Communist Party who felt that the West German guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line would play into Soviet hands and would preclude a long-term German-Polish rapprochement, while rekindling German nationalism about which the Poles have every reason to worry.

It should not be overlooked that Ulbricht, too, took steps clearly designed to prevent a rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow, perhaps in justified fear that the USSR, seeking the closer economic cooperation with the West she urgently needs, might find it useful to sacrifice East Germany and thus consecrate a new Soviet-German entente. Neither Warsaw nor Pankow appears to trust Moscow or to be unreservedly persuaded of the wisdom of its policy. Hence this is not the time even for semi-permanent settlements. Moscow's intentions not only remain unclear but they seem to be contradictory, slanted both toward conquest and coexistence.

The final outcome of Bonn's negotiations with Moscow, Warsaw and Pankow is still in doubt. If the Brandt Government stays in power, the odds are that Bonn will make further concessions and will get little, if anything, in return. But the negotiations themselves have indicated that Soviet foreign policy on Germany remains largely inflexible. Since the Geneva summit meeting of 1955, the immobility of the USSR on this issue has been exceeded only by that of the GDR. With the departure of Ulbricht, under whose stewardship the GDR has progressively fallen behind the Federal Republic, East Germany may adopt a new policy, more in line with that of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Hence Bonn has met with bad timing for its negotiations with Pankow. By contrast, negotiations now work to the USSR's interest, as this may be her last chance to preserve the status quo and retain her full dominance over East Germany.

In this connection, several additional changes in the situation must be noted: (1) Soviet military strength in East Germany and Czechoslovakia has grown substantially since the Red Army, together with East German and other satellite forces, moved against Prague.

(2) West Germany's enormous economic success has been accompanied by a certain destabilization in her internal situation.

The sudden rise of the New Left in Germany was rather alarming during the late 1960's. The unrest has not yet been brought under control, and much political uncertainty prevails in West Berlin. Moreover, the younger members of the SDP, who will soon hold positions of power, stand far to the left of the current leadership. Some of the Social Democrats even think that West Germany should imitate the Yugoslav "model." To some extent, extremism — the German political neurosis of forty years ago — has returned to the domestic scene; this time it is of the leftist rather than rightist variety. That it may have been abetted by subversion instigated by the USSR or East Germany, or even Communist China, has been debated. Regardless of whether such suspicions are justified, if the trend toward the left continues, the international communist movement will try to exploit it. Although the Soviet Union has made little headway in her attempts to accomplish the political conquest of West Germany, she has not abandoned the objective.

(3) It is true that during the last period of his regime Khrushchev moved toward a policy of increased international cooperation, especially with Europe. It is also true that since his departure a certain amount of re-Stalinization has occurred, as evidenced by the Brezhnev Doctrine. Within a few years there will be significant changes in the party leadership, and the new leaders may either revert to the "de-Stalinist" policy of Khrushchev or continue, and perhaps accentuate, the neo-Stalinist policy of Brezhnev. More fundamental changes do not yet appear to be imminent.

(4) The age-old Soviet commitment to maximum military power has not been revoked. Quite the contrary: the USSR has made every effort to increase her military strength, including ICBM's that could be directed against the United States and IRBM's that could be fired against Western Europe and Japan. The Kremlin has branched out into offensive and defensive space weapons and, more surprisingly, into globally conceived seapower.

(5) This means that the United States no longer holds the dominant military position, and that the Soviet Union is the strongest military power in the world. The question is whether the USSR will continue to strive for military superiority of such magnitude that she could risk major conflict with the United States or whether she aims to use her enormous deterrent power for the conquest-by-blackmail of Europe and/or for the settlement of her Chinese troubles.

The foregoing could be summarized by noting that the totalitarian dictatorship in Moscow has changed little. The Kremlin remains as "hard" as ever, and should a man like Shelepin assume control, "harder-line" policies may be pursued. The Politburo may be stronger than before and the Secretary General of the Communist Party may be considerably less powerful than Stalin was at the apex of his power, but it is still true that only a handful of men make the decisions; that there is no intraparty democracy; that the so-called parliamentary institutions of the USSR do not perform in a democratic manner; and that the USSR with her inner and outer empires remains a multi-ethnic, colonialist and imperialist power.

There is no substantial evidence to support the contention that the Kremlin has jettisoned its objective of world conquest (or world revolution). If one afternoon the Politburo or the Soviet leadership decides to launch a global nuclear attack the next morning, and if it obtains the support of the three or four leading military figures, that attack *can* and *will* be launched. On a lower level of violence, the Soviet leaders still adhere to their conviction that they must support and instigate "wars of national liberation." Their undertakings in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia are testaments of that conviction. In sum, Stalin's strategies and objectives have been modernized, not abandoned.

II

Many observers contend that the present Soviet leadership is, qualitatively speaking, inferior to that of Lenin and Stalin when measured by their willpower, their willingness to take risks, and their commitment to ultimate revolutionary goals. I disagree. In my opinion the current Soviet leadership is as intelligent as its predecessors. A notable difference is that it lacks Stalin's irrationality and madness. The present leaders are more dangerous and better equipped than were the old ultra-ideologues. Moreover, they are great calculators and probably prudent enough not to rush into a major conflict until the odds are clearly on their side.

In the matter of willpower, the singleness of purpose with which they have built up their armaments, branched out all over the world using political, economic and technological means, developed their intelligence services, laid the groundwork for a far-flung base structure, and established worldwide contacts through their ever-growing numbers of traveling emissaries, hardly indicates a weakness of volition. True, the Soviets deployed massive force against China and then were hesitant to attack. But before accepting that this proves weakness of will, it should be considered that there is no rational solution to the problems Peking has created for Moscow. Their restraint does not indicate that the Soviets are unable to decide upon and execute the policy they want. The problem probably is that they find it difficult to invoke a *plausible* policy because the objective situation is intractable.

Their willingness to take risks is shown by their stake in the Middle East conflict and their invasion of Czechoslovakia. To go back a few years, it was evidenced by Khrushchev when he delivered his de-Stalinization speech of February 1956 and in his attempt to emplace missiles in Cuba in 1962.

As for revolutionary commitment, the Soviets' stress on all-out offensive armaments belies a purpose to stay peacefully at home. Yet I am inclined to agree that Soviet leaders have gained a more sophisticated understanding of the impracticality of world rule, even under the twin conditions of nuclear victory and the emergence of communist dictatorships in various countries. Their experience with China proves that nationalist, imperialist and other conflicts *can* occur between communist states and that monolithic global rule is impossible. In their own experience the existing system is a poor realization of the communist dream and economic and imperial difficulties have driven home the lesson that Marxism-Leninism is no panacea for anything.

After more than fifty years of communism, the Soviet empire is still a Russian empire and half of the population of that empire is opposed to Russian overlordship. The same is true of the outer empire in Eastern Europe which Moscow finds increasingly difficult to rule. If this type of difficulty prevails when the ratio between Russians and non-Russians is 1:2, what would it be if it were to become 1:5 or, in case of world rule, 1:30?

Further expansions can only lead to overextension, especially if Moscow attempts to run distant and large nations. Preoccupation with "world revolution" has not helped the internal situation; nowadays it interferes with economic reform which is hard enough to achieve without unnecessary complications. Hence it is only reasonable to assume that the fourth or fifth generation of Soviet leaders must have lost its zest for a world revolution that cannot be accomplished without another series of major collisions, and which even if successful would prove to be chimerical.

Unless the United States collapses, which it will not do, the Soviet "world revolution" cannot win. Strategically, even if the Soviets neutralized the United States and created a large militant force in North America, they could not take over because the United States would be inaccessible to the Red Army. Regarding nuclear weapons, even if the Soviets preventively destroyed most of the U.S. strategic forces, a feeble American nuclear response could endanger the Kremlin. The risk exceeds the possible gain— until the time when U.S. retaliation is no longer feasible.

Yet granting that the commitment to the world revolution has weakened, this change — not in outlook but in emotional intensity — is by no means irreversible. The present Soviet leadership inevitably will be replaced and its successors may be more firmly committed to world revolution; contrariwise, a new leadership could liberate itself further from the imprint of communist ideology. There also is the possibility that technological changes and major upsets in relative armament levels — specifically, imbalances of power — could usher in a period during which concepts such as global conquest are more meaningful than they have been. Thus, if there is a certain easing of the situation, this may simply be a temporary pause. The behavior of contemporary rulers cannot be predicted, let alone that of future strategists. Some of the elements that may prove to be decisive in the Soviet equation remain unknown. Whether or not the Soviets have forsaken nuclear war cannot be determined from the attitudes they held when they were too weak to win such a war. The minimum purpose of their armament programs certainly has been that they want to keep *all* options open, including the option of nuclear attack.

III

Another major change is that during the last decade the developing Soviet economy has broken through the limits imposed upon it by the planning bureaucracy. On the one hand, one of the worst products of Stalinist economics, the *kolkhoz* system, remains in the USSR, although most satellites have abolished it. On the other hand, the provision according to which the *kolkhoznik* could not leave the collective farm without official permission is no longer enforced. Hence the young have been released from *kolkhoz* serfdom. Children, women and old people do the agricultural work as the rural population dwindles.

This situation denotes an unintended change. But the government has carried out a number of small *de jure* changes, and has acknowledged that the peasants must earn enough money. As a result, prices of agricultural products have risen and the private sector of farming has grown, both legally and surreptitiously. Above all, the private marketing of agricultural produce is allowed to proceed under the fiction that the peasants sell only what they produce on their own private plots. If this were true, those plots would be far larger than permitted by law; it is more likely that some features of capitalist marketing have crept into the collective farm system — that centerpiece of Soviet socialism.

Underground capitalism manifests itself in numerous ways, especially in black marketing in virtually all commodities and in such sectors as services, repairs and maintenance. Through this underground capitalism Soviet citizens earn more money than most people in the Free World realize, and enjoy some of the amenities of life. A new economic upper- and upper-middle class is emerging; these people, rather than the plant managers about whom much has been written, represent the new trends in the USSR. This "class" is prominently engaged in internal and external trade, and it wields influence, if only because many of its members hold several jobs concurrently. Plant managers, foremen and other industrial personnel, often in an illicit although profitable manner, are involved in this underground capitalism, partly because the planning machinery would halt if it were not lubricated by the initiatives of "capitalistic" wheelers and dealers.

Because the Soviet authorities do not acknowledge the existence of underground capitalism, many transactions and their resulting gains are not reported. Soviet statistics are unreliable not only because they overstate much of the industrial output and report in terms of an imaginary price system, but because they understate economic activity which, according to the doctrine, cannot exist.

Similar doctrinal blindness or mendacity was illustrated recently in another field by the Soviet academician, Isaac I. Mints, who issued a statement on anti-Semitism in the USSR. He argued that there is no anti-Semitism because under the new social system, with its overwhelming success, there cannot be any. Likewise, a public health expert wrote in a UN publication that no drug problem exists in the USSR where all major social problems had been solved, and then proceeded to explain the Soviet system of drug control. Moreover, a Soviet police officer attended an Interpol meeting at Paris to inquire about border control techniques — Tashkent, it seems, is full of Chinese heroin. Yes, drugs and anti-

Semites, and probably anti-communists, exist in the USSR, along with underground capitalism — and even pollution.

Whether or not those are the horsemen of the communist apocalypse, it also must be noted that centralized planning is gradually becoming irrelevant as the civilian market expands and as the Soviet economy moves from the primary to the tertiary areas of economic activity. The portion of the Soviet economy that is placed under the planning bureaucracy appears to be steadily shrinking relative to the portion handled outside that apparatus. Mao Tse-tung once said that if coercion and terror were removed from the economic system, capitalism would restore itself spontaneously. This is perhaps the most succinct refutation of socialism and the best justification for the free market system ever presented. We are witnessing this phenomenon in the USSR today — it is one of the trends Mao is complaining about. But there does not seem to be a return route to socialist centralization available. The limits and functions of planning must be redefined and the private sector must be acknowledged and secured, or the Soviet economy will decline.

The free market is spreading far more slowly in the USSR than in Eastern Europe, where experimentation with "socialist market economics" is in full swing. But it may soon be accelerated, for example, when automobiles appear in large numbers and their concomitant needs for roads, gasoline, repairs, replacements, used car shops, gasoline stations, motels, hotels and insurance drive the "planners" to distraction.

It cannot be said that these revolutionary trends in the Soviet economy have reflected revolutionary changes in the thinking of the Soviet bureaucracy. On the contrary, while problems pile up and the theoreticians elaborate new schemes, the leadership remains indecisive about economic reforms. In the economic arena the Soviet leaders lack willpower, and no wonder: some of the many surgical interventions that are becoming imperative would invalidate portions of their ideology, while others would endanger their tenure in office. Whatever the reason, they have not exhibited the same degree of willpower that Lenin displayed when he liquidated war communism and replaced it with the New Economic Policy. Still, it may be too early to judge and perhaps the situation calls for many small projects rather than one big reform operation.

Foreign trade is *one* economic area about which Soviet leaders have acted with remarkable realism. Under Stalin, foreign trade and treason were nearly synonymous. Trade was always the planner's last resort and was to be held to an irreducible minimum. This view is still in circulation, although during the last decade Soviet foreign trade grew by almost double the GNP rate, and it has now reached the considerable volume of more than $20 billion annually. The Kremlin has recognized that foreign trade is an indispensable requisite of economic progress, and Soviet trade planners have developed programs for their growing imports.

The USSR still is largely exporting raw materials, but trade officials realize that ultimately she will have to compete in finished products. The Soviets also know that to function as major exporters of industrial goods they must become competitive in costs, must exercise quality control, and must provide efficient maintenance and replacement services. Moreover, they need market-oriented price and distribution systems, and, consequently, must allow direct buyer-to-seller and seller-to-buyer contacts. All of this requires considerable change in the structures and procedures of the Soviet economy, and substantial revisions of the central planning system. As the volume of international trade continues to increase, these by-products of international trade will have a growing impact on the Soviet economy as a whole. Hence, while the major reform decisions have yet to be reached, the fact that foreign trade is being stressed suggests that they are in the making. The benefits of foreign trade are usually proportional to a multiple (K) of the GNP percentage share of foreign trade; that is, if X is the GNP percentage accounted for by foreign trade, KX per cent will grow more rapidly than the rest of the national product. In the USSR, foreign trade will probably perform as a "multiplier of reform": the faster foreign trade grows, the more unavoidable major reforms will become. Yet before the reform gets under way, many ideological debates will have to be fought and economic chaos will have to be prevented.

IV

In the cultural field censorship prevails, and it operates with a heavy hand, in accordance with the uninspired criteria of policemen and ideologues. Reports on writers who have been consigned to forced labor camps or psychiatric clinics or kept incommunicado are still coming in. The musicians are still handicapped, the painters remain underground, and in February 1971 Soviet leaders resorted to trickery to prevent a London exhibit of modern Russian art from displaying pieces they disliked. One wonders what returns the Kremlin expects from the persecution of art and from the espousal of artistic values similar to Hitler's.

Despite the bleak cultural scene, however, from time to time Soviet citizens speak up, some of them even on Red Square. There also is the institution of *samizdat,* or self-publishing, which is another manifestation of free enterprise. Interestingly enough, Russian intellectuals who manage to get their works published turn out to be perfect products of the Soviet dictatorship; that is, they are principled and sophisticated anti-communists. Several men have managed to have their manuscripts smuggled abroad. Some have achieved world fame and even earned Nobel prizes. Of course, the little *chinovniks* (bureaucrats) intruded, and the laureates were not allowed to accept their honors. The Soviets' pettiness and stupidity in not publishing the works of their best writers at home and then subjecting them to persecution is almost beyond belief.

One may ask, how could the authors' works be smuggled abroad? For one thing, there is now a great deal of travel and controls have beome lax. For another, the international telephone is in operation. Curiously, some smuggling seems to be done with the complicity of Soviet authorities, especially the KGB. Even Khrushchev had his memoirs smuggled abroad, and the best information is that the KGB was responsible for this piece of free enterprise. One would think a former Prime Minister and First Secretary of the Party would be able to publish his books in his own country. But Khrushchev made a few remarks about freedom and Soviet policies that seemed to be unacceptable to the present leaders. Yet some of them must have agreed with him, or else the KGB would have stopped the publication of his book.

If the former number one man smuggles his memoirs into the hostile capitalist world, if he is helped by the security police which would normally be expected to stop this sort of thing but reportedly made a lot of money in the transaction, and if in those memoirs the former First Secretary deviates from the official ideology and his own earlier preachings, the "unhappy consciousness" which Bukharin described back in 1938 must have infected and confused the entire leadership. When such a situation prevails, fundamental changes *are in the offing.*

V

The conflict between Moscow and Peking has been the most ominous and unexpected development for Soviet security in the past twenty years. Initially I did not take this conflict too seriously. After all, communists always quarrel and their doctrine of dialectics allows them to argue that when they are fighting each other they are really "cooperating" in furthering the world revolution. I never believed that this conflict was unreal. I only assumed that ideology would be strong enough on both sides to preserve unity. A common faith can heal many differences, but history also shows that states operating under the same creed often become the deadliest of enemies.

I have now concluded that the conflict does not rage merely between the party leaders in Peking and Moscow, or between the two parties. It is a conflict of a fundamental nature in which ideology plays a secondary role to geopolitics. It would not be difficult to show that the ideologies of the two parties have now diverged to such a degree that it would be appropriate to discuss an ideological conflict, too. The chief differences, however, deal with demography, nationality questions, boundaries, resources and strategic necessities. The longer the conflict lasts, the more intractable it will be, especially if the non-Chinese and non-Russian populations of Central Asia become activated.

The basic imbalance rests on the fact that east of the Yenisei River, and particularly east of Lake Baikal, the USSR is, for all practical purposes, empty. Yet there are substantial resources in this vast territory which the Soviets will need in the *distant* future, and which the Chinese, whose raw material base is rather scant, will urgently need in the *near* future. Peking has unashamedly asked for some of these territories, on the justified grounds that the czars took them from China. The geo-demographic situation looks bleak for the Soviets because they have insufficient manpower to populate the eastern areas which the Chinese covet.

If the Chinese were to move north across the Amur, Soviet access to the Pacific would be blocked. If the conflict activates the Turkestani Turks and enables them to achieve independence, Soviet world power would be diminished. If both events occur, the Soviet imperium would be transformed into a Russian national state augmented, perhaps, by a few non-Russian Slavs, Balts and Caucasians.

I do not imply that such a vision is prophetic. But the Soviets are highly nervous about their enormous strategic weakness in the Far East, which in the long run determines their empire's survival. For some eighty years the Far East has been the most active theater of international strategic confrontation. This area is the Soviets'

Achilles heel. They are trying desperately to strengthen themselves in the Far East by building sea communications between the western and eastern parts of the USSR, and by trying to persuade the Japanese to give them a hand in developing the economic resources in Soviet East Asia. Soviet-Japanese conversations on this point have lagged because the multiple question remains: whose manpower will be used, whose capital will be invested, whose profits will be maximized?

The Soviets lack the manpower. The Japanese will not move substantial numbers of people into Siberia because they do not have that much manpower to spare. So, aside from the Koreans, only the Chinese are available. But if the Chinese are needed to develop the resources, they also will be needed to operate them. Thus, it is obvious that once invited in, the Chinese will never move out; if they were forced out, the area would revert to being a wilderness.

And where would the capital come from? The USSR and Japan do not have enough for adequate investments. Hence a real and fast buildup of the Soviet Far East does not now appear to be possible.

This dilemma in the Far East illustrates the rather unmanageable situation in which the Soviets suddenly find themselves. When a crucial resource such as manpower is lacking in an area that is desired by an opponent which has a vast surplus of eager manpower, there is little freedom of strategic action left, especially if technological expedients are blocked by capital shortages.

This trouble was aggravated when the Chinese began acquiring nuclear weapons. True, they do not have an ICBM; they have barely started deploying medium-range missiles; most of their aircraft are of old vintage; their ground forces lack mobility — the list of weaknesses could be lengthened. But it is also true that the Sino-Soviet border is about 4,500 miles long and can be defended, even against obsolete aircraft and first-generation missiles, only if astronomical resources are invested in defensive systems. The USSR felt constrained, during 1970, to deploy something like one-half of her ground strength against China, and she augmented this formidable force by nuclear systems capable of delivering more than a thousand bombs and warheads. All this against a China everybody agrees is still weak!

The secret is this: virtually all cities and installations in Siberia east of Novosibirsk and in the Turkic Union Republics, including

Uzbekistan with Tashkent, are situated within a few hundred miles of the Chinese borders and therefore are subject to surprise attack at short range. If the Siberian towns were wiped out they probably could not be rebuilt, at least not by *Russians,* who have no demographic reserves and no hinterland in the area. This means that with a relatively light attack of 100 to 200 nuclear weapons the Chinese could eliminate the Russian presence in most of Siberia.

Granted, the Soviets could effectively retaliate against China. But what guarantee does the Kremlin have that Peking will not launch a nuclear first strike regardless of its impact on China? Where is the silver lining for Moscow in a dismal situation in which the Chinese Maoists will have several hundred long-range missiles of reasonable accuracy and the surrounding world, especially the United States, will still be intact and capable of intervening? Do the Soviets really enjoy freedom of action against NATO and the United States, when their Asian flank is unprotected against Chinese nuclear weapons and a demographic deluge? Mao may or may not want to provoke a Soviet-American war, but can Moscow risk a strike against the West, even *if* it again receives Peking's promise to honor the Sino-Soviet alliance? The least that can be said is that Maoist decisions are unpredictable and that they are not planned by the rationality of game theorists. Maoist strategies are uncertain; the vulnerability of the eastern USSR is a fact.

Whatever the global intentions of the Chinese communists, they want to build up China as a world power. Their ambitions extend to the historical borders of China and to the domination of all of her neighbors. This objective is perhaps less-than-global, but it involves about half of the world's population and the geographic heartland of the earth. In any event, the Chinese need Southeast Asia, which they might rule indirectly, and they need eastern Siberia, which they must try to possess.

There are two solutions for the USSR. First, the Soviets may decide to erect a defensive system strong enough to stop a nuclear surprise attack. The costs of this undertaking are sufficiently high so that their other strategic ambitions would have to be curtailed, especially if the standards of living are to rise. Second, the USSR may launch a preventive strike against the Chinese nuclear *dispositif* and in the process partition China by taking from her Manchuria, the northern tier of provinces and Tibet. Those areas could be made "independent" like East Germany, and some could be annexed, but the partition of China would have to be maintained indefinitely.

If they were to try this gambit, the Soviets would be bogged down in an interminable ground and counterguerrilla conflict. Of course, they could restrict themselves simply to knocking out China's nuclear installations but, presumably, this sort of operation would have to be repeated several times to keep the Chinese disarmed. Yet even the first "surgical" strike would force the Chinese to change their internal and external policies drastically and to re-establish security on a novel international basis. In the long run and given continued Sino-Soviet hostility, China must seek strong protection, preferably from a well-armed U.S.-Japanese alliance. If, however, the USSR succeeds in enlisting Japan on her side, China's turn toward the United States would become inevitable for any government in Peking that downgrades ideology and upgrades pragmatism.

Inevitably, outside powers would react to, and participate in, the Sino-Soviet duel, and the USSR, while trying to insure the partition of China, would also have to maintain the partition of Germany. The alternatives and perspectives remind me of Haushofer, and none are pleasant for anyone. But will the USSR resign herself to a defensive strategy which implies that the Kremlin, like Wotan in Walhalla, must just sit there and wait for the end?

Unexpectedly for almost everybody, the USSR, which is still pursuing offensives all over the world, is being pushed into a predicament of self-preservation. The East has always been Russia's vulnerable and dangerous flank. The trouble may be mitigated by establishing better relations with Peking. Such relations may be attainable but they cannot change the geopolitical facts. Perhaps the two countries will discover that their mutual interests, even their divergent geopolitical requirements, will be best served by cooperation. But, unfortunately, there are no visible solutions.

The old strategic situation in which two so-called superpowers confronted one another is no more; it is a three-power nuclear game now. In this game, the Chinese are the weakest player, but the Soviets are in the worst trouble. The three-power game will inevitably become more complicated when the Japanese and the Germans find that their vital interests are at stake. In the meantime, it seems that "communism as usual" will linger until the Kremlin decides either to change its fundamental policies or to launch a desperate attack.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD IN THE 1970'S

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

ON June 7, 1969, Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, enunciated what is likely to be in the decade ahead the underlying Soviet approach toward the Third World, particularly toward Asia and the Middle East. The occasion was the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow, a meeting Soviet leaders had finally succeeded in convening after almost six frustrating years of cajoling and pressuring foreign communist parties. After ritualistically warning of the continued danger from the forces of "imperialism" (i. e., the West), Brezhnev dwelt on the increased importance of the nonaligned developing countries, noting that "the fighters for national liberation and social emancipation in the countries of Asia and Africa comprise one of the most important and active contingents of the worldwide anti-imperialist front."[1] He observed with satisfaction the "considerable changes" wrought in the 1960's in the "alignment of forces in that part of the world" and the "socialist orientation" of a number of new nations now following the noncapitalist path of development—changes made possible by "cooperation between the progressive young states and the socialist countries."

Turning to the dangers besetting the unity of the international communist movement, Brezhnev, contrary to the expectations of most of the delegates, bitterly attacked Communist China. Denouncing Peking's "splitting activities," its "feverish military preparations" and its "fanning of chauvinistic feelings" hostile to the Soviet Union, he condemned the Chinese communist leadership for pursuing an adventurist policy that threatened not only the unity of the international communist movement but all "peaceloving" nations as well. Brezhnev then made a proposal, yet to be elaborated, whose general substance indicated a new Soviet priority in the Third World:

> The burning problems of the current international situation do not conceal from our view longer-term tasks, namely, the creation of a system of

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[1] *International Affairs* (Moscow), July 1969, pp. 20-21.

> collective security in areas of the globe where the dangers of another world war, of armed conflicts, is concentrated. Such a system is the best replacement for the existing military-political groupings. . . .
>
> We are of the opinion that the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.[2]

The timing and the thrust of Brezhnev's speech suggest a major Soviet diplomatic effort to isolate Communist China in Asia. The subsequent absence of any mention of China on the list of countries that might be included in the "system of collective security" must be assumed to be deliberate. Ties between Moscow and Peking have worn thin indeed. Moscow undoubtedly hopes for improved relations after Mao's death (they could scarcely get much worse). However, it does not appear nearly as interested in making concessions to China as it does in enticing Japan economically and in strengthening India economically and militarily while simultaneously improving relations with all the key countries of South Asia; and Soviet strategy in the Middle East and Africa is directed as much to countering the anticipated Chinese challenge in the coming decade as it is to consolidating the political gains of the past decade.

The reaction in Asia has been noncommittal, with each country gingerly interpreting the Brezhnev proposal in the light of its own national objectives.[3] Moscow possibly misread the immediacy of Asian fears of China out of its own obsessive preoccupations; it perhaps underestimated the importance of residual regional animosities. Certainly, Moscow does not intend to push for any formal military pacts — at least not in the near future. The Kremlin is unlikely, at a time when U.S. military alliances in Asia and the Middle East are weakening, to seek to substitute alliances with the Soviet Union for those with the United States, although the aim is an anti-Chinese coalition. Moscow has achieved too much from the loosening of formal alignments to urge ties that would repolarize alignments at this time.

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[2] *Ibid.* In retrospect we can identify instances where other Soviet officials made remarks that presaged the Brezhnev speech: for example, on March 19, 1969, New Delhi Radio reported P. Reshetov, a visiting member of the Soviet Peace Committee, as suggesting, in response to a question, the formation of a common front "of the peaceloving peoples of the Soviet Union, India, and Burma against the adventurist policies of the Chinese government"; on May 30, 1969, Premier Alexei Kosygin said during a visit to Pakistan that he would like "to see Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and the other states of this region developing relations of friendship and constructive cooperation with each other. For its part, the Soviet Union will do everything in its power to encourage this."

[3] Peter Howard, "A System of Collective Security," *Mizan*, July-August 1969, pp. 199-204.

There is yet another dimension to the Brezhnev proposal that is as important as the anti-Chinese one: namely, the USSR's implied readiness to assume additional leadership and burdens should the United States retreat from its massive involvement in the Third World, especially in Asia. What the United States is ready to relinquish, the Soviet Union is willing to assume. The Nixon Doctrine proclaims a diminution of direct American involvement in the world at large:

> Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.[4]

In the Third World especially, the Nixon Doctrine and periodic restatements of it have been interpreted to mean that the United States intends to reduce her economic and military commitments and involvements. The Viet Nam war is grinding down, and America's direct involvement is being systematically reduced. Domestic turmoil and problems mean that a larger piece of the governmental pie must be set aside for domestic programs, and no President can now contemplate a major military involvement abroad except in defense of commitments that American public opinion may consider vital. This means lean years ahead for Asia and Africa: U.S. economic assistance will be harder to obtain; military equipment and aid will be distributed with greater parsimony; and pro-Western elites will have to think twice about relying too heavily on U.S. support in local upheavals.

Not unexpectedly, Soviet commentators profess not to see any change in United States foreign policy, dismissing President Nixon's pronouncements as "just a wordy camouflage to cover up the new methods of achieving the same goal of establishing military and economic control over the rich natural and manpower resources" of the Third World. They contend that if there is anything new in the Nixon Doctrine, it is the attempt to foster "more active utilization of other countries for the purposes of achieving the military and political goals of the U.S.A."[5] But behind *Pravda's* measured attacks, Soviet leaders are no doubt assessing the significance of a reduced American presence in Asia, and possibly in parts of the Middle East and Africa. If Moscow is groping for a diversified, low-cost strategy for expanding its presence into areas from which American commitments are being withdrawn, and for reinforcing its position as a major benefactor of key developing countries, the Brezhnev proposal could well be the articulation of its central outline.

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[4] *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace.* A Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 18, 1970, p. 5.

[5] *Pravda,* February 19, 1970.

A few essentials need reaffirming before we can speculate on Soviet policies in the Third World. Soviet leaders naturally accord primary attention to their core concerns: to national security, especially as it relates to the adversary relationship with the United States; to domestic problems; to preservation of their imperial system in Eastern Europe; to wary participation in moves to improve relations with Western Europe, whose economic progress is both a threat and an attraction; and to the challenge of Communist China. Beyond these broad considerations Soviet policy will be affected by unanticipated opportunities and dilemmas that arise from developments in the Third World, by the state of superpower relationships elsewhere, and by bureaucratic political infighting within the Soviet leadership.

THE CASE FOR A FORWARD STRATEGY

There is every reason to assume that the Soviet Union will pursue a "forward strategy" in the Third World in the 1970's. As with any strategy, it will be the resultant of pressures and projections. The developing countries contiguous or nearly contiguous to the underbelly of the USSR are militarily more salient to the calculations of planners in Moscow than they are to those in Washington. A belt of friendly states on its "southern tier" is not a marginal goal for the Soviet Union. What the West considers as evidence of Soviet globalist aims, Moscow perceives as the proper exercise of its superpower status. A "superpower" can no longer be defined solely in terms of technological and nuclear capability; also implied in the word is the will to maximize its presence in an expanding network of areas and relationships.

Whereas the United States is essentially a status-quo power, the Soviet Union is not, because it believes that it is entitled to a far greater measure of participation in the evolution and management of the nation-state system lying beyond its immediate borders. This belief is nourished by increments in power, by the nature of great power rivalries, and by the economic needs of an expanding industrial society. To Soviet political leaders, the advent of the nuclear and missile age has not made obsolete the time-honored principle of defense in depth. Contemporary international politics may regard classical imperial expansionism as unacceptable, but that in no way diminishes the imperial impetus of the superpowers to cultivate and guide an assemblage of smaller nations with the aim of strengthening their own military, political and economic viability.

The détentist argument makes too much of the absence in the Soviet-American relationship of any unsatiated territorial grievance, which is an important but not controlling consideration; it reduces the rivalry of the superpowers to that of two competing nation-states instead of two imperial systems with global interests and aims that seriously conflict, and it seeks support from the persuasive but dubious notion of "convergence." Historically, competing imperial systems have rarely quarreled merely over real estate. The roots of their conflicts have been deeply set in irreconcilable ambitions and conceptions for organizing and preserving a stable imperium. In a sense, ours is the most fortunate of eras. Although it is overshadowed by the specter of a nuclear holocaust, there is a greater readiness to attribute a basic rationality to the behavior of one's major rival — an attribution implying that the rival does not want an Armageddon and hence will not push too far into the core areas of the other. But because the parameters of the Soviet and American imperiums are not clearly marked in the Third World, as they are in Europe, and because the alignments and attitudes of key Third World countries are in flux at a time when the superpowers also are reappraising their ambitions and interests, the likelihood of Soviet expansion and American response increases. The Third World is a region in which superpower competition may be waged, with minimum risk of a major war and for marginal advantages that can have important consequences for matters nearer the heart of Soviet-American rivalry, such as the viability of NATO, the future of the SALT talks, and the type of relationship each develops with Japan, China and Germany.

If there is a serious flaw in the assumptions underlying the evaluations of the "détentists," there is also one in the position of the strategists of deterrence. Noting the existence of a condition of general nuclear and missile "sufficiency" between the Soviet Union and the United States, and assuming that neither party could manage a first-strike attack without risking at least equal and intolerable damage in return, the deterrent school places a premium on maintaining this mutual balance of terror. The result is a tendency to dismiss or depreciate the utility of political incrementalism; marginal gains become less salient to policymakers, especially if the outlay required, however modest, is begrudged by inward-oriented leaders, and if the dividends are at best uncertain. More and more, American policy seems to minimize the value of the politics of incrementalism and to underestimate the danger of thereby contributing inadvertently to the disintegration of alliances and established relationships. It is especially difficult to sustain the case for incrementalism when the competition among the various bureaucracies for diminishing allocations is intensifying. However, there are few indications that the leaders in the Kremlin plan to curtail sharply expenditures to key Third World countries.

In the past few years, and particularly since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, American planners have been concerned over the Soviet Union's vast program of naval expansion, for which there are, of course, cogent military reasons. For example, a report on Soviet naval capability recently published in Great Britain identified five tasks the Soviet navy has been assigned "to defend the homeland":

> 1) to counter the Polaris submarines; 2) to neutralize the strike carriers prior to aircraft launch; 3) to contribute to the Soviet Union's strategic delivery capability; 4) to gain command of the four fleet areas, particularly the Baltic, Black and Barents Seas; 5) to provide maritime flank support for land operations along the coastal axes.[6]

From Moscow's point of view accomplishment of these tasks would justify the expenditures entailed.

Moreover, the Soviet navy has begun to play a political role in Soviet diplomacy, and it could be used to advantage in establishing a greater Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf, East Africa and the Indian Ocean. In the Mediterranean it has already limited, or at least raised the cost of, American options for intervention. It is also a valuable prop for shaky clients, serving to stiffen the resolve of anti-Western elites who may be emboldened to pursue radical courses they would have been deterred from had Western power predominated in the area. Syria, the Sudan, Libya, possibly even the United Arab Republic and Iraq, are illustrative examples. Certainly, Soviet propaganda has made much of the benefits to the Arabs of the Soviet naval presence.[7] Moscow is also using its naval power as an instrument of foreign policy to buttress emerging propensities toward less engaged alignments and more obvious nonalignment on the part of previously pro-Western partisans. In a word, the Soviet Union is using sea power in the classic way, as an arm of diplomacy, to attain political goals. If and when the Suez Canal is reopened – and this must be reckoned a prime Soviet aim in the Middle East – it is reasonable to assume that the USSR will become more active in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Although current Western assessments rest heavily on the assumption that "the main reason for an increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is primarily not to challenge Western interests but to support India against China and more generally to counter growing Chinese influence in both Asia and Africa,"[8] the leverage can quickly be given an anti-Western twist.

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[6] *The Times* (London), October 13, 1970.

[7] A not untypical commentary: "What is the reason for this clamor among the

THE DIPLOMACY OF BENEVOLENT SELF-INTEREST

Since 1955 Soviet courtship of the Third World, with few exceptions, has been a skillful blend of opportunism, largesse and salesmanship. Through a readiness to provide military equipment and economic assistance the USSR has established itself as an indispensable benefactor of such key countries as India and the United Arab Republic, and as a welcomed participant in the nation-building activities of such countries as Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and the Sudan. (Cuba is perhaps unique and will not be discussed here because Latin America, as a region, is low on the Soviet list of priorities.) Soviet ideologues continually try to cluster recipients and targets of Moscow's attention into ideologically-contrived typologies for reasons appertaining to the dynamics of intra-communist-world politics and the methodological compulsions of Soviet Marxist-Leninist political analysis, but Soviet leaders approach opportunities and dilemmas in piecemeal, pragmatic fashion, ever alert to pitfalls and rewards, and with an incisive understanding of *Realpolitik*.

Shrewd opportunism, not ideology, has been the impelling force behind Soviet behavior. Perceiving openings for penetrating the Third World and for exploiting the flaws in the Western network of alliances, Soviet leaders embarked on an ambitious course. Stint-

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ranks of the imperialist naval sharks? The fact is that they know the presence of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean will paralyze the attempts of the United States Sixth Fleet to carry out its designs against the Arabs." Moscow Radio in Arabic, October 12, 1968.

[8] *The Times* (London), September 15, 1970.

ing neither on economic aid nor military equipment, they took advantage of Western bungling and the systemic realignments in the Third World. Two purposes underlay Soviet policy: (1) to undermine the Western international system; (2) to intrude a permanent presence into areas which had previously been outside the realm of Soviet capabilities.

The more closely one examines Soviet diplomacy, the more one is impressed by the flexibility and opportuneness of its responses to the peculiarities of each situation. Thus, the inability of Nasser to acquire arms in the West and the unwillingness of the United States to finance the Aswan Dam provided the Soviets with rare opportunities, which they seized, in 1955 and again in 1956 for boldly moving into the Middle East. The economic assistance extended to India from 1955 on, the welcomed diplomatic support for India's position on Kashmir (until 1966), the alignment with the Indians (after an initial uncertainty) against the Chinese in 1962, the extensive and impressive military assistance given since 1965 — all these have served to make friendship with the Soviet Union a cornerstone of Indian foreign policy and to move the USSR, for the first time in its imperial history, into the forefront of developments on the Indian subcontinent. Less dramatic but no less important links have been forged with other key developing countries. Descriptions abound of Soviet economic and military assistance. But we know little about the actual leverage this has given Moscow, despite the abundance of informed speculation.

In general, Moscow has courted three categories of developing countries: first, those that adhere to nonalignment and maintain friendly, even dependent, relations with the USSR, often with a tinge of anti-Westernism congenial to Moscow; second, the swing states that are formally nonaligned but that have shifted, as a result of the vagaries of internal leadership changes, from an obviously pro-Soviet leaning to one more pleasing to the West, and which presumably can one day swing as quickly back to Moscow; and third, those countries that are formally aligned to the West but whose alignment has weakened in ways assiduously encouraged by Moscow. Clearly, any Soviet leadership will strive to improve relations with the countries in the latter two categories in the hope of nudging them into the first category. Congenial neutralization rather than communization is Moscow's aim in the 1970's. In this the Soviet Union is motivated more by traditional balance of power considerations than by ideologically engendered drives, more by its needs as the hub of an established but restive imperial system than by any compulsion to spread communism. Gradualism, not revolution, typifies the Soviet style.

India and the United Arab Republic are foremost among the nonaligned countries in which Moscow has invested heavily. Each is strategically and politically important in a region vital to the USSR. The details of the Soviet courtship have been amply catalogued by Western scholars; Moscow has demonstrated the premium it places on reinforcing its relationship with them. Though of lesser intrinsic significance, Afghanistan and Syria are also prime targets of Soviet attention. Moscow wants them nonaligned, friendly toward the USSR and outside the Western defense system. Brezhnev's proposal for an Asian collective security system had its antecedents in the Soviet success at Tashkent in January 1966, when Moscow effectively interposed its presence into a situation of delicate balance. If it could improve Indo-Pakistani relations, Moscow could begin to realize its dream of a land route, linking Soviet Central Asia to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan, thereby eliminating the inconveniences and expenses incurred by the closing of the Suez Canal and enormously enhancing its prospects for penetrating the subcontinent.

The chameleon-like character of many nonaligned leaderships makes them politically suspect. They are weak reeds with which to build sustaining political relationships. Moscow has never been comfortable with nonalignment. Despite Khrushchev's official scrapping of the two-camp thesis, and his enunciation of the "zone of peace" concept, with its implicit acceptance of a transitional role for developing countries trying to build "socialism," and despite frequent laudatory statements about the value of nonalignment in opposing "imperialism," Soviet leaders have, in practice, treated nonalignment with reserve and suspicion. There are a number of reasons for this.[9] Moscow does not believe in the abolition of blocs or alliances; it sees nonaligned countries as a vast potential strategical reserve in the global struggle with the West rather than as intrinsically autonomous entities capable of playing an independent role in world affairs; and it has yet to accept the proposition that a country can be both "socialist" (in its parlance, pro-Soviet and with a communist vanguard) and nonaligned.

Nonetheless, Soviet leaders have learned to tailor their tactical relationships with those nonaligned countries whose internal political inconstancies require frequent adjustments. Moscow is apparently willing to sustain a modicum of assistance to insure that these countries remain committed to an essentially nonaligned course, even though they may on occasion veer more toward the West than it would like. But, then, there is always the possibility that such countries as Indonesia, Ghana, Burma and Guinea will again become more pro-Soviet. Moscow has adapted its diplomacy not merely to forestall a full swing to the West, but to safeguard as much of the Soviet stake as possible and to lessen the likelihood of a pro-Chinese orientation developing.

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[9] See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 307-309.

Soviet policy toward Indonesia is illustrative. When Sukarno moved closer to Peking during the 1961-1965 period, relations between Djakarta and Moscow cooled. After the abortive communist coup in September 1965 and Sukarno's subsequent deposal, Indonesia turned to the West, although retaining her nonaligned credentials. Attempts to improve relations with Moscow languished for a while in the wake of Indonesian criticisms of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. But by August 1970 Moscow and Djakarta agreed on an economic protocol which called for a rescheduling of Indonesia's indebtedness on terms as generous as those offered by the Western countries. There are even signs that Moscow may reinstitute a program of limited economic assistance in the hope of encouraging Indonesia to maintain her nonaligned status and of affording itself some political access and leverage.

Notwithstanding the considerable attention that has been devoted to Soviet policy toward nonaligned India and the United Arab Republic, from Moscow's point of view the Soviet Union has achieved its greatest strategic-political triumph in the Third World in the changed policies of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan — countries still formally aligned with the West but increasingly pursuing a *de facto* policy of nonalignment, including a conscious effort to improve relations with the USSR. In the mid-1950's Moscow vaulted over the alliance system organized by John Foster Dulles to penetrate the Arab world, in part to undermine the West's predominance there, but perhaps even more importantly, as seen in retrospect, to outflank and weaken the network of Western military bases along its "southern tier." Its successes here must be acknowledged as in themselves amply repaying Soviet efforts in the 1960's. Moscow will no doubt persist in its benevolent courtship even more diligently in the 1970's.

The détente with Iran, for example, began in 1962, when the Shah indicated that he would not permit the United States to establish military bases or missile installations on Iranian territory, even though Iran would remain formally a member of CENTO. In 1965, the Shah visited the Soviet Union. A long-term economic agreement with the USSR was concluded in April 1966, and modified upward in April 1967. Under its terms, Iran agreed to provide the USSR with deliveries of natural gas up to a total of twenty billion cubic meters annually, as well as Iranian oil, and to build the trans-Iranian Gas Trunkline (IGAT) from the Agha Jari field in south Iran to Astara on the Soviet border; in return Moscow undertook to build a $350 million steel complex at Isfahan, a $200 million machine tool plant, several grain storage elevators and 250 miles of the natural gas pipeline.[10]

Political suspicions remain, but the USSR has astutely promoted a degree of nonalignment in Iran's diplomatic stance and a level of economic cooperation which would have been deemed inconceivable ten, or even five, years ago. Though less pronounced, tangible measures of Soviet achievement can also be discerned in the cases of Turkey and Pakistan, where prospects must be judged most promising.[11] Certainly, Western planners must anticipate an improved Soviet relationship with these countries, with a consequent further deterioration in the utility of CENTO and SEATO.

THE NONSALIENCE OF IDEOLOGY TO BEHAVIOR

During the mid-1950's and early 1960's, as Moscow embarked on its ambitious courtship of the Third World and scored notable successes, there was an upsurge of Soviet optimism concerning prospects for revolutionary socialist transformations. Soviet ideologues had a field day. Through "creative" reinterpretations of Marxist-Leninist tenets, they attempted to set the changes within the Third World in an all-encompassing ideological framework that would both explain the evolving relationships and legitimize, in Marxist-Leninist terms, the course of Soviet diplomacy. Thus, the "zone of peace" concept in 1956 justified support for nonaligned developing countries; and the notions of the "national democratic state" (1960) and the "revolutionary democratic state" (1966-1967) explained the importance to the USSR of the "progressive," anti-Western nonaligned countries which were following a "noncapitalist path of development." These formulations sanctified ideologically the differentiated diplomacy pursued by the Soviet state.

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[10] See *Middle East Economic Survey,* April 21, 1967, p. 1, and September 12, 1969, pp. 1-2; and *The Financial Times,* October 30, 1970.

[11] Japan, which is outside the purview of this essay, is another key country whose links to the Western alliance system Moscow seeks to weaken in the years ahead. The Soviets hold out the allure of enormous economic opportunities for the exploitation of Siberian resources, but they are hampered by an unwillingness to return the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, north of Hokkaido, which the Soviet Union seized in 1945.

For a time in the early 1960's Soviet ideologues were able to group all the "national democratic states" according to some rough-and-convenient concordance of internal and external orientation. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Burma and Indonesia, for example, were regarded as militantly anti-imperialist, pro-Soviet in their foreign policy, congenial (sometimes) to local communists, and following a noncapitalist path of development in building socialism. They seemed promising candidates for the transition to "people's democracies." But internal convolutions and unpredictable nationalism have confounded the ideologists. The formulations remain, and perhaps some new wrinkles will be added as each new Soviet leadership seeks to lay claim to some ideological innovation.

The record of Soviet diplomacy in the Third World is proof, however, that practice transcends and precedes ideology. Soviet behavior toward the developing countries is now determined predominantly by hard calculations of strategic and political advantage, actual and potential. Having shed the confining isolationism of the Stalin era toward the Third World, and having pioneered at considerable cost a strategic presence for itself in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, Moscow is unlikely to jeopardize its bilateral relationships with developing countries out of any misgivings of an ideological character. It is concerned, as always, with the extension of Soviet influence, to the detriment if need be of prospects for local communist parties. Whatever legitimizing function ideology plays within the Soviet communist hierarchy, and whatever its importance as a medium for communication and conflict within the communist international system, ideology is not central to Soviet policy formulation toward developing countries; it is more a fig leaf of Western imagination than a determinant of Soviet policy in the Third World.

CHINA AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET STRATEGY

Moscow is obsessed with China. Since their quarrel surfaced, the colossi of communism have waged in the Third World an intense competition, bitter and embittering, which has acquired an impetus of its own; it further complicates the dilemmas under which they operate and the difficulties of negotiating an ideological and political cease-fire. The USSR presses a "forward strategy" in the Third World not merely because of U.S. retrenchment or out of a superpower urge to maximize influence, but also because of genuine concern over the challenge from Communist China. The Soviets may well be exaggerating the threat to them of Chinese inroads in Africa and Asia, in much the same way that the United States did the Soviet diplomatic offensive in the late 1950's and early 1960's. But they do view the Chinese threat in the Third World in the 1970's more ominously than do American planners.

To Moscow, Maoism poses a pernicious challenge because it seeks to make inroads in areas where Soviet diplomacy has established strong beachheads. Whereas the Chinese stridently press a militant anti-Western and anti-bourgeois line, which appeals to radical "out" groups in developing countries, the Soviets must steer a course between anti-Westernism and revolutionary irresponsibility that is acceptable to the "in" groups, which not only are not communist but which, in many cases, are firmly anti-communist in their internal affairs; whereas the Chinese can with impunity call for an "anti-capitalist" line, the Soviets find themselves supporting regimes that maintain strong economic ties to Western countries and that, although professing "socialism," are far from adopting a sociopolitical system Soviet ideologues can grace with such a descriptive; whereas the Chinese encourage armed resistance splinter groups in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, the Soviets are constrained by their superpower status from unequivocally supporting such activities; and whereas the Chinese, in general, seek to overthrow the status quo, the Soviets have a vested interest in its essential preservation.

THE LIMITS OF SOVIET INFLUENCEBUILDING

It would be difficult to devise a credible scenario improving on Moscow's current position in the Arab world, the "southern tier" and South Asia. Yet there are gnawing dilemmas. The Soviet Union no longer enjoys the advantages it had as a newcomer to the Third World in the late 1950's and 1960's: its hands are no longer without imperialist taint, having been sullied in quests for power in the Congo, Guinea, Ghana, Iraq, Kenya and Syria; its aid is still sought, but with mounting debt repayment schedules and innumerable "red elephants," the paeans to Soviet generosity and efficiency are heard less frequently; its feat of industrialization is widely admired, but there are few Third World leaders who retain any illusions about the applicability of the Soviet model to their own situation; its reserve toward nonalignment has occasioned heightened sensitivity to its brand of anti-Westernism; and its involvement in Third World politics has forced it to take sides in residual regional disputes, to the detriment of Moscow's capacity for expanding its influence. The period of the initial accumulation of influence having passed, Moscow now finds that future yields are costly, difficult and uncertain. The more it tries to exercise influence over the behavior of its beneficiaries and clients, the more it arouses nationalist resentment and resistance.

The Soviet Union faces serious problems in the coming decade in its relations with the key developing countries. But that it remains committed to a course of influencebuilding should not be doubted. Moscow has derived considerable benefits from its diplomacy in the Third World; it sees others within reach. The bars to further successes are many, and they inhere as much in the rigidity and authoritarianism of Soviet institutions and practices as in the resolve of Third World countries to remain independent. Nonetheless, ambition makes Moscow a formidable factor in the international affairs of the Afro-Asian world.

THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND THE UNITED STATES

by Harry G. Gelber

DURING the past decade the fluctuations in Sino-Soviet relations have become an important element in the global balance of power. As early as 1960 the unity of purpose and policy formerly thought to unite Moscow and Peking had clearly deteriorated. Since then their disputes have ranged from mild disagreements to armed clashes along their borders in Asia. This relationship and predictions about its future have greatly influenced the foreign and defense policies of Japan, the United States, the nations of South and Southeast Asia, and perhaps even of countries in Europe and the Middle East.

The dispute has deep historical roots. Expansion eastward into Siberia and toward the Pacific is one of the constant themes of Russian history. So is a general fear of the Tartars and, recently, the Chinese. Moscow claims to be the chief bastion of socialism in the world, and resents the Chinese political and ideological challenge to its pre-eminence. On the Chinese side there is the tradition of China as the center of the world in terms of which others define themselves and their policies. Against this background stands the resentment of China's helplessness from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, not to mention the difficulties the Chinese communists experienced because of Soviet mistakes before 1949.

Disagreement became open toward the end of the 1950's, with Chinese criticisms of the circumstances, and even more so the consequences for the world communist movement, of de-Stalinization. This was followed, in short order, by Peking's ideological challenge implied in the Great Leap Forward, and by Chinese resentment of Moscow's failure to back Peking on the issue of Quemoy and Matsu. The break became inevitable when the Soviets denounced the 1957 agreement under which they had promised to aid the Chinese nuclear program. By 1960 Moscow decided to recall large numbers of economic, scientific and technical specialists from China, with important adverse consequences for China's economic development.

During the next few years the dispute grew more acrimonious.

Ideological differences not only remained unbridged through several conferences, but merged into direct competition for the support of other communist parties. Bitter disagreements developed over the proper attitude toward the Third World, the strategic risks to be assumed in furthering socialism, and attitudes toward arms control and the United States. Peking blamed the start of the Cuban missile crisis on Soviet adventurism and its end on Soviet cowardice. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was evidence of Soviet-American collusion to maintain nuclear supremacy over all nations, including China. As the 1960's wore on, disputes arose over such state issues as the common frontier in Central and Eastern Asia and the attitude of each side to the minority groups beyond its borders. Armed clashes began to occur. U.S. involvement in Viet Nam further complicated the situation, with Moscow and Peking developing different attitudes toward it. By 1965-1966 the dispute had become a major factor in China's internal political affairs.[1] The Cultural Revolution accentuated official hostility to the USSR. These trends culminated in the March 1969 border clashes on the Ussuri.[2]

Whatever the causes of these clashes — and it seems likely that the first, on March 2, was due to Chinese initiative and the second to Soviet action — they constituted a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet response to the March 2 incident was immediate. Moscow emphasized that the USSR could and would be protected against an obviously unreasonable and aggressive China. At the same time, the communist commonwealth would have to be protected against Maoist excesses. This second line of argument had been underlined in Soviet strategic discussions before March 1969. Between the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and February 1969, much of the discussion of the Brezhnev Doctrine had focused on the legitimacy of protecting the "gains of socialism" in any one socialist country. The debate involved the applicability of the doctrine to China, in view of the threat to socialist gains posed by Mao's leftist deviationism.[3]

After March 2, Soviet public statements included pointed hints about the power of Soviet strategic forces, the need for the Soviet

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[1] Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate', 1965-1966," in Pingt-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, editors, *China in Crisis, Volume 2: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 23-71.

[2] See Thomas W. Robinson, *The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-6171-PR, August 1970); also Harry G. Gelber, "Limiting Factors in a Reconsideration of U.S. China Policies," ORBIS, Fall 1970.

[3] Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-63.

Union and her allies to wage a struggle on "a second front," and the militaristic and chauvinistic character of Maoist policies.[4] Soviet military leaders, including Marshal Grechko, explained that Peking posed major problems for Moscow.[5] Nor did Moscow confine itself to words. Minor border clashes continued. Some of them were almost certainly intended as Soviet warnings to Peking, especially those of June 11 and August 13 in Sinkiang, where the balance of forces on both sides of the border, the weaknesses of the Chinese supply and communication system, and local minority problems made China vulnerable. In August Moscow appointed a strategic missile officer, Colonel General V. Tolubku, as the new commander of the Far Eastern Military District. Shortly thereafter a new military command was formed along the Central Asian border. By late summer of 1969 the danger of full-scale war seemed quite real.

But the Soviets also left the Chinese with a line of retreat. According to Lin Piao, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin tried to telephone the Peking leaders on March 21. Eight days later Moscow proposed a revival of the border talks which had been broken off in 1964. An exchange of notes, beginning in April, led to border river navigation committee meetings in June and to an agreement in early August. The Soviets used Ho Chi Minh's funeral ceremonies to propose to China that high-level negotiations about the border should be held. On September 11 Kosygin met Chou En-lai in Peking, and on October 7 the Chinese announced their agreement to holding such talks.

II

From the Soviet point of view relations with China since 1960 had raised issues of critical importance. Not only had China become increasingly unfriendly, she had grown in strength and was well on her way toward becoming a nuclear power. If the Soviet Union wished to maintain her interests in Europe and the Middle East, preserve the unity of the communist group of nations, and maintain the global strategic balance with the United States, she could not afford, simultaneously, a confrontation with China. Moscow seems to have considered the border clashes as a suitable opportunity to press for a solution of the larger outstanding problem. It was, in any case, necessary to demonstrate that the Soviet leadership could not be pressured, to satisfy Russian patriotism, and to discourage possible East European assumptions about softness in Moscow. At the same time, Sino-American relations had deteriorated to a point where U.S. support for Peking, however oblique, seemed out of the question.[6]

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[4] Cf. *Red Star,* March 8, 1969 and April 1, 1969; *Kommunist,* No. 5, 1969 and No. 7, 1969; *New York Times,* March 26, 1969.

[5] *Pravda,* May 9, 1969.

Soviet policies in the summer of 1969 seem, therefore, to have had three possible aims. First, military and political pressures could be used to force China to concede a border agreement, possibly as part of a larger settlement favorable to Moscow. One difficulty, however, was that once an agreement had been concluded the Soviets would lose the leverage against Peking implied by an unsettled border. Second, both military threats and talks could be used to conduct exchanges about ideological problems and mutual interests in world affairs. Or, third, if Peking remained obdurate the military buildup could lead to offensive action to curb the Chinese menace.

The available evidence does not permit positive conclusions about how these possibilities were debated in Moscow. It seems likely that two kinds of military action were seriously contemplated. Elements in the army, at least, seem to have pressed for them. One was the much-discussed "surgical excision" strike against Chinese nuclear production and testing facilities. A successful strike might have set back the Chinese program – and with it any serious Chinese military threat to the USSR – by many years. The other was an operation to detach a border province, in particular Sinkiang, and establish it as a buffer state on the model of Mongolia. In terms of terrain, comparative logistics and the availability of mobile forces, such an operation must have seemed militarily feasible.

The reasons against military action probably included the following. A war could be begun with comparative ease, but its end would be unpredictable. Military operations such as "surgical excision" strikes almost never work as smoothly as their proponents promise. Long stretches of the Trans-Siberian railway and most of the Soviet maritime provinces would be vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. Considerable effort would have to be expended to guard against the possibility of Chinese nuclear retaliation. It might be necessary to accompany the initial action by a preemptive strike (not necessarily nuclear) against the Chinese nuclear force. It might therefore be difficult to limit the operation. But an expanded war would carry with it the risk of Soviet armies being pulled into a "people's war" on Chinese soil, and in any event it would require large resources and great effort. Full-scale war between socialist countries would have a disastrous effect on both ruling and nonruling communist parties. European countries and the United States could not be guaranteed to abstain from taking advantage of any Soviet military involvement in Central Asia or the Far East. A Soviet attack would make the position of comparatively pro-Soviet "healthy forces" in Peking[7] impossible and would compel even a post-Mao leadership to maintain hostility toward Moscow, or to resume it as soon as practicable. A Soviet victory would carry great strategic benefits, but it would be a very costly and risky enterprise.

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[6] Confrontation with Peking would even have certain positive uses vis-à-vis Washington. It would, for example, strengthen Soviet arguments in strategic arms negotiations about the need for higher Soviet arms levels and the destabilizing potential of third-party nuclear forces.

Yet from Peking's point of view the dangers must have seemed very real. It was entirely possible that the Soviets would launch an attack. There was no source of outside support for China if they did. The damage to China, and China's standing in the world, would be enormous. Peking accepted the consequences.[8] Its reaction after March 15 was essentially passive, defensive, amounting, at the diplomatic level, to a gradual retreat under pressure. Lin Piao's report to the Ninth Party Congress on April 1 warned of intensified Soviet threats against China and the possibility that Soviet revisionism (as well as U.S. imperialism) might launch a war of aggression.[9] The Chinese military deployments along the border which followed were primarily defensive and nonprovocative to Moscow.

Peking's statement of May 24 proclaimed that the Chinese people could never be intimidated. But it also repeated the formula — used immediately after the March 2 incident — "we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counterattack," quoting Chairman Mao that "As far as our own desire is concerned, we don't want to fight even for a single day."[10] The Chinese also abandoned their previous opposition to the holding of border talks. From June to August they participated in the border river navigation discussions. Peking moderated its attacks on Moscow. The Chinese press played down the significance of the nation's two nuclear tests of September 23 and 29. Lin Piao's speech on China's National Day, October 1, emphasized the five principles of peaceful coexistence, calling on the peoples of the world to oppose wars of aggression whether launched by imperialism or by social imperialism.[11] The October 7 Peking announcement of China's agreement to a new round of border talks with the Soviet Union again stressed that there was no reason for war.[12] Last, and by no means least, Peking dropped its insistence that Moscow's recognition of the unequal character of the historic treaties, which had previously defined the frontier, must be a precondition for discussing a new treaty.

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[7] That such a group seems to have survived the Cultural Revolution is argued in Gelber, *op. cit.*

[8] Perhaps one reason for recently installing a Chinese missile-test facility in Manchuria has been the desirability of putting it into an easily defended region rather than into Sinkiang. The facility may also have offensive implications vis-à-vis the Soviet maritime provinces.

[9] Text in New China News Agency (NCNA) (Peking), April 27, 1969; *Peking Review,* special issue of April 28, 1969.

[10] Text in NCNA, May 24, 1969; *Peking Review,* May 30, 1969, pp. 3-9. For earlier usage, cf. *Peking Review,* March 7, 1969; NCNA, March 21, 1969.

The opening of negotiations implied that, pending any obvious breakdown of the talks, the danger of military action had lessened. This did not prevent either side from carrying forward its preparations. The USSR reinforced her existing material superiority along the border. China continued military and political preparations to absorb any conventional thrust. At the same time the reduced danger of immediate attack allowed the Chinese to strengthen their negotiating position. They proposed that both sides withdraw their troops to a distance of at least fifty kilometers from the frontier. They must have known that the USSR would refuse.[13] Nevertheless, events over the next year or so suggest that both sides may have been alarmed by the "brinkmanship" of 1969. Confrontation had produced few visible payoffs and some obvious dangers. If continued, the chief beneficiary would probably be the United States. Moscow and Peking seem to have concluded that a limited accommodation was worth pursuing.

At the same time, their moves toward accommodation did not need to be disarming. In Moscow's view, if Peking responded to overtures, the result could be a major shift in the world balance of power and one favorable to most Soviet interests. If not, China would be shown to be unreasonable. This would help to isolate her, thus facilitating any political or military measures which might later become necessary. On Peking's side, increased security in the north would give the country much-needed time to recover from the Cultural Revolution. Two interest groups, in particular, seem to have argued for accommodation. One was within the People's Liberation Army. Its members, impressed by China's military unpreparedness and technical inferiority, feared the loss of nuclear installations and industrial plant following a Soviet strike. They may even have reverted to the idea that accommodation might at some point mean renewed Chinese access to some categories of Soviet equipment. The other group seems to have been composed of technocrats and civil administrators. They wanted time for economic and administrative reconstruction, and an exploration of the possibilities of resuming trade with, and perhaps obtaining some economic help from, Moscow.

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[11] NCNA, October 1, 1969; *Peking Review,* October 3, 1969, pp. 15-16; *New York Times,* October 2, 1969.

[12] NCNA, October 7, 1969; *Peking Review,* October 10, 1969, pp. 3-4.

[13] If only for the security of the Trans-Siberian railway in those areas where it runs close to the border.

Both soldiers and bureaucrats must also have been impressed by the growing strategic problem of Japan. Since late 1969 Peking has displayed an increasing sensitivity to the possibilities of Japanese rearmament. In Peking's view, Tokyo was becoming committed, with Washington, to an anti-Chinese alliance in Asia. The upgrading of Japan's forces and talk about the possibility of a Japanese nuclear force became especially alarming in view of Japan's declaration of interest in the affairs of Taiwan and Korea.[14] Chinese protestations may reflect not merely a genuine concern but a wish to strengthen the anti-nuclear and pro-Chinese forces in Japan. Either way, a partial rapprochement with the Soviet Union seems one possible response to any perceived Japanese threat.

Several Chinese moves during 1970 indicate the pursuit of such multiple aims. Embassies have been exchanged with the Soviet Union. Relations with North Korea have been restored in ways implying confrontation with the United States and Japan.[15] These moves have had clear implications for the development of better relations with Moscow. No major concessions were made in the Sino-Soviet border talks. Indeed, the Chinese appeared to regard it as much less important to secure an agreement than to prolong the talks as a way of deflecting possible Soviet military action against China. Yet by mid-1970 Chinese denunciations of Moscow had almost ceased. Foreign policy pronouncements emphasized the hostility to the United States.[16] As the months went by, invective against the Soviet Union, even by Lin Piao, was reduced to a few comparatively perfunctory references. Although hostile language reappeared at the time of Moscow's difficulties with Poland toward the end of 1970, a milder tone returned in early 1971.[17]

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[14] On China's fears about a Japanese nuclear force, see NCNA, February 7, 1970 and February 17, 1970. More generally, cf. the joint *People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily* editorial of September 3, 1970, and *Peking Review,* September 18, 1970, p. 27.

[15] Cf. the documents in *Premier Chou En-lai Visits the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970); and the CCP message to the Korean party on October 9, 1970, *Peking Review,* October 16, 1970, p. 3.

From the Soviet side, similarly, came evidence of a change of mood. At the end of September 1970 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet sent greetings to Peking on the occasion of China's National Day. This spoke of the Soviet Union's wish for a normalization of state relations with China, friendship between the two peoples and the need for joint effort in the struggle against imperialism.[18] Such themes were repeated during subsequent months and at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in April 1971.[19]

III

What of the future of Sino-Soviet relations? In the short term, at least, one would expect both sides to continue their search for improved relations. Each may have had a fright about the possibility of an essentially unwanted war. Each has taken stock of the costs of their mutual hostility. Each would find a measure of rapprochement useful. Each can see some benefits in expanding interstate relations. Each would probably welcome the prospect of a secure border between them. China, in particular, may come to regard a border agreement as offering some security against dangers of Soviet attack. And any sustained attempt to solve her enormous economic and administrative problems may become more difficult as long as her attention and resources are tied up by hostility along the northern frontiers.

Relations with outside powers might bring the two sides closer together. Rapid Japanese rearmament, whether induced by a U.S. withdrawal or not, could have such a result. The evolution of Sino-Soviet relations involves uncertainties which may persuade third parties of various kinds to hedge against them in ways that would, in turn, encourage some forms of Sino-Soviet cooperation.

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[16] See especially Mao's own statement of May 20, 1970 in Mao Tse-tung, *People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970).

[17] The Chinese remained, however, extremely sensitive to any signs of Soviet intervention abroad that might herald a return to the Brezhnev Doctrine. They also began to make mild overtures to the United States.

[18] TASS (Moscow), September 30, 1970.

[19] Cf. the addresses by Secretary Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Moscow and Peking might agree on joint encouragement to some national liberation wars or other revolutionary efforts in the outside world. If such cooperation occurred, it would rest, among other things, on accentuated hostility to the capitalist West.

In the long run, however, a cooperative approach seems likely to encounter great difficulties. Each side is vulnerable to the other, whatever agreements there may be. This extends beyond territorial problems or the possible encouragement by one side of irredentist movements within the territory of the other, into the widest political and ideological differences. Mutual trust will be hard to create and harder to maintain. Each side is likely to seek safeguards which the other will regard as a threat, or at least an attempt to take advantage. Much depends on the character of the post-Mao regime in Peking and its foreign policy preferences. But it seems altogether unlikely that any Chinese regime would consider a return to a state of dependence upon the Soviet Union in any major area of public policy. Moscow may find dealing with an equal partner quite difficult. Any major or lasting rapprochement would seem to depend on ideological compromises by one side or by both — and these seem improbable. The increasing sophistication of Soviet strategic arms, which the outcome of the SALT talks may promote rather than discourage,[20] will be viewed in China with suspicion and resentment. Each nation seems bound to try to manipulate its relationship with the United States so as to increase the political and strategic uncertainties (and therefore the risks) of the other.[21]

It is not out of the question that armed clashes may, at some point, be resumed. This might take a variety of forms. Small-scale provocations by local patrols may recur. Peking might permit such activities while conducting talks — on the border or on other issues — with Moscow. This would amount to a new version of fighting-while-talking. Or, the fighting might escalate beyond patrol actions. If it did, especially following a period of Soviet attempts to secure a rapprochement, pressures in the Kremlin would mount for a major strike against China.

[20] It seems likely that even if SALT produces an agreement to limit the numbers and deployment of some kinds of weapons systems this will, among other things, stimulate research and development on many systems not specifically limited. See H. G. Gelber, "Nuclear Weapons, the Pacific and SALT" (Center for Policy Study Occasional Paper, University of Chicago, 1971).

[21] For Peking this obviously involves some softening, in coming months, of its attitude toward the United States. President Nixon has already stressed that the United States does not intend to collude with one side against the other. See his Report to Congress, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's*, Washington, February 25, 1971, p. 35.

IV

Almost all major U.S. policies in Asia have been importantly influenced by this fluctuating Sino-Soviet relationship. The modalities of U.S. support for Taiwan, including the Taiwanese position on Quemoy and Matsu, would have been quite different had Peking been able to count on Soviet support. Japanese-American relations have been influenced, perhaps decisively, by Tokyo's uncertainties about China and the USSR. The U.S. involvement in Korea in recent years would have been different but for North Korea's balancing position between Moscow and Peking. Sino-Soviet relations have had important consequences for the course of the Viet Nam war.

Future possibilities seem to fall into three broad categories. Disagreements between China and the Soviet Union might reach the point of major, perhaps even nuclear, war. Or there might be a settlement of major issues between them. This might include a border treaty, a larger political settlement, a resumption of trade relations and, less probably but still conceivably, a settlement of at least some ideological differences. A general rapprochement might accompany or follow such a settlement. Or the relationship could continue to be one of more or less suspicion and tension, veering between minor acts of cooperation and violent mutual denunciations, with a possibility of continued or resumed minor border incidents and patrol clashes.

The first category includes possibilities that range from a prolonged conventional engagement by substantial bodies of troops in a limited area to a full-scale nuclear exchange. In any event, there would be the danger that the conflict would involve other countries. Japan would have reason for immediate alarm. While the fighting lasted, and especially if it were prolonged, Eastern Europe might become restive. This would raise the twin dangers of Western involvement and of the Soviet reaction both in Eastern Europe and outside it. Or the West might be tempted to take advantage of Soviet difficulties by moves in Europe or the Middle East. Possibilities of this sort would probably encourage Soviet leaders, once war proved to be unavoidable, to try for a quick knockout blow. This might take the form, again, of a strike, nuclear or conventional, against China's nuclear facilities, her deployed longer-range weapons and possibly key points of the Chinese command, communications and supply network. Or there might be a cutting-out operation against Sinkiang, although

China's redeployment is making this a more difficult and hazardous undertaking.

Whatever the long-term political and other costs, such an operation could be militarily successful. A China thus defeated would cease, for a while at least, to count as a great power. Defeat might, indeed, be followed not by a reassertion of unity and patriotism but rather by intense recriminations and factional strife. That outcome would further weaken central authority, reinforce provincial separatism, attenuate the PLA's and the party's control of the population. Economic difficulties would be accentuated. If the Soviet Union established Sinkiang as a new Mongolia, Chinese morale and political cohesion would be further damaged. In such a situation China could come to resemble less the powerful and unified nation of Mao than the fragmented China of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This, in turn, would encourage instability throughout the eastern half of Asia.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would have gained not only prestige but an important measure of territorial security. For the time being, Moscow would dominate Eastern Asia. Any reconstruction of Peking's governing authority would take place, at least formally and for a time, within limits and on terms set by the Soviet Union. Victory would also permit a redeployment of Soviet forces and, more importantly, Soviet resources. More money would become available for economic development. The strategic arms competition with the United States would become easier to sustain. A SALT agreement would become somewhat less desirable. The USSR would gain an initiative which, assuming that the cost of the campaign against China had not been too great, would be exploitable in many areas outside Asia. In such circumstances, one would expect Moscow's willingness to assume strategic and political risks to grow.

These are not the only possible results of a Soviet-Chinese conflict, but most of the more probable outcomes would have profound effects on the global Soviet-American competition. A prolonged Sino-Soviet struggle would create great dangers of an expansion or spillover of the conflict and enormous uneasiness and uncertainty throughout Europe and Asia. The gains of a quick Soviet victory, however, would not be balanced by any U.S. advantage. It is true that the strategic nuclear balance between the two sides would not be greatly disturbed.[22] On the contrary, the stability of that balance would be enhanced by the elimination, for the foreseeable future, of a third nuclear force dangerous to both Washington and Moscow. But the disadvantages would far outweigh such benefits. The United States would face a strengthened Soviet Union whose Chinese distraction had, for the time being, been weakened or removed. Japan might feel it necessary to accommodate herself to Soviet supremacy in East Asia; it is doubtful whether such an accommodation would be consistent with the maintenance of the Japanese-American alliance in anything like its present form. The U.S. base system in the Western Pacific would lose much of its rationale. In the wake of such a shift in Asian power structures much of it would become politically vulnerable.

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[22] Except insofar as weapons now pointed at China became available for redeployment and, in the longer term, as any fresh resources the Soviet Union was able to devote to strategic armaments made their impact felt.

America's logical move would be to attempt, so far as possible, to help maintain China's territorial and political integrity[23] and to limit Soviet gains. Her possibilities in this respect would be limited, however. Military involvement on the mainland in support of China seems out of the question. Washington would rightly resist any proposal that involved America in China's internal difficulties and political maneuvers. Diplomatic support might be helpful, especially during a prolonged campaign. But it would not greatly change the Asian balance following a Chinese defeat. Any U.S. response would also be conditioned, and probably limited, by domestic political considerations. Proposals for U.S. intervention following a Sino-Soviet war would be resisted as involving the danger of a Soviet-American conflict, and a contradiction of the desirable policy of retrenchment of U.S. global responsibilities.

At the same time, once the larger consequences of a Chinese defeat became clear, there would be charges, in and out of Congress, that America had stood idly by while the world balance was changed to her profound disadvantage. For some, these developments would sound a call to arms. For many more, there would be increased pressure to retreat into "Fortress America." In any case, bitter debate and deep divisions would ensue. Yet the alternative to abstention would be expensive in resources, hardware, diplomatic effort and political credit, while success could not be assured. Either way, a limited, balanced diplomatic response which succeeded in safeguarding existing American interests might be extremely difficult to achieve.

V

A Sino-Soviet rapprochement would involve very different possibilities. It would almost certainly include — it might, indeed, be partly based upon — the creation of parallel or even joint anti-American postures. For insofar as ideological considerations may permit such a rapprochement at all, they would encourage rather than discourage common hostility to the United States. On pragmatic grounds Peking doubtless wishes to improve its relations with Washington, partly as a way of balancing its relations with Moscow. But conflicts of interests over Korea, Taiwan and the Japanese-American alliance seem likely to reinforce the ideological obstacles in the way of any far-reaching improvement in relations. A Sino-Soviet understanding would therefore tend to restore a degree of strategic bipolarity in the world under conditions much less favorable to the United States than those which obtained during the 1950's. There might even be some joint military planning between Peking and Moscow, or some alignment of their support for revolutionary movements.

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[23] The parallel with the late nineteenth century is obvious.

A rapprochement would free some Soviet forces and resources for employment elsewhere. This would have undesirable consequences in the Middle East and for NATO. Bilateral Soviet-American arms agreements would become even more difficult to achieve. The circumstances of joint Soviet-Chinese hostility to the West and increasing Soviet strength would combine to prevent them. For the Soviet Union, rapprochement with Peking and arms agreements with the United States have long been alternative and not complementary policies.[24] They are likely to remain so. The United States would also lose room for maneuver vis-à-vis Peking. China, like the USSR, would free resources for other purposes, including anti-American ones. Comparative freedom from anxiety in the north could be expected to translate fairly easily into greater attention to the affairs of South and Southeast Asia as well as increased support for insurgencies elsewhere.

Japan would either be pressed toward compromise with Peking and Moscow or become increasingly dependent upon U.S. military protection. This would contradict the present tendencies of Japanese policy. For this reason, among others, it might result in greater mutual friction and impatience between Japan and the United States. Or else Japan would be compelled to increase her defense efforts to permit not only effective home defense but the protection of any vital Japanese interests in Korea and Taiwan.

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[24] See H. G. Gelber, "Strategic Arms Limitations and the Sino-Soviet Relationship," *Asian Survey*, April 1970.

This might well come to include the development of a nuclear arm. In any event, it would place enormous strains on the cohesion of the Japanese body politic and the moderation of Japanese political life. In Southeast Asia, the pressures for accommodation with Peking would increase, especially if U.S. disengagement continued.

Theoretically it might be possible to avoid some of these difficulties if an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations could be achieved simultaneously with an improvement in relations between each of the principals and the United States. But it is difficult to regard this as realistic in present circumstances. China may upgrade certain military capabilities with an eye, most particularly, on defense against the Soviet Union. But if the United States appeared to encourage such a development, or even failed to safeguard her own position and that of her allies against these improved Chinese capabilities, she would thereby also risk increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia or the undermining of Tokyo's reasons for adhering to the Japanese-American mutual defense arrangements, as well as Moscow's reasons for seeking an agreement in SALT. Or, the United States could move toward the tripartite arms limitation discussions which are, in principle, highly desirable. If this proved possible, and if such talks succeeded,[25] international security and stability might greatly benefit. But at least some of the consequences of a move in this direction in 1971 could be unfortunate. Such tripartite discussions, or even the suggestion that they be held, would also create difficulties for powerful but excluded nations like Japan and the West European NATO allies. More specifically, many nations would conclude that the acquisition of nuclear weapons, on the Chinese pattern, had major benefits in terms of practical political advantage. Nuclear proliferation would be much encouraged.

It follows that, for the time being, the best available situation from an American point of view is Sino-Soviet tension and suspicion short of major armed clashes. This imposes the maximum strategic and political constraints by China and the Soviet Union on each other. It gives the United States maximum freedom of movement. It places great inhibitions on Chinese involvement elsewhere, for example in Southeast Asia. If this is so, Washington will presumably wish to emphasize to both sides that major war between them is undesirable, that it would involve real American interests but that, in the meantime, the United States does not intend to take sides in their dispute. Neither, however, will Washington inconvenience itself in order to discourage dissension short of war. An open U.S. attempt to divide Moscow and Peking, quite apart from the fact that Washington lacks the means to achieve it, would surely be counterproductive. Too close a U.S. reaction to details of the dispute, on the other hand, might suggest to both Peking and Moscow that U.S. policies toward them might be manipulated for their own benefit.

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[25] Of course this begs the vital question of what, in systems analysis terms, one means by "success."

But U.S. aims can be pursued less directly. Washington can stress that neither Peking nor Moscow can be accorded a veto on American policies toward the other. Under this heading, and without overtly taking sides, the United States can seek mildly improved relations with China. This tactic may persuade Peking that it has some freedom of movement vis-à-vis the United States. Such a policy, without being directly challengeable by Moscow, can mildly strengthen China's hand against the USSR and therefore her resistance to Soviet pressures. It may encourage Soviet anxieties about practical Sino-American cooperation without going to lengths which would persuade Moscow that SALT had become pointless. By strengthening China's hand it may help to postpone Sino-Soviet agreements on, for example, their common frontiers.

There are other political advantages in this posture. Signs of movement in China policies are likely to be popular in the United States. Yet the fact of discussions with Peking may also head off pressures for a total U.S. disengagement from East and Southeast Asia. Acceptance of, or even mild encouragement to, a multiplication of Peking's diplomatic and political links in the world can be used as evidence of U.S. flexibility and willingness to compromise. At the same time it can help to limit China's maneuverability in two ways. It will create diplomatic assets that she may be unwilling to lose. It may also create greater complexities for, and therefore limitations upon, decision-makers in Peking. Yet such a U.S. policy does not imply commitment to any particular follow-up. Nor does it necessarily greatly constrict Washington's future freedom of maneuver. For the time being, at least, this seems to be Washington's approach.

President Nixon has stated[26] that the United States accepts neither China's ideology nor a need for Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia nor China's right alone to determine the conditions of her entry into the international community. Improvements in Sino-American relations are not to take place at the expense of U.S. commitments to Asian allies. But the President has also opened the door to "productive relations" a little farther. He has pointed out to Moscow that it faces some hard choices. Decreased U.S. influence in Asia is likely to mean, among other things, an enhancing of China's position. A lower U.S. posture might also encourage improved relations between Washington and Peking. This, in turn, might allow China to devote more attention and resources to her northern problems. President Nixon has, in fact, told the Soviets that they have an interest in American containment of China which is certainly no less than America's interest in avoiding a renewed Sino-Soviet alliance. In the background, although the President did not need to say so, is also the consideration that if a partial U.S. withdrawal encouraged Japan to develop nuclear weapons, this would greatly complicate the East Asian balance of power and impose fresh and unwelcome constraints not only on Chinese, but also on Soviet, policies.

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[26] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, op. cit.*, pp. 34-36.

There is, however, a major difficulty about the patterns suggested here. Obviously a situation of Sino-Soviet suspicion and tension favors no one more than the United States. This alone will no doubt help to persuade both Moscow and Peking to look for ways of avoiding it. Furthermore, and especially in the post-Mao era, it may be that the payoff from improved Sino-Soviet relations will become increasingly attractive to both sides. Should that happen, the United States could do little about it. It would represent a major shift in the world balance of power. It would presumably compel fresh emphasis on the defensive alliances between the United States on the one hand and Japan and Western Europe on the other. The obstacles to such a development — Sino-Soviet ideological hostility, mutual vulnerability and conflicting concrete interests — look formidable. What the world balance would be if those obstacles were overcome remains to be seen.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 1970'S*

by G. A. Arbatov

FOR all the political worries, big and small, that concerned Americans in 1969, the question of the 1970s was central to many debates and discussions. And it would appear that the matter is not merely one of some kind of calendar magic.

The transition from one decade to the next coincides this time with a certain turning point in the development of the United States, when the domestic and foreign policy problems facing the country require a reevaluation of many established notions and a search for a way out of the impasses in which American policy has found itself. This is why the words, "the seventies," constantly recurring in the titles of numerous American pamphlets and articles, are something more than a device to catch the reader's eye. Behind these titles are the profound malaise and despair of a considerable part of the American public, which is beginning to realize that it is impossible to go on living in the old way, and is seeking, anxiously and with hope, to peer into the future.

The United States is a power whose policy influences the destiny of not just its own people. The general course of events in the international arena depends significantly on its policy. Therefore, the course taken by the U.S. in the 1970s is truly an international problem; and it naturally attracts the attention of Soviet specialists in American studies.

Any attempt to look into the future must include at least two components:

first, an interpretation of the policy changes that the objective situation, the real course of events, demands and probably will demand; and

second, an interpretation of the degree to which these objective needs are capable of influencing the formation of foreign policy.

These are the questions to which the present article is devoted.

I

The fact that the foreign policy of U.S. imperialism has en-

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*Reprinted from the translation journal, *Soviet Law and Government,* with the permission of the publisher, International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., White Plains, New York.

countered major difficulties, and is even in crisis, is beyond question. This is recognized even by many American researchers. Differences among them begin, basically, over another question: what are the causes of these difficulties? A great number of different opinions are expressed on this question. Some believe the causes lie in the loss by the United States of its "overwhelming military superiority" and in insufficient decisiveness. Others believe the causes stem from tactical errors; still others, from unskillful practical implementation of a political course that, in their opinion, is basically correct. But the voices of those who cast doubt not only upon individual manifestations but upon the very foundations of Washington's foreign policy are heard ever more loudly.

Thus, the dispute over the nature of the present difficulties comes down to determining what underlies them: faulty tactics or an untenable strategy?

It seems to us that whereas, at the end of the 1950s or early in the 1960s, there still might have been grounds for such a debate among American political theorists (as well as among practical politicians), by the beginning of the 1970s a discussion of this problem has become essentially meaningless: the debate has been decided by life, by the entire experience of the preceding decade. This experience has demonstrated rather clearly what can, and what cannot, be gained by improving the tactics and means of struggle within the bounds of U.S. political strategy since World War II.

The sources of this strategy are obvious. On the one hand, there was a sense of omnipotence in the Power that had emerged from the war, with hegemony over the capitalist world and with a monopoly of atomic weapons. This not only whipped up the imperialist pretensions of the United States but caused *its strategy in foreign policy to be linked indissolubly with the use of military force and with the threat to use it.*

On the other hand, there is a fear, penetrating ever deeper, of the changes that have come over the planet, destroying the old structures familiar and dear to imperialism, and establishing new ones, alien and hateful to it. This fear gave rise to the *political psychology of the world policeman,* defender of outdated systems, guardian and protector of reaction throughout the world, and engendered the claim of the right to impose upon other peoples a way of life and thought, a political system, and even leaders pleasing to American capital.

However, the plans to employ military force to reorganize the world in the manner desired by the Washington guardians of human destinies were not fated to be realized.

The rapid recovery and further advance of the Soviet economy dissipated the expectations of "economic collapse" of socialism. The atomic monopoly of the United States, one of the cornerstones of all American military-political plans, did collapse. The testing of a thermonuclear weapon in the USSR in 1953 was of decisive significance in this regard. A second blow against American plans, no less powerful, was dealt by the Soviet successes in rocketry, which put an end to the illusion of the "invulnerability" of the United States and to the advantages that it enjoyed at the time thanks to its geographic position. Another world war, which the imperialist circles of the United States were even recently able to see as a natural continuation – "the ultimate argument" – of their policy, now became equivalent to suicide.

Other principles of U.S. foreign policy strategy also proved to be undermined. One of them was the bogey of the "communist threat," with the aid of which Washington wished to unite its allies and mobilize the American people for an anti-Soviet crusade. But the "general mobilization" of the peoples for the struggle against communism broke down ingloriously.

In the first place, the attitude toward socialism underwent a basic change in many parts of the world. A number of countries irrevocably took a new path of development, and a worldwide socialist system came into being. Socialism became increasingly popular.

In the second place, the consistently peace-loving policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries convincingly demonstrated to all peoples, including those of countries allied with the United States, the absurdity of the propagandistic fairy tale of the "communist threat," with which American political figures sought to justify military preparations.

The carefully erected structure of "global" policy broke down under the impact of new realities of world history.

The dichotomy between the foreign policy strategy of U.S. imperialism and the conditions of the contemporary world was already generally apparent by the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. As early as that time, a broad discussion of the root problems of foreign policy developed in the United States. Even in government circles, people began to understand that the gap between the premises of the foreign policy strategy of the U.S.

and the actual conditions of the rapidly changing world was constantly widening. However, it soon became clear that the reorientation engendered by this basically amounted to a modernization of means and tactics, but did not touch upon the objectives and strategy of foreign policy.

In all fairness, it must be noted that divergent views were advanced in the debates. As an example, one can cite the outlook of Senator Fulbright, presented in his book *Old Myths and New Realities,* published as early as 1964. Even at that date, he posed the question of the need for a fundamental reexamination of many time-hallowed bases of U.S. foreign policy, and for bringing them into accord with changing reality. Senator Fulbright directed particular attention to the "paradoxical contradiction between the increase in national military might and the decline in the degree to which national security is guaranteed." [All non-Russian quotations are retranslated — Editors.] "To equate security and the quantity of arms," he wrote prophetically, "can only drag us into an accelerating arms race, lead to a rise in international tension and, accordingly, to a decline in security. Nor is it out of the question that we might possess overwhelming military superiority and still face erosion of our power and influence in the world."[1]

It was not only spokesmen of the "traditional" opposition in Congress and some political theorists who called many aspects of U.S. foreign policy strategy into question. Analogous views were also expressed by certain figures who played a role of considerable importance in shaping the country's course in foreign policy. President Kennedy, for example, not only declared that thermonuclear war was unacceptable to the United States, and spoke for reduction of tension in Soviet-American relations; he also came to recognize that no "American solution" of international problems was possible and that no single country could govern worldwide processes. However, it was the other trend that won out in the internal struggle within the ruling circles of the United States.

In the classical style of imperialist politics, reliance upon military might remained the point of departure in the search for new solutions. Nor could it be otherwise, once the ruling circles of the United States refused to consider abandoning their "global" pretensions. Under such circumstances it was difficult to with-

[1] W. Fulbright, *Old Myths and New Realities* (New York, 1964), pp. 49-50.

stand the temptation to seek new military means in the struggle to enforce these claims. One after another, studies by military and political theorists (Maxwell Taylor, Henry Kissinger, and others) made their appearance, with the very latest formulas for employing the armed might of the United States. Finally, the new doctrine, initially presented by General Taylor in 1956 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gained official adoption in 1961. It gained fame as the doctrine of "flexible response."

Officially, the essence of this doctrine consists in bit-by-bit application of force, i.e., of varying dosages of it, to correspond with the needs dictated by the struggle for American objectives in one or another theater of war. Proceeding from a recognition of the impossibility of achieving success by a blow directed at the principal enemy, the Soviet Union, the creators of this policy placed reliance on limited, local wars, military actions political in nature, and also on large-scale use of various kinds of subversion. Their purpose is either to prevent sociopolitical changes in various parts of the world or to proceed to the attack, "nibbling" at the socialist camp and at the zone of countries liberated from colonialism, at their periphery, in places where, for one reason or another, a weak link can be found (or created).

Many welcomed this doctrine, seeing in it a sign of a move toward realism, an abandonment of the prior doctrine of "massive retaliation" that suspended over the world the sword of thermonuclear war, which was to be dropped in case of any turn of events undesirable for the United States. But the realism of the "flexible response" doctrine was in many respects no more than apparent. In fact, the adventurism characteristic of earlier U.S. foreign policy doctrines is inherent in it as well.

Above all, it soon became clear that the new military doctrine did not negate, but rather supplemented, the old one. This is seen particularly in the very program of the U.S. military buildup since the beginning of the 1960s. It is undeniable that, under this program, intensified deployment began of "conventional" armed forces, with the objective of providing "small" and "medium" doses of application of force (according to this doctrine, conventional arms had to be sufficient to wage "two and a half" conflicts: two large and one small). But at the same time, the biggest leap ahead occurred in the development of strategic forces — nuclear weapons and various (primarily rocket) means of delivery — i.e., the weaponry of "massive retaliation" that was necessary primarily for the so-called "central war" (i.e., the war with the USSR).[2]

To justify this staggering program, a wide-scale propaganda campaign was launched on the "missile gap" by which the USA lagged behind the USSR. In evaluating it several years later, Robert MacNamara, former Secretary of Defense, admitted that the program for building the strategic forces of the United States was an "overreaction" and was not justified by the actual situation.

However that may be, the strategic arms race was whipped up, and the consequences of that step are to be seen to this day. An unmistakable contradiction appeared between certain political steps taken by President Kennedy, testifying to his readiness to normalize relations with the USSR, and the rapid growth of those forms of arms that could only be destined for the notorious "central war."

This emphasis on armaments manufacture essentially far from contradicts the doctrine of "flexible response." If one gives it some thought, that doctrine is by its very mechanism unthinkable without a large arsenal of nuclear rockets and without blackmail — including adventurist acts as an inherent component. Never mind the carefully worked-out system of "escalation" of conflicts, the ultimate stage of which is always world war; the very possibility of conducting "local" wars and broad operations of a police character involves bluff, intimidation, and balancing on the brink of thermonuclear war. It is precisely these elements in the policy of "flexible response" that are called upon to assure that the instigators of "local" and "police" wars will go unpunished.

Many American political figures made no attempt to hide this. Walt Rostow, who was President Johnson's Special Advisor for National Security Affairs, once wrote, for example, that the job

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[2] The following table is based on the data of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

	Type of weapon	
Year	Intercontinental ballistic missiles	"Polaris" missiles aboard submarines
1961	63	96
1962	294	144
1963	424	224
1964	834	416
1965	854	496
1966	904	592
1967	1,054	656

was to make the other side refrain from action, "fearful" that a given act would lead to a nuclear conflict. "To make this credible," he adds, "is as difficult a task as man has ever faced. . . . The only means that can instill such a conviction is if the President of the United States is prepared to anticipate a nuclear war and has in fact moved along that road."[3]

Another innovation of American foreign policy strategy in the 1960s was the policy of "bridge-building." At the time it was announced, it could still be regarded by many as a kind of response to the challenge of peaceful coexistence hurled by the socialist states. It is no accident that, at the outset, it was subjected to a fire of criticism by the extreme Right in the USA itself (it should be said that certain liberal spokesmen interpret this policy in this way to the present day).

However, the "bridge-building" policy soon presented itself in different dress: essentially as a platform for extended subversive activity aimed at dissolving the socialist commonwealth and undermining the socialist social system.

The inspirers of this policy demonstrated a remarkable capacity to distort and pervert any ideas they touched. Even generally accepted forms of international communication, which had enjoyed a good reputation for centuries — such as trade, cultural and scientific-technical ties, etc. — when put through the meat-grinder of the thinking of such people, are immediately transformed into their opposites, into evil weapons of subversive activity.

Z. Brzezinski has particularly distinguished himself in that walk of life. On his lips, the undermining of world socialism would be facilitated by no less than . . . peace and the normalization of the world situation. "Only in an international atmosphere free of tension," he declares, "can the hidden rough spots and contradictions from which the East suffers become politically important." A moderation of international tension, he says, "would unquestionably challenge" communism.[4]

One must approach such statements and declarations very soberly. In the first place, it should be seen that they simply contain a good deal of irresponsible propaganda chatter. It is especially irresponsible because questions having a direct bearing on such enormous contemporary political problems as the preservation of peace and normalization of Soviet-American relations become objects of petty and quite unscrupulous gambles.[5]

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[3] *Look*, December 12, 1967, p. 30.

[4] Z. Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition* (New York, 1965), p. 121.

At the same time, statements such as those adduced here speak rather eloquently about the notions with which the policy of "bridge-building" was associated by many of its inspirers — profoundly antisocialist notions having the purpose of undermining the socialist system and doing harm to socialism.

Thus, the "updating" of foreign policy carried out by Washington in the 1960s came down to the following:

an attempt was made to perfect methods to politically utilize military force on a global scale (i.e., as a means of political pressure and blackmail); and chosen as targets for direct application of force were opponents with whom clashes would not have suicidal consequences for the United States;

with respect to those whom Washington regards as its primary adversaries (the Soviet Union and other socialist countries), attempts were made to find and put in motion a set of other "instruments" of policy for the purpose of accomplishing what cannot be achieved by military means under present circumstances: the weakening of socialism, the undermining of its foundations and, in the final analysis, its destruction.

One of the results of the 1960s lies specifically in the fact that attempts to "modernize" the foreign policy of the United States suffered failure in both these directions.

Above all, efforts to put into practice the policy of subverting socialism were particularly unsuccessful. The events of recent years have shown the unsoundness of calculations that the socialist countries and communist parties would be indifferent observers of the efforts of internal counterrevolution and international reaction, designed to "erode" socialism and return the lands of socialism to the bosom of the capitalist system. It turned out that efforts of that kind yield the United States nothing but an increase in international tension.

Nor did Washington succeed in finding a means of implementing its former policy of "from a position of strength" in a manner that would bring real dividends and at the same time eliminate the risk of major international complications endangering the United States itself. There is no way of doing this. The threat of world thermonuclear war today lies not only in that some lunatic may "press the button"; it is in the very policy of "local" military adventures, nuclear blackmail, an unrestrained arms race, and high-handed intervention in the affairs of other countries.

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[5] Efforts to stake its own claim to all ideals and demands enjoying the broad support of the masses have become one of the principal tendencies in imperialist propaganda. It attempts, by all possible means, to instill the notion that not only peace, the easing of international tension, and the development of economic, scientific-technical, and cultural contacts with the West, but improvement in the well-being of the working people, the rise in education and culture of the peoples of the socialist countries, and the development of socialist democracy run counter to the interests of socialism and contribute to its "erosion." The intent of such ideological diversions is obvious: to appropriate to themselves and to depict as foreign and even hostile to socialism those very ideals and principles that strengthen the power of attraction of that social system and arouse increasing millions of people to the struggle against imperialism.

This policy is itself capable of directing the development of international relations into a channel in which it will no longer be possible to retain control over events.

In this sense there can no longer be any purely "local" conflicts and wars in today's world; they all have far-reaching international consequences. This is testified to by the experience of the U.S. adventure in Vietnam, which frustrated the relaxation of tension then under way, complicated the international situation, whipped up the arms race, and produced growing instability in the world arena.

The principal consequence of the 1960s for the United States consisted in the fact that its policy not only did not help it advance in the struggle for the strategic goals set by Washington, but actually undermined the country's international position and complicated the situation at home.

Of course, in recent years, the process of sociopolitical development in the world has been complex and contradictory. While the revolutionary, anti-imperialist forces have on the whole had major successes, certain difficulties have come to light in their ranks — due not only to the stance taken by Peking but also to objective complications arising in the creative tasks of the revolution in a number of countries, and due to mistakes committed by individual detachments of fighters against imperialism.

But the "slyness" of history lies in the fact that, in our times, even individual failures and losses of one of the sides — in this case, the anti-imperialist front — do not assure victories and "profits" to the other side. In today's world, events are determined not by the arithmetic of the traditional political game of the great powers, but by the algebra of the complex sociopolitical struggle that has engulfed our planet. This is why, for all the complexities and contradictions of the historical process, the net balance has proved not at all to favor imperialism. Recent years have brought the United States a further weakening of its political positions, and the collapse of all efforts to stop the profound processes under way in the world.

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The shameful war of the United States in Vietnam is a real catalyst of these phenomena. Many factors revealing the bankruptcy of the "innovations" in foreign policy thinking in the U.S. in recent years have been concentrated in the Vietnam war, as if by a focusing lens. Vietnam has served to test both the doctrine of "local" and limited war, the most recent discoveries in the sphere of counterinsurgency, the notorious concept of "escalation," and attempts to play upon differences in the socialist camp. On this level, the Americans have attempted to transform Vietnam into a proving ground not only for new military equipment but for new political techniques. The results have proved to be sad.

When it took the path of aggression in Vietnam, the U.S. counted on a quick, small war. Even in October 1963, the White House announced that "most of the military undertakings by the United States will be completed by the end of 1965."[6] Instead, the U.S. got a protracted, bloody war, perhaps the most difficult of any it has ever had occasion to wage.

The United States wished, in Vietnam, to give an object lesson to all peoples by demonstrating its readiness and capacity to employ force. No such lesson was given. On the contrary, the entire world saw that even the mightiest of all capitalist countries was incapable of performing the mission of policeman it had taken upon itself when it encountered the will and heroism of a revolutionary people reinforced by broad international sympathy and support.

The war in Vietnam produced enormous tension in the entire U.S. military machine and had severe economic consequences. It worsened the negative balance of payments and contributed to a weakening in the international position of the American dollar and to an acute international currency crisis. The war in Vietnam accelerated the growth of a budgetary deficit and of inflation and taxes, and led to a cutting of appropriations for social needs. The widely advertised program of building a "great society" ran aground; moreover, as is now obvious, it was adopted not out of good intentions but as a response to rising domestic pressure. Social contradictions within the country are intensifying, and the most acute of them are already breaking to the surface in the form of serious shocks.

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[6] E. Weintal and C. Bartlett, *Facing the Brink* (New York, 1967), p. 90.

The aggression in Vietnam seriously undermined the political position of the United States in the international arena. Whereas the Americans had succeeded in using the war in Korea to strengthen their military alliances, the war in Vietnam has shaken them. The economic expansion and foreign political adventurism of the United States has produced a sharp exacerbation of interimperialist contradictions.

Washington's gamble on differences in the socialist system also was trumped. The geographic remoteness of Vietnam from most of the socialist countries and the refusal of the Chinese leadership to engage in joint actions did not prevent the socialist states from giving effective support to the heroic people of Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam, we know, is by no means the first imperialist adventure engaged in by the United States. Nor is it the first unsuccessful adventure: one might recall the failure of the armed intervention in Cuba in 1961, not to speak of a series of earlier examples. But in at least one respect the significance of the failures that have overtaken U.S. imperialism in Vietnam goes beyond everything it ever had to encounter before. This time there was revealed the untenability not only of the plans for the "local" adventure next on its list, but of Washington's entire "global" political strategy.

The basis of this strategy has always been reliance on military force. The war in Vietnam demonstrated that military might alone is no longer able to bring the United States victory not only in the struggle against its "major" enemy but even on the periphery, in a struggle against an opponent which, by all the traditional canons of military art, might have been evaluated as far inferior to the United States. It turned out that even the enormous military power created by the United States has its limits, and that these limits are considerably narrower than required by Washington's political plans.[7]

No less important a foundation of U.S. foreign policy is the mission of "world policeman" it has taken upon itself. It is clear today that Washington no longer has the strength to carry out that mission, and that the attempt to implant and preserve regimes satisfactory to it everywhere in the world has less and less support both in the United States and beyond its borders.

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[7] At the end of 1968, the volume *Agenda for the Nation*, something of an admonition to the incoming Administration, was published in the United States. One of its authors was Henry Kissinger, who apparently had no inkling, when the book was written, that he was fated to occupy one of the key foreign policy posts in that Administration. He wrote: "Throughout history, military might has been regarded as an absolute value. Statesmen have held it to be a primary and essential task to bring about the further growth of this power. As recently as twenty-five years ago it would have been impossible to conceive that a country might dispose of entirely too much military might, such as to be inapplicable for political purposes. . . . The paradox of contemporary military force lies in the fact that the gigantic increase in force has undermined the possibility of employing it for political purposes. . . ." "In other words," Kissinger emphasized, "power is no longer automatically convertible into influence." *Agenda for the Nation*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1968, p. 589.

The present President of the United States recognized this during the election campaign, albeit in guarded form. In an article published in the October 1967 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* he wrote: "I am not arguing that the day is past when the United States would respond militarily to a communist threat in the less stable parts of the world, or that unilateral actions in response to unilateral requests are out of the question. But other countries must recognize that, in the future, the role of the United States as world policeman is limited. They can count on rapid and effective help from the U.S. only if they themselves create machinery meeting two requirements: (a) the states of the region will have undertaken rapid collective military efforts to liquidate, with their own forces, the potential threat, and these efforts have failed to yield the necessary result; and (b) a collective request to the United States for assistance follows."[8]

The undermining of these foundations of U.S. global strategy has had far-reaching political consequences. The yawning chasm has been revealed between goals and capabilities, between aspirations and potentialities, between a policy shaped over many years and the realities of the contemporary international situation. Many prominent American researchers come to the same conclusion.[9]

Thus, on the threshold of the 1970s, an objective situation has developed that imperatively demands serious changes in the foreign policy pursued by the United States. The course of events is taking such a turn that delay in making changes or, even more, attempts to reinforce the previous line of policy will inevitably deepen the crisis of Washington's foreign policy and engender more and more new problems and difficulties.

And here we move to the second question: to what degree will these demands of the situation influence the course of U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s?

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[8] *Foreign Affairs,* October 1967, p. 114.

[9] For example, one of the "patriarchs" of political science in the United States, Hans Morgenthau, wrote in 1969: "If one were to attempt to describe American foreign policy in a single sentence, it might be said that during the past decade or so it has lived on the intellectual capital accumulated during the famous fifteen weeks in the spring of 1947, when the concept of containment, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan laid the foundations of the new American policy, and that today this capital has been exhausted. . . . This policy has become obsolete, and the United States has thus far been unable to develop a new policy, capable of grappling successfully with the problems of this century." H. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York, 1969), p. 3.

One would wish, naturally, to answer this question as concretely as possible – not in the sense, of course, of attempting to divine precisely and in all details the forms and time periods within which possible changes in U.S. foreign policy will occur. Another question is involved: determination of the most likely direction of such changes, basing our analysis on the actual situation.

To do otherwise would mean to give the simplest kind of answer: that the U.S. remains, and will for the foreseeable future remain, an imperialist power, which will of course pursue an imperialist policy. But the point is that imperialism, despite all the tendencies built into that system and its policy, is able, both within the country and on the international arena, to go only so far as it is permitted to – permitted by the objective situation and by the strength of the resistance of its adversaries.

It is precisely this understanding of political reality that underlies the tactics of the communist movement and of all anti-imperialist forces at the present stage. Their program of struggle against the omnipotence of monopolies, fascist reaction, colonialism, and national oppression, against aggression and war, takes as its point of departure that many democratic demands can already be successfully implemented under the conditions existing today, and that, to accomplish this, there is no need to wait for fundamental sociopolitical changes throughout the world.

The validity of such an approach has long been demonstrated. The change in the world relationship of forces in favor of socialism, and the consistent and determined struggle of the working masses, have created serious obstacles to imperialist aspirations and have made it possible to achieve many major successes. These successes include the fact that it has been possible to prevent acute conflicts from turning into a new world war, and in many cases to cut short or prevent imperialist aggression.

Serious obstacles to the imperialist policy of the United States appeared in the international arena as early as the 1950s. In the 1960s, the relationship of forces in the world arena continued to change in the same direction. In dealing with the essence of these changes and their influence upon the policy of imperialism, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June 1969, emphasized: "The rising might of socialism, the abolition of colonial regimes, and the onslaught of the workers' movement are wielding a constantly increasing influence on the internal processes and policy of imperialism. Many important features of contemporary imperialism are to be explained by the fact that it has been compelled to adapt itself to new conditions, to the conditions of the struggle of the two systems."[10]

The matter at issue is essentially that of further limiting the freedom of action of imperialism – above all, U.S. imperialism.

In this regard, the development of events in the 1960s was marked by still another very serious change. Earlier, Washington's foreign policy had encountered obstacles of a purely international nature (the might of the Soviet Union and of the other lands of socialism and their determination to resist aggression, the opposition of the peoples of other countries to Washington's imperialist aspirations, the unwillingness of the allies of the United States to be drawn into risky adventures, and so forth). Now serious obstacles to this course have arisen within the country as well.

The present domestic situation in the United States is a major and important subject deserving special examination. In the present situation, we are interested in only a single aspect of it: the influence that the exacerbation of domestic problems has on Washington's foreign policy. There can hardly be any difference of opinion. The worsening of many of these problems was associated, directly or indirectly, with "excesses in foreign policy" – costly transoceanic adventures and the extravagance of the arms race. It means that solution of these problems demands at least a partial reduction in such "excesses."

This holds for inflation, which is intensified by the enormous expenditures for military and foreign policy purposes; it holds even more for the problems of the black population (one important aspect is the serious economic position of the Negroes), of poverty, and of the cities (to overcome the crisis of American cities would alone demand tremendous capital investments). Of course, the U.S. has managed to live with these problems for a long time. But what is new in the present situation is that it is becoming more and more difficult to do that. Many old problems are today arising anew in the sense that they are generating extensive sociopolitical manifestations and are threatening serious internal upheavals.

It was only in the 1960s that Americans became convinced that even so rich a country as the United States could not simultaneously have both "guns" and "butter." Under these conditions, demands for "butter" merged with demands to limit the production of "guns." This intensified the protest campaign against the war in Vietnam, a war that is costing American taxpayers about $30 billion per year. This has also changed the attitude toward the arms race, which not long ago was regarded by many as an economic blessing, one that saved the country from a depression. The argument that the arms race is an instrument for undermining the Soviet economy also ceased to be operative. In this connection, McGeorge Bundy, former advisor to the President and now head of the Ford Foundation, concludes: "The course of the discussion about the ABM indicates that that notion will apparently never gain popularity."[11] Disclosing the reasons for this change in the thinking of many Americans, the prominent American specialist on problems of arms control, Professor G. Rathjens, writes: "It would be an error to assume that by making the appropriate expenditures for arms, the U.S. could compel the USSR to accept the status of a second-rate power because of its lower economic and industrial potential. Long before such a situation was reached, the development of the U.S. itself would slow down, and the demands for new military projects would have serious consequences for American society."[12]

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[10] *Mezhdunarodnoe Soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,* Politizdat, Moscow, 1969, p. 44.

It is important to emphasize something else. Aside from economic considerations, moral and political factors have begun to play a more noticeable role in the stands taken against the arms race and an expansionist foreign policy. The policy of recent years was unsuccessful not only from the standpoint of its practical results. It helped to dispel, in the eyes of a considerable part of the American public, myths that had been used to conceal imperialist aspirations. Faith in the "nobility" of the mission that the U.S. is carrying out — according to American propaganda, "defense" of democracy and freedom — proved to be seriously undermined. An increasing number of Americans are ceasing to believe that the arms race and the rise in militarization are a necessary response to a "threat from without." Thus, it is not only the economic and military resources but the moral "resources" of American policy that prove to have been stretched too far. The youth and black movements, whose participants deny the very right of the U.S. to dictate its will to other peoples, provide especially clear evidence of this.

A situation has arisen in which continuation or, beyond that, further activation of a policy aimed at strengthening the military might and international influence of the United States is beginning, in the opinion of many sober Americans, to threaten serious domestic complications and the undermining of the foundations of the "national power of the USA." From this derive the deep differences in the ruling circles themselves, in the "political elite" as such.

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[11] *Foreign Affairs*, October 1969.

[12] G. Rathjens, *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's* (New York, 1969), p. 31.

Its liberal component is speaking out more actively than before for a serious review of foreign policy, including the speediest possible end to the war in Vietnam, limitation of the arms race, and reduction of the scale of American obligations abroad. The demands of these political forces are taking an increasingly antimilitarist direction.[13] Also noteworthy is the fact that even some conservative political figures, seriously frightened by growing domestic difficulties, are beginning to express similar viewpoints.

The marked activation of the opposition has provided the basis for diverse and often contradictory evaluations of the political situation in the U.S. Some observers have hastened to declare that serious changes in the political course of the USA are an accomplished fact, and have predicted a reduction in the military and diplomatic obligations of Washington abroad for the immediate future. Others, on the other hand, hold that essentially nothing has changed or can change, and that the course of the United States will remain what it was.

It seems to us that both extreme evaluations of the present political situation in the United States are unjustified.

The former overlooks the fact that, simultaneous with the activation of the opposition, the pressure of opposing forces has also grown, above all that of the so-called military-industrial complex, of reactionary groups intimately connected with the Pentagon and with war industry, and of the right-wing elements in both bourgeois parties (these groups have their representatives in the present Administration and exercise no small influence upon it). The results of the 1968 elections, in which about 10 million votes went to Wallace, indicate that the most extreme reaction consolidated its position. The voices of those who call for accelerating the arms race and intensifying the aggressive, expansionist course of foreign policy — essentially for a return to the period of the most acute "cold war" — are being heard today perhaps more loudly than in the recent past. Facts confirm that what has happened in the political life of the United States has not at all been a shift "to the left," but rather a polarization of forces and an exacerbation of the struggle.[14]

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[13] Thus, Professor Galbraith recently offered a complete program for combating the militarists and the military-industrial complex, a program to which, as far as one may judge, there has been a broad response in the country. J. Galbraith, "How to Control the Military," *Harper's Magazine*, June 1969.

At the same time, one must not underestimate the importance of the activation of the opposition calling for a revision of American foreign policy. Its strength lies not only in having a considerable number of votes in the Senate and in the support it has from many political and public figures and scholars with great prominence and authority in the United States. Even more important is the fact that the line taken by this opposition expresses the objective needs of the situation and is finding response among the broad public. This is transforming it into a political factor capable, to one degree or another, of influencing the formation of Washington's foreign policy.

It may be stated that a complex and, it would appear, not very stable balance of political forces has now taken shape in Washington. The struggle between these forces is becoming sharper, and its course will largely determine the further development of American foreign policy.

These aspects of the situation influence the policy of the present Administration. In the opinion of many American observers, the Administration is aware of the serious difficulties that U.S. foreign policy has encountered ("As the new Administration has apparently understood," writes Professor Stanley Hoffmann, forecasting U.S. policy in the 1970s, "the former political course led us into a dead end").[15] However, the passing months have not yet shown that serious practical conclusions are being drawn from this.

Spokesmen for the present Administration, both in the election campaign and after coming to power, have spoken more than once, for example, of the need to reduce the "involvement" of the

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[14] The struggle between the two trends is also under way with respect to fundamental questions of domestic policy. One of them is the line aiming at reforms designed to prevent further exacerbation of the most "explosive" problems of contemporary America (the problems of the Negroes, poverty, the cities, etc.). The measures proposed by the proponents of the other line tend rather to be aimed at the symptoms instead of the genuine causes of today's social difficulties and problems, whether they involve "tightening the screws," repression of the Negro movement and of the youth "rebellion," etc. These are the two typical responses of the bourgeoisie to any serious economic or sociopolitical crisis (both these trends appeared in what might be called polished form in the 1930s; the same severe crisis brought Roosevelt to power in the United States, with his reformist New Deal platform, and Hitler to power in Germany, with his attempts to solve all problems by fascist repression and war).

[15] *Life*, April 14, 1969, p. 66.

United States in the affairs of other countries (particularly the kind of "involvement" that might result in being drawn into such serious military conflicts as the war in Vietnam). However, there are virtually no real steps to be seen along this line. As far as Vietnam is concerned, in the positions taken on that question, there have been essentially no changes capable of opening the door to political settlement of the conflict.

The leaders of the present Administration entered the election with the demand for achieving decisive "superiority" over the Soviet Union in armaments. Subsequently, however, the term "superiority" was replaced by "sufficiency." But the leaders of the Pentagon are, as before, planning to force the arms race. The actions of the Nixon Administration in that regard are highly contradictory: on the one hand, it is making certain reductions in the current arms budget (small, and in matters of secondary importance); on the other, it takes decisions to build new and expensive weapons systems (the Safeguard ABM; the MIRV multiple, individually targeted warheads).

On the matter of relations with the USSR, the leadership of the new Administration has announced a change "from the era of confrontation to the era of negotiation." However, in practice, this change is making slow progress. It took more than six months for the new Administration to agree to conduct strategic arms limitation talks. Contacts with respect to the Near East began sooner; but because of the position taken by Washington, no prospects for settlement of that situation have as yet opened up. What is most important, no changes whatever have occurred in the practical politics of the United States pointing to a real desire to improve relations with the USSR.

Of course, the new Administration has been in power for only a year. However, many observers note "slowness" in the process of its getting down to work and developing a policy. But it would appear that this is not simply a matter of the difficulties of the "initial period." What is most important is the sharpness of the struggle that has developed around fundamental questions of policy, and the strength of the resistance to policy changes of a positive nature.

In the book already cited, *Agenda for the Nation*, the present Presidential Advisor on National Security Affairs, H. Kissinger, wrote the following with respect to the problems facing the new Administration: "Even under the happiest concatenation of circumstances, the new Administration will face crises. In virtually every corner of the world we have spent our fixed capital — we have rarely dealt with underlying problems and have warded off only the most immediate problems. The difficulties will probably multiply when it becomes clear that one of the consequences of the war in Vietnam will be a stubborn unwillingness on the part of Americans to be drawn into conflicts overseas.

"The new Administration has the right to demand understanding and sympathy from the American people. But it must base its demands not upon smooth superficial answers to hard questions. It must, in the first place, ask the right questions. The Administration must understand that in the sphere of foreign policy we will never be able to promote the establishment of a stable and viable world order if, to begin with, we do not draw up our notions about that order."[16]

As far as one can judge from the American press, Kissinger did not abandon this standpoint after he took his official post. As early as the summer of 1969, the following statement by him appeared in the press: "An important task facing the government is that of creating a new foundation of theory for the foreign policy of the United States. We have reached a time when the notions by which we were guided in the postwar period are dying away."[17]

Statements such as these, however, leave many questions unanswered. And this is not only because it is unclear whether those who may have a decisive influence upon the development of Washington's foreign policy share Kissinger's viewpoint. Even more important is whether the feeling of a need for changes will be embodied in actual policy. And even if this is the case, in what direction will these changes proceed: in the direction demanded by the objective situation or once again in the direction of perfecting the methods and means of fighting for goals that have long since demonstrated their unreality?

Many years ago the German military theorist Clausewitz presented a classical analysis of an international situation with a certain similarity to the present. It was the situation brought about by the Great French Revolution, which the monarchs of Europe attempted to crush by force. Clausewitz explains that these efforts failed because the forces of the old world "sought to use customary methods to create a counterbalance to new and overwhelming forces. All these are errors of policy. Is it possible to foresee and correct such errors if one continues to think in terms of a purely military understanding of events?" "Of course not," was his answer to that question.[18]

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[16] *Agenda for the Nation,* p. 614.
[17] *The New York Times Magazine,* June 1, 1969, p. 54.

This evaluation of the actions of the forces of the old world in the period of bourgeois revolutions is even more pertinent in our era — the era of transition from capitalism to socialism, of national liberation revolutions and broad democratic movements. Under these conditions, serious changes in international relations have occurred. To the changes resulting from World War II, there have been added the profound social and political changes of the postwar quarter-century.

Against the background of these changes, the goals of the United States have become manifestly unattainable and untenable: there is no Power that can contain the pressure for changes associated with social progress. Even less can it turn back the course of history. Nor has reliance on the use of force, whether "total" or "limited," justified itself. And still another fact has become apparent: the United States has quite enough problems not only in the international arena but within the country. And the old foreign policy is only rendering their solution more difficult.

A great deal depends, both for the U.S. itself and for the international situation as a whole, upon the conclusions that will be drawn in Washington from all these facts.

The decade now beginning opens many new opportunities. For the United States, they will consist primarily in the fact that a growing portion of its public is beginning to understand — more deeply and better than before — the problems facing their country, the reasons for its failures, the real sources of its weaknesses and strengths.

But the 1970s can also be years of serious dangers. The decade that has passed provides a certain notion of the possible nature and scale of such dangers.

The choice America must make is quite serious, perhaps too serious to be determined entirely by the wishes of the group now at the helm of power or by the advice of the experts helping them — be they the most highly qualified and farseeing. The answer to the question as to which path that country will follow in the 1970s will, in the final analysis, depend upon the course of the complex political struggle in the United States itself, a struggle that is developing under the influence of both domestic and foreign policy factors.

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[18] K. Clausewitz, *On War,* translation from the German (Moscow, 1934), p. 565.

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1970'S*

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

IN creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, the United States chose Europe as the determining factor in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. The international system at that time was characterized by a type of bipolarity in which the United States and the Soviet Union each enjoyed a wide measure of military superiority over the other great powers. But in the international system of 1949 the United States occupied a predominant position. Alone among the major powers, it had been spared the destruction of its industries and cities in World War II. The development of the atomic bomb, together with other defense-related technologies, placed the United States in an unprecedented political-strategic position among the nations of the world.

While the basic national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union have remained largely constant since World War II, the international system and the relative position of the two superpowers have undergone major changes. To grasp such changes it is necessary only to examine Soviet-American relations at several selected periods over the past generation.

From 1950 to 1955, the United States was the undisputed leader of the Western alliance. The Soviet Union controlled a group of nations in Eastern Europe that, following Stalin's death in 1953, began to grow restive under Moscow's domination. But even by the early 1950's, the Soviet Union had advanced from a position of economic and military inferiority to become a power in possession of nuclear weapons.

The advent of long-range Soviet delivery systems, as evidenced by the launching of Sputnik in 1957, together with the postwar recovery of Western Europe, led to profound changes in America's relationship with her European allies. Although many analysts have discussed in great detail the nature of these changes, they may be summarized as follows: (1) once the Soviet Union achieved a demonstrable capacity for inflicting nuclear destruction on the United States, the credibility of the U.S. guarantee to use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe was questioned; and (2) the recovery of Western Europe from the ravages of World War II was followed by a resurgence of confidence and a restiveness under what Europeans perceived to be U.S. "hegemony" in alliance relationships.

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*This article is based on a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in Los Angeles, California, in September 1970.

By the 1960's several other changes in the international environment had altered the context of the Atlantic alliance. The European colonial powers had completed the sometimes painful process of withdrawal from erstwhile overseas territories. In place of global perspectives in foreign affairs, European members of NATO had developed an essentially regional European focus. As the threat of a large-scale Soviet military thrust into Western Europe – a crucial factor in NATO planning in the early 1950's – declined, the West European powers grew increasingly interested in renewing links with Eastern Europe. The Gaullist idea of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," as well as West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, bespoke the new focus on relationships with Eastern neighbors – an interest enhanced by perceived internal and foreign policy changes, and opportunity for further change, in the communist regimes.

U.S. interest in West European integration in the late 1940's contributed to European initiatives from which came a series of institutions designed to remove age-old barriers in important sectors, such as industrial goods and agriculture, and to achieve greater mobility of people, capital and ideas. If the integration movement has made halting advances, the stresses to which it was subjected have not dimmed the ardor of its proponents. At the threshold of the 1970's, Western Europe was engaged in new efforts to enlarge the European Community by admitting other states, including Britain; to achieve by the end of this decade a European monetary union; to create a common European foreign policy; and to pool Europe's considerable technological resources in order to overcome the various "technology gaps" that separate the United States and Europe in such fields as aircraft, electronics and nuclear energy. In addition, there was a revival of European interest in defense collaboration.

Over the past generation, other major centers of economic power, in addition to Western Europe, have emerged. In Asia, Japan's economic capabilities already rank her third among nations, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union. She possesses the capacity for an international role which could hardly have been forecast twenty-five years ago. China, despite formidable economic problems and internal difficulties arising from the aging of her first generation of leadership, has developed a nascent atomic capability and delivery systems that place her in the exclusive category of nuclear states. In addition, the Sino-Soviet alliance of the early 1950's has been replaced by hostility shown not only by vitriolic verbal exchanges but also by the deployment of substantial numbers of Soviet and Chinese troops along a vast common frontier. The Soviet Union now faces a threat from China which has led the Kremlin's strategic planners to examine contingencies in the East as well as the West. In short, although the military-technological gap between the United States and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the remaining powers of the world, on the other, remains formidable, several power centers — in Asia and Europe — dot the current world scene.

This change in the international environment has profound implications for the Soviet Union and the United States. For both superpowers it creates new problems and new prospects. For the Soviet Union there is a need to guard flanks both in the East and the West. This can be done either by strengthening Soviet military capabilities or by developing foreign policies designed to neutralize or contain the threat posed by the emergent power centers.

Moscow appears to have chosen a combination of strategies reflecting both approaches to Soviet security. The Soviet buildup of armaments — in troop strength and in the development and deployment of a vast array of the most sophisticated and advanced weapons systems — is designed to ensure "all horizons" military capability against potential threats from China and the West. In addition, the Soviet Union has undertaken to extend her influence beyond the Mediterranean and into the Indian Ocean arc. The Middle East, in its own right a major area of immense strategic and economic significance to Moscow, forms a vital bridge for the strengthening of Soviet influence in the rimlands of Asia as a counter to China. Against the expansion of Chinese influence, the Soviet Union plays an emergent role analogous to that of nineteenth-century Britain against Czarist Russia in the same area. Like Great Britain before her, to play such a role she needs a Middle East bridgehead and the access to Asia provided by the Suez Canal.

Similarly, the Middle East is the key to the spread of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, the southern flank of NATO in Europe. Expansion of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, together with Moscow's active pursuit of a conference on European security and a strengthened relationship with Bonn, accord with the USSR's growing interest in the neutralization of Europe as a means of securing her Western front.

The primary power center that Soviet policymakers must consider is, of course, the United States. The Soviet strategic buildup, which is currently assuming the form of "parity" in all major aspects of modern warfare, serves the purpose of neutralizing the strategic capability of the United States. Thus, nuclear equality can furnish the strategic umbrella under which the Soviet Union can achieve her political goals in Europe and Asia. The large-scale development of offensive strategic capabilities, as well as the creation of a modern naval force, are designed to enable her (a) to lessen the capacity of the United States to intervene in those areas of Europe and Asia deemed vital to Soviet security, and (b) to penetrate regions, such as Latin America, that traditionally have been far beyond the Soviet sphere of influence.

Yet, from the perspective of the early 1970's the position of the Soviet Union differs greatly from that of a generation ago. Many analysts have noted the disintegrative tendencies that have beset Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, as well as the emergence of cleavages within the USSR itself, based on ethnic differences, dissatisfaction among intellectuals with the Soviet leadership, and the persistence of economic difficulties that the Soviet system seems unable to resolve. Against such problems must be set the United States' internal problems which have led her, in the Nixon Doctrine, to recast her foreign policy. The "internationalism" that provided the basis for Washington's creative policies of the early postwar period, including the formation of NATO, has given way to a quest for a "lower profile" in U.S. foreign policy, for which equally creative strategies must be found.

U.S. GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

In his foreign affairs statement of February 18, 1970, President Nixon set forth a series of premises about the international environment as well as goals for U.S. policy for a time period extending at least until the mid-1970's. The Nixon Doctrine is based on the assumption that the age of American global supremacy has ended and that in its place the United States must create a series of power centers to supplement, or even to replace, the power of the

United States if an equilibrium of forces at the international level is to be maintained. If Soviet policy is designed to neutralize the other potential power centers, while pressing for strategic parity against the United States, the implicit goal of U.S. policy, as set forth in the Nixon Doctrine, is to encourage the emergence of such power centers. Interpreted in this light, the aims of Soviet and U.S. foreign policy indicate a continued period of competition, if not confrontation, between Moscow and Washington. This competition may take a variety of forms, ranging on the Soviet side from efforts in Europe, as in the case of Germany, to lessen the attachment of key powers to Western security arrangements, to strategies designed, as in the Middle East, to use smaller states such as Egypt to gain a political-military position and to weaken Western-oriented power centers.

For the United States, the geographical implication of the Nixon Doctrine is apparent. If the resources to be committed to foreign affairs must be pared, Washington is constrained to adopt these policy guidelines: (a) identify those countries and regions of the globe most vital to U.S. security and international stability, and (b) formulate policies designed to concentrate necessary U.S. resources in these countries and regions, while transferring to them, in a phased program, much of the responsibility for their defense.

From this standpoint the following regions and countries must be considered vital to U.S. security: Western Europe and Japan, because of their vast industrial-technological-military potential; the Middle East, including Israel, because of its considerable local military-economic-technological capabilities, and Egypt and the Arab oil-producing states for economic and strategic reasons; Korea, because of her proximity to Japan; South Africa, because of her control of the southern approaches to the Indian Ocean and the littoral of Asia; Canada and the Caribbean, because of their proximity to the United States. Only in some of these regions or countries is there a major potential for the strengthening of indigenous forces to provide a substitute for U.S. power. For this reason, Western Europe remains crucial to the success of the Nixon Doctrine and thus to U.S. security.

Concerning relations with Western Europe, U.S. policymakers are seeking answers to questions raised by President Nixon in his February 1970 message: What is the assessment of the military threats to Western Europe that should be used as the basis for allied strategic and force structure planning? For what period of time can NATO sustain a conventional forward defense against a sustained attack from the East? Aside from their value as a deterrent to war, how should our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe be used to counter specific threats from the Warsaw Pact? How does the contemplated use of tactical nuclear weapons affect the size, equipment and deployment of NATO conventional forces?[1]

The answers must be determined within a context of strategic "parity" between the United States and the Soviet Union. However the concept of parity is defined, the relationship of strategic forces between the superpowers has changed substantially over the past generation, and especially in the last decade, with the dramatic increase in Soviet missile capabilities targeted against Western Europe and the United States. The implications of strategic parity for European security are threefold: (1) the linkage between U.S. strategic forces and European defense is diminished, since the stakes for which strategic forces will be used are higher; (2) as this linkage is weakened, Western Europe becomes more vulnerable to Soviet military and political pressure; and (3) the importance of theater forces is increased, since the military-political advantage accrues to that power, or combination of powers, which has superiority at the theater level. It is essential, therefore, to assess the meaning of strategic parity for European security in the 1970's. In this article attention is focused on the following crucial problems: (1) the reduction of force levels in Europe; (2) the development of an adequate strategic doctrine; and (3) the "Europeanization" of European defense.

The immediate effect of strategic parity, together with the prospect of major U.S. force reductions, is to heighten European interest in (a) bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and (b) a conference on European security. If the withdrawal of substantial numbers of U.S. forces from Europe will diminish the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, it follows that the bargaining position of European governments vis-à-vis the Soviet Union will be reduced. As a result, the Europeans may have an incentive to seek a political settlement with Moscow in advance of the withdrawal of U.S. units and the further weakening of the nuclear guarantee. Aside from the long-standing interest of Chancellor Brandt and his followers in *Ostpolitik,* the great emphasis of the Bonn government in recent months on accords with the East may be related to German perceptions of a changing balance of forces in Europe. If this assumption is correct, we may expect interest in reaching accords on European security to increase if the United States announces major unilateral force withdrawals from Germany, and if the strategic balance tips toward the Soviet Union.

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[1] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace.* A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 33.

Other factors may influence European interest in a conference on European security. There has long been a European concern that some day the United States and the Soviet Union might work out a political settlement without taking European interests into adequate account. By supporting a conference on European security with all European countries as participants, the Europeans are assuring themselves a voice in any such settlement. This possibility may account in particular for whatever interest the smaller countries have in a security conference.

Of great concern both in Europe and the United States has been the level of U.S. forces needed for the defense of Europe. In addition to President Nixon's question about the appropriate level and the discussions in the U.S. Senate, an East-West dialogue has been giving thought to the prospects for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) as well as unilateral U.S. force withdrawals.

The Reduction of Military Forces

In the East-West dialogue on European security matters over the past two years, a series of statements from NATO and the Warsaw Pact have dealt with the question of MBFR. The problem is fraught with difficulties for both the Soviets and the United States. From the Soviet perspective, several issues are of importance. To what extent can Soviet control of Eastern Europe be assured if Moscow withdraws large-scale forces from communist countries? Czechoslovakia points up this problem, because the widespread assumption both in Czechoslovakia and the West that the Soviets would not intervene militarily undoubtedly contributed to the political ferment of the Dubcek period. Conceivably, major reductions of Soviet forces in East-Central Europe, notably Czechoslovakia and East Germany, within a European context of détente, could motivate liberalizing forces once again in the communist states. Yet the Soviet intervention of August 20, 1968 also furnishes evidence of the speed and efficiency of the Soviet military in returning to Czechoslovakia and stands as a feat they could no doubt repeat if necessary. Thus, it may have a restraining influence on groups in Eastern Europe who seek to change the status quo. Should this be the case, the Soviets might find less difficulty in withdrawing forces several hundred miles in return for a U.S. pullback of several thousand miles.

The Soviets must also consider that the Warsaw Pact forces could be inferior to NATO's in motivation and loyalty, especially if they were called upon to fight an offensive war against Western Europe. Moscow might need to maintain substantial numbers of its own forces in East-Central Europe to assure the loyalty of the civilian population and indigenous armies. In such a conflict, NATO might find among the Warsaw Pact peoples and armies numerous allies who would use every available means to sabotage the Soviet military effort.

From the U.S. perspective several asymmetries are apparent in any discussion of MBFR. The United States would withdraw troops over a distance of at least 3,000 miles, in contrast to a Soviet pullback of only several hundred miles. Although the United States has conducted military exercises designed to demonstrate our capacity to move a division of troops across the Atlantic in less than forty-eight hours, such a feat would be difficult, if not impossible, under conditions of war. Moreover, it is doubtful whether large stockpiles of matériel could be maintained in working order in storage at European depots for the immediate use of combat troops. Such stores deteriorate when not in use. They could not be quickly assembled for use in a crisis situation. In fact, the essential precondition for a strategy which makes large-scale use of mobile capabilities is the preservation of military forces in Europe sufficient to check the advance of invading armies and provide the time necessary to transport several divisions from the United States and reactivate equipment stored in Europe for their use.

The territory available to NATO for defense-in-depth in Western Europe is not great, even if France were to become once again a full alliance participant. For the most part, the lines of supply and communication for NATO's central sector are parallel to the invasion front. A rapid communist offensive across northern Germany might not only cut vital communications and supply links, but also isolate the U.S. forces whose principal task is to man NATO defenses in southern Germany. Given the geographic asymmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, NATO must be equipped either to *deter* an enemy attack or to respond at an early time with a forward defense.

Qualitative differences among the NATO forces result essentially from diversities in length of training time and the nature of available equipment. Progressive reduction of the conscription period in certain armies, leaving less time for training, has detracted from their efficiency. (It could be argued that the introduction of a professional army would improve the quality of military units because of superior training and the long-range commitment of troops.) In addition, European armies in some cases are deficient in modern military equipment, as compared with U.S. forces. Despite NATO's efforts to achieve weapons standardization, an adequate interchangeability of capabilities has not yet materialized. Modernization becomes exceedingly difficult when separate stockpiles of weapons must be maintained for armies whose equipment is not interchangeable.

The MBFR problem is closely linked to the European political environment. MBFR should both reflect and contribute to the political milieu in which it is conducted. Among NATO countries the interest in MBFR is based on an assumption of diminished Soviet threat of a large-scale land offensive against Europe. In addition, MBFR has the object of enhancing the prospects for further improvements in Europe's political situation. Except as an exercise designed to reduce the defense burdens of the United States, it has meaning only if it is shaped by guiding principles reflecting the existing European environment and contributing to specified political-military goals.[2]

The minimum goal of NATO governments is the preservation of the existing political-military balance in Europe at the lowest possible cost. Depending upon the model proposed, MBFR accords with such a policy objective. With that goal in mind, several criteria for assessing the feasibility of one MBFR proposal or another can be suggested: (1) in the absence of an alternative security system, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact must retain capabilities sufficient to defend their respective territories; (2) "sufficiency" for each alliance should be so designed as to minimize the capabilities available for attack; (3) reductions should be of such a nature as to be verifiable by the opposing side; (4) reductions should be distributed among allies so as not to undermine the credibility of the nuclear deterrent possessed by the superpowers and available for the defense of allies' territory; (5) MBFR should be designed to preserve the confidence of both sides in the basic stability of the resulting balance of forces; and (6) MBFR must be based on mutually acceptable ratios between superpower forces and indigenous capabilities in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

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[2] The German government has put forward several proposals for MBFR, some of which call for asymmetrical force reductions to take account of the geographic differences between the U.S. and Soviet positions in Europe. However, it is difficult to foresee Soviet acceptance of any MBFR proposal that provides for Soviet troop withdrawals on other than a one-to-one ratio. The official German proposals are said to be similar to those contained in a report in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), April 22, 1970. There are three models, which may be summarized as follows:

(1) 10 per cent reduction of national forces; 30 per cent of allied forces in a zone comprising the FRG and Benelux, on the one hand, and the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other. Symmetry model. No principle of strict equivalency.

(2) Same zone. Reduction of all forces irrespective of nationality. 10 per cent NATO; 40 per cent Warsaw Pact.

(3) Pact zone extended to the three western military districts of the Soviet Union. 10 per cent reduction; 30 per cent Warsaw Pact.

For a French discussion of alternative European security models, see Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, "Modeles de Securité Européenne," *Politique Etrangère,* No. 6, 1967, pp. 519-542.

MBFR has elicited considerable interest in the United States because of growing concern about the size of American forces stationed in Europe. Critics of U.S. policy in NATO assume that Europe can bear a greater proportion of its defense. When its GNP's, population, technological potential, and other relevant resources are aggregated, it is easy to reach such a conclusion. But Western Europe differs from the United States in several fundamental respects that directly relate to defense: (1) it is a grouping of states widely differing in size and traditions and is only in the first stage of a unification process, and (2) the European Community has no power of taxation or spending sufficient to mount a major defense effort. Both the United States and individual European countries have internal problems that affect their capacity for a greater military effort[3] and are troubled by dissentient attitudes toward NATO that make a more adequate defense program difficult. Although Western Europe presently lacks power at a level sufficient to replace the United States as the guarantor of European security, it is essential, under conditions of nuclear parity and the guidelines of the Nixon Doctrine, that Europe acquire a greater capacity for its own defense.

Reduction of U.S. conventional forces in Europe would not necessarily lead to a greater European defense effort. Instead, it might contribute to further cuts in European commitments. If the United States saw no need to maintain capabilities at previous levels, the European governments would have difficulty justifying to public opinion a continuation of effort along present lines, not to mention greater expenditures to fill the gap left by departing U.S. forces.

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[3] For example, although Britain has made some additions to the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) as troops have been withdrawn from east of Suez, she has had to draw upon these forces during the Ulster crisis. Any major enlargement of the conflict in Northern Ireland would undoubtedly make necessary further withdrawals from the BAOR, which is considered to be one of the most highly trained and most militarily effective forces available to NATO in Europe.

Even though Washington would have withdrawn forces in response to other factors than simply a declining estimate of Soviet threat — including domestic pressures within the United States — a unilateral U.S. withdrawal of troops would diminish NATO's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact in relation to MBFR. It would have more potentially serious consequences, too: (1) Because of qualitative factors, a one-to-one relationship between U.S. and European forces cannot be assumed. (2) Because of the increased importance of theater forces under conditions of U.S.-USSR strategic parity, unilateral U.S. withdrawals under existing strategic concepts would gravely weaken local West European defense. (3) If the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee has been diminished as a result of the development of Soviet nuclear capabilities, fears about the willingness of the United States to use strategic capabilities, if necessary, to defend Europe are likely to increase in the absence of a tangible U.S. commitment of forces within Europe. Even in a situation of strategic parity, Soviet planners must include in their calculations of the credibility of the U.S. guarantee the effect of the presence of several hundred thousand American troops, and their dependents, upon U.S. decision-making.

FORCE REDUCTIONS AND NATO STRATEGY

If U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity operates to diminish the linkage between U.S. strategic forces and the defense of Europe, the withdrawal of large numbers of U.S. forces, either unilaterally or as part of MBFR, would have potentially important implications for NATO strategic doctrine. The doctrine of flexible response depends on the preservation of a capability for other than an early nuclear response to an attack against NATO. It is unlikely that NATO, even under existing circumstances, could long withstand a major communist attack without early resort at least to tactical nuclear capabilities. Given the configuration of NATO forces and the terrain in Europe, the early use of tactical atomic capabilities may be essential to prevent positioned nuclear weapons from being overrun by a communist attack. Such a contingency can be averted only by major qualitative (and perhaps quantitative) improvements in nonnuclear forces stationed near the Eastern frontier or by the withdrawal of nuclear capabilities to areas far behind the front lines.

With less troops available, the need would become more urgent for modernization of NATO capabilities, development of more highly skilled armies, creation of greater force mobility, more adequate stockpiling of equipment that somehow can be kept in constant readiness, collaboration in Europe on weapons standardization and procurement, and development of a common European outlook on defense and foreign policy. But even with such measures it is questionable whether NATO could preserve a flexible response strategy without substantial numbers of ground forces in Europe. If U.S. forces are drastically reduced, the alliance may be forced toward a strategic doctrine based on highly mobile units stationed near the frontier, capable of using low-yield nuclear weapons at an early stage in any conflict at the point of enemy penetration. Indeed, the development of a strategy that could halt an opponent's offensive at the point of penetration would contribute toward restoring the credibility of NATO deterrence under conditions of strategic parity. A strategic doctrine based on the most advanced conventional capabilities *and* low-yield tactical nuclear weapons might enable NATO to halt an enemy penetration without devastating Eastern Europe[4] or attacking the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, the unwelcome burden of escalation would be upon Moscow. The Soviet Union would lose the incentive she possesses under conditions of U-S.-Soviet strategic parity to exert military and political pressures against Western Europe.

In addition to improving the flexible response strategy at the tactical level, it is essential to strengthen strategic theater forces as a deterrent against Soviet I/MRBM forces. At the present time, there is no effective European-based deterrence against the 700 Soviet missiles targeted against the cities and defense installations of Western Europe. The greater NATO's willingness and capacity to block Soviet penetration with low-yield tactical nuclear capabilities at the beginning of hostilities, the greater the Soviet incentive for nuclear pre-emption to whatever level required to counter the NATO capability. Unless *both* adversaries were convinced of the prospect of mutual assured destruction, the Soviet Union would gain an incentive to escalate. If the logic of strategic parity is to enhance the importance of local forces, the power that *believes* it possesses the strategic edge at the top of the escalatory ladder has an incentive to use its advantage against the local forces of its opponent. Therefore, in addition to the preservation of U.S. strategic "sufficiency," the strength of Western deterrence can be enhanced by the creation of credible European strategic forces designed to make it possible for the NATO states eventually to assume the major burden of neutralizing the Soviet I/MRBM threat.

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[4] For a recent analysis of tactical nuclear weapons in a context of U.S.-Soviet strategic standoff, see R. G. Shreffler and W. S. Bennett, *Tactical Nuclear Warfare* (Los Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory of the University of California, LA-4467-MS, July 1970).

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND THE "EUROPEANIZATION" OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE

One of the paradoxes of current U.S. thinking about European security is the conviction, on the one hand, that Europe should assume a greater part of the burden of its defense, while, on the other hand, the United States seeks to preserve under its own control the most advanced weapons of modern warfare, namely, nuclear capabilities. If the withdrawal of substantial U.S. forces is accompanied by a diminished European (and Soviet) estimate of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee for Europe, the result may be a greater European interest in atomic weapons. The logical consequence of the Nixon Doctrine is the development of a greater defense capability under European control. It is only in the nuclear field that the Europeans might be prepared to make a substantially greater defense effort. Hence, the United States has no alternative but to aid Europe, or at least to acquiesce in European development of atomic capabilities under appropriate control.

France is developing a defense capability based on an increasingly sophisticated nuclear technology. By 1972 French forces are to be equipped with hydrogen bombs, about three years ahead of earlier expectations. In addition to submarines equipped with missiles, the French will have available land-based intermediate-range strategic missiles embedded in silos in southern France, as well as tactical missiles with a range of seventy-five miles.[5]

Although the French nuclear program, as presently projected, will continue to absorb about one-third of France's defense expenditures, the ability of France and Britain to maintain credible forces will depend on their ability to penetrate the more sophisticated Soviet defenses which may be anticipated over the next decade. On many occasions in recent years the question of Anglo-French nuclear collaboration has arisen, either as a means of preserving the credibility of strategic capabilities in European hands, or as part of an arrangement between London and Paris for Britain's entry into the European Community. Especially in the Conservative Party in Britain, there has been interest in Anglo-French nuclear collaboration.[6] Prime Minister Heath has spoken of the development of a joint Anglo-French deterrent to be "held in trust for Europe."[7] French spokesmen have expressed a similar interest. According to Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas:

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[5] See *New York Times,* August 5, 1970, p. 2.

> Great Britain is a nuclear power. And since, in our European policy, it is clear that . . . we are favorable to the entry of Great Britain into the [European] system . . . then from that moment, an agreement relating to these [nuclear] matters could be made, seriously modifying the conditions of our national effort which would cease to be national and would become European.[8]

French interest in strengthening the *entente cordiale* with Britain appears to stem in part from France's concern to assure that Germany does not become the dominant power in Western Europe. It may even be argued that one of the French motivations in maintaining a national nuclear force is to assure France's military supremacy over Germany. British entry into the European Community would provide a powerful counterpoise to the Federal Republic in European affairs. The British have apparently alluded to this possibility in their discussions with France on problems of Common Market membership in recent months. The French may also wish to counter the strengthened ties between Britain and Germany which developed between the German Social Democratic Party and Wilson's Labour Government. Conceivably, the French favor a strengthened European

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[6] See, for example, Eldon Griffiths, M.P., and Michael Niblock, *Towards Nuclear Entente: The Case for Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1970).

[7] Edward Heath, "West European Integration and East-West Relations," in *Western Europe and Eastern Europe: The Changing Relationship* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 33, March 1967), pp. 34-35; also Edward Heath, *Old World, New Horizons* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). For similar proposals, see Lord Gladwyn, *The European Idea* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 77-78, 103-107 — at the time he wrote this book Lord Gladwyn was Chairman of the European organization, Britain in Europe — and Edward Beddington-Behrens, *Is There Any Choice? Britain Must Join Europe* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 103-106 — Beddington-Behrens was Chairman of the British Council of the European Movement (formerly The United Kingdom Council of the European Movement).

[8] Quoted in Griffiths and Niblock, *op. cit.*

Community, including Britain, as a device for exerting greater control over Germany, and especially over Bonn's *Ostpolitik*.

In its enunciation of U.S. foreign policy the Nixon Administration places major emphasis on the development of indigenous capabilities for defense. The British and French nuclear deterrents may play a key role in the Europeanization of European defense. Aside from the logic of the Nixon Doctrine as applied to Europe, several factors are likely to increase the importance of the British and French forces in the 1970's. They include (1) the interest of Britain's governing Conservative Party in defense collaboration with France; (2) the increasing cost of R&D for advanced weapons systems; (3) the desire of some Europeans to maintain a European nuclear capability; and (4) the momentum toward European unity that bids fair to stimulate greater collaboration in the defense field, particularly if efforts now underway are successful.

After the successful completion of negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market, the Heath Government is likely to evidence greater interest in nuclear collaboration with France. Although the question of collaboration has undoubtedly not been discussed formally during the Common Market negotiations, it cannot be far from the minds of policymakers and negotiators as an eventual and necessary step toward European integration if Britain joins the European Community.

In any discussion of this collaboration for the next decade we must assume that Western Europe will *not* have evolved a political union, based perhaps on federal principles, which could control a nuclear capability. Hence, the ultimate decision for the use of the British and French forces will remain, respectively, with the Prime Minister of Britain and the President of France. Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage joint arrangements that reconcile the essentially national character of decision-making with an emerging need for a more broadly based European force.

In fact, it may be essential to provide for the participation of other European countries in order to reduce the possibility of intra-European political divisions between groupings of powers with atomic weapons and those not possessing them. Although U.S. "hegemony" in military affairs appears less than acceptable to some in Europe, there might be even greater opposition in, say, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, to Anglo-French atomic "hegemony."

The prospects for discord could be diminished if the European countries, including Germany, Italy and the Benelux three, could be given a role in planning for the use of the British and French forces by means of a European Nuclear Planning Committee in NATO. Such a committee would be charged with the development of strategic doctrine, contingency planning for the use of nuclear forces and joint targeting.

In addition, arrangements for joint financing and conduct of research in advanced technologies could be worked out.[9] Besides Britain and France, other countries might contribute to the financing of R&D and the production of certain kinds of advanced equipment for these forces. European states could simply include in their annual military appropriations a contribution to nuclear defense. Alternatively, a portion of the funds that will accrue to the European Community by 1978 from the EEC agricultural policy could be earmarked for the British and French nuclear forces. (Since Britain as an EEC member would make a major contribution to the EEC as a result of levies on imports of farm products, Britain might be permitted to retain a portion of such funds for her nuclear programs in the defense field.) Another alternative lies in the allocation of funds from budgets for direct financial support of U.S. troops. Bonn has expressed Germany's willingness to make a direct financial payment to the support of U.S. troop costs in Europe.

In the absence of satisfactory trade-offs, however, other European countries are not likely to evidence interest in contributing to British and French nuclear forces which remain under exclusive national control. At best, the strengthening of such forces would be fraught with major political and psychological problems. The development of a satisfactory package of trade-offs is therefore crucial not only to the financing of the British and French forces, but also to other European countries accepting them as a major component of their security.

The key to the resolution of such problems lies in the development of "European" procedures for command and control and R&D and defense procurement. The essential criterion for the development of such procedures is the extent to which they reconcile the ultimate decision of London and Paris with the requisite voice of other European governments in *detailed* planning for the use of the forces under all likely contingencies.

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[9] General André Beaufre has suggested that Anglo-French nuclear collaboration should begin with the creation of a European research and development organization for nuclear and conventional weapons. *New York Times*, August 9, 1970, p. 19.

To some extent Europe faces, on a smaller scale, a problem the United States faced in protracted discussions with her European allies in the 1960's on the question of the sharing of nuclear weapons. Because of international agreements concluded since the early 1960's, when the nuclear sharing issue dominated NATO discussions, the United States and Britain, but not France, are prohibited from giving nuclear assistance to European allies. For their part, most West European countries have bound themselves, by ratifying the NPT, not to acquire national nuclear capabilities. As a result, in the Europeanization of European strategic defense at the nuclear level all options but one have been foreclosed. Europe must find a "non-hardware" solution to its defense, because atomic weapons cannot be disseminated among those countries not now possessing them.

Just as NATO's Nuclear Planning Committee presently affords European countries a voice in planning for the use of the U.S. nuclear force, a similar committee at the European level would make possible intensive participation by nonnuclear European countries in the development of strategic doctrine, the planning of long-range policy, and the highly detailed targeting of the British and French forces for all foreseeable contingencies.

The European Nuclear Planning Committee would differ in certain respects from its existing counterpart in NATO: (1) Membership would be granted to states in return for a financial contribution to the British and French nuclear forces. (2) The European Committee would be part of a *European* defense arrangement, in which R&D contracts would be allocated to the greatest extent possible within Europe, rather than the United States. Because of their financial contributions, their role in planning and targeting, and the emphasis on the development of a European R&D base, members of the European Committee would be afforded a voice in nuclear planning for Europe's defense beyond that they now express in NATO.

Although most European countries are prohibited by the NPT from developing atomic capabilities, they are not prevented by existing treaty commitments from developing and producing other vital technological components of advanced defense. (Even in the atomic field, however, Western Europe has registered major advances. The most notable example is the centrifuge project in which Britain, the Netherlands and the German Federal Republic are developing a cheaper source of nuclear energy for use in nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes.)

In the past decade, European governments and industries have devised many kinds of defense-related projects providing for international collaboration. But Western Europe has lacked an effective organization for allocating such contracts and even for establishing criteria for priorities in those areas deemed most vital to defense. As part of the framework for the "Europeanization" of the British and French nuclear forces, a NASA-type organization in the field of technology should be established. It can only be effective, however, if it is given political guidelines from the constituted political authorities. Therefore, Western Europe must begin to progress toward political union by achieving a consensus both on major foreign policies and strategic doctrine. The NASA-type organization should be empowered to devise criteria for the allocation of contracts and the establishment of research priorities. Although there must be other criteria as well, in return for their financial contributions European governments would receive contracts for the development and production of certain kinds of equipment. It would be essential to avoid problems such as those which have beset ELDO in its ill-fated efforts to develop a European rocket for launching space satellites.[10]

The Role of the German Federal Republic

Aside from the willingness of Britain and France to contemplate changes in Europe's strategic defense such as those outlined above, Germany's place in such a framework is of the greatest importance. The Europeanization of European defense rests necessarily on collaboration among the three principal West European powers — Britain, France and the German Federal Republic. Therefore, the goal of Western policy toward Germany should be to assure that, on balance, she retains the westward orientation that has marked her foreign policy since the Federal Republic's founding. London and Paris have little choice but to give Bonn a major voice in the devising and operation of a European defense framework. The essential precondition for the success of the proposed European strategic force is the avoidance of a situation in which the Federal Republic is unable to satisfy her security interests within a Europeanized defense. In an age of U.S.-Soviet parity, the result would be the encouragement of forces in the

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[10] See, for example, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and James L. Deghand, "European Technological Collaboration: The Experience of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)," *Journal of Common Market Studies,* September 1968.

Federal Republic favoring the national acquisition of nuclear weapons or the development of still closer ties with the Soviet Union.

But the rationale for West German participation rests upon even more immediate considerations. The Federal Republic could make the greatest financial contribution and, because of its technological-industrial capacity, receive a major share of contracts for R&D in areas from which the Germans are not prohibited by international agreement. It is essential to satisfy German interests by granting the FRG major participation at all phases in the development of planning for the possible use of the Anglo-French forces. Such a solution is the only feasible one so long as there is no "European" political executive capable of acting on behalf of a unified command representing a unified Europe. According to the German government's *White Paper 1970* (p. 33): "A full-fledged European defense community would . . . presuppose the political unification of Western Europe. This would be all the more true of the formation of a European nuclear force."

U.S.-European Trade-offs

The proposed arrangements for the Anglo-French forces should not be viewed as a *substitute* for the U.S. nuclear guarantee, but rather as the first stage in a process toward a European political unit possessing a unified command in which the Federal Republic could participate. Conceivably, the United States could offer to make available nuclear information to a WEU consortium or another framework mutually acceptable to Western Europe. But the prospects for moving toward this second stage of European defense collaboration are not promising, given the tenacity with which nation-states, in Europe and elsewhere, have sought to retain ultimate control over their military capabilities. For this reason any solution must reconcile the emergent need for the "Europeanization" of Western Europe's defense, in an age of strategic parity, with the continued importance of the nation-state as the locus of decision-making.

Undoubtedly, the progress registered by France in the development of a national capability has diminished one of the important incentives from the French standpoint for collaboration with Britain, namely, access to British nuclear technology. If France would have less to gain from collaboration with Britain, the reverse holds for Franco-American nuclear collaboration. Under the 1958 amendments to the McMahon Act, the United States has made nuclear information available to Britain, but not to France. If the French nuclear program has reached a level of development comparable to that of Britain, and in some respects is even more advanced, the exclusion of France from U.S. atomic assistance is less justified than once was the case. Even without U.S. assistance, France has shown a capacity to build a nascent nuclear force.

The question of Anglo-French technological collaboration should be examined within a broader context than the future of the British and French nuclear forces. France lags behind Britain in certain important areas of nuclear technology, such as the centrifuge. In the development of a new generation of aircraft for civil and military use in Europe, there is need for Anglo-French collaboration. Most of all, there is a political basis for closer ties between London and Paris in order to furnish the nucleus of a uniting Western Europe which will prove attractive to Bonn and thus either lessen German interest in, or provide the necessary strength for, the pursuit of *Ostpolitik*. It appears that French interest in British entry into the European Community as a counter to Germany has been matched by British fascination with the leverage of such interest in negotiating for membership.

The United States, more than any other country, has much to offer France in the development and production of advanced technologies. In extending assistance she would reduce the cost to France (and possibly to Europe) of developing and maintaining a nuclear force. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss specific programs for nuclear assistance, they might be evolved as part of an arrangement whereby, in return, Washington receives French agreement that the embryonic European nuclear capability, while remaining under alternate British and French control, with the participation of other European governments, will be coordinated with the U.S. force. Joint targeting and contingency planning, to the extent consistent with ultimate European control of European capabilities, should be encouraged by the United States in any arrangements worked out with Britain and France. But such collaboration may appear risky from the French standpoint. One of the principal justifications for the development of the French nuclear force was the independence of action France might gain from it. The U.S. decision to cancel the Skybolt in 1962, as well as U.S. policies designed to assure that nuclear information which crossed the Atlantic to London did not reach Paris, can only reinforce French reservations about becoming dependent technologically on the United States in areas considered vital to national security.

At the same time, Washington should make an effort to resolve differences which contributed to France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure in 1966. Although France is unlikely to resume full NATO membership, the departure of President de Gaulle, as well as the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, served to remove some of the friction between Paris and its partners in the Atlantic alliance. Even during the final months of General de Gaulle's tenure, French strategic doctrine underwent a modification of major proportions. General Ailleret's successor as Chief of Staff, General Fourquet, abandoned the "all azimuth" strategy, under which France was to have the nuclear capability to deter an attack from any point on the globe.[11] The Fourquet strategic doctrine bears some resemblance to the official NATO strategy of flexible response. Strategic nuclear weapons cannot be used in response to minimal threats to French security in Europe. Before unleashing strategic weapons, France would have to determine the aggressor's intentions; the use of conventional capabilities would provide an important "first-test" of such intentions. Even if this first line of defense were to be breached, a "second-test" would precede a decision to employ strategic weapons. This "second-test" would make use of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus the Fourquet strategy, with its emphasis on tactical nuclear capabilities, accords with the requirements of NATO strategy in an age of nuclear parity.

France is developing a tactical nuclear capability. By 1972, she is scheduled to deploy a twenty-kiloton missile with a range of seventy-five miles. From the French perspective justification for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons lies solely in their use as a "second-test" against a Soviet probe into Germany. Therefore, the French plan to equip their divisions in Germany with them. It is difficult to envisage German agreement to the stationing of French tactical weapons on FRG territory in the absence of Franco-German, or Franco-NATO, agreement about the conditions for their use. It may be assumed that their deployment will be acceptable to the Federal Republic only if France is prepared to agree to strategic concepts which are not at variance with those of Germany and, more broadly, NATO. In short, the impending French deployment of tactical weapons provides the Federal

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[11] See General Michel Fourquet, "French Military Strategy: 1969," *Atlantic Community Quarterly,* Summer 1969, pp. 241-254.

Republic, and less directly NATO and the United States, with additional bargaining power in obtaining greater coordination between Paris and its Atlantic allies in strategic doctrine and in nuclear planning for European defense, and possibly even greater collaboration within the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

In discussing the problems surrounding Anglo-French nuclear collaboration, the relationship between West European unification and European security becomes apparent. Depending upon the extent to which the integration movement is strengthened, Europe will gain a greater institutional capacity for defense collaboration and for the "Europeanization" of defense. The successful completion of the British EEC negotiations is likely to contribute to Anglo-French defense discussions. Moreover, there are other trends in the European Community that can be expected to affect European security and the prospects for U.S. foreign policy as set forth in the Nixon Doctrine.

European Integration and European Security

At the beginning of the 1970's, the European integration movement appears to have entered once again a stage of forward momentum. The shape of a unifying, or unified, Europe is difficult to foresee because Europe lacks a leader. Of the great "Europeans" of the postwar generation — Adenauer, De Gasperi, Schuman, Churchill and Monnet — only the latter survives. There is a dearth of ideas about the desideratum. Europeans, and especially those of the younger generation, appear to favor integration not so much as an end in itself but as a means toward other goals, without any clear understanding of a unifying strategy.

Over the next decade, Western Europe will be engaged in a process of unification in several sectors. These include monetary affairs and economic union, foreign policy questions and defense policy, technological collaboration, and agricultural policy. Monetary union and technological collaboration, in particular, may provide catalysts for integration in other sectors. Although it may be argued that developing a "European" position in defense and foreign policy presupposes a large measure of political integration, it is doubtful if defense and foreign affairs alone are sufficient to generate widespread European support for this achievement; for example, among the younger Europeans there is substantial opposition to military expenditures.

With respect to monetary affairs and economic union, the goal of the European Community is to remove fluctuations between the currencies, coordinate budgetary policies, harmonize budgetary procedures, concert credit policies, adopt Community targets for medium-term planning, and achieve the gradual coordination of short-term economic policies.

In the field of foreign affairs and defense, the Six, together with Britain, will engage in regular consultations with the aim of arriving at common policies. On May 29, 1970 the EEC foreign ministers reached tentative agreement on steps designed to increase political unity in these matters. In accordance with a plan drawn up by the Davignon Committee, composed of officials from the foreign ministries of member countries following the Hague summit conference of December 1969, the foreign ministers of the Six will meet twice a year to discuss foreign policy questions. Before such meetings they will hold consultations with representatives from Britain and other EEC applicants.[12]

There has been much discussion of the "technological gap" in recent years. Over the past decade the Europeans, with mixed results, have embarked on programs of technological collaboration. Programs such as Euratom and ELDO have pointed up a lesson for the future: collaboration on a multilateral basis will have to be accompanied by a clearer vision of goals, more adequate procedures for the allocation of research and production contracts, control of costs, and a greater willingness of governments to commit resources to R&D at the European level. During the 1970's Western Europe can be expected to undertake a series of projects involving two or more nations. The centrifuge program for the development of nuclear energy, with Britain, the German Federal Republic and the Netherlands as principals, as well as the agreement between London and Bonn in July 1970 to develop a combat aircraft to replace the F-104's of the West German Air Force and the American Phantoms now in service with the Royal Air Force,[13] are illustrative of such joint projects. In another project potentially far-reaching in its political implications, France and West Germany have arranged for the joint construction of a training and tactical support jet aircraft, the Alpha, to go into service after 1975. The political significance of the project lies in the agreement between Paris and Bonn to train their pilots on the same equipment, to use the same techniques of instruction, and to pool training facilities.[14]

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[12] *European Community* (London), June 1970, pp. 8-10.

[13] See the *New York Times,* July 23, 1970.

By 1978 the EEC will have at its disposal a major independent source of funds accruing from levies on farm products imported into the Community. With financial resources totaling several billion dollars annually, the Community is likely to face pressures for control, perhaps from the national governments but more likely from those who seek to increase the representative nature of European institutions. Thus, another force will be generated for the strengthening of the European Community as a political institution.

CONCLUSION

In sum, for the next several years the United States, with its own domestic and foreign policy problems, will face a Western Europe that is uncertain about its future. The United States seeks a "lower profile" in foreign affairs; the Europeans strive to minimize their involvement in regions outside Europe and to maintain military capabilities only at a level necessary for deterring a seemingly remote Soviet attack. Whether or not the Atlantic Alliance can survive a prolonged period of negotiations with the power against which it was designed is problematical. But the essential prerequisite for the success of the Nixon Doctrine, applied to Europe, is a recognition of its logical implications for European security, namely, that Western Europe must undertake a phased development of capabilities under European control commensurate with whatever arrangement emerges from the thickening web of East-West security negotiations.

Two major trends in international politics can be expected to heighten the urgency of steps toward the Europeanization of Western Europe's defense. The first is the evolving strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union; the second is the anticipated reduction in the U.S. defense commitment to Europe and other regions symbolized by the Nixon Doctrine, and the contemplated withdrawal of U.S. troops. Organizational problems, as well as timing and phasing, make a shift of a portion of the U.S. defense burden to Europe formidable, but this is the requirement if a military balance adequate to European security is to be maintained in a period of declining U.S. commitment to, and interest in, foreign policy.

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[14] See *Le Monde* (Paris), Weekly Selection, July 29, 1970.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY

by Samuel T. Cohen

THE first quarter-century of the nuclear age undoubtedly will be remembered as a unique era. For during that period the world did not experience a conflict involving nuclear weapons. Why? Were those twenty-five years of nonuse a time of fortuitous international circumstances? Did that period result from "deliberate avoidance" among the major nuclear powers? In debating this point U.S. defense policy emerges as a factor. Throughout most of this period of nuclear nonuse the major tenet of U.S. national security policy was — and remains to date — the intense desire to avoid nuclear warfare and to solve military problems through nonnuclear means. Since 1961 that desire has been enunciated in our policy of Flexible Response.

Many events and changes have had a profound effect on the question of nuclear weapons usage by the United States. Regarding weapons policy, these events and changes fall into three key categories: (1) the American ability to use conventional forces; (2) the Soviet nuclear buildup, strategic and tactical; and (3) the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities.

In the early 1950's and late 1960's the United States fought "limited" conventional wars in Korea and Viet Nam. While constrained in terms of strategy and geography, neither of these conflicts was very limited regarding the level of military effort, the cost of the effort and the effect on the U.S. domestic scene.

The Korean war, a military and political trauma, forced a change in U.S. policy. In 1953 the United States decided to prevent such involvements in the future through a policy of nuclear retaliation against the aggressor. Pragmatically speaking, the Eisenhower policy worked. The United States maintained her foreign commitments while she deterred aggression at levels even substantially below that which had occurred in Korea. It should be realized, however, that during those years the United States held a nuclear arsenal far superior to the Soviet Union's.

II

American involvement in the Viet Nam war began under the

Flexible Response policy adopted by the Kennedy Administration. At that time Soviet strategic nuclear forces were of such strength that they raised grave doubts concerning the possible consequences of escalation in the event that the United States used nuclear weapons at the tactical level. For this reason, in addition to concern over the moral and political implications of nuclear usage, the decision was made to prosecute the war with conventional weapons only. The results, however, have been far less rewarding than those of the Korean involvement. As a consequence, the policy has now been geared to avoid such undertakings in Asia by dint of refusing direct U.S. combat participation, viz., the Nixon Doctrine.

The subject of present and future U.S. abilities to engage in nonnuclear war hardly lends itself to refined analysis. Rather, it requires the broadest military judgments; the kind, for example, that led Douglas MacArthur, after Korea, to warn against fighting further land wars in Asia.

Somehow, although there are highly quantified analyses that show that the potential exists to conduct conventional operations in a considerably more effective manner than previously, official Washington seems unable to cope with the essentials of conventional war. Despite all that modern technology has contributed to the conduct of such wars, the fundamental equation remains one of human beings, not of machines. The United States, however, has stressed the use of machines to deliver massive amounts of conventional firepower. In so doing, her primary aim has been to conserve manpower. This credo is difficult to assail; but it is pitted against an enemy who has little regard for manpower, and the result can be a war whose proportions, duration and inconclusiveness lead to domestic political rejection. This has been the impact of the Viet Nam involvement.

III

The United States faces the dilemma of relating conventional military force to its foreign policy objectives. C. L. Sulzberger has noted:

> The greatest lesson of the Vietnam war is that America still has many commitments abroad and still retains foreign policy aims that can no longer be maintained by the kind of military establishment, strategy or network of alliances now employed.

This is quite clearly emphasized in the diminishing power of NATO vis-à-vis its potential adversaries and also in growing pressure by U.S.

opinion to reduce forces abroad, not only in South Vietnam and South Korea but also in Europe.[1]

How well the Nixon Doctrine will fare in helping Asian nations to defend themselves against communist aggression remains to be seen. But it seems that MacArthur's warnings have been heeded and that the prospects for direct U.S. conventional involvement in Asia are dim. The Nixon Doctrine stipulates that the United States will provide a nuclear shield against attack by a nuclear power, yet it is unclear about what this shield is or how it will be used. Moreover, it does not say what U.S. action might be taken in the event of future aggression by either North Viet Nam or North Korea.

In Europe, despite the shortcomings in conventional operations in Viet Nam and despite the unsatisfactory record of conventional emphasis in NATO, the United States emphasizes nonnuclear capabilities for deterring possible aggression by the Warsaw Pact. While the consensus of military judgment has been that the Pact's conventional forces have always excelled NATO's, it is hoped apparently that renewed U.S. effort and greater European cooperation will establish a conventional parity with the Pact, thereby avoiding reliance on nuclear weapons. How realistic is it to expect success? Even if this were achieved, how meaningful would such parity be to NATO's defense and deterrent posture?

When assessing NATO's conventional capabilities, the political desirability for them is at least as important as the judgment of the military. In the United States the requirement for adequate conventional response has been critically affected by the desire to avoid nuclear responses. The prevailing opinion has been that any nuclear response is politically unacceptable and increases the chances for general nuclear war. (That this attitude has existed, and continues to exist, for Asian defense is indicated by the recent decision to turn conventional defense over to Asian allies rather than to redefine direct U.S. participation along tactical nuclear lines.) European allies, however, have held a generally different view. Opposing increased draft quotas, stressing economic difficulties that prohibit increased military budgets, and unreceptive to repeating their World War II experiences, Europeans have preferred to rely primarily on America's strategic nuclear guarantee.

Although Washington made intensive efforts during the 1960's to increase NATO's conventional capabilities to the level of the Warsaw Pact forces, the European allies essentially refused to accede to U.S. demands. At this juncture there exists an allied pledge, principally by West Germany, for certain weapons modernization efforts and some additional force deployment, but can it be expected that more required effort will be made to close what is widely considered to be a substantial gap in capabilities? Probably not, since the factors that made this impossible during the 1960's have not changed much. Moreover, although the United States has pledged to maintain her NATO conventional strength and reaffirmed her adherence to conventional emphasis, how realistic is it to expect that this avowal can long resist mounting domestic pressures for force reduction?

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[1] C.L. Sulzberger, "Solving an Ugly Dilemma," *New York Times*, November 15, 1970.

One is hard pressed to forecast with any confidence the achievement of NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional parity. This goal, now sought for a decade, probably will remain beyond NATO's grasp. Furthermore, considering Soviet nuclear weapons developments in the last decade, justification of this goal becomes increasingly difficult.

IV

We might recall that during the early 1960's the U.S. debate on the comprehensive nuclear test ban was influenced heavily by considerations of the U.S.-USSR tactical nuclear weapons balance. Washington, in pointing out the benefits of test cessation at that time, emphasized America's substantial advantage over the Soviet Union in tactical nuclear weapons. Since no serious tactical nuclear threat existed then, this large superiority not only could be used to justify a comprehensive test ban treaty, but it could serve to fortify the arguments for emphasizing conventional defense in NATO. That, however, was nearly a decade ago. What about today?

In considering this question, the opinions of Denis Healey, then British Defense Secretary, merit our attention:

> I don't think it would, in fact, make sense for NATO to aim at an all-out conventional defense against an all-out Warsaw Pact conventional attack because all Soviet exercises and training assume the use of nuclear weapons from the word "go," so I think an all-out conventional attack is very unlikely . . . the other side would use nuclear weapons to begin with and there's a great deal of evidence for that, both in the exercises they do and what they write in their strategic journals.[2]

[2] Interview, "The Nuclear Genie," Radio 4 (London), Aspects of Government Series, April 7, 1970.

Healey's observations on the Soviet tactical nuclear emphasis — in sharp contrast to the United States' conventional emphasis — seem well-founded. The Soviets apparently decided, back in 1954, to develop tactical nuclear capabilities.[3] By the late 1950's appreciable numbers of nuclear delivery systems appeared in the Soviet armed forces, and during the 1960's these weapons increased in both quantity and quality. Extensive use of nuclear rockets and missiles, in support of highly mobile tank and infantry units, forms the basis of the Soviet doctrine. Stressing surprise, speed and dispersion, these mobile forces can exploit nuclear rocket and missile strikes and simultaneously avoid presenting lucrative targets to enemy nuclear fire.

In contrast to Washington's apprehensions over Moscow's massive strategic buildup (which is still increasing), strangely enough there has been no noticeable public concern over the Warsaw Pact's tactical nuclear buildup and its implications for NATO's defense. It is interesting to note that while the United States has engaged in a major and continuous effort to change and modernize her strategic posture by minimizing her vulnerability to possible Soviet strategic nuclear attack, she has done relatively little to change NATO's posture toward minimizing its vulnerability to Soviet tactical nuclear attack. Yet, in terms of possible risk to the Soviets it would appear much less perilous to attack NATO than to attack the United States; on this premise one would assign a greater likelihood to tactical nuclear attack.

Apart from predictions of future Soviet intentions, the Warsaw Pact's capability for initiating a tactical nuclear campaign against NATO can no more be disregarded than its capability to launch a large-scale conventional attack. Obviously a nuclear attack would be far more successful militarily: the Soviets would have the great advantage of a nuclear first strike and NATO's forces, which are not structured for tactical nuclear war, would be highly vulnerable. Yet the U.S. emphasis continues to be based on conventional attack, which somehow is assumed to be far more probable and credible. Ironically, emphasizing a NATO conventional capability to defend against a Pact conventional attack appears only to increase the likelihood that any attack will be nuclear at the outset. Why would the Soviets opt for a mode of warfare that had a lesser chance for victory?

Healey, while essentially ruling out an all-out conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces, is able to salvage the potentially disastrous consequences of a tactical nuclear attack by reaffirming the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee:

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[3] Martin J. Miller, Jr., "Soviet Nuclear Tactics," *Ordnance,* May-June 1970.

> . . . the impressive thing, I think, for the European Allies is that in spite of the very substantial growth in the Soviet nuclear capability there has been no sign whatever of America being unwilling to continue providing the nuclear guarantee to her European Allies which she has provided successfully over the last 20 years.[4]

V

The U.S. strategic umbrella has been the fundamental shield of NATO. Under any set of conditions for defense against ground attack by the Warsaw Pact, America's pledge to use strategic forces has been essential for NATO's viability. Although these forces originally were regarded as a strategic deterrent to attack, in recent years U.S. conventional emphasis policy has obscured their deterrent role. It has not been possible to define the set of circumstances under which U.S. strategic forces would be used, and in stressing the necessity for NATO to resist a Pact conventional attack with conventional defense, for periods up to ninety days, the U.S. desire to withhold its strategic forces has emerged. Moreover, this desire has increased in accordance with increasing Soviet strategic capabilities.

On the one hand, it may not be possible politically for the United States to renounce its strategic guarantees to NATO. On the other hand, we have recently seen official U.S. references to present Soviet capabilities that are quite different from those made when the U.S. preference for conventional emphasis was expressed first in the early 1960's.

In his report to the Congress on foreign policy, in February 1970,[5] President Nixon stressed the growth of the Soviet strategic forces. He pointed out that "the prospect for the 1970's is that the Soviets will possess strategic forces approaching and in some categories exceeding our own." He described the strategic balance during this period as representing a "fundamental change" and an "inescapable reality." These observations concerned NATO problems and showed the need "to conduct a thorough study of our strategy for the defense of Western Europe, including a full and candid exchange of views with our allies."

In many NATO problem areas "full and candid" discussion is possible. However, full candor — by either the United States or its

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[4] Interview, *op. cit.*

[5] "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace," A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970.

European allies — on the issue of strategic guarantees seems politically inadvisable. For the United States to give unequivocal assurances probably would hold great domestic political risk, considering the general fears of the consequences of a U.S.-USSR strategic exchange and the mounting inclinations for military disengagement from Europe. For Europeans to press too hard toward receiving such assurances might only lead to greater U.S. equivocation or even a renouncement. Therefore, it would appear that any clear resolution of the problem of strategic guarantees is most difficult to achieve.

At the heart of the matter is not so much NATO's appreciation of the credibility of the U.S. strategic umbrella but rather that of the USSR. In this regard the problem of the Pact's tactical nuclear capabilities comes into focus, for this is one threat to NATO against which there seems to be no effective defense — now or in the future.

If NATO's conventional forces are insufficient to stop a massive Pact conventional thrust into Western Europe, certainly the large-scale first use of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons will suffice. However, if the Pact's thrust begins with its own large-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons, then, considering NATO's vulnerability to this form of attack, it is difficult to see how any effective defensive ability will remain. Moreover, a Pact nuclear strike against NATO would hold the least risk of military failure. But what would the risk be that such a strike would bring strategic retaliation by the United States? Would there be any significant difference, in the risk of incurring such retaliation, between nuclear and conventional attacks? Or has the "fundamental change" in the strategic balance removed any gradations of U.S. resolve in differentiating between modes of attack against NATO?

Answers to these questions must remain subjective and individual. But if it is not possible to resolve the implications of the increasing Soviet tactical nuclear presence in the Warsaw Pact, it appears reasonably clear that this presence substantially compounds an already perplexing problem. In contrast to the military balance in NATO that existed when the United States adopted the Flexible Response policy, when it held a clear-cut tactical nuclear superiority and thus had the ability to achieve tactical victory, the option for victory soon may rest with the Soviets. This poses a potential scenario in which even the use of American strategic forces may not preclude a Pact tactical victory over NATO, and yet where the U.S. strategic option appears to be the only one possible to employ with some hope for beneficial results.

The option for conventional defense emphasis was taken because, in President Kennedy's terms, it offered "a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action." In 1961 humiliation to NATO could have resulted only from the threat of Soviet conventional actions. The United States sought to block this possibility through a buildup of NATO conventional strength, contending that tactical nuclear defense and general nuclear war, through escalation, would quickly become a common action. In 1971 the Soviet Union may be verging on the ability to humiliate through the threat of tactical nuclear action, against which conventional defense is meaningless. Considering the body of evidence indicating that the Soviets have not chosen to eschew the tactical nuclear option, the question posed is whether NATO should shift from conventional to tactical nuclear emphasis to meet this threat. If it does not and the Soviets are allowed to gain clear tactical nuclear superiority over NATO, the possibility exists that the threat to use this superior force will constrain the United States to decide upon what President Kennedy wanted to avoid — "all-out nuclear action."

An intense and controversial political climate has confused existing knowledge about the technical and military aspects of tactical nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear warfare. In the United States, especially, the subject has been rejected politically on three grounds: (1) Limited discrete tactical nuclear warfare is essentially impossible because both sides, seeking military advantage, would escalate the conflict into general nuclear war with catastrophic consequences. (2) The use of tactical nuclear weapons would produce such high levels of death and destruction to the civilian fabric as to make such use politically impossible. (3) In the United States and over most of the world, especially in Asia, U.S. employment of tactical nuclear weapons would produce deep resentment and assure disastrous political repercussions.

In an era when the United States and the Soviet Union have strategic arsenals with enormous destructive power, to assume that one (or both) would force a tactical conflict (on someone else's soil) to the level of a strategic exchange solely for the sake of gaining military advantages appears ludicrous. Moreover, it is difficult to relate the results of a U.S.-USSR strategic exchange to the course and outcome of a tactical nuclear war in Western Europe. It is conceivable that there is no significant relationship between these modes of warfare and that a Soviet tactical nuclear sweep across Europe could proceed independently of a strategic war. Finally, it never has been made clear why it would be militarily advantageous to escalate the conflict to increasingly higher levels of nuclear violence. An analysis of the problem shows that a NATO tactical nuclear force postured to gain the most effective war-fighting capability would call for enemy use of large numbers of low-yield weapons, reducing substantially the extent of collateral damage effects. Thus, in militarily idealized form the nuclear battlefield would entail lower levels of violence than would result from attack of the target system NATO currently presents to the Warsaw Pact.

What level of collateral damage the use of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons may produce is conjectural, but hardly predictable. However, if we cannot predict the death and destruction the Soviet forces might produce in Western Europe, we can ask why they would employ warheads that would destroy the prize they allegedly sought. And should they desire to maximize military effectiveness and at the same time minimize their contribution to collateral damage, there are technologies in nuclear warheads and delivery systems they can readily exploit to permit this objective.

On the U.S. side of the ledger, the destructive potential in NATO's tactical nuclear stockpile has long been made public. The average nuclear yield per weapon has been revealed to be several times that of the bombs which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (Considering that this stockpile contains some seven thousand weapons, its total yield apparently is on the order of several hundred megatons. This is roughly comparable to the total yield of the U.S. Minuteman ICBM force.) Scenarios involving the extensive use of these weapons show horrendous levels of damage; they make plausible the contention that NATO's tactical nuclear weapons lack political credibility and that their general release would not be sanctioned.

The U.S. decision to maintain a tactical nuclear stockpile of such destructive proportions has provoked questions and criticism. In 1968, U.S. Congressman Craig Hosmer, a senior member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, wrote to Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford expressing his opinion on the consequences of not modernizing the stockpile to give it discriminate capabilities:

> Grave doubts can be expressed regarding the political credibility of our current tactical stockpile. There is not a single weapon in it for which a decision to produce was made after 1960. I am also not aware of any weapon system in the tactical nuclear area which has a possibility of

> being turned over to the military forces before 1972. Because of this it is easy to understand why the average yield of our tactical stockpile has taken on the horrendous proportions described by Mr. McNamara and why DOD studies on tactical nuclear war in Western Europe show such terrible devastation possibilities to the people and lands of our NATO allies.
>
> Since I am aware of what the AEC weapon laboratories have a potentiality to develop in the area of smaller, cleaner and more discriminate tactical nuclear systems to alleviate such devastation, and am aware of the daily increasing obsolescence of our present capability, I can only assume that the absence of an effective force modernization is a matter of conscious and deliberate decision within your office. . . .
>
> If indeed, the Soviets have been busy perfecting a family of clean, discriminate tactical nuclear weapons and the time should ever come when they decide to use them against us and our allies, a time will come when the devastation and contamination from tactical nuclear war will come from our stockpile. Or, a time will come when because of the inevitability of such devastation and contamination, the Soviet appetite for Free World territory will have to be appeased.[6]

From Hosmer's statements it would appear that NATO's tactical stockpile has purposely been assigned weapons of vast destructive potential. In the context of the combined use of tactical and strategic weapons such a decision can be rationalized on the grounds that the tactical weapons are part of the overall nuclear deterrent. But if the strategic guarantee should deteriorate to a degree where its credibility essentially disappears, then the tactical nuclear force is all that is left. In this event the credibility of this force must rest on its usage apart from strategic forces; in which case, in its present form, it may not be credible.

VI

Apart from an understandable desire by the United States to seek policies and military postures that work to minimize the need to use tactical nuclear weapons, there has been the additional factor, both domestically and abroad, of the political and moral burden such use would entail. Much of this assumed burden has stemmed from the world reaction to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and the image of the nuclear weapon as an instrument of vast urban destruction. The horror of these bombings has been used for political purposes ever since. In particular, it has been widely held in the United States that the use of nuclear weapons against an Asian enemy would produce such deep resentment and turmoil in many Asian countries that the military benefits would be more than negated by the political loss.

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[6] *Congressional Record,* July 31, 1968, pp. H7955-7956.

Seven years ago, in 1964, Senator Goldwater discovered the domestic political hazard of contemplating the use of low-yield nuclear weapons in Viet Nam. It is noteworthy, looking back on this episode, that the U.S. domestic reaction upstaged by far whatever Asian reaction there was to such statements from a presidential candidate. What about the climate on tactical nuclear weapons today?

Generally, the political trauma on a given issue can become intense when there are no related issues for which the climate is comparably traumatic. Such was the case in 1964 when national policy and dialogue singled out the tactical nuclear genie as singularly threatening to U.S. survival and security. There was no widespread concern about America's ability to fight conventional wars, and her substantial strategic superiority assured that no nuclear power would launch a strategic attack against her. Today, however, national concern over the problems of conventional and strategic warfare represents serious factors countervailing a singular concern over the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The traumatic experience of the Viet Nam war has made the contemplation of future conventional engagements fearful to a degree where we now see a general U.S. withdrawal from the Asian theater and mounting pressures for withdrawal from Europe. Relatively speaking, how fearful is the prospect of attaining a tactical nuclear posture as compared with retaining a conventional posture in areas where potential conflict exists? It is not clear at this juncture that the tactical nuclear option would receive outright rejection.

In the early 1960's the United States widely publicized its strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. America's strategic power was put on open display during the Cuban missile crisis when the flexing of U.S. strategic might was alleged to have been the major factor in persuading the Soviets to withdraw their missiles. Today it is admitted that the Soviets have more ICBM's than the United States and that theirs are capable of delivering considerably more megatonnage. Furthermore, official fears repeat that this Soviet ICBM superiority soon will give the USSR an effective first-strike capability to destroy the U.S. Minuteman missile system unless the Safeguard ABM is deployed. This revelation of Soviet offensive missile might and the U.S. decision to cope with it only through defensive means hardly is an indication of strategic bravado, as practiced through the 1950's and into the early 1960's. On the contrary, it is more in the way of expressing apprehension of the Soviet buildup and a recognition that U.S. strategic options for dealing with possible Soviet aggression have little, if any, credibility left. (Within another decade the same may hold true for dealing with Communist China.)

Because of current U.S. domestic fears and preoccupation over the consequences of conventional and strategic nuclear war, it is at least questionable whether the essentially unnoticed and unpublicized issue of tactical nuclear weapons would provoke a significant uproar if it were surfaced. It may well be that the national resentment over conventional involvement — which has proved to be prolonged, costly in national resources and ineffective — transcends whatever qualms might exist if a shift in policy were announced in which tactical nuclear weapons were substituted for U.S. manpower. And almost certainly a policy of tactical nuclear response would be preferred to any reintroduction of massive strategic retaliation against an aggressor, where the aggression was not directly against the United States.

For almost twenty years after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, it was widely contended that U.S. use of tactical nuclear weapons against a communist Asian enemy would produce the most unfortunate reaction on the part of noncommunist Asian powers, particularly India and Japan. How well this allegation has held up within the last several years deserves scrutiny, for these years have encompassed the major military involvement and disengagement of the United States in Southeast Asia and a growing apprehension by Asian nations regarding the U.S. ability to protect them against future communist aggression.

The attitude of India toward nuclear weaponry has changed drastically from a past moral aversion to a majority public opinion seemingly in favor of the nuclear option, a refusal to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and strong indications that the decision has been made to develop nuclear explosives. Japan was slow to sign the NPT and at this juncture has yet to ratify it. While there have been official Japanese denials of intent to develop a nuclear arsenal, there has not been any national repression of debate on the subject.

Other Asian countries have shown considerable reluctance to embrace the NPT. Regarding the U.S. employment of tactical nuclear weapons, however, the subject seems less of direct concern in Asia than in the United States. There certainly has been no repugnance expressed to the notion. A Gallup Poll on Asian attitudes toward the military use of nuclear energy does not appear to exist, but perhaps indicative of such attitudes, as a consequence of the Viet Nam war, is an opinion expressed by Philippines Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo after President Nixon first enunciated the principles of the new U.S. military policy for Asian defense, the Nixon Doctrine, in September 1969.

Romulo's reaction and concern about future communist aggression in Asia was of a magnitude to provoke him to say that the United Nations should establish radioactive belts along threatened borders to repel attack.[7] (He was referring here to the suggestion allegedly made by MacArthur during the Korean war.) While Romulo's opinion may not represent Asian opinion — insofar as there is one — on U.S. nuclear weapons usage on behalf of threatened allies, it is interesting to note that thus far in the Viet Nam war no American official of comparable rank and distinction has even hinted at the possibility of using some form of nuclear energy to improve the military position. Ironically, such a statement has come first from an Asian, whose prestige in Asia seems not to have suffered as a result.

It is true that whatever the future may hold is only suppositional. It is also true that we cannot exclude from the future what most would prefer to have excluded — namely, the incorporation of nuclear weapons into ground warfare. The emotional block to contemplating future contingencies in which the governing factors dictate the use of tactical nuclear weapons has had a highly inhibiting effect on the U.S. ability to plan around the military and political realities of such contingencies. Estimating what might be the results of this inaction would have to be based on assumptions for an unassumable future. Yet we can dwell on future possibilities which, in the context of today's understanding, hold respectable probabilities of occurring.

The Viet Nam campaign has shown a U.S. propensity to make great efforts and expend huge sums of money in waging conventional war. The consequence of this experience has been a new policy for Asia in which Asian combat personnel will receive American advice and weapons. But noting that the United States has failed to end a war in Southeast Asia with advice and weapons, plus a massive infusion of its own personnel, how optimistic can we be that Asian friends and allies will do as well or better — considering that U.S. monetary generosity most likely will be sharply limited as compared with Viet Nam expenditures? If, for reasons such as these, it turns out that certain Asian nations cannot defend themselves, is the United States to stand by while they topple, or will it be willing to use tactical nuclear weapons in a manner which fits credibly into the military and political situation at hand? If the choice is to be the latter, then perhaps planning and development for such contingencies should now be considered.

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[7] *New York Times*, September 22, 1969.

In Europe NATO faces a potential adversary that has achieved a formidable tactical nuclear capability. If the United States continues to stress conventional defense — at the expense of providing a viable tactical nuclear posture for NATO — and the Soviet tactical nuclear buildup continues at its past rate, a time will come when the outcome of a ground war will appear decidedly in favor of the Warsaw Pact. The question of how the Soviets might exploit this superiority is moot. That they would actually launch a full-scale attack against NATO, using these forces, seems difficult to imagine, though the possibility cannot be ruled out. But for NATO to contemplate a future where such a possibility exists and where the U.S. protective strategic shield has essentially vanished does not bode well for high resolve in differences or confrontations with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

Surely the United States never would allow the Soviets to gain a clear-cut strategic superiority which might be used for coercive purposes in direct confrontations between the two powers. Yet, by not providing NATO with realistic means to deter tactical nuclear attack it is risking a future for Western Europe that it would not risk for itself. What this future may be remains to be seen, but as of now the East-West nuclear chessboard seems to be changing in a manner allowing the more decisive moves to be made by the East.

VII

A decade ago revelations were made of possibilities for new classes of tactical nuclear weapons deriving their energy from the fusion of light elements, such as hydrogen and lithium. In contrast to the use of heavy fissionable elements, uranium and plutonium, exploitation of these fusion processes could largely eliminate the objectionable features of excessive physical destruction and radioactive contamination. In fact, tactical fusion weapons offered a potential that appeared considerably more discriminate than conventional warfare.

In 1967 it was officially revealed that the United States was pursuing research programs along fusion lines:

> The AEC is conducting research on enhanced radiation weapons — neutron bombs. Such a device would be very "clean." The term "very clean" would come from fusion. The blast effect would be very small but the radiation effect from neutrons would be predominant. The AEC also is conducting research on pure fusion weapons. The status of programs for developing such weapons is classified.[8]

Yet it would appear that prevailing security policies of the 1960's have precluded the incorporation of this technology into the tactical stockpile. As a consequence, the stockpile has remained of a nature which drew the following remarks from two U.S. Atomic Energy Commission scientists:

> Our present tactical nuclear armaments were conceived and weaponized in the 1950's under assumptions that are ill-advised for the 1970's. Escalation was equated with desperation in an extension of a contestant concept of war. Ten or twenty kilotons were regarded as a "small, tactical" yield, to be used in a European ground battle for real estate *after* a strategic exchange. In the aftermath of that holocaust reducing "tactical" collateral damage was only of academic interest. A new strategy — policing our boundaries with individual yields reduced by factors of 100 to 1000, and burst predominantly in the air or underground — could reduce the integrated collateral damage by factors of thousands, even if the *number* of uses were greatly increased.[9]

If the United States has neglected to exploit this new and different technology for its tactical arsenal, has the Soviet Union likewise? There may be no definitive answer to this question. For almost eight years, in accordance with the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Soviet testing has occurred underground. Not only has this effectively shut off the gathering of debris from the atmosphere that might enable an analysis of these tests, but for the low-yield category, of greatest relevance to discriminate weapon capabilities, it is possible that a large number of such tests has escaped even detection. Thus, the intelligence assessment of Soviet tactical nuclear warhead developments may be quite limited and the possibility exists that the USSR may clandestinely be able to attain a family of discriminate weapons. Should this take place and should the Soviets some day combine intimidation of a NATO nation with a demonstration of such a capability, what might the response be?

To divine what official national reaction might be holds the same limitation as efforts to determine the future credibility of the

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[8] "U.S. Discloses Its Weapons in Nuclear Arsenal," *Los Angeles Times*, September 6, 1967.

[9] R.G. Shreffler and W.S. Bennett, *Tactical Nuclear Warfare*, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LA-4467-MS, June 1970.

U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee: one cannot talk officially with candor on such matters. However, were candor to underlie the answer to the above question, the logic behind that candor should be disturbing, for it poses the question of how one responds to a superior credible threat with an incredible response, both tactical and strategic.

ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1970'S

by James E. Dougherty

JUST a decade ago, spokesmen of the United States and the Soviet Union publicly discussed general and complete disarmament as though their governments regarded it as a feasible policy goal to be achieved within, say, four to twelve years. A few years of analysis and negotiation demonstrated: (1) that the gulf between rhetoric and reality was wide and deep; (2) that the nature of the arms problem was complex; (3) that the superpowers had no choice but to shift the diplomatic effort from rapid total disarmament to a series of limited arms control measures. Agreements with the purpose of improving the safety of the international environment and moderating the pace of continued armaments competition will, it is hoped, gradually create conditions in which negotiations for substantial arms limitations might be realistically undertaken on a worldwide scale at some future time.

As a result of the Leninist theoretical heritage, large numbers of intellectuals, students and journalists both in the Western and non-Western worlds harbor the suspicion that economics is at the bottom of the disarmament impasse. They trace the lack of progress in negotiating disarmament to that sinister cluster known as the "military-industrial complex," with its "vested interest in perpetuating the arms race." Such an attitude represents a modernized and somewhat more sophisticated version of the older "devil theory of war" in which U.S. entry into World War I was blamed on the profit-seeking motives of munitions-makers. This *neo-diabolus* theory, accorded the status of religious dogma within the ranks of the American New Left, is admittedly more subtle and comprehensive than its predecessor, which social scientists have long since discredited. But it can never transcend its limitations as a mere corollary of the Leninist theory of imperialism, which is itself a simplistic explanation of the complex phenomena of international relations.

Undoubtedly general disarmament would cause serious economic dislocations. But purely on economic grounds, the problem should prove no more intractable for a capitalist system than for a socialist one – indeed, the former might well adjust more easily to the new environment.[1] The profoundest obstacles to general disarmament, far from being economic, are technical, strategic and political. In the final analysis they are rooted in man's psychological, sociological, technological and cultural structures.

Ever since the onset of the atomic era, countless leaders and concerned citizens have warned that nuclear war is inevitable unless nations achieve complete nuclear disarmament. Yet more than twenty-five years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is unthinkable that any one of the five existing nuclear states — not even China, perhaps especially not China — hopes to achieve any political purpose by initiating nuclear war. Paradoxically, despite the terrors of the thermonuclear age, not one of the five — not even Britain — has acted consistently during the last decade as if she looks upon total nuclear disarmament as the only way, or necessarily the best way, of safeguarding her security. In all five countries we would find intellectuals, government officials, military leaders and others who, in moments of philosophical reflection, regard general disarmament as a desirable goal. But it would seem that in all five most political leaders conclude that the same advanced weapons technology that makes disarmament more ethically imperative than ever before also makes it more difficult than ever to attain technically, strategically and politically.

The United States and the Soviet Union never solved to their mutual satisfaction the technical problems inherent in implementing the 1961 McCloy-Zorin principle that the disarming process should place neither side at an unfair disadvantage. Given the different geostrategic requirements of the two superpowers and the different weapons systems at their disposal, it was impossible even to agree on where to begin the dismantling of arms. (Now, a decade later in the Helsinki-Vienna negotiations we are arguing the same question of where to start "freezing.") Back in the early 1960's U.S. analysts demonstrated their creative imagination by devising a remarkable variety of physical and nonphysical inspection and control schemes to insure either compliance with the disarmament agreement or effective sanctions in case of violation. But that intellectual exercise remained rather theoretical. Virtually all the proposed schemes were vulnerable to serious criticism: they could be circumvented; they were politically obnoxious to the Soviets; or they were so bizarre that they would be unacceptable even in the more permissive framework of American politics.[2] One crucial inspection problem — that of "hidden stockpiles" sufficiently large to threaten a disarmed power's survival — was never overcome. Governments do not like to discuss those facts that inhibit their ability to engage in public rhetoric concerning persistent foreign policy themes.

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[1] The literature of the 1960's on this point was ample and never really controverted. See Gerard Piel, "The Economics of Disarmament," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* April 1960, pp. 117-122, 126; *Economic Impacts of Disarmament,* United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1962); *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament,* Report of a Study by the United Nations Economic and Social Council E/3593/Rev. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1962); Emile Benoit and Kenneth Boulding, editors, *Disarmament and the Economy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Otto Feinstein, "Disarmament: Economic Effects," *Current History,* August 1964, pp. 81-87; *Report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament,* Submitted to President Johnson July 30, 1965 (Washington: GPO, 1965); *United States Report to Secretary-General Thant on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament,* March 26, 1968, in *Documents on Disarmament 1968,* United States Arms Control and Disarmament Publication 52, September 1969 (Washington: GPO, 1969), pp. 196-203.

The strategic obstacles to general disarmament can be simply put. Essentially they involve the issue of security and the propensity of governments in the nation-state system to seek that security through some form of power balancing and, when possible, deterring war by threatening to make it too costly. All five nuclear powers appear to assume, as John H. Herz has suggested in a revision of his earlier estimate concerning the "demise of the territorial state," that nuclear weapons for all practical purposes have become "unavailable" for any use except deterrence and that, despite lingering ambiguities, they now constitute a safeguard rather than a threat to national security.[3] The two superpowers cannot but wonder, both in their mutual strategic relations and with an eye to other powers, how fast and how far they could dare carry out reductions down the strategic scale before encountering the danger that mutual deterrence might give way to renascent incentives for surprise nuclear attack, based on the expectation of achieving a decisive advantage. This is the central strategic problem in all planning for nuclear disarmament.[4] It would be more accurate to say that we have forgotten it than that we have solved it.

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[2] The author has dealt in detail with these technical problems in "The Disarmament Debate: A Review of Current Literature" (Parts One and Two), ORBIS, Fall 1961 and Winter 1962; "Nuclear Weapons Control," *Current History*, July 1964; "The Status of the Arms Negotiations," ORBIS, Spring 1965; and *Arms Control and Disarmament: The Critical Issues* (Washington: Center for Strategic Studies, Special Report Series, 1966), especially Chapters 6 and 7.

[3] John H. Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," reprinted from *Polity*, I, 1, 1968 in James N. Rosenau, editor, *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 76-89.

[4] See Thomas C. Schelling, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," Chapter 10 of his *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), especially pp. 235-236; Henry A. Kissinger, "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1960, pp. 559-561; Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 168-169; Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 97-103.

II

The political obstacles to general disarmament were, and remain, insuperable. Essentially, Soviet opposition to Western proposals for inspection and control has been political. There are no signs that the Soviets are more ready today than a decade ago to permit international on-site inspection. (Whatever limited-risk arms control measures we and the Soviets agree upon — such as the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, or the Seabed Treaty and the proposed Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement — require that the United States depend on its own national detection and verification capabilities.) Furthermore, there still exist serious political disagreements between the Western and the communist states over the development of an international peacekeeping organization (especially the United Nations) in lieu of national military establishments. Generally speaking, the nuclear powers appear unwilling to forsake an international environment in which the conditions of precarious stalemate have become relatively familiar for a radically transformed international system in which none of the great powers would be free to invoke either force or the threat of force to protect its interests and pursue its objectives. At present, each nuclear power attaches higher priority to policy objectives other than general disarmament. None of them is ready to start talking seriously about disarmament — this for several reasons.

First of all, because among the five there are serious asymmetries of situation and power, two of the nuclear-weapon states, France and China, are unwilling to enter into serious negotiations at this time. Both have continued to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Neither power has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, but neither indicates being motivated to encourage the diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional nations. France has given public assurances of an intention to "behave in this area exactly as do those States that decide to adhere to the non-proliferation treaty."[5] Now that the de Gaulle era is over, France may be able to return to the international conference table during the 1970's. But for China the strategic security situation is more difficult than it ever was for France. China's position vis-à-vis the superpowers is still quite weak, and she has a long way to go before she possesses the bargaining leverage that would make her feel comfortable about negotiating arms limitations, assuming that she will ever be willing to enter into such a process. Moreover, if China were to be invited some day to a world disarmament conference, in virtue of the fact that she is one of the nuclear *beati possedentes,* and thereby have her international political prestige enhanced, India's incentive to acquire nuclear weapons would probably increase and the prospects for inhibiting the further proliferation of national deterrent forces would be correspondingly diminished. Thus even the timing and the form of international disarmament negotiations can be a tricky business. For now, "pentagonal" negotiations are untimely, and it is impossible to predict confidently whether circumstances would permit them to begin before the end of this decade. Perhaps they should appear no more remote than did such U.S.-USSR agreements as the test ban and the nonproliferation treaty at the height of the Cold War.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament 1969,* United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 55, August 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 579.

The superpowers are still constrained in respect to arms limitation policies by consideration of the effects various types of agreements might have on their alliance systems and on the future behavior of other great powers, notably Germany, China and Japan. In the past, West Germany and other NATO allies have become extremely nervous at the prospect of any substantial alterations in the European political-military situation. The Brandt government's *Ostpolitik* apparently reflects some diminution of West German cautiousness, conservatism and apprehensiveness in the realm of foreign and defense policies — a willingness to strike out on a bolder course looking toward some vaguely defined change. There is now more talk in Western Europe about a European security conference. The adverse security implications of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia have been all but forgotten by Western public opinion, but responsible policymakers in NATO capitals are still compelled to remember them. Most West European politicians cannot yet see any practical alternative to NATO as a method of preserving the present condition of continental strategic equilibrium; they are generally supported by those people who perceive that the U.S. defense guarantee enables the European countries to enjoy the benefits of lower levels of military expenditure than they might otherwise have to sustain.

Throughout most of the 1960's, any effort by the United States and the Soviet Union to reach even the most limited arms control agreements (such as the establishment of the Washington-Moscow "hot line," the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty) invariably aroused suspicion on the part of some of the NATO allies. It was perhaps inevitable that an ambiguous détente should be greeted with mixed emotions. On the one hand, many Europeans welcomed the superpowers' willingness to tone down the hostility of their confrontation and to enter a new era of mutually advantageous negotiation; on the other hand, there was some fear (not entirely unjustified) that the two giants might try to strike a few bargains over the heads of, and at the expense of, the Europeans in between. They insisted that, if the premier partner of the Western alliance intended to undertake negotiations with the major adversary, it should also intensify the consultative process within NATO. Henceforth the Atlantic alliance had to conceive its role in terms of managing both defense and disarmament.[6]

During recent years, intra-NATO consultation has markedly improved. The scrapping of the ill-conceived NATO Multilateral Force (MLF) was accompanied by the creation of a Nuclear Planning Group through which the allies were admitted to a greater share in formulating defense strategy. This apparently has helped to strengthen the impression that alliance strategy is a transatlantic affair, and that even though nuclear command and control must remain in Washington, the development of political guidelines and contingency planning requires a much broader base.[7] Moreover, the need for better consultation on East-West arms negotiations has been recognized. A new Disarmament and

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[6] Throughout the decade of the 1960's, the ORBIS "Reflections on the Quarter" were replete with editorial pieces on the misgivings various NATO allies expressed on such subjects as East-West negotiations for general and complete disarmament; the credibility of the Western deterrent; NATO's nuclear strategy; the ideas of "flexible response" and "conventional pause"; the implications of summit diplomacy for Western security and alliance solidarity; proposals for a NATO deterrent and for a European deterrent; the Rapacki Plan for denuclearization of Central Europe; Skybolt and Nassau; the negotiation of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; German apprehensions that arms control treaties would become devices for the "backdoor" recognition of East Germany; the effort first to create a NATO multilateral force (MLF) and later to scuttle it in order to attenuate Soviet opposition to the Nonproliferation Treaty; complaints by the West Germans that the NPT would not safeguard their interests in peaceful nuclear reactors; and criticisms by other Europeans that the NPT would have adverse consequences for Euratom and for the whole European unity movement.

[7] See Walter Schutze, "European Defense Cooperation and NATO," *NATO Letter*, January 1970, p. 22; W. F. van Eekelen, "Development of NATO's Nuclear Consultation," *ibid.*, July/August 1970, pp. 2-6. Within recent years, the January and the July/August issues of the *NATO Letter* have also carried the texts of the communiqués emanating from the semi-annual meetings of the Nuclear Planning Group.

Arms Control Section within the Secretariat has carried on discussions concerning the Seabed Treaty (which prohibits placing nuclear weapons on the ocean floor), the control of biological and chemical weapons, and the concept of mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe.[8] On this latter point, the allies contend that symmetrical troop withdrawals, negotiated by East and West, are vastly preferable to the kind of unilateral American pullback proposed by the Mansfield Resolution. Faced with a growing neo-isolationist sentiment in the United States, the West Europeans now seem more disposed, publicly if not privately, to make favorable references to the notion of a "carefully planned" European security conference. But the NATO allies wisely insist upon making progress toward a guaranteed Berlin settlement a precondition of such a conference.[9] They also insist that MBFR must be on the agenda.[10] Thus far, however, the Soviets have shown little incentive to negotiate balanced force reductions, probably because they regard domestic political pressures within the United States for unilateral troop withdrawals as eventually irresistible.

The Soviets have been preoccupied for the last decade and more with the behavior of Germany and China – which causes them the greater worry, Western observers have been unable to decide. During the years of negotiating the Nonproliferation Treaty in the mid-1960's, it was sometimes suggested in the West that when Soviet propagandists inveighed against the militant revolutionism of the Chinese communists, this was really intended to disguise their deep-rooted fear of the Germans. It was also sometimes suggested that when Soviet diplomats at Geneva and elsewhere declaimed against the desire of the "West German revanchists" to acquire nuclear arms, they were only trying to tell us in Aesopian language how worried they were about the Chinese nuclear capability. It is quite possible that Moscow is seriously afraid of both Peking and Bonn. It is also possible, and perhaps more likely, that the Soviet leaders are rational enough to perceive that both Germany and China are at present decidedly inferior in total military capabilities to the USSR; neither by itself can pose a serious threat to Soviet security. Possibly, too, they are more concerned about the one than the other at any given time, depending upon the circumstances — including, e.g., the political character of the government in West Germany and the degree of tension or conflict along the Sino-Soviet border.

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[8] See A. G. Kuhn, "NATO and Disarmament," *NATO Letter,* January 1969, pp. 17-19, and "Active Disarmament Consultations in NATO," *ibid.*, March 1970, pp. 20-23.

[9] *New York Times,* December 5, 1970. See also Dieter Mahncke, "A Modus Vivendi for Berlin," *The World Today,* April 1970.

[10] See the Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions issued by the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Rome May 26-27, 1970. *NATO Letter,* June 1970, pp. 24-25.

III

It has become commonplace for Western observers to analyze the Soviet-American détente following the Cuban missile crisis as a function of two basic assumptions: (1) The Soviets recognized that NATO's political determination, backed by the strategic military power of the United States, made it impossible for the USSR to think any fundamental change in the political situation of Europe could be brought about by the threat of coercive action. (2) As the Sino-Soviet dispute became more publicly acrimonious, Moscow grew anxious to "mend its fences" with the West and thus "safeguard its rear" while preparing to deal with the increasingly ominous threat from China. As we look ahead to the 1970's, these two assumptions will no longer prove adequate for the interpretation of U.S.-USSR relations.

Undoubtedly it was U.S. strategic superiority which enabled the Kennedy Administration to make the response it did in the Cuban missile crisis, to stand fast on Berlin, and to adhere to a nuclear strategy for Europe despite all the talk of "flexible response." That same superiority prompted the Johnson Administration to think it could take a strategic initiative in Asia and "up the ante" in Viet Nam. But in recent years the international strategic equation has been substantially modified, especially in respect to the number of land-based launchers.[11] The significance of quantitative and qualitative changes in the strategic military-technological capabilities of the superpowers is mentioned here merely to indicate that a shift *may* be occurring which could undermine one of the two major assumptions on which the détente has hitherto rested. This is a crucial issue for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki and Vienna.

Western observers have assumed that the dispute with China figured prominently in Soviet motivations for entering the SALT in late 1969. But we should not discount the possibility that Soviet apprehensions over China may have been exaggerated in the past by Soviet policymakers, or by Western observers, or by both. If the Soviets were mistaken, they might now be revising their assessment. The real threat from China, if there is to be one, probably lies in the future. The Peking leadership must certainly recognize its country's strategic vulnerability in this early nuclear phase of its history. There is no reason to believe that a generation nurtured on Maoist doctrine will risk everything by plunging into strategic adventurism.[12]

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[11] Virtually all published sources of strategic estimates indicate that the Soviet Union has substantially passed the United States during the last two years in the number of land-based missiles, while the United States retains a wide lead in submarine-based launchers. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1970), pp. 41-58; *Strategic Survey 1970* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 12.

As the 1960's gave way to the new decade, the British journalist Victor Zorza expressed the opinion that the Soviet military, under Kremlin orders, was preparing to mount a preventive attack on the Chinese nuclear installations at Lop Nor, while the Chinese were increasing their war preparations against the Soviets.[13] Chinese propagandists asserted that Soviet-American negotiations in the SALT were designed to concert a policy of nuclear blackmail against China. Neo-Machiavellians in the West might be tempted to think that the West could derive strategic profit from a Sino-Soviet war. But anyone who is seriously interested in improving the quality of human life on earth as well as the prospects for international arms control and political order is bound to reject such a proposition as morally and politically abhorrent. A war between the USSR and China, regardless of which side started it, would constitute a wild leap into the historic unknown. It might lead to incalculably tragic consequences not only for the protagonists but for their neighbors and for other countries as well, whether they try to remain aloof from the conflict, exploit it from the sidelines, or eventually find themselves drawn into it for one reason or another. A war between any two nuclear powers, even though one be technologically far "smaller" than the other, could become catastrophically destructive of human life, the fruits of civilization, the economic potential for future development, and even the rationality of that political intelligence on which the survival of mankind depends.

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[12] For an analysis of Chinese attitudes toward arms control, see A. Doak Barnett, "A Nuclear China and U.S. Arms Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1970.

[13] The reader is referred to the following articles by Victor Zorza: "Is Russia Planning War on China?," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, October 4, 1969; "Chinese War Buildup Worries Kremlin," *ibid.*, December 13, 1969; "Polemics on a Powder Keg," *ibid.*, January 17, 1970. In "Spectre of War on Two Fronts," *ibid.*, January 24, 1970, Zorza presented the following analysis of Moscow's concern: "The United States does not expect to be bothered by China's nuclear capability until the mid-seventies, if then, and not seriously at that. But the threat to Russia, from missiles with a much shorter range, from much cruder nuclear weapons, which might even be carried by aircraft, could materialize much earlier. There is some reason to believe that the threat exists already. Of course, the Soviet Union would be able to respond to a Chinese strike, however small, with a massive salvo that would lay the whole country waste. But even a small Chinese strike is obviously more than the Soviet Union is now prepared to accept, and its policy is to prevent it, rather than to retaliate."

Once the SALT was under way, mutual hostility between China and the Soviet Union lessened considerably. By the end of 1970, one heard little of the Sino-Soviet dispute, or of the earlier speculation that the superpowers were using the SALT to rationalize their acquisition of a missile defense capability against China. On the one hand, the U.S. move into Cambodia may have prompted Moscow and Peking to attenuate their animosity, lest the United States take advantage of it. On the other hand, recent developments, including the recognition of the Peking government by Canada and Italy, along with a perceptible softening of the U.S. position toward the Chinese People's Republic in respect to travel, trade and United Nations diplomacy, helped the CPR to inch toward international respectability, and also served to demonstrate that the triangular Washington-Moscow-Peking relationship is a highly complex phenomenon, comparable to the "three body" problem in physics.[14] It will complicate the arms control picture throughout the 1970's, and the three principals can be expected to try to make capital of it.

A French analyst, Michel Tatu, has recently suggested that it may be less appropriate to interpret the current détente in terms of the Soviets' desire to "safeguard their western rear" while coping with China than in terms of their interest in "safeguarding their eastern rear" while pursuing a more active diplomatic policy in Europe.[15] Such 1970 developments as the Bonn-Moscow treaty (whereby the USSR obtained much of what it sought to gain through a European security conference) should make us wary of any simplistic explanations of Soviet negotiating behavior vis-à-vis China and the West.

Nevertheless, in the future the Soviets will usually have reason, because of geographical factors, to be more worried than the United States about China's nuclear capability. Moreover, because of the population imbalance, the Soviets would not contemplate Sino-Soviet nuclear disarmament negotiations with much enthusiasm. As Peking's nuclear arsenal grows, it will become increasingly difficult for the Soviet political-military leadership to entertain the idea of a pre-emptive attack upon China. Historical-psychological factors rooted in the Russian character and culture, as well as the rationalist dictates of communist ideology, already militate in favor of caution and nonviolent conflict resolution. Perhaps the Soviets realize that, as a sheer matter of coldly calculated *Machtpolitik,* they have passed the point where they could deliberately opt for war with China, and that they must look forward to the inevitable development of conditions of mutual deterrence in Asia. But if so, they will probably strive to maintain a margin of strategic superiority over China as long as possible. There is no reason to think that the leaders in Moscow, in working out an arms limitation policy, would be willing to take the "down escalator" while the Chinese (still a few floors below) are on the "up escalator."

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[14] For a discussion of the complexities of this relationship, see Pierre Maillard, "The Effect of China on Soviet-American Relations," in *Soviet-American Relations and World Order: The Two and the Many* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 66, March 1970).

[15] Michel Tatu, *The Great Power Triangle: Washington-Moscow-Peking* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, Atlantic Papers No. 3, 1970).

Why, then, are the Soviet Union and the United States involved in the Helsinki-Vienna negotiations? There is a variety of motives, not necessarily similar or of equal intensity on both sides. Both nations are beset by uncertainties. Decision-makers in each country cannot help wondering at times whether things are really going as well as they might, domestically and abroad. As a nation, the United States has become frustrated by the Viet Nam war and by her effort to establish some sort of equilibrium in Asia (despite a degree of success). She has experienced internal social disorders arising from urban crises, racial conflicts and campus unrest, as well as a pervading inflation which has contributed to general discontent with the existing institutional structure. The intelligentsia and youth have fed on one another's alienation from the nation's political, economic and technical culture. All of these factors have generated a demand, led by youth and responded to by some politicians, for a reordering of national priorities from defense and outer space to the environment and the inner city. There is an ambiguous mixture here of futility and hope on the part of those who expect a democratic system that they despise to transform itself by moving in what they deem more ethical directions. (The New Left finds it hard to believe that the "war machine" or the "death economy" can reform itself or carry on serious arms limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union.)

The Soviets, too, have had their problems, quite apart from China. Their counterpart of America's student rebels is the minority of scientists, artists, writers and intellectuals — the

Sakharovs and Solzhenitzyns — who in a more restrained way embarrass the communist leaders with their criticisms. Tens of thousands of Soviet Jews, unable to appreciate the subtle distinction that Moscow tries to draw between anti-Zionism and old-fashioned anti-Semitism, would like to depart from the socialist fatherland, and if this were permitted it might lead to unflattering comparisons between the USSR and Nazi Germany. The Soviet leaders, when they look toward Eastern Europe, are probably aware that the Common Market exercises a powerful attraction upon East Europeans, and to an extent even upon themselves. They must also realize that the sobering effects of the invasion of Czechoslovakia may wear off in Eastern as well as in Western Europe. Some East Europeans may still hope to exploit for their own gains the tension on the Amur-Ussuri rivers. A series of repeated applications of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" (in Rumania, Poland and elsewhere) is not something to be anticipated enthusiastically, although Moscow can be expected to apply the doctrine whenever necessary. In other words, the search for limited agreements with the West may either reduce the necessity of further applications of the Brezhnev Doctrine or increase the readiness of Western intellectuals and governments to excuse such "counterrevolutionary interventions" as may yet occur.

IV

Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States appears seriously worried today about a deliberately planned surprise attack by the other. Neither side seems greatly concerned over mild disturbances in the prevailing equilibrium of mutual deterrence caused by fluctuating, marginal differences in particular weapons sectors. Most policymakers in both countries are probably convinced that, for all practical decision-making purposes, there exists at least a temporary, crude parity based on compensating offensive and defensive asymmetries. These asymmetries involve different numbers of bombers, land-based missiles and sea-based missiles, all of differing ranges; different numbers of deliverable warheads and total "throw-weight" (measured in megatons); differences in hardening and dispersal (which affect vulnerability), firing reliability, guidance accuracy, re-entry speeds, penetration aids, detonation altitudes, and other weapons-design characteristics known only to the experts; and differences in warning systems, strategic intelligence, attack and defense strategies, offensive and defensive weapons mixes, and ability to overcome the unknowns of large-scale nuclear war (such as the operation of command and control systems under circumstances affecting electronic communications).

Given the present levels in numbers of strategic launchers (with growing numbers carrying multiple warheads), the case can be made that the uncertainties inherent in the calculus of a nuclear exchange are, on the whole, more stabilizing than destabilizing. Military strategists may continue to worry, as they must, about the numbers game, about the possibility of decisive technological breakthroughs, and about the "worst possible case" in which *our* systems fail to perform well while *theirs* work perfectly. But McGeorge Bundy was probably close to the mark when he said that the political leadership in Moscow and Washington cannot under existing circumstances conceive of any rational purpose to be served by a deliberately planned first strike, because the risks of retaliation are much too great.[16] This need not always be so, although it seems plausible now. The political leadership may be naïve in assessing the intentions of their counterparts in the opposite capital, or they may become so in the future, or they may at some time lose control over the first-strike decision to military leaders who have a different perception of the situation — but these are all possibilities political leaders are understandably reluctant to think about.

The widespread assumption of a U.S.-USSR crude parity of assured sufficiency is important because it is the first time in the twenty-five years of nuclear history that such a condition has been thought to exist. One might infer that American decision-makers have been virtually "marking time" for nearly a decade with respect to deploying strategic military capabilities, as if they were waiting for the Soviets to "catch up" to the point where serious negotiations for arms limitations could begin. But it is recognized that the USSR has been coming abreast at a disturbingly rapid rate within the last two years (and surpassing the United States in land-based missiles by nearly 50 per cent). The United States has sought to reinsure its own security position by preparing to deploy the Safeguard system (around four out of twelve missile sites) and to arm half its land-based Minuteman missiles and three-quarters of its submarine missiles with multiple-warhead weapons.[17]

There are apprehensions on both sides. The Soviets are not happy at the prospect of the Safeguard deployment around even a few sites, for they know that once ABM and radar technology has been produced on a small scale it could be extended rather quickly. They are probably also concerned over the U.S. ability to upgrade the quality of weapons by MIRV-ing them more rapidly than the Soviets can. Conversely, U.S. defense and arms control planners wonder whether the Soviets will be content to level off at crude parity, or whether they might try to sustain and increase their recent momentum in an effort to achieve the kind of strategic superiority the United States has for all practical purposes renounced. The fear is that the Soviets will try to gain a substantial edge by deploying large numbers of SS-9's or other large vehicles with warheads of megatonnage greater than those in U.S. missiles.[18] During 1970, U.S. spokesmen speculated about the possible upgrading of low-performance Soviet anti-aircraft missiles into an effective ABM system; the possibility that the Soviets were developing a satellite-destroyer capability which could seriously hamper U.S. strategic reconnaissance efforts; and the significance of the buildup of the Soviet navy, including the submarine fleet.[19] All of these developments created suspicions that one side or the other was trying to take advantage of the SALT to gain a military margin over its rival, as well as misgivings that ongoing quantitative and qualitative developments in advanced military technology may quickly render obsolete or irrelevant any precisely formulated clauses of treaties on which the superpowers might reach agreement at Helsinki and Vienna.[20]

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[16] McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1969, p. 9.

[17] See *New York Times,* December 6, 1970, December 20, 1970 and February 27, 1971.

But beyond the uncertainties that make it so difficult for the superpowers to reach agreement, there are other uncertainties which motivate them to continue the negotiations. It is possible that both the United States and the Soviet Union see the SALT more in the framework of what may lie beyond 1975 than of presently projected deployments of familiar weapons systems during the next two or three years. The Soviets would probably like to use the SALT to inhibit the deployment of an operational ABM system in the United States (and under certain circumstances they might accomplish this objective). But even if they prove unable to obtain such a bonus, there are other reasons why they would not wish to withdraw from the effort to arrive at some limited-risk, limited-cost, mutual interest agreements. Some of these reasons also serve to explain, in varying degrees, U.S. motivations.

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[18] Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on more than one occasion has warned against the threat of a rapid Soviet missile buildup, which could produce a capability to destroy most of the U.S. Minuteman force before 1974. (*New York Times,* January 8 and February 21, 1970.) He said that during the previous five years the USSR had virtually quadrupled the total megatonnage in its strategic offensive force, while the United States had reduced its megatonnage by more than 40 per cent, and was "literally at the edge of prudent risk." (*Ibid.,* April 21, 1970.)

[19] See *New York Times,* January 11, February 5, October 4 and October 18, 1970 and April 29, 1971.

[20] Anyone interested in pursuing a highly sophisticated debate over the implications of quantitative and qualitative changes in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces for the continuation of mutual balanced deterrence and for arms limitation talks should refer to the following works: William C. Foster, "Prospects for Arms Control," Harold Brown, "Security through Limitations" and D. G. Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense," all in *Foreign Affairs,* April 1969; George W. Rathjens, *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969); Matthew P. Gallagher, "The Uneasy Balance: Soviet Attitudes toward the Missile Talks," *Interplay,* December 1969/January 1970; William R. Kintner, "The Uncertain Strategic Balance in the 1970's," *Arms Control and National Security,* I, 1969; Jeremy J. Stone, "When

Both are aware that there might be technological breakthroughs in the future. If the SALT were to collapse, competition in military research, development and deployment could well be stepped up. The familiar action-reaction process, marked by occasional overreactions, might end the existing condition of crude parity, creating new military-technological imbalances, perhaps leading to imprudent decision-making in a future international crisis. Both sides share an interest in moderating the rate of competition between themselves as they watch China. (The term "arms race," insofar as it implies a hectic rush to pile up or to improve weapons as rapidly as possible, is not an apt one for describing the present situation. The United States is preparing to deploy a limited ABM system only after ten years of debate.) Both sides must ponder at times the "economics of futility," that is, indefinitely expanding their nuclear missile capabilities and investing in costly new weapons systems throughout the 1970's, only to find at the end of the decade that such programs have had a reciprocal canceling effect, and that neither side has thereby improved its security or its ability to deter, much less gain any meaningful superiority.

Curious contrasts can be drawn here. The Soviets have reason to be worried about the total productive capabilities of the American economic-technological system whether measured in time, quantitative or qualitative factors. In a prolonged and unbridled arms race, the U.S. system, theoretically speaking, should still perform

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and How to Use SALT," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1970; J. I. Coffey, "The Soviet ABM and Arms Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* January 1970; Alexander De Volpi, "Expectations from SALT," *ibid.*, April 1970; Jerome B. Wiesner, "Arms Control: Current Prospects and Problems," *ibid.*, May 1970; and J. I. Coffey, "Strategic Superiority, Deterrence and Arms Control," ORBIS, Winter 1970.

better. Soviet planners may realize this. Moreover, Soviet leaders undoubtedly feel economic pressures to limit spending for strategic arms — pressures for increased investment in agriculture and consumer industries, for narrowing the "technological gap" with the West in nondefense sectors, and for a reallocation of defense resources to the army and navy.[21] But in actuality, the purely economic incentive to reach agreement in the SALT is probably stronger in the United States than in the Soviet Union, because domestic political pressures to reallocate national budgetary resources to nondefense purposes are considerably stronger on Washington than on Moscow. Soviet leaders are undoubtedly aware of such domestic U.S. constraints.

In the final analysis, the logic of the economist is not likely to be the ultimate determinant of defense choices in any country where the leaders are worried about security. Both superpowers will do what they think they must do in the military sector. But economic rationality prompts the leadership groups in the two countries to carry out communications and negotiations designed to hold armaments competition to manageable rates, lower than they would be in a more suspicious, fearful climate.

Another important set of shared motives for negotiating strategic arms limitations arises out of the connection between the SALT and the Nonproliferation Treaty. The superpowers definitely prefer a world of five nuclear powers to a world of ten or fifteen, and hence they must consider the implications of SALT's outcome for the viability of the NPT. This is not the central issue, yet it is by no means negligible. Whether or not India or Israel or another country decides to go nuclear will probably not be determined solely by the success or failure of SALT. But if the SALT should collapse entirely or drag on without even producing what the Swedish neutrals call a "cosmetic" or face-saving agreement, it will become easier for several countries to justify decisions to move in directions that contravene the provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The diffusion of peaceful reactor technology during the last decade has considerably compounded the difficulty of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. "Atoms for peace" are not easily separated from "atoms for war." Despite a growing uneasiness about the dangers of environmental pollution from nuclear reactors, the fact that nuclear energy is becoming economically competitive ensures that it will become more common as a source of power throughout the globe.[22] Thus, the growth of reactor technology will render it easier in the decade ahead for several countries to divert fissionable materials into weapons production if they are determined to do so. The intimate relationship between military potential and the nuclear power industry makes it difficult to prevent the proliferation of weapons without at least seeming to jeopardize the freedom of such countries as West Germany, Japan, India and Brazil to exploit the atom's peaceful uses. The International Atomic Energy Agency will probably not be able to perform the desired control function for two or three more years.[23] By that time, the possibilities for manufacturing nuclear weapons through centrifuge technology and through the even more esoteric ruby laser or argon technologies may have further compounded the problem of thwarting proliferation through technical controls on international exports.

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[21] An excellent analysis of conflicting economic, technological and strategic pressures upon Soviet decision-makers can be found in Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," *Problems of Communism*, September/October 1970, pp. 1-10.

The superpowers acted out of a combination of self-interest and a sense of international responsibility in agreeing to a Nonproliferation Treaty at the height of the Viet Nam war. But it must be recognized that they can do no more than discourage proliferation, by providing disincentives and compensations; they cannot absolutely prevent it. Their shipment of conventional arms into regions of local conflict, such as between the Arabs and Israel or between India and Pakistan, may under some circumstances decrease incentives, and under other circumstances increase incentives, to acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence or defense. For several years the United States sought to persuade new aspirants to the nuclear club that the game is not worth the candle because small deterrents are costly, provocative, accident-prone, noncredible, subject to rapid obsolescence and highly dangerous because young nuclear powers are vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. But none of these arguments has proved overwhelmingly convincing and some have often seemed irrelevant to countries worried not about the superpowers but about their immediate neighbors.

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[22] See Lord Ritchie-Calder, "Mortgaging the Old Homestead," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1970, especially pp. 210-212; Sheldon Novick, *The Careless Atom* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969); Richard Curtis and Elizabeth Hogan, *The Perils of the Peaceful Atom* (New York: Doubleday, 1969); Philip F. Gustafson, "Nuclear Power and Thermal Pollution: Zion, Illinois," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* March 1970, pp. 17-23; Alvin M. Weinberg, "Nuclear Energy and the Environment," *ibid.,* June 1970, pp. 69-74.

[23] See the author's "The Treaty and the Nonnuclear States," ORBIS, Summer 1967 and Frank Barnaby, "Limits on the Nuclear Club," reprinted from *New Scientist,* 19 March 1970, in *Survival,* May 1970.

It is a sobering thought that the list of countries which have not yet signed the NPT includes Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and Spain. Those that have signed but not yet ratified are Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland. During the last three years, the treaty has been criticized on several different grounds. It is a device for "disarming the unarmed." Virtually all of its burdens fall on the nonnuclear weapons states; thus it fails to provide an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations. It perpetuates the nuclear hegemony of the five. It prohibits peaceful nuclear explosions by nonweapon countries. It limits the rights of nonweapon countries to develop an export business in civilian reactor technology. It will facilitate industrial espionage. It could inhibit the movement toward European integration. It infringes upon the sovereign prerogatives of nonweapon states by requiring them to submit to international inspection and other forms of "intervention" or "bondage." It limits the choice of nations in respect to vital questions of defense without providing adequate compensations in the security field. Steady if undramatic progress has been made toward reducing some of the foregoing bases of objection to the Nonproliferation Treaty, but several misgivings remain in a number of countries — especially in regard to security — and these are sufficient to make governments reluctant to close off the nuclear weapons option.[24]

The principal question concerning the danger of proliferation is whether the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union can offer credible security guarantees to nonweapon states which adhere to the treaty. At present the three "nuclear arms control powers" are committed to do no more than concert action through the United Nations Security Council in the event of a nuclear attack upon a nonnuclear signatory (and one can argue that the members of the Security Council always had such an obligation under the Charter). We must remember that a nonweapon state such as India is also concerned about the threat of conventional aggression. Indians have no reason to expect that, if their northeast frontier should again come under Chinese attack, they will receive help from the British (who have withdrawn irreversibly from "east of Suez"), from the Americans (who, according to the Nixon Doctrine, plan to reduce their Asian commitments in the post-Viet Nam era) or from the Soviets (who have to worry about their own troop commitments both in Eastern Europe and along the Chinese border).

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[24] See Elizabeth Young, *The Control of Proliferation*: *The 1968 Treaty in Hindsight and Forecast* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 56, April 1969); Ryukichi Imai, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May 1969, pp. 2-7; George Schwab, "Switzerland's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Policy," ORBIS, Fall 1969, pp. 900-914; Shelton L. Williams, *The U.S., India and the Bomb* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); George H. Quester, "India Contemplates the Bomb," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* January 1970, pp. 13-16; H. Jon Rosenbaum and Glenn M. Cooper, "Brazil and the Non-Proliferation Treaty," *International Affairs* (London), January 1970; George H. Quester, "Israel and the Non-Proliferation Treaty," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* June 1969, pp. 7-9, 44-45.

Any nonnuclear weapon state confronted with either a serious conventional or nuclear threat will naturally fear that as the crisis mounts it will find itself under pressure from the superpowers to make substantial concessions in the interests of peace, so that they need not become involved in its defense. More than that, a nonnuclear weapon state has to worry about the possibility that, in a future defense crisis, the superpowers might be in an adversary rather than a détente relationship with each other. Thus it is understandable that a country in India's position should temporarily adopt the anomalous policy characterized as the "three negatives": No bomb, no treaty, no guarantees.[25] This enables India to defy the superpowers in their efforts to pressure her to sign, while moving steadily in the direction of reducing (perhaps to a matter of days) the leadtime problem between a decision to acquire nuclear weapons (if it should become vitally necessary) and their actual acquisition.

India's decision-making process is of crucial importance to international arms control efforts. Obviously, if she were to become a sixth nuclear power (whether for defense reasons or from a political desire to be guaranteed a place at the international negotiating table at least as early as China is seated there), pressures would quickly mount for several other states to pursue the nuclear weapons path. Indian officials may perceive that their country is not without political leverage vis-à-vis the delicate triangular relationship of the United States, the Soviet Union and China. During the years when the NPT was being negotiated, Indian spokesmen argued trenchantly that the treaty could be justified as equitable only if it eventually paved the way for nuclear disarmament, or at least a reduction of the symbolic importance of nuclear weapons in international politics. It was largely at the insistence of India that the superpowers agreed to insert Article VI into the treaty: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Yet precisely because of India's dependence for security on the continued ability of the superpowers to deter Peking's aggressive behavior by maintaining a wide margin of strategic superiority over China, her leaders are forced to adopt an ambivalent attitude toward strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. At present, the New Delhi government is not berating the superpowers for talking about a "freeze" rather than about arms reductions. At the same time, Indian leaders probably take some comfort from the thought that international circumstances are scarcely propitious for a Chinese onslaught against India. Indeed, New Delhi's policy of abstention from nuclear weapons may depend as much upon China's prudent restraint as upon any hope that India could count on assistance from the superpowers *in extremis.*

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[25] Hans R. Vohra, "India's Nuclear Policy of Three Negatives," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* April 1970, pp. 25-27.

V

We can see, then, that the prospects for significant progress toward arms control in the 1970's will depend on such a variety of factors as to render prediction difficult even if they do not make hope meaningless. Each of the major world powers suffers under its own unique set of problems, demands, supports, commitments, apprehensions, dilemmas, assets and liabilities. Certainly one of the important tasks of U.S. diplomacy in the Helsinki-Vienna talks is to find out whether the Soviets will be satisfied to accept the condition of crude strategic parity as a permanent part of the superpower relationship, or whether they seem determined to go beyond mild and temporary disturbances of the existing equilibrium (which need not cause panic) toward a more fundamental alteration of the strategic equation to the disadvantage of the United States. If the Soviets should opt for the second course, it will not augur well either for the superpowers or for the world.

What would happen if Moscow should try to seek a decisive superiority in the realm of strategic military technology? One possibility is that the United States, preoccupied with other problems, might allow the Soviets to take a commanding lead. In recent years U.S. defense policies have encountered a rising chorus of domestic criticism. Probably at present a majority of U.S. Senators would evaluate the issue of additional ABM, MIRV and other weapons deployments, regardless of whether they are for or against them, less on grounds of sheer national security requirements than on grounds of the estimated positive or negative impact they would have on the chances of progress in the SALT. This reflects a legitimate theoretical disagreement in the present situation—i.e., whether the further deployment of weapons at this time, which is not seen as urgently necessary to safeguard national security in a period of rough strategic parity, would have a favorable or an unfavorable effect upon U.S.-USSR negotiations. Put differently, should the United States contemplate recent Soviet deployment rates with equanimity, and even make unilateral concessions in respect to its own deployment policy for the sake of creating a climate favorable to negotiations, or should the United States display a determination to deploy Safeguard and MIRV as may be necessary to perpetuate the condition of parity and to enhance its bargaining leverage for the SALT while remaining ready to reverse decisions on projected but as yet unfulfilled deployments as soon as an equitable agreement is reached?

Perhaps the greatest danger is that the Soviet Union will misinterpret the contemporary American mood and seek to achieve an impressive mathematical superiority that might be exploited psychopolitically in future confrontations with American power. In this undesirable event the possibility of nuclear war might well increase beyond the levels that prevailed when the United States enjoyed strategic superiority, simply because Soviet communist ideology is more dynamically expansionist. It is doubtful, however, despite current uncertainties and ambiguities, that the American political system will acquiesce in the creation of such a situation (just as it is doubtful that the Soviet political system is capable of subscribing to any agreement calling for the destruction of substantial quantities of arms that might some day be useful for the defense of the Russian homeland against attack and invasion).

The American people, accustomed to the concept of planned obsolescence, can readily adjust to the notion of weapons destruction if they think this will lead to enhanced security and peace.

With greater difficulty they can be persuaded — as they have been — to set aside the notion of strategic superiority and to think of national security primarily in terms of balance, mutual restraint, parity, equitableness, fair play and reciprocal respect, and negotiated settlements advantageous to both parties. These concepts are not inconsistent with either the American ethos or the American national character. Yet, regarding strategic weaponry, we have in recent years played down our traditional competitiveness and our compulsive desire to be "first in the field." Even this adjustment has not been achieved without political strains, including a tolerable amount of domestic polarization. But if those enduring national cultural traits which the anthropologists assure us cannot be easily changed are still significant in international politics, we should remember that never in their history have the American people shown themselves willing to accept a subordinate role to an external dominant power, particularly one disposed to exhibit any political hostility. It would therefore be unwise for Soviet policymakers to expect that the USSR, having moved abreast of America in strategic military power, could now substantially surpass her and achieve such a strategic preponderance as to pose a psychopolitical threat. That development would not be tolerated by the American political system, regardless of how much polarization or how many drastic political changes within that system the counteractive process would require. Perhaps Soviet policymakers understand the foregoing comments better than do certain segments of the U.S. intelligentsia.

Finally, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can afford to adopt an exclusively technological, weapons-oriented approach to the SALT. Although a limitation on offensive and defensive strategic delivery vehicles might have a beneficent effect on the international political climate, at least for a time, we also must bear in mind that the existence of long-range nuclear missiles is the necessary but not the sufficient condition of nuclear war. The SALT, as one important dimension of U.S.-USSR functional negotiation, is related to specific geographic-political areas of controversy where superpower interests often conflict—Berlin, the Middle East, Cuba, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and Korea. Obviously, there cannot be a complete and close linkage between the SALT and the "conflict temperature" of Soviet-American relations in regions where the two countries are seeking objectives perceived as incompatible. The Soviets may be partly correct in warning that the SALT should be insulated against the adverse effects of ongoing international conflicts. But the United States is right in contending that arms negotiations cannot be entirely separated from those confrontations in which one superpower attempts to apply or support coercive tactics against the other, or against a state to which the other is committed. Such attempts will inevitably have an adverse effect upon the climate of superpower relations and hence upon the prospects for the SALT.[26]

It can be interesting to speculate on what precise type of agreement might come from the SALT. Will there be, as the United States was reported to have proposed in mid-1970, a numerical limit on the total number of strategic delivery vehicles, with each side free to vary the offensive-defensive "mix" to its own needs, except for such stipulated limits as the permissible quantity of SS-9's?[27] Or will there be a five-year agreement, such as the one reported to be advanced by the Soviets, restricting any further deployment of anti-missile defenses except around the two command centers in Moscow and Washington?[28] The American proposal involves a definitional question as to what constitutes a "strategic weapon." The Soviets wish to include the 500 U.S. planes based in NATO Europe and aboard Sixth Fleet carriers in the Mediterranean. The United States argues that if NATO's "tactical aircraft" are to be counted in on the grounds that they are capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union, then the 700 medium- and intermediate-range missiles based in western Russia and targeted on Western Europe must also be included.[29] The Soviet proposal for a ban on ABM except around the two capitals could give rise to political criticism within the United States, and it would not appear to be an attractive agreement with which the Nixon Administration could enter a presidential election campaign in 1972. Election politics will inevitably play a part. Unless the United States can achieve an agreement before the election campaign moves into high gear in the spring of 1972, it will probably be better for Washington to suspend negotiations until after the election.

But although these questions are important, they are in a sense peripheral to the central question concerning the future of Soviet-

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[26] See James E. Dougherty, "A Nuclear Arms Agreement: What Shape Might It Take?," *War/Peace Report,* December 1969, especially pp. 11 and 16.

[27] *New York Times*, August 17, 1970; Chalmers M. Roberts, "Arms Talks: Progress and Prospects," *Washington Post,* August 17, 1970.

[28] *New York Times,* January 9, 1971 and April 29, 1971.

[29] Hedrick Smith, "After the Helsinki Arms Talks, New Complications," *New York Times,* December 24, 1970.

American relations. After a long era of containment, the United States is now preparing to carry out a selective reduction of its global commitments as "policeman of the world." It is hoped that such a reduction can be carried out responsibly, without ushering in a period of dangerous instability in which such powers as China, Germany and Japan might be tempted to embark upon policy courses that will in the long run seem imprudent not only to American policymakers but to their Soviet counterparts as well. To expect the two superpowers to enter into some sort of world condominium arrangement is grossly premature.[30] But perhaps it is not too much to expect the Soviet Union, as a superpower, to assume a stabilizing and peace-strengthening rather than a destabilizing and peace-jeopardizing role. Although the United States and the USSR are a long way from a community of interest based on common political, social and cultural values, they might be compelled to recognize a coincidence of interest, based on a fear of what might happen if they squander this opportunity for at least a minimum of cooperation designed to hold a volatile world together.

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[30] Hedley Bull asserts that, although the United States and the Soviet Union have some common objectives, there is no evidence emanating from the superpowers to "justify speculations that they might agree to establish, or to work towards, some kind of joint hegemony of the globe." "The Scope for Super-Power Agreements," *Arms Control and National Security*, I, 1969, p. 6.

SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY

by Donald G. Brennan

THERE are two subject areas of basic importance concerning which I should like to raise some fundamental questions. The first subject area is that of American strategic nuclear policy, both unilaterally considered and in relationship to arms control. The second subject area is the relationship of the United States to security in Western Europe.

As concerns strategic nuclear policy, much of the community concerned with American foreign policy believes that the "right" answers are more or less known, at least in the sense of desirable directions for strategic nuclear policy. I believe that the commonly accepted views on desirable directions are wrong, and I shall argue a case for a major change in contemporary thought about strategic nuclear forces.

In contrast, there does not appear to be a clear consensus on exactly how the relationship of the United States to the security of Western Europe should evolve during, say, the next decade. I do not myself have clearly defined views on just how that evolution should best proceed, but I should like to raise some fundamental questions concerning that relationship, including some that are rarely, if ever, confronted directly, more in the spirit of experimenting with ways of thinking about and discussing the problems involved than of providing answers that are intended to be definitive.

I

American strategic nuclear policy has been dominated in recent years by an idea called "Assured Destruction." This concept is that the dominant task of the U.S. strategic forces is to be able to mount a nuclear attack that would reliably destroy a substantial fraction of Soviet society, even after a major Soviet first strike on American forces. Recent public statements of the Nixon Administration have emphasized a doctrine called "Strategic Sufficiency." Although the published formulations of this doctrine are ambiguous, it is clear that something like the concept of "Assured

Destruction" still dominates American strategic policy, even if the terminology itself is no longer used in official formulations.

This domination extends to strategic arms control matters. It is widely argued, especially by technical or technically-oriented people concerned with arms control, that the most peaceful, stable, secure, cheap and generally desirable posture is one in which both we and the Soviets maintain an assured destruction posture pointed at each other, and in which no serious effort is made by either side to limit the civilian damage that could be inflicted by the other. Most of the serious opposition in the West to substantial systems of missile defense for cities, and some of the opposition to the incipient Safeguard ABM system, derives from the alleged benefits of a posture of "Mutual Assured Destruction."

I believe that the concept of "Mutual Assured Destruction" provides one of the few instances in which the obvious acronym for something yields at once the appropriate description for it; that is, a posture of "Mutual Assured Destruction" *as a goal* is, almost literally, mad. MAD.

If the forces of technology and international politics provided absolutely no alternative, one might reluctantly accept a MAD posture. But to think of it as *desirable*—for instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our arms control negotiations, as many current proposals automatically assume—is bizarre. This can be made very clear by considering the simplest and most effective means of realizing it.

At present, we and the Soviets achieve a MAD posture by means of long-range missiles and bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons. There are, however, many problems associated with these forces; missiles and bombers may be attacked on the ground before they are launched, they may fail to perform properly in flight, they may fail to penetrate enemy defenses, and so on. Concern about such vulnerabilities in our posture helps to drive the arms race. These forces are also expensive; in the United States alone, we spend about $8 billion per year on them.

Now, if it were genuinely desirable to have a MAD posture, we could achieve it far more effectively, reliably and cheaply than at present. As Leo Szilard remarked ten years ago, we and the Soviets could have an arms control agreement to mine each other's cities. We could send very large thermonuclear weapons and secure firing crews and arrangements to Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and so on, while the Soviets could install similar weapons and arrangements in New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, and so on. It is technically feasible to make such a system very secure, and all of the vulnerabilities mentioned above could be eliminated, which would reduce arms race pressures. While such a system would have its own technical problems, analysis indicates they would be far simpler to solve than the problems of the present system. It would also be much cheaper than the current system; it could save many billions of dollars per year.

Yet almost everybody will judge it starkly absurd, even after consideration. And, since a mined-city system is clearly the best way of realizing a MAD posture, it follows that a MAD posture as a goal is itself fundamentally absurd—it is, indeed, mad.[1]

This reduction-to-absurdity argument is useful for sharply drawing attention to the fact that something must be wrong with MAD as a way of life. However, one can discuss the problems of MAD directly. There are at least three interrelated fundamental problems.

The first is that, in spite of our best efforts, a major nuclear war could happen, whether because of a crisis such as the Cuban missile crisis, an escalation in the Middle East, or whatever. An institutionalized MAD posture is a way of *insuring*, now and forever, that the outcome of such a war would be a nearly unlimited disaster for everybody. While technology and politics may conspire for a time to leave us temporarily in such a posture, we should not welcome it—we should rather be looking for ways out of it. And they can be found.

The second fundamental difficulty is, in essence, political: The body politic of the United States did not create a Department of Defense for the purpose of deliberately making us all hostages to enemy weapons. The government is supposed, according to the Constitution, to "provide for the common defense," and plainly most Americans would revolt at the idea that a mined-city system is a sensible way to provide for the common defense. They would be quite right.

The third fundamental difficulty is moral. We should not deliberately create a permanent system in which millions of innocent civilians would, by intention, be exterminated in the event of failure of the system. The system is not *that* reliable. If we accept such a posture as an interim solution, we should be seeking ways out of it, not ways to enshrine it.

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[1] When presented with the concept of a mined-city system, advocates of a MAD posture have been known to argue strongly that a mined-city system could not work because of some alleged technical difficulty or another. There is, however, no decisive technical difficulty.

Why, then, in view of these problems, do some Americans advocate MAD postures? The advocates involved are, in the main, technical or technically-oriented people concerned with arms control, and the arguments involve appeals to "stability" of various kinds and reference to other sophisticated jargon—jargon that I understand very well, having helped to articulate it a decade and more ago. For instance, one argument sometimes heard is that such postures will best protect against war altogether, but this proposition is very dubious indeed.

While these advocates are undoubtedly sincere, and many of them are even intelligent, I believe they have been bemused by theoretical models of strategic interactions, models which seem sophisticated and intellectually appealing but which are in fact much oversimplified descriptions of reality. Indeed, some few technical people, who have at least had the integrity to follow the logic of their analysis to its conclusion, have been so bemused by these models as to have seriously advocated the actual deployment of a mined-city system to achieve a MAD posture.

Well, if an institutionalized MAD posture is not desirable as a permanent way of life, and it is not, what alternatives are available? The answer, broadly speaking, is to provide increasing emphasis on defense, and corresponding reduction in the relative effort devoted to strategic offensive forces.

There is a good deal of controversy about just how effective defense (such as ABM) can be made against current offensive forces, or against further enlarged offensive forces. I cannot discuss this controversy here. However, there is very little controversy over the fact that defense can be made quite effective if the opposing offense is held down or actually reduced, while allowed defense is built up. This is precisely the direction that negotiations in the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) should be taking, but, so far as I can see, are not.

Even if it were held that currently achievable defense is too ineffective to be useful against even a suitably reduced offensive threat (a position that few informed persons would believe), it would still make sense to leave open the possibility of a more effective defense being found in the future. Most of the current thought about these matters does not embrace this possibility.

It might be possible to achieve similar effects simply by sharply reducing offensive forces, without building any defense, if it were not for two factors: (a) there are other countries in the world besides the United States and the Soviet Union; and (b) perfect inspection of sharply reduced offensive forces probably cannot be achieved, and defense can provide protection against clandestine weapons.

The most desirable postures providing increased defensive emphasis would be those achievable through negotiations with the Soviets. If such negotiations should fail, other alternatives, though less desirable, are available. I believe a sensible unilateral American strategic program would be governed by the following three rules:

(1) (The Budget Rule.) We should spend about as much money on strategic offensive and defensive forces combined as the Soviets do, neither greatly more (which might stimulate arms race effects) nor greatly less (which would leave us in a position of increasing risk).

(2) (I shall, for obvious reasons, call this the Brass Rule.) In terms of possible strategic nuclear wars, we should be able to do about as badly unto the Soviets as they can do unto us. This makes it unlikely that the Soviets could "dictate" terms to the United States in a crisis. Note that this formulation, in contrast to the McNamara formulation of "Assured Destruction," leaves open the possibility of reducing our threat to the Soviets, if their threat to us can be reduced by whatever means.

(3) (The Defense Rule.) Of the money provided by the Budget Rule, spend as much on defense as is compatible with the Brass Rule. (With the technology and Soviet postures of the foreseeable future, this would imply continued substantial expenditures on offense, but it would also permit substantial expenditures on defense.)

We should not be busily engaged in forging a permanent Sword of Damocles, to hang forever over our heads, by our own design and efforts. It is too likely to fall. We should rather devote our best efforts to escaping from these MAD postures. The alternatives are available.

II

American support for the security of Western Europe has been a major fixture of world politics for over a quarter of a century. However, few fixtures in politics remain fixed forever, and many voices are questioning whether the United States can or should continue to provide support of the nature and to the degree that has become traditional since the establishment of NATO. The view that the security relationship must change is widespread; what is lacking is a consensus on the nature of the changes to be undertaken, and when and how they should come about.

In this somewhat experimental discussion, I shall take up some of the factors that bear on the relationship of the United States to European security. I shall also discuss briefly the linkage of these relationships to various considerations of arms control, although the implications here will not be examined in detail.

Let us begin by listing some of the factors that motivate continued American support for European security. These factors are of different kinds, and to some degree they overlap.

(1) There is a continuing large American interest in Europe, composed of a great many separate interests. A number of these interests have political support of considerable breadth and depth, and consequently will be influential in shaping American policy for a long time to come. Most Americans are descended from European ancestors and many have European relatives. We like to travel there freely and we enjoy various facets of European culture and items of European produce, ranging from wines to perfumes. These associations are sufficiently strong to insure that, whatever happens, the United States cannot be disinterested in Europe.

(2) Any attempt to withdraw from Europe might prove illusory. An important argument sometimes made against the idea of American withdrawal from continued support for European security is that the United States could not become genuinely isolationist even if she wished to do so. It is conceivable, according to this reasoning, that U.S. withdrawal might lead to a renewal of serious conflict in Western Europe, which would be likely to draw America back at a net cost far greater than the cost of continuing the present level of support. Although this argument is somewhat speculative, it cannot be dismissed.

(3) The U.S. presence provides a good deal of tranquillity within Western Europe. So long as America remains a major factor on the European scene, Europeans can go about their own military preparations without having to look too closely over each other's shoulders. This is a new and useful environment in Europe.

(4) The protection provided by the United States helps to provide diplomatic freedom for West European governments. From a European perspective, and possibly also from a long-term American perspective, this factor may constitute the most impor-

tant argument against a too-hasty withdrawal of American forces or guarantees. It is largely because of the continued American presence that West European states can bargain as diplomatic equals with the countries of the Warsaw Pact. For example, the so-called *Ostpolitik* of the Federal Republic of Germany, including the Moscow-Bonn treaty concluded in 1970, represents an attempt to provide normalization of political relationships between Eastern and Western Europe, and, by this means, to bring about a lasting political settlement of European security problems. Thus, the diplomatic freedom provided by the American presence may be a major prerequisite to eliminating the need for that presence.

(5) The U.S. presence may help to achieve mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR). There are large Soviet forces deployed in various countries of Eastern and Central Europe, notably in East Germany. Although the prospects for negotiating a reduction in those forces are not noticeably bright, in spite of recent Soviet overtures, they would surely be much dimmer if the American presence were largely or wholly withdrawn; that development would lessen the Kremlin's incentives to negotiate about the levels of its own forces.

(6) The U.S. presence may help to retard proliferation. As matters stand, many West European statesmen now believe that the ultimate deterrent of Soviet aggression against Western Europe resides in the American nuclear deterrent threat. If this "nuclear umbrella" were hastily withdrawn, some of the states of Western Europe which do not now have nuclear weapons, but which (as in the case of Italy and the German Federal Republic) are fully capable of making them, might well be motivated to begin their own nuclear-weapon program.

It will be apparent that the overall impact of these considerations is strongly in favor of continuing American support for European security. This is true, it should be noted, in spite of the fact that the list does not include the actual repulsion of a major Soviet invasion.

Let us now discuss the specific nature of current American support for European security. It is useful to consider separately two major components: the actual military forces — manpower and equipment — provided to NATO, and the nuclear guarantee.

The most conspicuous element in U.S. support consists of military manpower, the total assigned to the European theater being somewhat over 300,000 men. In relation both to other NATO forces and to the Warsaw Pact forces they confront, the

American contingent is certainly large enough to be of serious significance, although it would be difficult to characterize that significance precisely. The dollar outlay for maintaining these troops together with their associated equipment and support costs must be about $3 or $4 billion per year. (Estimates as high as $14 billion can be found, but are implausible.) The total dollar figure does not indicate the total true cost, because a large fraction of that cost would be in foreign exchange which contributes to our balance-of-payments problem, and as long as any substantial portion of the manpower is provided by the draft, there is a political cost as well. Some of the impact on the balance-of-payments problem is reduced through offset purchases by our allies (chiefly Germany) of American goods and services or American bonds.

The other major component of American support consists of the so-called nuclear guarantee. The key part of this idea is that, in the event of Soviet aggression that cannot be contained by the NATO forces without recourse to the use of nuclear weapons, the United States would be willing to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe, even if the Soviets had not first used them. Let us call this a "first-use guarantee" to distinguish it from other cases we shall consider later. It is to be expected that if the Soviets themselves were to introduce the use of nuclear weapons, we should respond to them.

So far as I know, there is no formal treaty or other formal obligation that specifies exactly when or under what circumstances the United States would implement a first-use guarantee. Yet existing NATO plans and arrangements certainly envisage that the United States might employ nuclear weapons "if it became necessary," and actual theater arrangements lend considerable credibility to this posture. There are over 7,000 U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Perhaps the chief function of these weapons is to make it highly plausible to the Soviets that the NATO forces could not be overrun without having them brought into play. In turn, there would be considerable likelihood that a nuclear conflict in the theater would activate the strategic nuclear forces.

In essence, therefore, the main bastion of NATO defense, at least in the minds of many European statesmen, resides in American willingness to escalate to nuclear levels in the event of a Soviet aggression not containable by nonnuclear forces alone. The cost of providing this first-use guarantee is not so much in dollars, balance-of-payments cost or direct political cost. The real cost is in risk to the United States: we might become involved in a nuclear conflict, possibly all-out in character, in a situation that did not threaten our direct physical or political survival, and in which the enemy might not have initiated the use of nuclear weapons.

A few observations about this "risk cost" are in order. First, the likelihood of a conflict in which we should find it necessary to introduce nuclear weapons is low. Second, it is, however, not zero, and the consequences of carrying out a "scenario" of that kind would be enormous. Third, I do not believe the existence of this "risk cost" is widely recognized in the United States. I believe even a majority of the staffs in the Pentagon, and certainly the public generally, is under the impression that the United States would not use nuclear weapons except in response to their use by others. To some extent, lack of public understanding that we have undertaken this risk is a potential element in the cost of the policy, much as the absence of public understanding of and support for the escalation in Viet Nam in 1965 proved costly.

This and other factors argue against continuing U.S. support for European security, at least at the level of the recent past. As in the list of arguments for American support, these overlap, and they are not all of the same logical kind.

(1) Despite considerable American urging over the years, Europe's military efforts on behalf of its own defense remain relatively weak. The fraction of gross national product devoted to defense by most West European countries has been considerably below the fraction spent for defense in the United States. Similarly, and again in spite of considerable American urging, European efforts toward some form of political unification have been less than successful. For example, if the European Defense Community had come into existence in the mid-1950's, Europe would today probably be in a far better position to meet its defense needs.

(2) These observations should be understood in light of the fact that the population and GNP of Western Europe are comparable to those of the Soviet Union. Thus, there is no intrinsic reason why Western Europe as a whole should have to rely substantially on a non-European power for its defense. It would not be unreasonable for Washington to take the position that the appropriate scale of the U.S. effort should be modest if European efforts are modest. This argument has been an important factor in the minds of Congressmen (such as Senator Mansfield) who have

been increasingly cool toward continuing American support at its recent levels.

(3) The costs mentioned in reference to the components of American support for European security should be counted as an argument against continuing that support. Remember that those costs included the amount of money required for the support of the forces, the political costs in raising the manpower, balance-of-payments costs, and risk costs for providing the first-use nuclear guarantee.

(4) Senior military and diplomatic personnel of the NATO allies which have their own nuclear weapons obviously consider those weapons as a potential "trigger" on the American deterrent force; their weapons are often so described rather frankly. From an American perspective, this talk of "triggering" the American deterrent is tantamount to saying that allied personnel are willing to consider pre-empting the decision of the American government and involving the United States in a nuclear war whether or not American leaders would so decide or had so decided. While such a posture increases deterrence of Soviet aggression, it also poses a question for the American body politic: do Americans wish to surrender such a decision, perhaps to allied personnel of less than the highest rank?

(5) It is now more than a quarter-century since the end of World War II. This is a long time for one country to stand as guarantor of a group of other countries having the collective resources of Western Europe. Europe's economic recovery has been substantially complete for over a decade. As yet, however, there is no evidence that Europe collectively will rise to the occasion of its own security needs.

(6) One of the arguments for our continued support for Europe, mentioned earlier, is that the American presence may increase Moscow's motivation to negotiate mutual balanced force reductions for Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. But the Soviet interest in participating in MBFR negotiations already may be slight. It is widely — and I should say correctly — believed that the Soviets' principal motive for positioning their ground forces in East Germany and other Communist countries of Eastern Europe is much more closely associated with the need to maintain discipline in their domain than with providing a counterpart to Western ground forces. Consequently they might not want to reduce these forces even if the NATO forces were diminished to nothing.

III

We have considered two sets of factors: one arguing for continued American support for the defense of Europe, at something like its present level; the other arguing against continuing American support at major levels. Many of these conflicting factors are incommensurable, and in some cases they are incompatible. There is, thus, no simple "solution" that will simultaneously satisfy all of them. One must hope that time and the evolution of events will lead us to a situation in which the conflict between various considerations and motivations will be reduced.

However, the potential utility of a discussion such as this is that it may enable us to discern the nature of the changes that might be made while realizing our most urgent objectives, both from the perspective of the United States and from that of NATO more generally. As a device to help focus on the basic issues involved, I here suggest a set of characteristics for a possible future American posture for the support of Western Europe. I cannot say whether these conditions should be achieved in a few years or in a decade, but the changes required could certainly not be effected in the span of a few months, at least not without damaging the goals for which our past support has been invested.

(1) The United States should move to a second-use guarantee. Since Western Europe collectively has manpower and economic resources comparable to those of the Soviet Union, there is no reason why the United States should, by the device of a first-use guarantee, indefinitely underwrite Europe's political inability to raise conventional forces adequate to withstand existing Soviet conventional forces. I am rather skeptical that the American electorate would support such a first-use guarantee if the issue were presented and understood in these terms. I believe it is a fundamental mistake to continue adhering to elements of a national security policy that the electorate would not support. However, it seems quite plausible that the public would support the posture of a second-use guarantee: The United States would provide the nuclear "insurance" to deny the Soviets any incentive to initiate nuclear escalation — if European defense efforts were sufficient (in relation to Soviet efforts) so that the Soviets could not conquer Western Europe without themselves resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons.

(2) American troops in Europe should ultimately be reduced to relatively small levels. Whether "small" should mean 10,000 or 30,000 or 100,000 is not clear, but some number in this range

seems appropriate, if the Europeans continue to want them. The function of this force should be more to manifest continued U.S. interest in Europe than to make a major difference in the forces immediately available in Europe to repel large-scale invasion. In the words of a former president of Turkey, the troops should provide an "American plate glass window." However, this "glass window" probably does not require the presence of 7,000 nuclear weapons, and these weapons might be largely or wholly withdrawn, in keeping with the posture of a second-use guarantee.

(3) Both to increase our understanding of European problems and perspectives, and to increase European confidence that these problems are perceived and understood, I believe it would be mutually beneficial to encourage European participation in U.S. planning concerned with national security matters. Some useful beginnings in these directions have been made in recent years, but my impression is that the efforts have not yet gone far enough and that there is considerable scope for more.

(4) If wanted, we should provide technical assistance to a *European* nuclear force. It is not obvious to me that the Europeans should ultimately wish to deter the possibility of a Soviet nonnuclear assault by threat of first nuclear use. However, withdrawal of the American first-use guarantee might leave them generally feeling that they must provide their own nuclear deterrent. Though I am skeptical of any European solution of this problem outside the framework of genuine political integration, which is not to be expected in the immediate future, it is conceivable that Europe might unify sufficiently to create an integrated nuclear force for its defense. This force would presumably embrace the existing British and French forces, but provide for the defense of all of Western Europe. If the Europeans make this choice, the United States should be prepared to give them technological help. (We have done so in the case of the British but not the French force.)

Some posture such as this would seem to me a fair interpretation of what the Nixon Doctrine might mean in relation to the defense of Europe. Even so, a number of questions remain. How fast should we move toward this posture? Should it depend on the achievement of specific goals by Europeans? Should it be dependent on negotiated understandings with the Soviets? What would its political implications be for Europe, considered in several different "scenarios" of how the posture might be achieved and what arrangements might result in Europe and between Europe and the Warsaw Pact? What would these various scenarios imply for stability within Europe, and for harmonious relationships between Europe and the United States? Obviously most of these questions do not admit of definite answers, but we should be able to achieve far better collective understanding of the issues involved than we have at present.

One particular device that might be helpful in the interim is a bilateral relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. West Germany probably has a higher perceived need of American support than do any of the other European NATO countries, and it may be most in need of the diplomatic freedom continued American support would provide. For instance, we might continue for a time a first-use guarantee to Germany, even after it had otherwise been withdrawn from NATO. It should be noted, however, that considerable deterrent effect would remain, even if the American first-use guarantee were wholly withdrawn. Neither we nor the Soviets could be completely confident, if a serious crisis arose in Western Europe, that we could not or would not change our minds when the crisis was upon us. It is tempting to argue that the residual deterrence from this uncertainty would be about as effective as the current explicit threat of the first-use guarantee. (The other side of the coin, of course, is that the current explicit guarantee might prove to be nothing but a bluff in the event of an actual war; many Europeans, and some Americans, are convinced that this would be the case.)

IV

The security relationships between the United States and Western Europe also affect certain arms control issues. The following list will provide some sense of the scope and importance of the linkages:

(1) We have already noted the hope held in some quarters that we may negotiate with the Soviets on mutual balanced force reductions; this hope is stronger to the extent it looks less likely that the United States will phase down its troop commitment unilaterally.

(2) Plans have been advanced providing for more specific constraints than the abstract notion of MBFR. The Polish proposals for denuclearization or partial demilitarization in Central Europe, advanced by Rapacki and Gomulka, are among the more prominent suggestions of this kind and retain some possible interest. Exactly what could be achieved in this way would depend on the security posture evolved in Europe.

(3) Many strategists have argued at various times that, if it were not for the first-use guarantee extended to Europe, it would be sensible for Washington to issue a declaration that it would not be first to use nuclear weapons. Peking has already made such a declaration, and Moscow has given evidence in the past that it might be interested in a joint no-first-use declaration.

(4) Certain issues that have come up in the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are related to European defense issues. In particular, there is some controversy over the relationship between Soviet intermediate-range missiles and American forward-based nuclear forces in Europe. While this problem may not be of fundamental importance, its resolution is linked to European-American security arrangements.

(5) The subject of nuclear proliferation is related in two ways. First, as already noted, some European states may be motivated to acquire national nuclear forces of their own if the American first-use guarantee is withdrawn or substantially impaired in credibility, and if no genuine European force emerges to take its place. These motivations might not, however, result in actual nuclear forces. The other relationship to proliferation stems from the fact that the current European security posture — of defending against nonnuclear threats by means of nuclear threats — is a very bad example from the perspective of persuading other countries that they do not need nuclear weapons for their own security. Thus, diametrically opposite effects may be involved here.

These problems, or variants of them, are likely to remain important issues of national security through the 1970's.

U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

by Benjamin J. Cohen

IN contemplating America's prospects in the world economy of the 1970's, one can hardly escape the feeling that we have now reached the end of a cycle. For the last quarter-century, our foreign economic policy has fully supported a general foreign policy of active world leadership and deliberate political involvement in every corner of the globe. This use of economic policy represented a significant shift from the pattern that had earlier prevailed. Before World War II usually diplomacy and the Marines promoted and protected U.S. commercial and financial interests abroad. Since the war, however, the pattern has often called for the reverse. Now even that is changing. We seem to be striking a "low profile" in general foreign policy. Our international ambitions are becoming more moderate than they were before our involvement in Viet Nam. Our global role is no longer seen as that of the omnipresent policeman. Within this context our foreign economic policy too is certain to undergo considerable, if not sweeping, revision.

The Viet Nam war is not the only reason for reassessing our activist role in world affairs, however; it is only the most obvious. Over the past two and a half decades, the world as a whole — outside Viet Nam as well as in it — has changed in its attitudes, its institutions, its organization and structure. Many of these changes have been economic in nature. We face a "new world" and new situations.

I

Since 1945 the ultimate objective of U.S. foreign policy has been to ensure our national security — our independence and our way of life — against what, once the Cold War began, was viewed as an ominous threat from expansionist world communism. It does not matter whether in fact the threat was "real"; what matters is that the *fear* of a threat was real. Moreover, the range of minimum national "core values" we then felt worth preserving against such a threat — including material possessions, special privileges, security zones and the like — was vast. This helps to explain our involvement in "entangling" alliances, spheres of influence, and even wars in various areas of the globe during the 1950's and

1960's. In the Western Hemisphere we considered it in our national interest to maintain our hegemony. In the Eastern Hemisphere we considered it in our national interest to maintain the balance of power against the pressure of expansion from the Soviet Union and her allies; in other words, to "contain" communism. In one half of the world our design was to keep Canada and the Latin American republics as closely associated with us as ever; in the other half, it was to buttress Western Europe and Japan, counterbalancing, respectively, the Soviet bloc in Europe and mainland China in Asia, while competing against the attempts of communist states to extend their influence in the nonaligned Third World of South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. For twenty-five years these have been the principal goals of U.S. foreign policy. In pursuing these goals, America has used every foreign-economic-policy instrument at her disposal — commercial policy, foreign-investment policy, foreign-aid policy and balance-of-payments policy.

Geographically, U.S. foreign economic policy has divided into three primary components that correspond roughly to the three broad economic divisions of the world in the postwar period: the noncommunist industrial nations of Europe, Canada and Japan; the communist bloc; and the less developed Third World of Africa, Asia and Latin America. American policy regarding the noncommunist industrial nations has been unmistakably clear. From the start of the Cold War, official Washington's chief objective was to reconstruct the war-ravaged economies of Western Europe and Japan, and maintain the vigor of the undamaged Canadian economy, so that they could all serve as effective barriers to communist expansion. Toward this end we disbursed to the former war zones aid in the form of grants and loans, most spectacularly under the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), which lasted from 1947 to 1952. Toward this end, also, we later encouraged an outflow of private investments from the United States, particularly to Canada but also to Europe, and we promoted through GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) a broad program of worldwide liberalization of industrial trade that frequently benefited our allies directly at our own expense. Lastly, we encouraged various schemes of regional cooperation and integration in Europe, despite the potential threat to our own economic influence, on the grounds that these would cement ties and substitute cohesion for fragmentation in the face of external communist pressures. Any cost of these policies was regarded as a small enough price for preserving the power balance in Europe and Asia as well as the united strength of the North American continent.

With respect to the communist bloc, our postwar foreign economic policy was equally plain. The United States' main objective was the economic equivalent of political "containment": to minimize her own and her allies' trade contacts with the bloc in order to deny to the Soviet Union and her presumed satellites the major benefits of an international division of labor. East-West trade, we reasoned, was far more important to the communists than to us. Hence, correct or not, it seemed possible for us to enhance our national security at relatively little cost in terms of income forgone. Our policy began in 1948, after the Berlin blockade, with the initiation of mandatory export licensing controls. It was later extended in several major pieces of legislation, including the Export Control Act of 1949, which withdrew most-favored-nation tariff treatment from all communist states and established a list of "strategic" goods for which no U.S. export licenses would be issued, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the "Battle Act"), that tried to ensure allied cooperation with our policy by threatening to end economic aid to any state exporting strategic items to the communist bloc. Actually, aid has never been terminated under the 1951 Act, which has always been more or less a dead letter; and under the 1949 Act exceptions favoring such countries as Yugoslavia and Poland have been made as a means of encouraging tendencies toward "polycentrism" and economic liberalism within the communist world. Even so, after two decades of the Cold War, the quasi-isolation of communism still remains our policy's principal emphasis.

Finally, with respect to the underdeveloped Third World, the main objective of our foreign economic policy has been to cooperate in its aspirations for economic development in order to maximize our own net influence in the area and to protect our existing commercial and financial interests. Our main instrument of policy in this connection has been the foreign-aid program, beginning in 1949 with Point Four technical assistance and later expanding to include grants and loans by a succession of such alphabetical agencies as MSA, FOA, DLF, ICA and AID. Trade policy has not been used much for this purpose, and private investors have received only modest encouragement to seek out investment opportunities in the less developed countries. Even the foreign-aid program has never been large relative to our potential.

Apparently the United States, as a political community, has not felt compelled to pay a great deal for this aspect of national power and security.

Behind our foreign economic policy in all these areas there has always been our policy regarding the balance of international payments. This category of policy has no geographical limitations, because it influences and regulates our actions in every part of the globe. Since World War II the United States has functioned as central banker for the world: her dollar has circulated widely both as the principal "vehicle" currency for international trade and investment — even the communist states tend to use dollars when trading outside their bloc — and as the principal reserve currency for governments and international institutions. In practice, this means that the amount of new "international" money placed in circulation has depended mainly on the magnitude of the annual deficits in our balance of payments. When the world's demand for new money exceeded the available supply, the United States, the central bank, could run deficits of almost any conceivable magnitude. This happened during the period of the "dollar shortage," which lasted from the end of the war until about 1958. During those years we were effectively freed from balance-of-payments constraints to pursue whatever policies we considered appropriate and to spend as freely as we thought necessary to promote objectives believed to be in the national interest. From the foreign-exchange point of view, we could afford to forgo potentially profitable trade with the communist bloc, we could afford to revive Europe and Japan with aid, investments and trade advantages, we could afford to promote development in the Third World with substantial grants and loans, and we could afford to maintain hundreds of thousands of American military personnel abroad. In effect, although a payments balance, by definition, is a mutual experience, our position as international central banker enabled us to adopt a unilateral balance-of-payments policy: we issued the world's principal vehicle and reserve currency in amounts presumed to be consistent with our own priorities — not with those of our depositors.

After about 1958 that situation changed dramatically. A deterioration of our balance of payments showed that the world's demand for new money no longer greatly exceeded the then available supply. Indeed, according to many observers the dollar shortage by the late 1950's had become a "dollar glut." As a result, the United States could no longer continue ignoring the priorities of her depositors as she had until then: the balance of international payments now constrained her policies abroad. Yet U.S. foreign policy objectives remained unchanged. Accordingly, much of the 1960's was spent devising policies and programs that would minimize the impact of this payments constraint on our ability to act as we saw fit in world affairs. That was the purpose, for example, of tying our foreign aid to the purchase of American goods and of restricting U.S. private investments in certain foreign areas. That was also the purpose of such schemes as the "gold pool" and the network of foreign-exchange swaps arranged with various foreign central banks. Our ambition was to preserve the political privileges accorded us, as international central banker, to act abroad unilaterally in promoting our perceived national interest.

Although much has changed since these basic elements of our foreign economic policy were set forth in the early postwar period, one thing has *not* changed — the ultimate policy objective of safeguarding the nation against any threat from expansionist world communism. Yet as a result of the global nuclear stalemate our fear of such a threat has diminished. Consequently, the range of minimum core values we feel worth preserving is not as great as it was. Viet Nam has taught us that there are limits to the price we should be prepared to pay for achieving any of the principal proximate goals of our general foreign policy.

But even if there had been no Viet Nam, changes in the world economy over the last quarter-century would alone have presaged a lower profile in foreign economic policy in the 1970's. Because of space limitations, only three of the more important of these changes can be discussed here — first, the strikingly successful recovery of the economies of Europe and Japan; second, the less-than-strikingly successful, but nevertheless significant, beginning of the development process in the Third World; and third, the altered status of the dollar in world affairs.

II

Throughout the postwar period U.S. economic policies toward Europe and Japan have been conditioned by the fact that America emerged from the war undamaged, fully employed, and with a competitive edge that allowed her to launch first the Marshall Plan and later a generally liberal trade policy. As indicated, any cost associated with these policies was thought to be a small enough price for "Free World solidarity." But as we bitterly learned, generosity of this sort, particularly on trade matters, was to become more expensive. Our competitive edge as the world's leading trading nation narrowed as the Europeans and the Japanese recovered. It was narrowed even more by integration within Europe – especially within the Common Market – which clearly implied trade diversion at America's expense. This, in turn, signaled a decline in our relative share of the welfare gains from international trade. Ten years ago there was already much concern in this country about the competitive threat from a potentially inward-looking European Economic Community.

America's initial response to that threat was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, granting the President sweeping new powers to negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions of up to 50 per cent in all categories – and of up to 100 per cent in those categories for which the United States and the European Economic Community together accounted for 80 per cent or more of world exports. This latter provision, promising free trade for a wide range of goods, was intended to nullify any potential for trade diversion generated by the emergence of the Common Market. It was also intended to spur the movement toward general European integration which had been revived that year by Great Britain's decision to seek membership in the Community. Everyone understood that without the British the provision was meaningless. In other words, everyone understood that we were still trying to pursue our postwar goal of regional cooperation and integration in Europe. The only difference was that perhaps for the first time we were also taking more explicit account of the potential cost to ourselves.

As it happened, the free trade provision of the Trade Expansion Act became a dead letter when President de Gaulle vetoed British membership in January 1963. Thus, for all its success over the next four and one-half years in reducing tariffs across the board by as much as 35 to 40 per cent on average, the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations did not eliminate the competitive threat from an inward-looking European Community. If anything, that threat from the Common Market, now the world's largest trading unit, is greater than ever – and will be even greater if Britain's renewed application for membership this time turns out to be successful. One evidence of this is the Community's obvious determination, for internal political reasons, to maintain what, from the American view, amounts to a highly protectionist common agricultural policy, despite repeated protests by Washington.

(London seems prepared to accept the higher price level for foodstuffs set by the common agricultural policy, in return for scaling the Market's industrial tariff wall.) The Community's growing network of preferential trading arrangements around the Mediterranean and throughout Africa – many of which clearly violate the Six's obligations under GATT – is another example of the Common Market's threat. Still another is the Community's increased willingness to fight for a share of American business' sales, not only in Europe and in Third World areas but even in the U.S. domestic market. In the first half of 1970 alone Common Market exports to the United States were up by some 17.5 per cent over the same period a year earlier.

Nor should we forget Japan, now third among the world's economies in terms of gross national product and industrial output. Anyone who has bought a television set or a radio or camera recently is aware of the willingness of Japanese industry, too, to fight for a share of American business' sales, even in our home market. Until recently Tokyo was extremely reluctant to antagonize Washington on issues related to trade. In the late 1950's, for example, the Japanese agreed, although unhappily, to our demand for "voluntary" quotas on exports of cotton textiles into this country. These "temporary" quotas are now enshrined in the Long-Term Cotton Textile Agreement, sanctioned by GATT. Likewise, as recently as two years ago the Japanese acquiesced in a system of "voluntary" quotas on exports of steel into this country. This system is still in effect. However, last year the Japanese refused to acquiesce in a similar system to be applied to exports of woolens and synthetic-fiber textiles. The U.S. reaction was the protectionist Trade Bill of 1970, which only narrowly failed to obtain Congressional approval. At the same time, the Japanese have stiffened their resistance to pressures from us – and from others as well – to liberalize their own system of import quotas. Japan, it seems, is no longer loath to throw some of her considerable economic weight around.

As we enter the 1970's, therefore, the United States faces on either hand an economic giant able and willing to compete vigorously with us in our home markets as well as abroad. In a sense, our postwar policies have been *too* successful. Europe and Japan have not only recovered from World War II; now they can even effectively challenge American leadership in world economic affairs. This country can no longer set the pace on matters such as commercial policy. Europe and Japan will become the pacesetters;

amid their current prosperity and rapid growth there is no sign that either challenger will see it as in its interest to promote a further liberalization of international trade.

Indeed, there is a real question whether the United States would any longer find it to her interest to promote a further trade liberalization. Economists here and abroad have studied ways to eliminate the tariffs remaining from the Kennedy Round; non-tariff barriers have also come in for a good deal of discussion. However, there is no evidence that further liberalization would still be essential from our point of view to maintain the health of Europe and Japan; they are obviously doing well enough now. Nor is there any evidence that further liberalization would be still essential to maintain the health of our economy at home. On the one hand, as Lawrence Krause has pointed out, since U.S. economic activity is becoming increasingly oriented toward the provision of services of various kinds, the American economy in the future will probably depend less on exporting than before. Consequently, apart perhaps from our agricultural sector, we would gain little on the export side from a further liberalization of world trade.[1] At the same time, we might have much to lose on the import side. True, consumers at home would benefit from import liberalization in the form of lower prices on their purchases. But after six rounds of liberalization these additional benefits are not apt to contribute much more in real welfare terms. Gains would probably be more than offset by the real welfare costs of dislocation in domestic competing industries, many of which are unfortunately concentrated in locales where few alternative employment opportunities exist for workers thrown out of jobs. Even with an adjustment assistance program considerably more effective than the one we have now, the costs of adapting to further import liberalization — human and otherwise — might be too harsh and painful to make the exercise worthwhile. Organized labor has now become one of the bulwarks of protectionist sentiment in the United States, and this is just one sign of the breakup of the traditional coalition of domestic interests that has been responsible for our liberal trade policy since the 1930's.

What may we conclude, then? First of all, U.S. trade policy in the industrial world of the 1970's is likely to become increasingly restrictive rather than liberal. This follows directly from the shift in the balance of forces both at home and abroad. In retrospect, the Kennedy Round appears to have been the final gasp of a policy of liberalization now outmoded by the flow of events. The nearly enacted Trade Bill of 1970 may be more indicative of things to come. Over the next decade U.S. policy will be essentially defensive rather than activist. Lacking strong domestic or foreign-policy interests in the matter, we are unlikely to take any new initiative to further liberalize world trade. The same may be said for our industrial trading partners. For America in the 1970's, the main problem will be to contain the gathering of internal protectionist forces provoked by the threat of competition from the reinvigorated economic giants, Europe and Japan.

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[1] Lawrence B. Krause, "Trade Policy in the Atlantic World," *Columbia Journal of World Business,* January-February 1971.

III

Similar shifts have occurred in the balance of forces affecting U.S. economic relations with the underdeveloped Third World. Here, too, after the war we pursued a course of casual, almost reflexive generosity, and the price of such generosity inevitably grew more expensive. Over the next decade the main concern of policy toward the less developed countries (LDC's) also will be essentially defensive rather than activist.

During the early years of the postwar period, the most remarkable facet of U.S. economic policy in the Third World was not its generosity but its cheapness. Achieving our chief objectives cost relatively little. The development process then was in its infancy, throughout most of Latin America as well as in Africa and Asia. Needs were virtually infinite, and the capacity of the LDC's themselves to satisfy them were almost nil. Moreover, in most LDC's experience in the effective use of political sovereignty to maximize economic objectives — even in Latin America, where formal independence had existed for some time — was limited. Consequently, any industrial country prepared to offer even a token amount of development assistance could assure itself of a measure of influence and protection of its commercial and financial interests. It was a seller's market, with the United States, the world's richest nation, easily becoming the biggest seller. As indicated, we as a political community were compelled to pay relatively little for this aspect of our foreign policy.

However, also as indicated, the price of this policy rose, and gradually it has become quite a bit more expensive for us to maintain influence in the Third World merely by continuing to associate ourselves with the area's development aspirations. At first, it was the Cold War that was responsible for this considerable inflation of costs. From 1950 to 1955, before the USSR became seriously involved in the business of foreign aid, the amount of development assistance provided by official Washington averaged scarcely more than a billion dollars a year. But once the Soviets began competing with us — and, in addition, once a number of LDC's learned how to play aid donors against each other — our aid program rapidly increased. By 1956 official flows of funds from this country to the Third World were topping $2 billion a year. By 1961 they were in excess of $3 billion at an annual rate.

Toward the middle 1960's, Cold War competition came to exert less influence, mainly because Washington and Moscow seemed to have reached agreement on tacit limits to rivalry in the field of foreign aid. Meanwhile, however, a new and potentially more significant influence began shaping our economic policy in the area — the growing sophistication and unity of the LDC's themselves. The market is gradually becoming less strictly a seller's market. Increasingly, the pace of relations between the rich nations and the poor is being set by the latter. In this regard, the turning point was the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held in Geneva in 1964.

Before UNCTAD I, the LDC's had not particularly distinguished themselves in articulating their needs in the international economy. A variety of voices had been raised on their behalf (not least among them that of Raul Prebisch), emphasizing the complexity of the development problem. It was clear that a little aid, a little investment, a little import-substitution would not suffice to bring the poor nations into the ranks of the affluent; for all their contribution, in some cases substantial, to getting the development process started, the LDC's could use much more help than that. But how to get that help? The governments of the poor had not yet learned how to answer that question, in part because they had not yet learned how to mobilize sufficient political pressure in the world arena to match the power and influence of the rich.

That was the significance of UNCTAD I. For the first time the LDC's, banding together in the so-called Group of 75, achieved real unity in confrontation with the rich. As a result, they articulated a list of demands that far exceeded the usual pleas for more aid on easier terms. In effect, a fundamental recasting of the entire world economic order was requested. In the field of industrial trade, for instance, concessions were demanded in the form of tariff preferences, termination of the principle of reciprocity for LDC's in tariff negotiations, abolition of quotas and other nontariff barriers affecting imports of manufactures from LDC's, and alteration of the graduated tariff structures of the advanced countries. Similarly, in the field of commodity trade, international agreements or other arrangements were sought that would guarantee exporting nations higher and more stable prices for their production. Another request was for a system of compensatory finance to protect LDC's against unanticipated shortfalls of foreign-exchange receipts. The poor nations seemed to be making the point that the cost of associating with their aspirations for economic development was going up. Influence would cost more in the future.

Since UNCTAD I the developing countries have, if anything, more vigorously pushed their demands on the rich. UNCTAD itself has been reorganized as a permanent institution of the United Nations, functioning principally as an articulate lobby for the development interests of the Third World. At the second conference held in New Delhi in 1968, the basis was laid for a limited system of tariff preferences, the details of which were finally worked out in an international agreement announced in October 1970. LDC's have also met with some moderate success in obtaining nonreciprocity for themselves within GATT and compensatory finance within the International Monetary Fund (IMF). More recently, they have begun to make some progress in controlling—or, in an increasing number of cases, expropriating—the large multinational corporations that have investments within their borders. The success of the oil-exporting countries this past winter, for example, in bargaining from strength with the major petroleum companies, was of no small significance in this connection.

What has America's reaction been to these developments? Initially, our response was stiffnecked in the extreme. At UNCTAD I the U.S. delegation was isolated in opposition on every major issue. Apparently, we were reluctant to surrender the economic and political pre-eminence in the Third World we had attained after World War II. But we soon realized how expensive that kind of tenacity might be in terms of political influence lost and economic interests jeopardized — to say nothing of the potential military costs of trying to preserve our former power position. Tolerating the demands of the LDC's, and at the same time moderating these demands wherever possible to our own advantage, seemed to be the cheaper course. Accordingly, this became our strategy in cooperating in recent reforms agreed under the auspices of the principal multilateral agencies (e.g., tariff preferences under UNCTAD and GATT, compensatory finance through the IMF). Likewise, we have significantly relaxed our position regarding the growing limitations placed by LDC's on our private investments abroad. Increasingly, our multinational corporations will find that only the industrial world, not the Third World, will continue to be hospitable to their operations. It is noteworthy that, officially, there has been no U.S. reaction to the new Chilean government's proposed nationalization of our copper-mining operations, just as there was little or no special reaction to comparable takeovers in Bolivia and Peru. In the past such actions often brought out the U.S. Marines.

During this same period our foreign-aid program has been dwindling. Today, official aid flows amount to less than a third of one per cent of gross national product, down from twice the ratio just a decade ago. It takes little foresight to predict that over the next decade that ratio will decline further. For a number of reasons the aid program has lost most of its constituency in this country. Senator J. William Fulbright and others are disturbed by the apparent causal connection between our aid programs and our military involvements abroad. Others are disappointed by the slow pace of development in the LDC's, or are antagonized by the Third World's increasingly shrill demands. Few seem disposed to oppose President Nixon's proposal of September 1970, following the recommendations of a task force report of the previous April, to dismantle the Agency for International Development and channel the bulk of future development-assistance funds through various multilateral and regional institutions instead.

The point is that with the LDC's growing increasingly activist on their own behalf, American policy has little choice in the 1970's but to become more and more defensive in turn, as our power position declines. Not that this necessarily implies that America must abandon the Third World. The implication is rather that we are likely to do no more than is absolutely necessary to maintain a minimum of our previous influence. The problem is to reconcile our idea of what is absolutely necessary with that of the LDC's.

IV

The picture of the United States I have drawn is of a country whose relative economic position has declined significantly in the past two and a half decades — and, moreover, is apt to continue doing so in the decade to come. But the word "relative" here perhaps ought to be stressed. In absolute terms America is still a superpower. We are still the richest and most productive economy anywhere, the single largest national trading unit, the greatest source of international investment. We may no longer be the *sole* center of economic strength on the globe, as we were at the close of World War II; we are still the *first*. Probably the clearest evidence of this is the continuing dominance of our currency in international affairs. The dollar is still the principal vehicle and reserve currency in foreign-exchange markets. There is no other country that can even challenge America's role as central banker for the world.

Of course, other countries have felt inclined to challenge America's *use* of this role. France in particular, under President de Gaulle, was resentful of the freedom the dollar's pre-eminence gave us to pursue policies the French considered abhorrent—such as our involvement in Viet Nam. Essentially, this explains the difficulties we experienced in managing our balance of payments during the 1960's. France and others expressed their displeasure with our policies by threatening a "run on the bank" — that is, by threatening to bring about a depletion of our gold stock, either directly by means of massive conversions of their own reserve dollar holdings, or indirectly by withholding assistance in the event of speculative drains through the private gold market. (The United States had assumed the role of residual supplier of gold to the private market, first unilaterally, and then after 1961 as the principal member of the so-called gold pool.) As indicated earlier, our response consisted of policies and programs designed to minimize the impact of this constraint on our ability to act as we saw fit in world affairs. Tension and uncertainty — to say nothing of drama — resulted.

The denouement of the drama came suddenly during the great "gold rush" of March 1968. Without prior warning the United States, in accord with other major financial powers, announced that it was ending support of the private market for gold. Henceforth, the international system would be characterized by a two-tier gold price — one price for the private market, determined by supply and demand; and another price for central banks, to remain at the previous fixed level of $35 per ounce. This effectively ended any danger of a run on the bank due to private speculation against the dollar.

But what about the danger of *official* speculation against the dollar? Technically, our currency is still convertible at the central-bank level. Foreign governments which, like France's, may disagree with our foreign policy, still retain the legal right to exchange their reserve holdings of dollars for U.S. gold. However, the U.S. government considers that right to be a limited one, *de jure* rather than *de facto.* If a serious depletion of our gold stock were threatened, Washington has intimated, it would be prepared to close the window and refuse further sales — in effect declaring the dollar inconvertible. Other countries would then be faced with a choice of two alternatives: either they could keep accumulating dollars indefinitely, or they could sell them in the foreign-exchange market for whatever price they would bring. The first choice would represent acquiescence in a world dollar standard; the second, and perhaps more likely, would transform the economic order into a system of currency blocs or flexible exchange rates.

At present foreign governments have refrained from testing the technical convertibility of the dollar; instead they are accumulating it as if it were even now formally inconvertible. In essence, they seem *already* to have chosen a world dollar standard. But it is a standard with a difference, for the final choice has not yet been made: other countries can still force the issue on the United States, and bring down the dollar standard, if they so desire. The monetary ball is still in their court. That they have not yet moved — not even during the European exchange crisis in May 1971 — means only that since March 1968 they have not been sufficiently dissatisfied with America's policies to forgo such benefits of the present system as elasticity of supply and stability of value of international money; it does not mean that they never will want to. The problem for the United States, therefore, is to design our policies so that the issue never will be forced. If we are to preserve the benefits we still receive from the system (such as greater flexibility in the management of our domestic economy), we must try to avoid seriously antagonizing any of our principal depositors.

In a sense, we are caught in a real paradox. The United States reigns supreme as central banker for the world; the dollar remains the centerpiece of the international system. Yet our supremacy persists entirely on the tolerance of others: we reign but do not rule. As long as we find it useful to preserve the world dollar standard, we may never use it again in a unilateral fashion to promote our own national interests abroad. In the future our balance-of-payments policy will have to be much more passive than it has been in the past. It will have to respond more to the monetary needs of the international system and less to our own foreign economic and political objectives. No longer are we in a position to ignore the rest of the world.

Actually, the paradox is no paradox at all. All this is quite consistent with what can be expected over the next decade of other elements of our foreign economic policy as well. America's activism in international commerce and finance is swiftly coming to an end. We are now entering a new era of lower profile in foreign economic affairs.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THE NIXON DOCTRINE

by Robert Jefferson Wood

IN his February 18, 1970 report to the Congress on foreign policy, President Nixon enunciated five principles that, taken together, have been cited as presaging a change in the direction of U.S. national security policy:

> Let us not . . . pose a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home. We shall meet both or we shall meet neither. . . .
>
> Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations. . . .
>
> The United States will keep all its treaty commitments. . . .
>
> We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole. . . .
>
> In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. . . . the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but . . . America cannot — and will not — conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world.

A careful reading of these five points raises the question: Are they not actually a restatement of basic U.S. policy and truisms, and merely an indication of change in the methods of implementing that policy?

U.S. security policy presumably will still be based on three essentials — deterrence (the maintenance of the nuclear "shield"), collective security (the honoring of treaties) and flexible response (a readiness on the part of American forces to take defensive military action as necessary, ranging from a show of force to a major conflict).

What is different for the 1970's is the decision to withdraw a maximum of U.S. general purpose forces from overseas deployment on foreign soil, and to expect allies and friendly nations to rely for defense principally on their own manpower, supplemented by modern weapons, equipment and training supplied by the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). This is the essence of the Nixon Doctrine first announced (but not so identified) in background remarks to reporters in Guam on July 25, 1969.

This article will discuss U.S. military assistance programs — their history, their triumphs and failures, their present level — and the bearing of the Nixon Doctrine on their role, nature, size and importance for the future.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

On December 29, 1940, President Roosevelt set forth a tenet of common defense and collective security which was and is basic to foreign aid in general and military assistance in particular:

> If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and the high seas; and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us in America would be living at the point of a gun — a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.[1]

Hence, we embarked on Lend-Lease,[2] which by V-J Day (September 2, 1945) had cost the United States over $46 billion in aid to over forty countries, including nearly $11 billion to the Soviet Union.[3] In retrospect, would we rate that latter program a triumph or a failure?

But "military assistance," per se, is generally dated from 1947, when Soviet external pressures on Turkey and external and internal pressures on Greece caused President Truman to go before Congress on March 12 and call for an appropriation of $400 million, declaring that "it must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. . . ."[4] This policy became the Truman Doctrine. Truman's successors, Republican as well as Democrat, have honored it.

The next milestone for U.S. military assistance was the year

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[1] Radio "fireside chat." See *U.S. Foreign Aid,* Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, June 11, 1959 (86th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 116), p. 9.

[2] HR 1776, March 11, 1941.

[3] *U.S. Foreign Aid, op. cit.,* table, p. 99.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 30.

1950, during which the communists invaded South Korea and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, enacted by Congress in October 1949, began to be implemented. The latter was an inevitable outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine, of General Marshall's European Recovery Program, of the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, and of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Surely initiation of rearmament of our European NATO partners can be credited as a success.

The Draper Report

In 1959 the Presidential Commission chaired by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr. rendered the most comprehensive report yet made on the subject of military assistance.[5] Among other things it noted that American military stockpiles of World War II and Korean War weapons and equipment were almost exhausted. "A larger part of future deliveries for military assistance will come from new production . . . a greater proportion will consist of advanced weapons requiring longer time to produce."[6]

As a result, the Draper Report viewed "with concern" the trend toward reduced appropriations which, in the late 1950's, dangerously jeopardized the continuing effectiveness of the military assistance program. It called for a reorganization of the program and a restoration of adequate appropriations. In passing, it might be noted that the Draper Commission considered that military assistance should be placed in the regular budget of the Department of Defense and given continuing authorization.[7] As we shall see, the Viet Nam conflict partially accomplished this objective.

As to reorganization, the Commission felt that foreign policy guidance of both the military and economic assistance programs by the State Department should be strengthened and improved; that clear responsibility for military assistance operations should be given the Defense Department; and that a new agency, preferably outside the State Department, should be given responsibility for foreign economic aid.[8]

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

The original Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 was replaced in 1951 and the latter, in turn, was replaced by a third Mutual Security Act in 1954. In 1961 Congress enacted the Foreign Assistance Act, which, with subsequent annual amendments, remains the basic legislation covering the U.S. Military Assistance Program.

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[5] Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Washington, August 17, 1959.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 37, *et seq.*

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 49 and 115.

Section 501 of this Act spells out MAP's mission:

> In enacting this legislation, it is therefore the intention of the Congress to promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of political independence and individual liberty, improving the ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist or Communist-supported aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security and creating an environment of security and stability in the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid social, economic and political progress.

Some may consider that long and somewhat involved sentence as so much "boiler-plate." Far from it. Note the coequal and related objectives of the program: "to promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States." Note that the enemy is defined: "Communist or Communist-supported aggression," and the task is "to deter or, if necessary, defeat." Note that this basically military program is described as "essential to . . . more rapid social, economic and political progress" in the developing friendly countries. And note, finally, that "security" appears four times in this sentence and has four connotations: "security of the United States," "individual and collective security," "internal security" and security as related to "stability."

To my mind the Congressional intention thus declared supports the view that the military assistance program was designed to be in our own interest, our own hard, calculated Yankee self-interest. If it won friends or influenced people, well and good. One could count such results as collateral benefits. But attaining such objectives was not included in the statement of mission.

Self-interest must be the basic motivation of individuals, peoples and governments. As Lord Palmerston, British Prime Minister of a century ago, is credited as saying: "We have no eternal enemies, we have no perpetual friends. But we do have interests, both *eternal* and *perpetual,* and those it is our duty to follow." In this regard Americans are no different than the British, or the Russians, or the French or the Germans.

Grant Aid 1950-1969

Without burdening the reader with numbers, some statistics on MAP over its first two decades would seem necessary to indicate what funds it had to work with and how they were used.[9]

First, *appropriations* totaled $34.8 billion for the period 1950-1969 inclusive. Of this sum $14.3 billion was appropriated, mostly during the early 1950's, to fund the program for NATO Europe; $16.4 billion was used, mostly since 1960, to fund programs for East and South Asia. The program shifted, geographically, with the threat and the need. The Latin American program ran to some $800 million; the African to some $300 million; and approximately $3 billion of the overall program for the period is accounted for under "Non-Regional and Other," which includes overhead and administration.

Second, *goods* and *services* for the period 1950-1969 were provided in these amounts (billions of dollars): vehicles and weapons 7.7, aircraft 6.9, ammunition 4.4, technical assistance 3, miscellaneous equipment and supplies 2.8, transport and delivery operations 2.4, communications equipment 2.1, ships 1.8, missiles 1.2, training 1.3, repair and rehabilitation of equipment .7, construction .5.

With these items from the ledger as a gauge of its dimensions, what did MAP accomplish? First, let us be clear about what it did not do and what it was not, because many Americans have been confused as to its objectives and content. The Military Assistance Program was not economic aid per se, i.e., development loans or technical grants or agricultural assistance, although in the field of "civic action" it had some collateral economic benefits. It did not, per se, restore the economies of devastated countries or construct economies in less developed countries, though it allowed recipient countries to use scarce monies for development rather than for military expenditures. It was not Food for Peace or the Peace Corps or the Executive Service Corps. It did not distribute dollars, as such, to any country. It was not a major contributor to the United States' balance of payments deficits.

MAP provided "goods and services," i.e., military weapons, equipment and related training, to the forces of allied and friendly nations which were unable to purchase such items themselves. It funded purchases from American industry for shipment overseas to the forces of those countries which had the will and the manpower for their own national, and for the common, defense. It brought to the United States over 200,000 foreign military students, exposing them not only to American military knowledge but also to the ways, the traditions, the mores of American democracy. It assisted the United States in securing overseas military bases in strategic areas. Thus, in essence, it championed the American self-interest.

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[9] The figures are drawn from *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts*, Department of Defense booklet, March 1970 (hereafter cited as *MAP Facts*).

To mention a few specifics: In Europe, as we have noted, U.S. military assistance primed the rearmament pump in the developed countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and provided aid to Greece and Turkey. In the Far East, the same can be said respecting Japan and, to a lesser degree, considering their special circumstances, Korea and Nationalist China; in the Middle East Iran is the noteworthy example of MAP accomplishments. The rapport developed in the process of training the Indonesian army paid dividends when Sukarno was overthrown. Bases and facilities were made available in strategic areas, e.g., Spain, Libya, Ethiopia, the Philippines.

Perhaps MAP did not fare well in India and Pakistan, but it could hardly be charged with originating the basic hostility between those two countries. Southeast Asia remains a doubtful accomplishment, with the returns not yet complete. It should be remembered, however, that U.S. assistance to South Viet Nam began as a matter of rescuing French interests rather than advancing our own. Since the United States never declared war in coming to South Viet Nam's aid against the North's aggression or even adopted a "posture" of victory in that conflict, a good case can be made that the perception of American interests in Southeast Asia as vital was misguided (which may also hold true with respect to the Middle East). In Latin America, too, results have been spotty, yet there have been no suitable alternatives. Africa rates as only a qualified success — with the notable exceptions of Ethiopia, Congo (Kinshasa) and Liberia.

In short, the MAP record shows a batting average of somewhere around .800 or better — and diplomatically, militarily and economically, that is an achievement of significant proportions.

Foreign Military Sales 1950-1969

To complete the picture, a word should be said about foreign military sales,[10] as distinct from grant aid. Until 1964, and mostly after 1961, sales totaled just over $5 billion. The next five years saw tremendous growth in this activity, with the result that the total for 1950-1969 exceeded $12 billion. Of this, some $10.3 billion was for cash and the remainder represented credit arrangements. Developed countries accounted for over $10 billion of purchases, and underdeveloped countries for less than $2 billion.

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[10] *Ibid.*

The breakdown, area-wide, in billions of dollars, was: Europe and Canada 7.9, Near East and South Asia 2.1, East Asia 1.4, Latin America .5, international organizations .3, Africa .1.

Deliveries to principal country customers for the period were valued (again in billions) at: West Germany 2.9, United Kingdom 1, Canada .8, Australia .6, Italy .3, France .3, Iran .3.

Foreign military sales and the provision of U.S. government credit or credit guaranties played an important part in supplementing or taking the place of grant aid. Yet, excluding Southeast Asia, the shift from grant aid to sales did not increase the total of U.S. military exports. The combined total of grant aid and sales under MAP legislation averaged about $2.4 billion each for fiscal years 1963 to 1969 inclusive.[11] In no sense has the United States been "pushing" weapons on the underdeveloped countries. Because of Executive and Congressional concern, sales were governed by strict criteria. Among other things these precluded sales which might have "exacerbated regional tensions," contributed to arms races among neighbors or diverted limited resources of less developed countries from urgently needed economic progress. Transactions were made through commercial channels when practicable, but they were under government munitions control procedures with the State and Defense Departments ensuring that all sales were consonant with American foreign policy and security interests.

Extension of credit involved additional controls to ensure that there was capability for repayment (though the terms were minimal), that the prospective purchaser had himself initiated the request and, finally, that the goods and services were really required for the "stated purpose." Furthermore, compliance was required with Congressional limitations, e.g., $40 million annually for both grants and sales (excluding training) for African countries, and $75 million for Latin American countries. Congress also prohibited sales to countries that seized U.S. vessels engaged in fishing more than twelve miles off their shores.[12]

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[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *The Foreign Assistance Program*, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1969 (Washington: GPO, March 1970).

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TODAY

The foregoing review has covered the period from the initial U.S. venture in foreign military aid up to 1969. In that year — the last of the Johnson Administration and the first of the Nixon Administration — programs and appropriations already authorized carried through to June 30.

The Military Assistance Program for FY 1969 "provided carefully selected and limited amounts of grant aid to 47 countries, 22 of which received training only. In accordance with the sense of the Congress as expressed in Section 501 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the needs of nations in danger of becoming victims of Communist or Communist-supported aggression or internal subversion continued to be given priority in the allocation of available assets."[13] Thus, grant aid for Greece, Turkey and the Republics of Korea and China totaled some $315 million, or approximately 70 per cent of the program of $452.7 million.[14]

As to sales, during FY 1969 orders totaled some $1.5 billion, those from developed countries accounting for about 63 per cent of the total or some $800 million. More than $1.2 billion represented cash orders placed directly with the Defense Department and the remainder came under the Department's credit authorization.[15] It is noteworthy that sales to Latin America and Africa together accounted for only 3 per cent of the total, specifically $31 million for Latin America and $13 million for African countries.[16]

Appropriations

For grant military assistance, Congress *appropriated* $375 million "new money" for FY 1969 and *authorized* $350 million each for 1970 and 1971. In March 1970, it was estimated that the 1970 total grant aid program would come to $390 million, including $350 million "new obligational authority" appropriated and $40 million "recoupments, reimbursements and reappropriations."[17] As of the end of the fiscal year, however, the total for FY 1970 reached $409 million.

For FY 1971, the Defense Department proposed initially a program of $392 million (see Figure I) consisting of the $350 million authorized and $42 million recoupments, reappropriations and

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[13] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 47.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *MAP Facts*, p. 5.

FIGURE

DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPOSED FY 1971 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

$392.0 Million



Source: Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, Department of Defense, March 1970.

reimbursements.[18] In the "regular" foreign aid appropriation bill, Congress appropriated $350 million[19] as had been previously authorized.

Again, in both FY 1970 and FY 1971, some 70 per cent of the program was allotted for the "forward defense" countries, Korea, China, Greece and Turkey.[20] Also, the Nixon Administration appears to have been unable to escape from the dilemma of previous administrations, since 80 per cent of the grant aid funds available is "for operations and maintenance costs, training and supply operations — all of which must be funded first merely to preserve the status quo."[21] This means that some $314 million (of the $392 million proposed for fiscal 1971) supports "a holding action, and that only 20% can be devoted to investment in equipment urgently needed, and long overdue, for force improvement."[22]

Corrective Action

In considering corrective measures, the Peterson Commission in 1970 recommended that the United States assist recipient nations in adapting their military force structures, risks permitting, to levels their own capacities could maintain.[23] Otherwise, the Commission warned, Washington faced "the prospect of continuing the programs indefinitely, without any assurance of improvement in local force capabilities."[24] It suggested that one way to do this would be "to eliminate units that are only marginally effective and to provide modern equipment to the ones that are retained. . . . The initial costs may be higher, but the long-term results could be more effective at a lower recurring cost."[25]

Southeast Asia

In late 1970 the Administration proposed and Congress, after considerable debate, approved a supplemental military assistance appropriation for FY 1971 totaling approximately $1 billion (of which $500 million was for Israel). This was a complicated measure and it requires some understanding of the Administration's approach to funding American military activities in Southeast Asia.

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[18] *Ibid.*
[19] PL 91-619, December 31, 1970.
[20] *MAP Facts,* p. 1.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach,* Report to the President from the Task Force on International Development (Washington: GPO, March 4, 1970), p. 13.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*

It must be noted that, in describing the FY 1969, 1970 and 1971 military assistance bills, no mention was made of the Southeast Asian countries. Small amounts were included for the Philippines and Indonesia, but South Viet Nam, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos were conspicuously absent from the list. Of course the United States furnished military aid to these countries — but how much?

Programs for Laos have always been classified; others have more recently been veiled from public scrutiny. For example, the Defense Department's published MAP table for 1950 through 1969 reads as follows (in millions of dollars) :[26]

	1950-1964	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*	*1968*	*1969*	*1950-1969*
Cambodia	86.8	0.3	—	—	—	—	87.1
Indochina	709.6	—	—	—	—	—	709.6
Thailand	467.7	36.4	40.8	44.6	—	—	589.5
East Asia Area	434.9	59.3	68.3	83.0	3.1	2.6	651.2

Obviously, these figures do not tell the whole story. The reason is that in 1966 the Johnson Administration adopted, and the Nixon Administration has continued, the policy of requesting that appropriations for military assistance initially for Viet Nam, and subsequently also for Laos and Thailand, be placed in the regular Defense Department budget. This became known as "Service-funded military assistance." The procedure was justified, at least in part, because of the conflict in South Viet Nam and the difficulty of supplying U.S. and indigenous forces from separate stockpiles under combat conditions.

In the matter of secrecy, there were definite advantages in keeping aid figures for Southeast Asia from the enemy. There were also advantages in having the Congressional committees which handled Defense appropriations look, at the same time and in closed sessions, at the costs of indigenous forces supported by the United States and engaged, or likely to be engaged, in the same or a related conflict. Experience showed, too, that the membership of committees considering Defense legislation had larger percentages of "hawks" than did the membership of those considering foreign aid legislation.

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[26] *MAP Facts,* p. 12.

Accurate military assistance data for Southeast Asian countries for the period 1966-1970 are still partly classified. However, the following figures are considered reasonably accurate estimates (in millions of dollars):

	1966	*1967*	*1968*	*1969*	*1970*
Viet Nam	870	1580	1635	2085	2125
Thailand	50	35	75	150	160
Laos	50	55	60	90	105
Cambodia	—	—	—	—	10
Totals	970	1670	1770	2325	2400

The FY 1971 Supplemental Appropriation

In his message to Congress of November 18, 1970, President Nixon lumped economic and military assistance, grant aid and credit sales together, saying: "It is in America's self-interest to support the growing efforts of our friends. The overwhelming evidence of the last 25 years — from the Marshall Plan to Vietnamization — is that a systematic program that helps other nations harness their own resources for defense and development enables them to take on the primary burden of their own defense." The supplemental appropriations he proposed were (in millions of dollars):[27]

	Economic Aid	*Military Assistance*			
		Grant	*Credit*		
Israel			500		
Jordan		30			
Lebanon		5			
Viet Nam	65				
Cambodia	70	85			
South Korea		150			
Indonesia		3			
Program restoration		67*			
Totals	135	340	500	=	975

*Including $50 million to replace funds already appropriated for and "borrowed" from "such vital programs as those of Taiwan, Greece and Turkey." Forty million was used in Cambodia and $10 million in Indonesia. Seventeen million replaced anticipated recoupments and reimbursements which failed to materialize.

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[27] Secretary of Defense Laird in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 11, 1970.

The overall FY 1971 figures for Southeast Asian countries thus became, in round millions:

Viet Nam	2000		
Thailand	90		
Laos	80		
		2170	("Service-funded")
Cambodia		185	("MAP-funded")
Total		2355	

Sales—FY 1970 and 1971 (See Figure II)

The Ninety-first Congress almost adjourned without passing a foreign military sales authorization bill for either fiscal 1970 or 1971, although the FY 1970 Continuing Resolution Authorization (from 1969) had expired January 28, 1970. President Nixon had requested $275 million for credit assistance for 1970 and $272.5 million for 1971, not including the $500 million for Israel authorized earlier by Congress in Section 501 of the Defense Procurement Act.[28] Passage of the sales credit act was delayed partly because of the addition of controversial amendments. The delay did not, however, hold up *cash* sales, i.e., those made direct through commercial channels.

During the considerations, Secretary of Defense Laird told the Passman Subcommittee the Foreign Military Sales Act "serves a unique purpose by relieving some of the pressure on the limited funds available for grant military assistance which, hopefully, it will eventually replace," and added that he saw "an urgent need for prompt authorization and appropriation of funds . . . to provide credit associated with Foreign Military Sales in fiscal years 1970 and 1971."[29]

Congress passed authorization and appropriations just before adjournment in late December 1970. Since fiscal 1970 had ended six months earlier, that year was overtaken by events. For FY 1971, Congress really authorized $750 million and appropriated $700 million (including the $500 million for Israel in both figures).

FMS represents no long-term outlay from the U.S. Treasury.

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[28] Secretary of Defense Laird in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, March 10, 1970.

[29] *Ibid.*

FIGURE II

DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTED FY 1971 MILITARY EXPORT SALES



Source: Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, Department of Defense, March 1970.

Money appropriated is used to finance military sales on credit terms of up to ten years, and interest is normally set at the current cost of money to the U.S. government. In addition, FMS authorization helps to fulfill the wish of Congress, expressed in Section 505 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to end grant military assistance wherever possible. Nationalist China and Greece are among the countries that have indicated interest in military credit purchases in FY 1971.

The Trend in Appropriations

Until fiscal year 1971, appropriations for grant military assistance showed a general annual decline from the high point of almost $6 billion in 1952. The decline reached a low point of $1 billion in 1956, was arrested temporarily by a $2 billion appropriation in 1957, was again arrested in 1961 and 1966, but the trend was always downward, the original $350 million authorization by Congress for fiscal years 1970 and 1971 being the lowest ever.[30] (See Figure III.)

But one should not forget the supplemental funding for FY 1971 which, as mentioned, added $340 million in grant military aid authorization and appropriations and thus raised "new money" for MAP for this year to $690 million. If the Defense Department realizes from recoupments and reimbursements as expected, the total MAP program for FY 1971 may exceed $750 million — the highest since 1967.

Foreign aid, as such, whether economic or military, has never had a real "constituency" in the American electorate. There are exceptions, certainly: if South Viet Nam had the "constituency" in the United States which Israel has, we would have been able to extricate ourselves from that situation long ago. In Secretary Laird's words:

> Lack of . . . support in the past, combined with general concern about U.S. involvement overseas and the competing claims on total national resources of equally important domestic needs, has already led to a significant decline in the appropriations for military assistance. This decline has, in turn, made it increasingly difficult to realize the full potential contribution of MAP grant aid, in conjunction with credit financed sales, to the attainment of the national security and foreign policy objectives both are designed to promote.[31]

As the American people have wavered from supporting the activities of the United States as a world policeman to favoring the role of a disinterested neighbor, so the foreign aid program has undergone good and bad times. As the President outlined in his message to Congress on September 15, 1970, American foreign *economic* aid is moving inevitably toward greater use of international organizations.

As to *military* aid, Secretary Laird, in testimony before the Passman Subcommittee on March 10, 1970, said:

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[30] *MAP Facts,* p. 8.
[31] Laird, March 10, 1970 testimony, as cited above.

FIGURE III

MILITARY ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATIONS, FY 1950-FY 1970



Source: Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, Department of Defense, March 1970.

> The basic policy of decreasing direct U.S. military involvement cannot be successful unless we provide our friends and allies, whether through grant aid or credit sales, with the *material assistance* necessary to ensure the most effective possible contribution by the manpower they are willing and able to commit to their own and the common defense.[32]

The Military Assistance Program, since its inception, has been supported by every American President. Congress has not changed the statutory MAP mission with its emphasis on promoting "the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States." Yet securing appropriations has been an annual bloodletting affair and at times has seemed hardly worth the effort of those presenting the Administration's case on Capitol Hill.

The Proxmire Hearings

In January 1971, the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress under the chairmanship of Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) conducted an "inquiry" into military aid to foreign nations. Labeled as a consideration of the *economic* issues and aspects of this aid, the hearings became openly partisan with the purpose of influencing the Republican Administration. Such Johnson Administration stalwarts as Nicholas Katzenbach and Townsend Hoopes appeared to confront Nixon Administration witnesses, pointing with alarm to situations about which they themselves had done nothing while in office (e.g., declassification of data and aid to Greece).[33]

For our purposes, it is useful to take the FY 1970 figures — which are the latest historically accurate figures — as used in the Proxmire hearings, and clarify the definition of "military aid."

The expression "Military Assistance Program" (MAP) refers to *the* program authorized and funded in foreign aid legislation. Thus MAP, as a budget line item, contains by definition only items of new obligational authority, expenditures and receipts and obviously cannot contain data related to military assistance which do not have budgetary impact. Nor can it contain items included under other budgetary lines. MAP, per se, for FY 1970 contained a grant aid program of $409 million of which $350 million was "new obligational authority." To this can be added foreign military sales, accomplished in the period July 1969 to January 1970 under "continuing resolution authority," of $70 million.

"Ship loans," together with the category "long supply and excess," are also parts of military assistance but these categories do not require MAP appropriations and their dollar values are not properly added to the figures above. "Ship loans" – meaning the loan of U.S. Navy ships, either surplus or outmoded, to foreign nations – were valued in FY 1970 at approximately $25 million. This total represents the *original acquisition cost* of these old ships. A MAP appropriation was not required as the ships had been bought and paid for from U.S. Navy appropriations years ago. Recipient nations can add ships' values to their naval inventory, but to add a charge of this amount to the American taxpayer for military assistance would be a grossly inaccurate form of double bookkeeping.

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[32] *Ibid.* (Emphasis added.)
[33] See *Washington Post,* January 6, 1971.

"Long supply and excess" includes items no longer used or needed by U.S. forces. Surplus arms, tanks, vehicles and aircraft are declared "excess" by the services from time to time as new items are procured or as stock levels become greater than authorized because of decreases in the size of forces. If the Army declares a number of M-48 tanks – or the Air Force a number of F-104 aircraft – as *excess,* the policy has been to offer these items to foreign countries at a minimum cost of rehabilitation and transportation. In this way appropriated dollars could be stretched to provide more matériel, and "recoupments" were generated which could enlarge the current or following year's program. "Long supply" often refers to *new* parts (of M-48's and F-104's, for example) bought in anticipation and no longer needed.

Although some degree of advance planning is possible in the management of this category, after-the-fact reporting to Congress rather than advance knowledge is normal because it is not known at the beginning of any one fiscal year just what weapons and equipment will be declared excess and what might be appropriate for transfer to other nations. (There is little use for used B-52 engines, for instance.)

"Long supply and excess" was valued – at *original acquisition cost* – in FY 1970 at approximately $225 million. Incidentally, the Ninety-first Congress decided (mistakenly, in this writer's opinion) to limit this form of assistance to "$100 million at one-third acquisition value," i.e., $300 million at acquisition value. With substantial reductions in U.S. forces in progress, large quantities of excess matériel will become "excess." Unless they can be given to needy friendly nations, the alternative is to dispose of these items as scrap.

It *is* quite proper to include the "Service-funded" programs for

Viet Nam, Thailand and Laos as military aid (though technically they are not part of *the* Military Assistance Program) because appropriations are made for this purpose in the Defense budget. For FY 1970, as shown earlier, this category was about $2400 million, and for FY 1971, $2170 million.

Other categories of appropriations and expenditures are often added mistakenly to "military assistance" or even to "military aid." For FY 1970 the amounts for these, in millions of dollars, were:

In the AID (Agency for International Development) budget for public safety programs and security assistance (budget support)	525
Commercial sales	570
Cash sales and Export-Import bank loans	770
Support of U.S. forces:	
Operation of MAAG's and missions	160
International military headquarters	55
NATO infrastructure	50
(the last two representing U.S. percentage shares)	
Food for Peace Funds for common defense purposes	100

MAP Training

Since the earliest days, it has been deemed essential that the provision of U.S. items of equipment or weapons be accompanied by related training. Hence, formal and informal instruction of foreign students by U.S. military or civilian personnel, contract technicians or contractors; and training aids, exercises, orientation and military advice to foreign military units and forces have formed an integral part of military assistance.

Most training, in over 2,000 military courses to develop proficiencies ranging from automotive mechanics to aircraft pilots, from telephone repairmen to missile maintenance personnel, from artillerymen to tankers, from submariners to blue-sea sailors, has been done in English at American military schools and training centers. There, in the same classes attended by American military personnel, over 200,000 foreign students have received instruction since 1950. An additional 100,000 have been instructed overseas, either at U.S. schools principally in Panama and Okinawa or by mobile training teams in their home countries.[34] Over seventy countries have been represented in the program. As many as 20,000 students have come to the United States in a single year, and the average annual participation is about 14,000.

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[34] ***MAP Facts***, p. 17.

A collateral benefit derives from the training of those students who attend courses at schools in the continental United States. The larger political interest of "strengthening the bonds of mutual understanding through a person-to-person program that has introduced thousands of actual or potential foreign leaders to American life and institutions" has not been neglected.[35] This program has been praised by the students who particularly welcome visits to farms, factories, legislatures, places of entertainment, sports events, government offices and the homes of their American classmates.

MAP FOR THE 1970'S

Following his foreign policy message of February 18, 1970, "A New Strategy for Peace," President Nixon on September 15, 1970 forwarded to Congress a message entitled "Foreign Assistance for the Seventies." In this document the President advanced the view that the United States should pursue three interrelated purposes through its foreign assistance program: first, promote national security by supporting the security of other nations; second, provide humanitarian relief; and third, further the long-run economic and social development of the less developed countries. He stated that he would shortly submit implementing legislation.

The Setting for an International Security Assistance Program

With respect to the first "purpose," the area in which we are interested here, the President said: "To provide effective support for the Nixon Doctrine, I shall propose a freshly conceived International Security Assistance Program. The prime objective of this program will be to help other countries assume the responsibility of their own defense and thus help us reduce our own presence abroad."[36]

Let us consider the world climate, the environment, in which that objective must be sought. As the United States proceeds through the 1970's there are few clear crystal balls with which to foretell the future. But it may not be too much of a simplification to say that the decade will certainly include the following: (1) two communist concentrations of power, often hostile to each other, but constituting the only military threat to the security of the Free World; (2) the Free World itself, with few exceptions still looking to Washington for leadership that it hopes will be enlightened and not narrowly self-serving; and for both economic and military assistance, at least cost to the recipients; (3) persisting American commitments (that the Nixon Doctrine is pledged to honor) to allies and to international organizations, which, acting alone or in concert, will be either unable or unwilling to assume major peacekeeping responsibilities; (4) in the less developed world, increased nationalism and weak efforts toward regional groupings with the possibility of recurrent conflict and the constant risk of great-power involvement and escalation of violence; (5) in America, domestic problems, not all nonpartisan, pursued militantly and divisively, whose urgency will demand more money, time and national attention; and (6) the necessity of living with the long shadow of events in Southeast Asia which will demand a careful forecasting of the costs, liabilities and benefits of any American involvement that risks military action abroad.

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[35] Dr. Ernest W. Lefever, of the Brookings Institution, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development, October 6, 1970.

[36] *Foreign Assistance for the Seventies,* President Nixon's message to the Congress, September 15, 1970, published by AID, Washington, p. 2.

Partnership, Strength and Negotiation

Few would suggest, after the last half-decade, that there is a broad consensus on foreign policy in the United States. The widespread protests against entanglement in Indochina and the attack on the Safeguard ABM system have gone far beyond specific objections to specific policies and, mingled with politics, have become vehicles for fundamental challenges to U.S. foreign policy and to the military's role in implementing that policy.

In discussing that role, the Secretary of Defense has said that the strategy by which the United States hopes to realize its goal of Peace in the Seventies "is summarized in the three pillars of President Nixon's foreign policy . . . *partnership, strength* and *willingness to negotiate.*"[37] Secretary Laird particularly emphasized the first two.

The Nixon Doctrine says that the United States will keep its treaty commitments, although it does not specifically say how. It says the United States will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens, but again it is unclear as to exact action or reaction and as to the threshold level that would trigger such action or reaction. The Doctrine promises military assistance but qualifies this promise by demanding that the nation threatened assume responsibility for providing manpower for its own defense.

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[37] Secretary of Defense Laird in remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 22, 1970. (Emphasis added.)

No objective analyst can fault the Administration for this lack of clarity. It is deliberate. A doctrine, a policy, designed for a decade must cover innumerable diverse situations rather than instant cases; it must contain some flexibility, some margin allowing opportunities for options.

Shared Responsibility

Footnotes can be added from time to time to spell out the Nixon Doctrine in more detail. Some have already been presented:

> The Nations of each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their own well-being; and they themselves should determine the terms of that well-being.[38]
>
> . . . reliance on local initiative encourages local assumption of responsibility and thereby serves both the needs of other countries and our own national interest.[39]
>
> The United States is not going to withdraw from the world. But times are changing; for us to fulfill our responsibility now, we must link our efforts more closely with those of our friends to build the foundations of peace.[40]
>
> Helping countries that demonstrate the capability to help themselves enables us to reduce our direct overseas involvement; it eases our budgetary and balance of payments burdens; and it lessens the likelihood of the engagement of American forces.[41]
>
> Since I took office, we have already lowered our military presence abroad. . . . Already 68 installations abroad have been closed and 44 more have been reduced. . . . By next spring [1971], under present plans, the total number of military personnel overseas will be at least 300,000 below the number that were abroad in January of 1969. . . . But our national security requires that we provide friendly nations the military . . . assistance they need to defend themselves.[42]

Straws in the Wind

Thus it appears that decisions have been taken to:

(1) Reduce military forces overseas, specifically, at the moment, in Southeast Asia, Korea and Japan. To this writer, it is inevitable that similar action will follow in Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines, and even in Europe if the Middle East and Berlin situations can be bettered. The objective will be to have U.S. overseas forces permanently stationed only on sovereign territory.

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[38] President Nixon, 1970 "State of the Union" message to Congress.

[39] *Foreign Assistance for the Seventies* (AID booklet), *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

[40] President Nixon's message to Congress on the FY 1971 Foreign Aid "Supplemental," November 18, 1970.

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] *Ibid.*

(2) Reduce the overall size of U.S. general purpose forces in order to have more funds to pay personnel (to encourage a volunteer force) and for research, development and procurement of advanced weapons and equipment.

(3) Retain a military assistance program, designed to compensate for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and to facilitate their redeployment overseas if the situation demands.

The Peterson Commission

The Peterson Commission, as indicated earlier, addressed itself in part to the third point. It noted that, in addition to the assistance given the "forward defense" countries, small programs are presently furnished in forty-four countries for internal defense and training purposes and in a few countries in payment for U.S. base rights; and that sixteen countries receive credits for military items under the Foreign Military Sales Act. It also noted that policy guidance is currently a State Department responsibility, while administration, organization and funding are divided among State, Defense and AID.

The Commission observed: "As the United States reduces its forces overseas, increased security assistance may be needed for a time to cushion the effect and to improve local security capabilities. The ultimate goal, however, should be to phase out these grant programs." Although it felt that a comprehensive analysis of U.S. security requirements for a decade ahead exceeded the scope of its report, it expressed the view that

> the amount of military assistance allocated among countries should be related to a realistic assessment of needs, not to historical assistance levels. Furthermore, U.S. programs should assist receiving nations in adapting their military force structure, the risks permitting, to what ultimately will be within their own capacity to maintain.

These goals, of course, may be incompatible in the foreseeable future. For example, how distant is "ultimately?"

As to organization, the Peterson Commission recommended the inclusion of all security assistance programs in one piece of legislation. This would cover military grant aid and sales, supporting (budgetary) assistance, disposal of surplus military stocks, and public safety programs. (These last-named are assistance to national police forces now handled by the Agency for International Development.) The Commission also suggested that responsibility for policy guidance, for direction and coordination, should be assigned to the State Department; administration of military grant and sales programs should remain with Defense; and administration of supporting assistance, public safety programs and a contingency fund (if any) should be charged to State.[43]

The International Security Assistance Act of 1971

On April 21, the President sent to Congress two pieces of legislation designed to replace the FAA of 1961. The first, covering foreign economic aid, was entitled "The International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act of 1971" and the second, covering military assistance, "The International Security Assistance Act of 1971." The second proposed legislation includes the various components of "security assistance"—military grant aid, foreign military sales, disposal of excess stocks and long supply items, supporting economic assistance for defense purposes and the public safety program. This Act would divorce security assistance from AID's economic programs, the latter to be authorized in the proposed legislation dealing with development and humanitarian assistance.

All of the security assistance programs would be subject to State Department policy guidance, but the Defense Department would administer those programs dealing with military assistance, both grant and sales, and disposal of excess and long supply items.

To provide a mechanism for disseminating State policy guidance, the President stated, in his transmittal message, that he proposed the creation of a "Coordinator for Security Assistance at a high level in the Department of State to assure effective coordination of our security assistance effort. . . ." This would be an important office.

The Act confirms budget authorizations for FY 1972 for $705 million for grant aid, $510 million for foreign military sales, $778 million for supporting assistance and $100 million for the "President's Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund."

Military assistance for Viet Nam, Laos and Thailand will continue to be funded in the Defense budget, the President added, "because these country programs are subject to the uncertainties of active hostilities and intimately linked to the logistical support systems of our own forces in Southeast Asia."

Important changes from existing legislation proposed in the new Security Assistance Act include: (1) removal of the Fulbright-Church limitation on the number of foreign trainees, (2) raising the annual ceilings on Latin American and African programs from $75 to $150 million and $40 to $60 million respectively, (3) raising the ceiling on the acquisition value of excess items from $300 to $660 million and (4) easing of credit terms from ten to twenty years with interest as low as 3 per cent if the President finds such "in the national interest."

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[43] *U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach, op. cit.,* pp. 11-15.

Since this legislation was not submitted until April 21, it appears unlikely that Congress will enact it during the current session. Instead it is likely that a "continuing resolution" action will authorize the continuation of programs at the FY 1971 levels.

Certain factors surface in considering any security legislation:

(1) The United States must always consider first its own self-interest, and in the security field this means determining exactly where and under what conditions that interest is vital.

(2) History shows that, since it became a major world power, the United States has considered its vital interests sufficiently endangered to warrant engaging in, or threatening to engage in, major conflict only in Europe, the Far East or Latin America. In the first two areas, the apparent objective has been to prevent a hostile great power from achieving hegemony, and in the last-named, to maintain its own hegemony.

(3) Perception of its interests as vital led America mistakenly into Indochina. This is now realized and the decision to effect an "honorable withdrawal" acknowledges the absence of a threat to vital American interests in that part of the world.

(4) The United States has interests, of a lesser order than vital, in all areas of the world — in peaceful settlement of disputes, access to resources, friendly relations, facilitating trade and commerce, maintaining cultural ties. None of these interests, by itself, warrants major conflict.

(5) It is in the U.S. interest that Israel remain free and independent, but vital American security interests are not involved to the point of deploying U.S. ground forces in Israel's behalf.

(6) Similarly, it would be preferable from a U.S. standpoint if NATO Europe, Japan and the Republics of Korea and the Philippines were able to maintain adequate forces — particularly ground forces — to avoid the necessity of U.S. deployment on their territory should Communist China or the Soviet Union appear likely to threaten vital American interests in those areas. At the same time, the provision of air and naval base support facilities for the

possible emergency deployment of American air and naval forces would be highly desirable. Such measures would be minimal in fulfilling U.S. treaty commitments.[44]

With respect to security assistance for the 1970's, it would appear that:

(1) The need for assistance programs will continue as long as threats to the Free World exist. While it may be desirable to reduce the size of programs and specifically to phase grant aid down and perhaps out, the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine, the protection of American interests and the planned withdrawal and reduction in American military forces will all prevent the achievement of these objectives for an indeterminate period.

(2) Policy guidance for security assistance programs is in the realm of foreign policy and thus a Department of State responsibility; but administration and management are so closely related to the administration and management of U.S. military forces as to justify assigning all these programs to Defense — and, Congressional committees willing, to inclusion in the Defense budget. There, military assistance could compete directly with appropriations for U.S. forces (as in the arrangement for Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam) and be a true "extension of the Defense budget."

(3) Military assistance — both grant and sales — should remain predominantly for the "forward defense" countries, and with emphasis on ground forces, but small dollar programs should be contemplated for a limited number of countries which request aid in the areas of internal security and training.

(4) Costs are difficult to estimate, but it would appear that Administration requests for appropriations for FY 1972 may be on the order of:

Military Assistance Program (grant aid)	$705 million
(including Cambodia	200 million)
Foreign Military Credit Sales	520 million
(including Israel	300 million)
Service-funded military aid to Viet Nam, Thailand and Laos	2200 million
Economic aid for military purposes and public safety programs, previously in AID's budget	778 million
Contingency Fund	100 million

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[44] In this connection, while I was engaged in a study of U.S. overseas bases for the next decade, in late 1968, high-level personnel in three South Pacific countries who conversed with me expressed the view that U.S. power in that area was desirable but should be "just over the horizon," not on *their* sovereign soil.

"Military aid" appropriations on the order of $4-plus billion would thus be required. Surely any administration would hope to see this figure decline, over the decade, to less than $1 billion, but as long as Washington can support eight to ten foreign soldiers for the cost of one U.S. soldier, American taxpayers are getting a bargain, assuming that expenditures for U.S. forces are reduced by amounts equivalent to those appropriated for foreign military aid.

As stated earlier, training has been a particularly successful part of the military assistance program. In FY 1970, trainees came from forty-eight countries, excluding Southeast Asia, and the direct costs were approximately $19 million. (Most trainees from developed countries attend at no cost to the United States.) This program should continue as long as foreign military personnel want instruction on U.S. matériel and at U.S. service schools.

When Dr. Ernest Lefever, who is currently engaged in research in the military assistance training area, testified on October 6, 1970 before the Zablocki Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he summarized his principal recommendations (with which I agree) as follows: (1) There should be no arbitrary Congressional limitation on the number of foreign trainees. (2) A substantial portion of training should be done at U.S. installations which have the facilities and capacity, but there can be increased use of existing U.S. overseas schools, U.S. mobile training teams, on-the-job training with U.S. forces overseas and third-country training. (3) Increased emphasis should be given to training in more advanced courses, including those providing technical, administrative, personnel management, defense planning and command skills. (The Peterson Commission also considered this point and specifically recommended "greater emphasis . . . on force structure and logistics planning and on fiscal and budget programming.")[45] (4) "VIP tours" to the United States should be continued for carefully selected military leaders and groups. (5) Nonequipment (e.g., staff level) training should continue to be made available to countries even though grant matériel aid may have been terminated. (6) Careful selection of trainees requires careful selection of U.S. in-country mission personnel.

In conclusion, Dr. Lefever told the House Subcommittee that military assistance training of foreign personnel is perhaps the single most valuable instrument the President has to encourage local and regional[46] initiative in defense and security. A sustained training program leading to greater self-sufficiency will have the effect of relieving the far-flung military burden of the United States. Military training is a low-cost and low-profile program. More important, it is a low risk instrument. A training program as such has never involved us militarily in a foreign conflict. The United States has provided training for more than 70 countries, and we became involved in combat in only two — South Korea and South Vietnam (including Cambodia) — because the President believed U.S. interests were at stake, not because we had previously trained Koreans or Vietnamese.

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[45] *U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

The case for military assistance, then, rests on considerations of U.S. national security; on using the Defense budget to buy defense wherever it may be found; on helping friendly nations that have the manpower for their security forces but not the means to train and equip them. In the last analysis, it rests on U.S. self-interest.

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[46] I would demur somewhat on *regional* initiative. It is a weak reed in areas where it is needed most, East Asia for example. Countries there have little to share but their troubles. Except in the case of external attack — which has even brought together, however loosely, such age-old foes as South Viet Nam and Cambodia— they spend most of their time watching each other rather than the enemy.

TOWARD THE 1980'S: A POLICY "VISION" IN SEARCH OF A PROJECTION

by Morton A. Kaplan

IT is hazardous to project policy for any time span, let alone the 1980's. Projections cannot anticipate the unexpected; they can consider, rather superficially, the probable, the possible. Beliefs, goals, means, ends and certainly technological innovations will bear on policies in the 1980's; to review them adequately would require an encyclopedia. In projecting, therefore, I can at best, within this article, merely skim the surface and mention some of the major variations that may shape the world of the 1980's.

I

Let us consider the Western world for a moment. Confrontation politics may characterize Western-style polities. If so, the foreign policy process may be paralyzed in terms of rational adjustment to the external world. Sit-ins in France, ethnic confrontations in Canada, confrontation politics in Italy, psychodramas, even verbal and physical abuse — these phenonema may occur more frequently and be more pronounced in some countries than others, and in some not at all. Conversely, these new styles of political behavior may pass away, be accommodated, or give rise to new and more flexible ways of solving certain localized problems. Confrontation politics may so paralyze the democratic polities that succeeding regimes, whether revolutionary or counterrevolutionary, may impose rigorous political controls that will insure domestic tranquillity and enable Western states to turn their attention to managing external matters.

Let us consider Europe. By the 1980's the Continent may have united into a federation or confederation. In such a union local diversities may find outlets that the nation-states had failed to provide. Contrariwise, the present system of nation-states may remain. Depending upon developments, Europe may be united, vigorous and progressive or disorganized, disunited and incapable of an active foreign policy.

The Soviet bloc faces several possibilities in the 1980's. The nationality problem within the Soviet Union may erupt and become uncontrollable. Resistance by Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Turkomans, Georgians, the Baltic peoples and other nationalities may strain the capacity of a weakened Communist Party. The communist parties in Poland and Czechoslovakia may collapse for lack of members. The bloc may split asunder, and the East German regime may either collapse or may seek another *raison d'être* to support Moscow's control and leadership. At the opposite extreme, brutal control may be re-established in the USSR by the Communist Party; this may involve strong controls over and campaigns against intellectuals and strong police and army control over internal nationalities and satellite countries. Without going into greater detail, one cannot project whether such a development would require so much of the Kremlin's administrative capacity that it would be diverted from the external world, or whether its lack of capacity and of flexibility would force the leadership to seek quick and forcible solutions to external problems. There remains another possibility for the Soviet bloc: namely, that with better economic management, credits from abroad and the use of the latest computer techniques, major economic problems would be solved. As a result, the regime could achieve a greater consensus, thereby allowing greater liberalization and diversity within the USSR and the bloc. If so, the Soviet system would become an attractive model for other countries.

What will China's future be? Will the China of the 1980's influence events throughout Asia and possibly throughout the world by direct action, or, as is the case today, will she be unable to exercise important military power except at her borders? Will the Peking regime become heavily bureaucratized, or will it undergo many "cultural revolutions?" Will China be unified, or will she still face vast nationality problems? Will she enter a period of economic success or will failure and successive crises plague Peking and its centralized control?

What will Japan's future be? Will Japan by the 1980's surpass the Soviet Union in gross national product and challenge the United States? Will she become a superpower politically, economically and militarily? Will she enter a period of economic slowdown, at least a decrease in the rate of the gross national product? Or will instabilities in international trade, upon which Japan is so heavily dependent, produce an internal crisis? Will Japan remain a democratic state? Will she revert to her authoritarian past?

What of Latin America? Will the major hemispheric nations advance economically, in tandem with regime stabilization and possibly democracy? Will Marxist regimes take over in Brazil and Ecuador as well as in Chile? Will such Marxist states remain democratic long, or will they become totalitarian? Will the different types of regimes in Latin America quarrel among themselves? Will the future belong to Marxism and anti-Americanism? If the latter occurs, does this mean major problems for U.S. foreign policy, or might such Marxism and anti-Americanism coincide with economic stagnation and ineffectiveness?

What of the Middle East? Will Israel and the Arab states make peace? Will Israel perhaps be reduced to a client state of the Soviet Union? Will the present stalemate continue? Will Israel's quarrels then be with the various Arab nations or with increasingly effective *fedayeen* groups? Or, considering the background powers, if the U.S. position in the Middle East collapses, might the USSR provide the Arab states with the possibility of a military victory and a bloody march to the sea?

What of Africa? Will there be a successful move toward African unity? Or African regional federations? Will the countries of black Africa move into an era of progress or remain economically stagnant? Will the South African and Rhodesian regimes tighten their internal controls, or will they be severely harassed? Will Soviet or Chinese influence in Africa become major? Will European-type democracy finally become a viable philosophy in Africa?

Will India have collapsed by the 1980's, or will she have begun solving her economic problems and pulling herself together? Which state will play the major role in Southeast Asia? India? China? Japan? Will India remain a democracy, or will she by the next decade become an authoritarian or totalitarian regime?

What of the United Nations? Will it have gained important international functions by the 1980's? Possibly with respect to control of space and of ocean bottoms? Will successful *ad hoc* UN military forces have quelled outbreaks of regional violence? Will Third World nations by the 1980's have captured and converted the world body into a vehicle for their foreign policies, thereby driving the United States or the Soviet Union, or possibly both, into opposition? Will the United Nations become a force for world order or for more disorder? Or will it become an organization that is honored but ignored on most crucial occasions?

What can be projected regarding the military and the spread of nuclear weapons in the 1980's? Will the United States have a first-strike capacity against the Soviet Union or vice versa? Or will neither power have such a capacity? Will Europe possess a nuclear force as a federation? If so, will this force have adequate command and control and a second-strike capacity, or will it be the kind of provocative force that France's *force de frappe* is? Alternatively, will France, England and West Germany have nuclear weapons systems? And, if so, what kinds of systems will these be? Will Japan, China, India, Israel, Sweden, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt and South Africa have nuclear weapons by the 1980's? Will a cheap gas centrifuge process become available, thus increasing the number of nuclear powers to twenty or thirty? Will a nuclear incident occur in the 1980's? What effect could this have upon world order?

In terms of men under arms, mobilizable air forces, navies, logistical controls, communications and delivery systems, will both the United States and the Soviet Union be world powers or will only one of them so qualify? Will a united Europe be a world power by the 1980's? Will Japan? China?

Will new weapons systems have revolutionized warfare? Will laser systems or other innovations permit hit-and-run tactics or unattributable interventions in internal dislocations? Will new techniques permit forms of influence and control that can either destabilize the system or force nations into countermeasures with enormous negative consequences for the well-being and freedom of individuals?

What can be projected on environmental problems? Will these be brought under control by independent national measures? Will they become so much worse by the 1980's that uncontrolled measures in one country may have catastrophic consequences in other countries? And, if so, will this force international management or alternatively provoke both military and political countermeasures?

II

This rapid survey has been far from complete. At best, it has indicated the types of questions that can be asked and has shown the uncertainty that must confront policy planners. It clearly raises another major question: If the future is so uncertain, and the policymaker's grasp so short and his influence on events largely unpredictable and often self-defeating, can he pursue any calculus better than that of counting immediate costs and benefits? Many would answer no and perhaps be right.

The foregoing range of possibilities, in my view, establishes only that we must avoid a schematized foreign policy in which we plot the moves as in chess. Such a policy most assuredly will fail. It plays God with the lives of men. The world is too complex in its detail for us to understand completely, but we do have a marvelous capacity when guided by an appropriate vision to fit and adjust policy to that vision. Properly guided by a view of the kind of world we would like, it is possible to sketch broad policy goals and adjust policy to them, and even to change them in major ways as events occur. Approached in this manner, foreign policy becomes not a series of atomistic decisions but a stream of decisions guided by values and capable of influencing the macrostructure of world politics.

Statesmanship in this revolutionary age — when contending visions of world order vie for advantage — is not adequate if it merely adjusts for reasons of expediency within the framework of a given order; the formulation of policy should have in view that a developing order can evolve from the discordant materials confronting us. If we shortsightedly neglect to treat disorders as challenges and opportunities, they will be so treated by others, and to our disadvantage.

III

The essential issue for the United States is what kind of world order she decides to build. The contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the potential contest with China, involves a conception of man, of the state, and of human freedom, among other values. Unlike the struggle against the Nazis, the West has no fundamental disagreement with the values inherent in Marxism. We disagree primarily with the means used to propagate those values. Our major fear is that the chosen means are essentially inconsistent with their attainment. We disagree fundamentally with the Soviet view that a political party can achieve scientific truths in the arena of politics and thus has the right to impose that truth, without contest, on the rest of humanity, which that party considers as being in a state of false consciousness. The main purpose of U.S. foreign policy should be to make the world safe for the common values to which Marxian communists and Western democrats appeal. Therefore, we must resist the spread of Soviet-type institutions which are inconsistent with the communists' own ideals, as in Viet Nam, for example. Even corrupt and authoritarian regimes are preferable; they have less stability, less enthusiasm for *gleichschaltung* and more outlets for dissenters.

We need a moral resilience that permits us to foster policies consistent with the development in the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries of those values and institutions which are compatible with their Marxian ideals. This effort has no end. We must also be aware that our means to implement policy can strongly influence our ends. Survival often forces us to assume many of our opponents' worst traits. Although this cannot entirely be avoided, it is important to attempt to chart a course of foreign policy that will enunciate standards we can afford to support in the long run. This means cautiousness in supporting reactionary regimes, reluctance to indulge in force, determination to employ force effectively when used, awareness of the requirements for maintaining the United Nations and some minimal standard of world law, resistance to developments in the world that produce atomization or isolation or incendiary rules of behavior, and a strong and constructive outlook on world order.

The President must be strongly conscious of his ceremonial role; his speeches are at least as important as his actions. Every civilization has its religious trappings, and ceremonial institutional roles perform important quasi-religious functions: they sanctify community membership in terms of community ideals; they legitimatize courses of action consonant with the highest national and international values; they provide assurance regarding our intentions.

It is impossible to achieve complete consistency of national policy in terms of national values. This is why a president, or other national leaders, must be able to articulate policy in terms of high ideals. Moreover, there must be enough consistency to maintain the confidence of the population, and particularly of intellectuals, who tend to be disaffected and who have a wide audience for their disaffection. Thus, whenever possible, policies that are nominally inconsistent with our libertarian values must be plausibly explained within their proper framework. For example, our policy of arms aid to the Greek colonels has much merit; yet there should be some ceremonial way of indicating our distaste for the Athens regime.

IV

In terms of general policy, it is clear that the United States can no longer be the world policeman. Other nations must assume or share the role. In this respect, an important objective of U.S. policy must be a united Europe with its own nuclear force, although such a Europe will play a strong role in other areas of the world that is not entirely consistent with American aims. If Europe, Japan and China begin to be more influential actors on the world stage, the head-on clash of the Soviet Union and the United States will be deflected. Moreover, if both Europe and Japan remain strongly democratic, we shall be moving toward a modified unit-veto international system. Such a system would decrease the incentive to produce a major world destabilization that would undermine the libertarian values the United States wishes upheld. The United States can still maintain highly mechanized forces for swift, carefully chosen operations in various areas. Such operations should always be undertaken with full awareness of the deficiencies in our political knowledge and in our capacity to articulate a consistent policy and execute it wisely.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union must have a powerful military component. The USSR must never gain a first-strike potential against the United States. Within this limitation, we should pursue arms control agreements whenever possible, although it would be a mistake not to go into a light ABM program. Our channels of communication with Moscow must be kept open. In some respects, the provision of a forum for continuous communication is one of the most significant aspects of the SALT talks. We should make no direct attempts to influence the internal succession of regimes within the Soviet Union. In the first place, our knowledge is inadequate for this task; in the second, such activities are likely to be counterproductive.

Regarding Communist China, one of our prime objectives should be to bring her within the community of nations as an independent but restrained power. We should discourage any effort to destroy the Chinese nuclear force by military attack. Although our protection of the Taiwan government, which is morally required, stands as a barrier to normal relations with China, diplomatic recognition of Peking should be an aim.

In the Third World, our assistance for the most part should be ceremonial. Much of our aid has been counterproductive; much has been misused; much has been misunderstood and ineffective. Many of the new countries will likely fail to develop economically at a satisfactory rate whether or not we aid them. Any aid we provide, therefore, should relate to clear standards concerning both the external and the internal behavior of the Third World nations. If they are improving the conditions of their populations, if they are building at least the preconditions for democratic government, and if their behavior is consonant with minimal standards for world order, they should qualify for American assistance. If these conditions are not met in a particular state, then unless there is some urgent reason of national security policy, that state should not receive U.S. aid. We should not bargain over these conditions, for in that case our aid would appear to have "strings." We must have clearly enunciated, "objective" standards, perhaps implemented in a quasi-judicial manner.

Our attitude toward the UN should be a modest one. The organization is not the hope of the world or the custodian of the peace. It is an important forum for international discussion and for the mediation of differences. But if the UN should not be exalted, neither should it be misused for immediate national political objectives. It is a forum within which we may gain experience for the international management of space, the seabed, and other measures that may serve as a foundation for greater political cooperation. It is an arena within which we may be able to devise instruments to strengthen human rights, both substantively and procedurally. Use of the UN toward this end should be an objective of U.S. policy. We should help to create instruments, even if they can operate only intermittently and in a few areas of the world, capable of taking action in cases of outrageous violation of human rights and thus establishing a precedent. Yet these instruments should not be used for tasks for which the world political system is unprepared; nor should they be used to implement these standards in ways deleterious to those states which have made at least some progress in this direction in terms of their own national law.

I have been able only to outline considerations that could shape U.S. foreign policy. Such a perspective could be contraindicated in any specific set of circumstances. Yet it would remain viable except under the worst permutations of world outcomes. My comments constitute no more than a point of view; but points of view forcefully put can capture the imaginations of men. For democracies at least, policies without support cannot succeed, whatever other virtues they may have.

SCHOLARSHIP AND THE REAL WORLD OF THE POLICYMAKER

by Charles Burton Marshall

IT is easy to settle a question of someone's vocational status as pharmacist, barber, jockey or solicitor, but not as scholar. The genus is imprecise. The dictionary at hand – offering a choice among various definitions: to wit, someone studying under a teacher, a subsidized student, an advanced student, and a learned person – is not of much help, for a person qualifying under one definition might fail under another. For the present purpose, an essay on "scholars' misperceptions of realities in external affairs," focusing on the 1970's, this definition may serve: a scholar is a producer of published works (probably, but not necessarily, with footnotes) reputedly derived from special research and deep reflection and objective in the sense of presenting facts undistorted by personal feelings or prejudices.

Definition is the easiest aspect of the baffling topic. One difficulty stems from the fact that I am a scholar, not necessarily a good one, but still one qualifying under the definition given. Accordingly, I should begin by perceiving my own misperceptions – obviously, a self-contradictory and impossible task. A second difficulty inheres in all attempts at prophecy. That events will reveal fallibilities in foresight among our scholars is a safe prediction, but some also will probably be proved right in certain particulars. A roundup of pertinent scholarly analyses of futurity, classified in advance as true or false, would involve more effort and risk than I would care to undertake.

Still another difficulty relates to a question broached by an elder-statesman friend with whom I discussed the topic. What basis is there for supposing scholars' misperceptions to differ in nature or likelihood from those of other sorts of people? That last question prompts a retrospection to a time, just over forty years ago, when, as an undergraduate, I first studied international relations.

With undisciplined curiosity and not too fastidious reading tastes, a student in those times could learn much, and even develop some prophetic judgments, about international affairs.

Spy novels abounded. Tales of conspiracies, aggressions and mass terror were narrated in the Sunday newspaper supplements, particularly of the Hearst chain. *Liberty*, a now long defunct magazine specializing in excitation, foretold intercontinental wars between technologically prodigious mass forces fought for total stakes. Authors of science fiction, notably H. G. Wells, adumbrated relentless competition in strategic invention. Pierrepont Noyes' *The Pallid Giant*, a tale of 1927 read by chance, anticipated policy dilemmas posed by absolute weapons. Homer Lea's *The Day of the Saxon* and *The Valor of Ignorance* revealed the flimsiness of tacit strategic postulates on which the national security counted.

On a higher plane of inquiry, I learned in an ethics course (taken for scheduling convenience rather than from intellectual thirst) about the inherent fallibility of intentions, the potential for evil in assumed good will, the dubiety of idealism, and subtleties involved in linking means and ends. Tennyson's hopeful "Locksley Hall" and his dour "Locksley Hall Sixty Years Later," encountered in an English class, focused my attention on ambiguities in the idea of progress in general affairs. Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, Goethe's *Faust* and Conrad's *Nostromo*, perused for diverse reasons, were instructive respectively on the elusiveness of causation in great events, the inherent limitations on all human endeavor, and the primitive propelling forces in politics.

Thus prepared, I was not taken unawares as world events unfolded in the 1930's and 1940's. That effect, however, was hardly due to anything learned in course work in international relations. It was a modest subject then. An average college might, or might not, offer a pertinent course. Three or even four courses would be a probable number for a resourceful university. The focus was mainly legal and institutional. Pertinent books were relatively few. Full of thoughts fathered by wishes, they were mostly misleading.

Characteristically, the literature celebrated the League of Nations. Something called the Geneva spirit was invoked as an epitome of the future. How Aristide Briand, as League Council President, had forestalled a war by quick messages to Sofia and Athens was recounted as a weighty precedent substantiating the evangel. Locarno and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were emphasized as milestones along mankind's certain advance into a future pacified by ordinances of national self-restraint and processes for international collaboration. Disarmament, already applied as to capital ships in the Washington naval treaty, was presumptively about to be effected in all categories.

The omissions were notable. The assigned readings gave no hint of the practices of espionage, the role of intelligence gathering and analysis, or the play of propaganda. States' propensities for leading double lives—having at once forensic and efficient policies, one sort for display, the other to be pursued — were sloughed over. The complexity of any institution called a government and the multifarious interplay between domestic forces and external affairs were scarcely alluded to. Racial animosities, cultural differentiations, and the diversities among ways in which unlike aggregates of people with differing language and belief systems might discern their worlds were barely acknowledged.

In Michael Oakeshott's sense of the term, rationalism dominated the portrayal. It was in part a heritage from a scholar turned policymaker. The books assigned in international relations had no monopoly on Wilsonian ideas, but they reflected them disproportionately. All o' God's children had wings. Democratization and self-determination, inherently linked, could only redound to peace. Interchange was bound to add to comprehension, thereby to instill sympathy, and thus to help tranquilize the world. War, an aberration, a breakdown, an interruption, would be foreclosed by preventive techniques. The United States had sinned by isolation — a dereliction needing to be redressed by participation and commitment, whereupon peace would be assured over the globe.

Reversing its habits in another decade, the United States would convert to being an inveterate participant. Thereafter the country would contradict a multiplicity of international responsibilities borne at fabulous expense, and would find itself involved in hostilities for twenty-five of the ensuing thirty years. In time that record of involvement, with its attendant vicissitudes, would come to be rued, and scholars would join in the repining and contrition.

Quantitatively, the progress made latterly in relevant scholarship is remarkable. Studious works dissecting and deploring the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam outnumber, I suspect in a ratio of ten or a dozen to one, the range of books for a course in international relations four decades ago. Never before, I venture, have so many written so much about so narrow a compass. If the whole body of available literature is taken into account, the increment is astounding. There must now be at least a thousand pertinent books, a hundred of them really good, for every one available at that earlier time. With little trouble, one can find ten times as much as he should want or need to know about any facet. Courses have burgeoned in only slightly more modest progression; poor indeed is an institution without an offering of seminars in such topics as the dynamics of political leadership in the Indian subcontinent or comparative approaches to nuclear non-proliferation. Ph.D.'s have been coming off the academic assembly lines in hundreds, bearing theses on themes no less finely spun. If information generates knowledge, and knowledge crystallizes in wisdom, then we should be intellectually well fortified for the decades ahead.

What doubts I have about the nexus between scholarship and policy stem not from simple heretical disbelief in the value of being informed in contrast to being ignorant. Learning and prudential judgment of the sort which sustains a policymaker are not entirely separate, but neither are they identical. The point occurred to me, in analogy, a few years ago when I happened to listen to a TV interchange between Casey Stengel and three whiz kids encyclopedically knowledgeable about baseball. Obviously they knew and could articulate many things about the game vastly beyond Stengel's ken and powers of expression. He excelled them only in knowing how to get runners around the bases.

Scholarship focuses on book learning and specializes in knowledge of sorts conveyable in books. Thus it tends — I use a term of tendency rather than inevitability — toward rationalism, which Oakeshott identifies with technical knowledge:

> Technical knowledge . . . is susceptible of formulation in rules, principles, directions, maxims — comprehensively, in propositions. It is possible to write down technical knowledge in a book. . . . And it may be observed that this character of being susceptible of precise formulation gives to technical knowledge at least the appearance of certainty. . . . On the other hand, it is characteristic of practical knowledge that it is not susceptible of formulation of this kind. Its normal expression is in a customary or traditional way of doing things or, simply, in practice. And this gives the appearance of imprecision and consequently of uncertainty, of being a matter of opinion, of probability rather than truth. . . .[1]

In this fashion, scholarship can postulate the existence of a solution for every problem — and not only that, but the one right solution. It is able to do so in part because it is in position to address any problem by starting, so to speak, at square one. I used to note this aptitude in a most scholarly colleague of mine on the State

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[1] Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 107.

Department Policy Planning Staff. Confronted by an obdurate policy issue, this colleague would habitually assume a vantage in antecedent time instead of the present moment, the only practicable one from which to consider the issue. From such origin, he would redesign the past by hypothesis and arrive at an imagined present with the problem drastically reduced or even vanished. Scholarship abounds with such time-wasting exercises. Observations in Tolstoy's *War and Peace* concerning criticism of Kutúzov's deployments in defending Moscow against Napoleon have a bearing by analogy:

> . . . Why did Kutúzov . . . not do this or that? . . . People accustomed to think in that way forget, or do not know, the inevitable conditions which always limit the activities of any commander in chief. The activity of a commander in chief does not at all resemble the activity we imagine to ourselves when we sit at ease in our studies examining some campaign on the map, with a certain number of troops on this and that side in a certain known locality, and begin our plans from some given moment. A commander in chief is never dealing with the *beginning* of any event — the position from which we always contemplate it. The commander in chief is always in the midst of a series of shifting events and so he never can at any moment consider the whole import of an event that is occurring. Moment by moment the event is imperceptibly shaping itself, and at every moment of this continuous, uninterrupted shaping of events the commander in chief is in the midst of a most complex play of intrigues, worries, contingencies, authorities, projects, counsels, threats, and deceptions and is continually obliged to reply to innumerable questions addressed to him, which constantly conflict with one another.[2]

Besides exercising a critic's prerogative to revert to a beginning, scholarship has a license to versatility denied to policy. Whereas an authoritatively wrought change of course in great affairs may be a wrenching phenomenon with enormous reverberatory effects, scholarly judgment may be shifted with relative ease. The Viet Nam record is replete with such mutations accomplished with a facility that anyone charged with responsibility for the policy machine might well envy.

II

The illustrative instance which follows is somewhat ambiguous because the individual concerned, Senator J. William Fulbright, besides holding scholarly credentials – as a former law professor and university president, author of four successful books on public issues, and, in a biographer's phrase, "a scholar in the gentlemanly tradition of Thomas Jefferson"[3]— also has official standing as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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[2] Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), pp. 921-922.

Ranging over a wide array of problems of U.S. policy in a Senate speech on March 25, 1964, the Senator came to the situation in Viet Nam, described as posing "a far more pressing need for a re-evaluation of American policy." He added: "Other than withdrawal, which I do not think can be realistically considered under present circumstances, there are three options open to us." He enumerated the options as including a continuation of antiguerrilla warfare, along with efforts to improve the South Vietnamese military apparatus and government; attempting to negotiate for neutralization of both North and South Viet Nam; and "finally, the expansion of the scale of the war, either by direct commitment of large numbers of American troops or by equipping the South Vietnamese army to attack North Vietnamese territory, possibly by means of commando-type operations from sea and air."

Discounting prospects for negotiation, the Senator deduced: "It seems clear that there are only two realistic options open to us in Vietnam in the immediate future: the expansion of the conflict in one way or another or a renewed effort to bolster the capacity of the South Vietnamese to prosecute the war successfully on its present scale." He called for "thorough examination by responsible officials in the Executive Branch," pending which, he said, "it seems to me that we have no choice but to support the South Vietnamese Government and army by the most effective means available." He declared: "Whatever specific policy decisions are made, it should be clear to all concerned that the United States will continue to meet its obligations and fulfill its commitments with respect to Vietnam."

Touching upon the mood in which knotty issues of foreign policy should be approached, Senator Fulbright described the Executive Branch and particularly the Department of State as "subject to the malady of chronic and excessive caution," whereas, he added, "an effective foreign policy is one which concerns itself more with innovation abroad than with conciliation at home." In his continuing words:

> A creative foreign policy — as President Truman, for one, knew — is not necessarily one which wins general approval. It is sometimes necessary for leaders to do unpleasant and unpopular things, because . . . the duty of a

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[3] Tristram Coffin, *Senator Fulbright: Portrait of a Public Philosopher* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1966), p. 10.

democratic politician to his constituents is not to comply with their every wish and preference but to give them the benefit of, and to be held responsible for, the exercise of his own best judgment.[4]

The sequel is too well known to require much recounting. With some exceptions, including the idea of precipitating South Vietnamese attacks against North Viet Nam, what the Senator urged was eventually undertaken by the Administration. The premised commitment to South Viet Nam was unequivocally affirmed by President Johnson a year after the Senator's cited speech. Fulbright, however, shifted from advocate to renouncer when the course proved full of perplexity.

Whether prompted or merely prefigured by the Senator's urging, the actions undertaken were designed presumably to undercut North Viet Nam's civil will. The means, however, have proved inappropriate to the end. The actions persisted in appear to have damaged the United States' civil will more than the adversary's. Had he lived to witness it, Vilfredo Pareto might well have included this instance of mismatch between intentions and results as an item in his notable disquisition on nonlogical conduct,[5] and have cited both the scholarly Senator and the policymakers for postulating purposes without taking proper account of how to achieve them. For scholars as for nonscholars, that is a thing easy to do. For scholars, free of operational responsibility, correcting such an error requires only an intellectual or literary shrug. For those with responsibility for action, abandonment of error is far more difficult. Thus the plight in which governments often find themselves is akin to that of a fabled Australian bushman who went insane trying to throw away an old boomerang.

Persons of scholarly bent often overlook the difference. I have reflected on this point many times recently in noting shrill demands for the United States to shed the consequences of its course in Viet Nam much as a hit-and-run driver flees the scene of blunder. I pondered the point again on hearing a scholarly assemblage stimulate itself to a swivet over South Africa's suffrage patterns and to fervor for applying commercial discriminations to the end of overturning the ruling group there. Had such means ever produced such consequences? Was there reason for anticipating unprecedented efficacy in this instance? Was the United

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[4] *New York Times,* March 26, 1964.

[5] Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology* (New York: Dover, 1963), I, 3 ff.

States in position to cope with the results in the improbable event of success? Such questions were not even touched upon. South Africa, let it be remembered, is a major trading partner of the United Kingdom – perhaps the most important one in view of the fact that accounts are settled by massive gold shipments to London. A program of boycotts and embargoes against South Africa could scarcely impinge on the target without affecting the trading nexus in a way to damage the pound. Drastic trouble for the pound would reverberate in trouble for other currencies, including specifically the dollar, which itself is not so robust that it should be courting opportunities to test its strength in unnecessary adventures. Thus the would-be impinger would all too probably find itself the one impinged upon. I should suppose that the United States, notwithstanding some huffing and puffing, will not try to blow that particular house down in the calculable future.

III

Although the prevailing mood of the government is to avoid quixoticism in the 1970's, as safe a prediction as I can think of is that foreign policy in the decade will experience perplexity in abundance. My closing thought is that the circumstances producing the proliferation of effort and lore in the academic study of international relations are the ones which concomitantly conspire to baffle policy. The cliché that the world has shrunk is neither literally true nor metaphorically apt. To the contrary, the world, in the sense of a span of cognition, has expanded to encompass unprecedented multifariousness.

Paul Valéry, the French poet and literary critic who had unsurpassed insights into the problems of policy, anticipated the consequences almost a generation ago. He foresaw a time when there would be "no tribe whose affairs do not fill some dossier and thus, under the spell of the written word, become the business of various well-meaning bureaucrats in their distant offices." He asked: "What could be more remarkable, more significant than taking the inventory, parceling out and linking together every part of the globe?" Valéry went on:

> Hitherto, all politics gambled on the *isolation of events. . . .* Any disturbance had, at one point on the globe as it were, a boundless medium in which to reverberate; its effects were nil at a sufficient distance; everything went on in Tokyo as though Berlin were at infinity. It was therefore possible — it was even reasonable — to predict, to calculate, and to act. There was room in the world for one or several great policies well planned and carried out.

Sensing an end to such conditions, he predicted:

> Henceforth every action will be re-echoed by many unforeseen interests on all sides; it will produce a chain of immediate events — confused reverberations in a closed space. The *effects of effects,* which were formerly imperceptible or negligible in relation to the length of a human life and to the radius of action of any human power, are now felt almost instantly at any distance; they return immediately to their causes, and only die away in the unpredictable. The expectations of the predictor are always disappointed, and that in a manner of months or a very few years.

Valéry then appraised the malign effects: "There is no prudence, wisdom, or genius that is not quickly baffled by such complexity, for there is no more duration, continuity, or recognizable causality in this universe of multiple relations and contacts." He described prudence, wisdom and genius as identifiable "only by a series of successes," and added: "Once accident and disorder are predominant, an expert or inspired game is in no way different from a game of chance; the finest gifts miscarry."

He summed up:

> Hence the new politics are to the old what the short-term calculations of a stock market gambler — the nervous spurts of speculation on the floor of the exchange, the sudden fluctuations and reverses, the uncertain profits and losses — are to the old patriarchial economy, the slow, careful accumulation of a patrimony. . . . The long-pursued schemes and profound thought of a Machiavelli or a Richelieu would today have no more reliability and value than a "stock market tip."[6]

The scholar's cardinal misperception about world realities is not exclusively his. Multitudes share it. It inheres in a tendency to expect the world of affairs to be as tidy as a book — to overlook that "the Nature of Things abhors a drawn line and loves a hodgepodge, resists consistency and despises drama."[7] There is a lesson in T. S. Eliot's words:

> The only wisdom we can hope to acquire
> Is the wisdom of humility. . . .[8]

I should add one more. A policy cannot be founded on humility alone, for policy imposes a recurrent necessity of decision even in face of a consciousness of how little we really know, and how problematic all human ventures are.

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[6] Paul Valéry, *Collected Works,* Volume X, *History and Politics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 19.

[7] James Gould Cozzens, *Guard of Honor* (London: Longmans, 1949), p. 572.

[8] T. S. Eliot, *Collected Poems, 1909-1912* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 185.

CANADA: THE RELUCTANT POWER

by John W. Holmes

INQUIRY into the appropriate role of small, middle and great powers in the maintenance of world order has been overtaken by uncertainties about the categories themselves. Which is now the model of a modern "middle power," Germany or Canada? It has been overtaken also by doubts about the art of rolemanship and even the concept of "world order." There is still a strong argument for a state less than super to acquire a perspective on what it should and should not seek to achieve and see its power in relative terms. Typecasting, however, has encouraged posturing. Efforts to categorize the uncategorizable have confused as much as they have clarified. And states are left, whether aligned or nonaligned, to find their own balance between national and international demands, alone and unique. At least that seems to be the current mood at a time when disintegration has affected the categories as well as the alliances, except for the superpowers locked in their strange embrace.

That Canada's role in the world is unique and therefore not interesting has been a persisting assumption of European and American students of international affairs. Like all countries, Canada is unique but its case is illustrative. Europeans, believing Canada no more than a frontier province of America, have disregarded a valuable laboratory for the study of foreign investment. Americans, for their part, have never realized that the problems that plague Canadians as allies, although complicated by the continental relationship, resemble those that bother their allies in Europe and the Pacific. For the foreign policy establishment, plagued with troubles, Canada remains vaguely in the mind as a temperamental but loyal and eminently forgettable tract. The anti-establishmentarians, the revisionist historians, curiously ignore Canada also — perhaps because the long history of the Canada-United States struggle for control of the territory of North America had such a happy ending for the lesser power that it raises doubts about the innate American appetite for imperialism.

The point of these introductory remarks is not pique. The advantages of being a lesser power and forgettable are more evident today to Canadians than they were in the days of their adolescence.

It is simply to suggest that the throes in which Canada finds itself over foreign policy are both typical and illuminating. Which is not to say, as Canadians have been wont to say, that they are typical of the throes of a category we have been pleased to call "middle powers." What is typical and perhaps interesting is not the Canadian role but the Canadian dilemma about that "role."

I

Among internationalist Americans it is now customary to observe that Canada has a distinct mediatory role in world affairs and that is a good thing. It is a way of defining the uniqueness and making further consideration unnecessary. Canadians should not complain, because they have, for the past decade, been trying to convince their allies that they have indeed a special role as a middling and moderating force in world politics. Basic concepts of international relations, however, take a long time to be transmitted even to neighbors. After three-quarters of a century the Soviet Union seems to have come around to the views of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan when Americans are growing weary of them. Americans who, in the 1950's, regarded the independence of Canadian foreign policy as not playing the game, are being converted to the Canadian thesis about diversity in unity and the role of the middle power at a time when Canadians – especially those in high places – are turning away from the idea of a role of any kind. The recent government white paper on foreign policy rejects the Canadian image of the country as the "helpful fixer." The reference is less derogatory than it sounds. The paper was not designed to question the intermediary part Canada played in the UN (at the time of the Suez crisis, for example), over Commonwealth differences, and even occasionally in NATO, or her general peacekeeping function. Rather it expressed revulsion against excessive rhetoric about middle-powermanship, against a shift of emphasis from a Canadian diplomacy which had tried to be useful because world order mattered to Canadians to an unhealthy emphasis on the Canadian role as an end in itself in a kind of diplomatic Olympic games.

Revulsions have set in in Canada as they have in other countries. There is a weariness not so much with the actual structure which Dean Acheson, with a little assistance from others, created after World War II as with the twenty-year-old clichés about that structure and the Canadian part in it. The Canadian response to a call to serve is likely to be as cooperative and as reluctant as it was when Canada was called upon previously to do dirty jobs, as for example to man the International Control Commissions in Indochina. That the compulsion to mediation is still stronger than the revulsion against it was illustrated by the widespread expectation that Prime Minister Trudeau would take the lead in holding the Commonwealth together in Singapore. This sort of thing is less likely to be seen, however, as the central purpose of Canada in world affairs.

II

Canadian commentators on foreign policy are obsessed now with two ideas. Canadian influence in the world, they insist, has declined from an inflated position after the war because of the recovery of the defeated powers and the expansion of membership in the United Nations. A masochistic delight is taken in puncturing their own pride. The other fashionable argument is that Canadian foreign policy has paid too little regard to the national interest and has given its priority to pretentious international diplomacy. These are different from but similar to trends of thinking in the United States and Britain. In the growing disillusionment about the Canadian role there has been some flirtation with Gaullist philosophy, the argument being that Canada's quiet diplomacy failed to move the great powers, especially the United States, whereas de Gaulle by his bluntness made Washington shake. That de Gaulle got larger headlines in the American press than did Lester Pearson is beyond dispute. That American policymakers responded any more favorably to loud than to quiet diplomacy is not proved. Canadian nationalists are crying out for a posture of defiance against Washington, but this kind of rhetoric is also dated. It is associated with the claustrophobic debate of the 1960's about independence and influence as ends in themselves and the advantages of alignment and nonalignment which appear increasingly irrelevant in the 1970's. In any case Canada has for a prime minister the most noted non-Gaullist in public life, as uninterested in that kind of nationalism as he is in national role-playing. It is significant that in the past two years official comments from Ottawa about the Viet Nam war have virtually ceased, but one would be mistaken to assume a greater sympathy with any American policy except withdrawal. The silence is rather a reaction against a Canadian role as moral adviser and a practical calculation that public calls from Ottawa are not for the moment likely to help President Nixon get the boys home.

The charge that Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy have neglected the national interest reflects illusions about "priorities" which afflict Americans, British and others. Problems of the cities, ethnic tensions and economic paradoxes force themselves upon the attention of governments. Domestic problems are probably less serious in Canada than in almost any country in the world, although it would be hard to convince many Canadians of this. The idea that they can or should drop foreign policy to turn to domestic policy is a fallacy that persists in all countries. The issues of world peace, commerce and development do not pause while political leaders deal with slums. The notion that governments and bureaucracies can turn their minds to only one or the other, the interests of the people at home or those abroad, is particularly strong among Canadians, who have rarely regarded foreign policy and defense expenditure as a life and death matter for themselves. There is in public statements these days a rather forced note of *Realpolitik,* a determination to put the interests of Canada first, that nicely catches the nationalist mood but need not be taken seriously by allies who never shared the widespread Canadian view that Canada has been the patsy of international politics.

III

Canada happens to be one country that can, or whose people think it can, leave world security to others without getting into serious trouble. Canadian governments for sixty years have notably refused to adopt that position, but it is always tempting them. It is particularly tempting at the present time because Canadians have grown skeptical of the role they chose for themselves. Serious questions are raised about all the pillars on which their international commitments were built. They find it hard to discern a role in the SALT age. If there is a drift away from traditional commitments to international security, it may be attributed to several causes. First there is a more aggressive demand for aid at home from those less benefited by the rich Canadian economy. More shrill but less important is the Canadian variation on the theme of disengagement from "American imperialism," although this cry cannot fairly be called isolationist because it demands Canadian involvement and expenditure on behalf of the unliberated in distant continents. Most important may be an involuntary cause, failure to find an answer to the question: what can a smaller ally do in the 1970's that makes sense? Most Canadians would probably still like to go on trying, but changing circumstances cast doubt on old answers, and new ones that seem practical and consistent with the preservation of identity are not forthcoming. So the temptation is strong to turn to the internal revolution and justify the downgrading of a role in world security by a significant but not too painful rise in the contribution to aid and development.

Americans may find it difficult to understand why Canadians would not happily accept their good fortune as part of a North American economy burgeoning from the technological revolution, and as a partner in defense against common enemies which is allowed to pay only a small share of the cost. Anglophone Canadians, incidentally, persist in asking almost the same question, and with the same blind spots, about Quebec. In the New World we are intolerant of all nationalisms except our own. In the United States nationalism was turned into a state religion. Canada, on the contrary, was designed, as all states should be, for comfort and convenience rather than for a moral purpose. Canadians, even at some cost, are reluctant to get involved in a continentalism which at present looks uncomfortable. This is not a kind of nationalism that looks worthy to the heirs of Jefferson, but it has some of the frontier optimism the United States has mislaid.

Another problem of timing is that although Canada may in recent years have been too big for its boots, it is now trying to get into a smaller pair that will not fit. In military terms Canada is not only a lesser power; it is without ambition to be anything else. The ambition of most Canadians is probably to be the smallest possible military power. Unfortunately for a country getting over its adolescence and recognizing the happiness to be found in modest means and seclusion, greatness is being thrust upon it. In those things that matter increasingly — territory, resources, industry and trade — Canada is rapidly becoming a great power. This fact is obscured by the inevitable comparisons with its neighbor. The persistent problem of the Canadian image is chiaroscuro.

Before this decade is over, Canada, according to present trends, may have a larger gross national product than either of the two European countries with permanent seats in the Security Council. Canadians debate whether theirs is an adult economy, whether their ability to play a major role is inhibited by foreign control. A larger share of Canadian ownership of industry and resources might well strengthen the Canadian hand, but descriptions of the Canadian condition in drastic terms as powerless or satellite are wide of the mark. Control by Canada of resources desperately needed by the United States and Japan gives the country its own kind of power. The growing importance of Canada in international bodies concerned with monetary or commercial issues, or in conferences on questions like the law of the sea in which vast geography is a factor, suggest that, however diminished its military strength, it will be a country of increasing consequence in the kind of world affairs that are beginning to matter most.

IV

One reason Canada has been conducting an extensive and, on the whole, healthy review of its foreign policy is that serious questions have been raised about the bases on which that policy rested: the United Nations, the Commonwealth, NATO and the continental partnership.

The universal worry over the United Nations has a special dimension in Canada because it has always been the ideal place for a creative lesser power to find a role compatible with national interests and national pride. In the function of peacekeeping Canadians found an outlet for their idealism and a satisfying use for their military forces. The rhetoric about peacekeeping, like the rhetoric about middle-powermanship in general, had been overdone in recent years and the disposition at present is to play down its significance. On the other hand a tragic stance about the United Nations is avoided. Canadian governments had tended to view the United Nations as a valuable diplomatic instrument to be developed rather than as a world government in which they could put their total trust. They are less disposed therefore to write it off now. Canadians are continuing to take UN causes seriously, especially those having to do with economics or disarmament. All that is needed to revive interest in peacekeeping is probably another invitation. If such an invitation comes, there will be a more skeptical examination by Ottawa of the provisions for the operation, but the government is not going to find it much easier to say no than did its predecessors — although there may be more countries now than there were ten years ago with an interest in this kind of employment for their troops, and the ban on great powers may be lifted.

Recent unilateral Canadian gestures to extend authority over larger areas of ice and sea have been looked upon by Americans in particular and by members of the international law community as a Canadian retreat from the role of international good boy. The Canadian argument is that it is nothing of the kind; it is simply a gesture by a reasonably powerful country to defy the domination of international law by large powers with special maritime and naval interests, an insensitive domination which has encouraged international lawlessness among the developing countries. There is room for argument here, but the Canadian position is not that of the calculated outlaw. Like most countries, Canada will identify its national interest with the general interest, but it still recognizes that there is a general interest and that international law is important. One might sense a disposition to join forces with the developing countries, and Canada may play this part again when opportunities arise. Unless the Ottawa government becomes a great deal more revolutionary than it seems, such opportunities are not likely to arise often. Because Canada has an enormous coastline and few ships, its interests on maritime questions are contrary to those of the United States and other major powers, but usually it will be pulled by its own interests into their camp.

V

As for the Commonwealth, Canadians are proving tenacious because they consider themselves to some extent creators of the modern Commonwealth. It has been easier for Canada than Britain to accept the looser Commonwealth because Canada had not regarded it as a monolithic structure and its function as a consultative body has not ceased to be useful for Canada. A few years ago one might have thought interest in the Commonwealth was moribund in Canada, but few external issues have attracted as widespread attention as the Nigerian war and the controversy over arms to South Africa. With a strong emphasis on the Canadian role in Francophonie as well, it could be charged that these are areas of a modest kind of Canadian imperialism. In both cases there has been some contest with the mother country. The Secretaries-General of both the Commonwealth and *L'Agence de Coopération culturelle et technique* are Canadians. Because it is in a sense the Canadian as much as the British Commonwealth which is at stake, Trudeau was forced by Canadian opinion and African expectations as well as conviction into opposing the British over the sale of arms to South Africa.

Few Canadians question the right of the British to say goodbye to their imperial past and to plunge into Europe, but a renunciation by the Heath Government of one of the great creations of British political genius would deny the validity of a long experiment in international relations in which Canada played its own honorable part. At any rate, the Canadian response to this challenge to the Commonwealth shows that the mood is not really as isolationist as it may seem to be — although of course there is little cost involved. There is the cost of economic aid and development programs both in the Commonwealth and Francophonie, still not adequate for an economic "great power" but rising faster than those of other developed countries. Any suggestions that Canada might take over leadership roles from Britain and France in these last phases of their empires get little encouragement in Ottawa. Canadians are anti-imperialists not so much by conviction as by laziness — and a surfeit of territory. They prefer to be a supplementary rather than a leading power.

VI

For Canada the Commonwealth has been part of a philosophy of counterweight. NATO was another aspect. Canadians made no secret of the fact that although their primary purpose for going into NATO was its urgent necessity in 1949, it was also an answer to their own need for a multilateral rather than an unequal bilateral alliance. The service of NATO as a counterweight is now questioned. The United States insisted on divorcing NORAD from NATO, and there has been no practical way for the Europeans to correct the imbalance in continental defense. Counterweight is a neat political idea without much relevance here. There is skepticism also about the value of acquiring "influence" through alliances. NATO may, as its advocates argue, have given Canada some voice in European affairs, but the critics are asking what national interest that serves. Europe as an economic and cultural counterweight is more interesting, but these advantages are unrelated to the NATO tie.

The reduction of Canadian forces in Europe should be attributed not so much to Canadian isolationism as to the sheer irrationality in the 1970's of Canada, with its own vast land to control or defend, maintaining troops in Germany. It has made sense to those who lived through 1949; but it is difficult to convince present Canadian voters that an emergency situation of twenty years ago, attributable to the weakness of France, Germany and Italy, is still an emergency. This is not because the Soviet threat has diminished but because the capacity of the Europeans has increased. The case of the United States is different because the United States is more than a Western Hemisphere power; it is a world superpower, and its influence in NATO councils is commensurate with its power. So is Canada's for that matter, and that is why it is hardly worth maintaining. The argument that Canada's presence in Europe is that of proxy for the American presence is insulting.

The assumption in Europe that Canada is withdrawing in order to enter into a more comfortable defense relationship with the United States is the reverse of the truth. The philosophy expressed in the Prime Minister's defense statements is that we should keep our forces at home so that we can look after our surveillance ourselves rather than rely on our neighbor to do so. In that way we preserve our independence from creeping continentalism and American wrath. Serious questions about the basis of continental defense have been raised which cannot be discussed adequately here. Suffice it to say that the logic of joint continental defense is still accepted but not taken for granted as readily as it was fifteen years ago. Partly this is because there is not the same certainty of consensus in designating the enemy. Partly it is because the escalation of technology and cost has made anything resembling military partnership or joint control of policy impossible. Some Canadians think that by rejecting a defense relationship they can exorcise the United States. The majority, while unhappy about the present situation and puzzled, are not clear about safe alternatives. At most, the established machinery of joint defense might move along unobtrusively. It is not a political climate that encourages new initiatives, new roles or even the refurbishing of old ones — or participation in expensive new joint projects.

VII

A preoccupation with the dilemmas of the continental relationship has prevented Canadians from contemplating the impact on them of a weakening of the *Pax Americana.* A problem for the allies is that the United States in the age of the American empire behaved, insofar as the allies were concerned, not so much like a governor as a governess. It did not impose NATO on any of us. In a sense of common danger we got together and created an alliance. Because the United States paid the piper it came to call the tune — not entirely, but to a considerable extent. It tried to get as many contributions as possible from the poor relations, encouraged and praised them when they did well, and reminded them of the awful dangers when they strayed into heresy. An unhealthy reliance on the United States developed. It was inevitable that people would come to think, especially after the excessive Cold War ideology of the 1950's, that Washington had created the alliance for its own purposes and that the Soviet threat was the product of American imagination — an assumption encouraged in recent years by certain political and historical writings even in the United States. We became dependent upon the United States even for intelligence, a disabling situation for any ally. As the age of the superpowers developed, the allies, or at least their voters, became less and less preoccupied with the Soviet "threat." They thought it exaggerated or they thought it was something for the United States to cope with. Sheltered from the Soviet Union, governments became preoccupied with their relationship with Washington. It was not that the United States threatened them in the same dire way, but it raised more complicated problems.

This is particularly the case in Canada. The Soviet threat in the Mediterranean may have stimulated the Europeans into anxiety, but it has less impact on Canada. Increasingly, Canadians see themselves as Arctic neighbors of the Soviet Union rather than as separated from the Soviet land mass by Europe, but this awareness, this ultimate abandonment of Mercator's view of the world, leads their attention to a frontier where they cannot see clearly. The greatest physical threat to Canada is not a Soviet invasion of Europe but a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. The former might trigger the latter, but the former is a problem for the Europeans. The exchange of missiles between the United States and the Soviet Union is almost entirely a problem for the United States. Canada had a role in defense against the manned bomber on which doubt is now cast. For twenty years Canada has accepted a supplementary role in defense of the U.S. nuclear capacity, but this has grown less important. Canadians once thought their partnership in continental defense would give them some share in defense policy, but their bargaining power has been reduced. In the age of the superpowers lesser allies can do little more than protect some of their own immediate interests. The United States alone makes the decision to go into an ABM program, although it will listen to Canadian complaints about how this might affect Canadian territory.

Canadian influence in the SALT talks is not likely to be important, and Canadians look for a more active outlet in the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. As in the argument over the placing of arms in coastal waters, they sometimes find themselves in association with lesser powers against the United States and the Soviet Union, but the philosophy is that while the superpowers alone can maintain the deterrents, other countries can best use their brains exploring arms control agreements. Canadians do not see themselves as antagonists of the United States, but sometimes they are allies of certain forces within the United States against others — a situation that makes relations with the U.S. government tricky indeed.

VIII

Taking a fresh look at the fundamental problems of defense, Canadians ask: Who, if anybody, does threaten us? To judge by the decibels of the debate one would conclude that the answer is the United States. The dilemma is that while Canada considers the conventional problems of its security in a dangerous world, it must also consider the defense of its independence, sovereignty and identity. The traditional associate in the former struggle is the country that poses the largest threat in the latter. The fact that the threat to Canadian independence is not a calculated policy of the U.S. government, but an amalgam of economic and cultural forces over which the U.S. government has little control, diminishes the ill will but not the problem. Regionalist answers to world security problems which seem sensible elsewhere would be suicidal for Canada. The United States impinges so much more than the Soviet Union that defense against its far less mortal threat preoccupies Canadian attention. Furthermore, it is a threat Canadians can and must cope with on their own.

The long-term challenges, however, are different from those perceived twenty years ago. Canada is vulnerable because it is a country with a small population, enormous territory and vast resources. It is exceedingly dependent upon a world safe for commerce. Its relatively good image in the Third World is threatened by its international activities and its own "neo-imperialism." It is one of the few underpopulated countries in the world and there is likely to be a great scramble on the part of the major industrial powers for Canadian resources. The challenge is not of flying missiles, invading armies and submarines, but of a general threat to those who are unfairly rich in a desperately poor world. The guerrilla arm has already struck at us viciously. The threat of international anarchy to the specific Canadian need for "world order" was never more clear, but this is not at all like the kind of Cold War threat against which our security arrangements were established in the postwar years.

Few developing countries now see emigration as an answer to their problems, but they are nonetheless likely to resent the Canadian proportion of resources and investment to population. The only country that could conceivably provide a threat of mass immigration to Canada is the United States — an unlikely possibility but one which, in the light of civil unrest and pollution, is at least imaginable. (Canada has civil unrest and pollution but more space for it.) There is some fear that the United States will withdraw into its own continent where the pressures for resources of energy and space will become such that Americans might put intolerable pressures on their underpopulated neighbor. In addition, uneasiness about the turbulence across the long thin border has made Canadians fearful of, rather than frightened by, the United States. It is to some extent the malaise of the comfortable suburb. It is keeping the attention of Canadians off distant continents and worldly roles.

Because their capacity to contribute much to world security in the conventional sense has diminished, Canadians will find their role to be much more in the realm of economics, but as economic pressures grow more threatening, the issues of world security may be largely economic. One would like to think that the Canadian capacity for intermediation could be displayed in this area. There is an obvious will in Ottawa to be the enlightened world citizen in international economics, but here Canadian interest is much more basic and direct than in military questions, and the pressure of domestic forces is likely to make it more defensive. The Canadian standard of living is involved as it never seemed to be over Suez. For this purpose Canada is in a paradoxical position. Its favorable balance of trade and payments has been increasing spectacularly, and in international terms Canada is a rich and fortunate country. At the same time unemployment and regional disparity are increasing, and the difficulty will be for Canadian governments to behave abroad with the assurance and generosity other countries have a right to expect from a major and confident power.

IX

The Nixon Doctrine for Canadians, as for other associates of the United States, has contradictory elements. The majority of Canadians probably feel that U.S. power was overextended, especially in Viet Nam, and that a withdrawal from the role of world policeman is all to the good. There may, however, be shocks accompanying that withdrawal which will remind us all of the extent to which we had come to rely on the Americans' capacity to intervene — when we wanted them to as well as when we thought they should not. The notice from Washington that others are expected to assume a larger share in the maintenance of world order and the combating of world catastrophes may have an effect in Europe. There are signs it is doing so. However willing sensible Canadians might be to accept such a call, it is hard for them to know what they could do except perhaps maintain their capacity for peacekeeping should the occasions arise again. Token contingents are more trouble than use. The white paper advocates a Canadian orientation toward the "Pacific rim," but in spite of the willingness to become more involved, no one has advanced any serious suggestions about a role Canada could play in Pacific security. A brigade or two in Viet Nam might once have been the suggestion from Washington, but the Nixon Doctrine indicates that is not likely in future to be the kind of help required. There is no prospect of a North Pacific Treaty Organization and no apparent disposition in Washington to share its Pacific supremacy with allies who could be troublesome. In looking for a role here there seems little else than to fall back on remedies which may sound old-fashioned but may still be valid: economic aid where it is needed, mutually beneficial bilateral trade, and efforts at political and cultural understanding for which lesser people have some advantages.

Canadians would argue that their establishment of relations with Peking is of this order. Some have apocalyptic illusions about what one medium power can do to bridge that great gap. In more influential circles, however, the move is seen as a valid if small contribution that could help eventually to get Americans and Chinese talking to each other. It is ironic that now, when the tendency in the country is to minimize the international influence it can exert, Canada has demonstrated again the powerful effect even a lesser power can have as a catalyst. The formula for recognition that Ottawa and Peking agreed to accept has been adopted by Italy and Chile and has led to a climactic situation in the United Nations. Whether this was a move in the right or the wrong direction is arguable, but that it has been influential is beyond dispute. When conventional wisdom is to minimize the impact of lesser powers on the world scene and to maintain that life is controlled by the superpowers, we tend to gloss over the impact of Cambodia or Israel, not to mention Albania and Canada. What indeed is a middle power?

REGIONALISM DIRECTLY FOR DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

by Covey T. Oliver

THIS article is concerned with the future of regionalism as an attitude about, and as a structural arrangement directly serving, the development process in the world's less affluent areas. The events and situations I shall discuss have occurred in the Western Hemisphere, where regionalism has wider, if not assuredly firmer, footings than elsewhere among the less developed countries. Evaluations of other sectors among the poor countries are only suggested here; specific work in other areas must await events and acceptance of the notion that regionalism for development is a distinct subdivision of regionalistic studies.

To date, the security, trading and political unification aspects of regional movements have attracted more attention than regionalistic approaches to the planning and execution of development programs. Recent events in the Western Hemisphere raise the possibility that the developmental potential of regionalism may equal or surpass in importance the more traditional orientations just cited.

In many areas of Latin America nationalism has decried foreign influence and become impatiently irrational in wanting to know how and over what period of time total development takes place. At present official Washington is silent about ideas on development. The amount of American development assistance is, generally speaking, also low and uncertain, because of the steady rise of bipartisan Congressional avoidance of commitment. The drying up of American governmental inputs into the idea pool of development is directly attributable to a specific application of President Nixon's Guam Doctrine. With respect to the development process the low posture policy is taken to mean that the United States should volunteer neither viewpoints nor money. The President himself has said that the United States will wait for the developing countries to advance ideas and proposals. Temporarily, at least, "never volunteer — even viewpoints" seems to be the watchword for U.S. assistance agencies.

The Nixon Administration's tendency to taciturnity is, paradoxically, complemented by the nation's willingness to accept blame for its leaders about almost anything bad that happens in Latin America, on the assumption that the United States actually controls all that happens there and hence is culpable. This national masochism, at its most psychotic, is seen in such calls as those of George F. Kennan[1] (and even U.S. Senators) that the tainted and unworthy United States withdraw from the world until she has purified herself. Thus, in a bizarre way, the low posture and a national guilt complex are compatible; they induce a shift from activism to passivity insofar as new ideas about economic, social and political development are concerned.

In this environment, what about development? Is it possible that, despite the bad reasons that have led to the decline of U.S. helpfulness, the Latin Americans on their own may organize themselves and their thoughts in ways conducive to new and more effective lines of action?

ORGANIZING FOR DEVELOPMENT

As is well known, the now classic model for regional self-improvement with the assistance of extraregional capital transfers is the Office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). From its beginning the regional development program for the Western Hemisphere, called the Alliance for Progress, sought to achieve regional approaches to the development process. The first of these efforts, involving the "Nine Wise Men," concentrated on what might be termed high-level technical assistance regarding national planning of the development of the less developed countries within the hemisphere. The effort was not successful, on the whole, for reasons that need not be explained here, and the institution is now defunct.

Envisioned in the Charter of Punta del Este, but not effectuated for several years after the 1961 gathering, is the Inter-American Commission of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP). As in the case of the earlier committee of the Nine Wise Men, CIAP members do not represent national governments but the community of the Alliance for Progress as a whole. They are technocratically qualified to review periodically the development operations of particular countries in accordance with general criteria for sound development and the programmatic undertakings of the countries in question. CIAP also functions as the executive agency, insofar as developmental matters are concerned, of the Inter-American

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[1] George F. Kennan, "America after Vietnam," address delivered at the Prelude to Independence ceremony, Colonial Williamsburg, June 1, 1968 (published in pamphlet form).

Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States. In this capacity it administers a small fund, based upon annual pledges, in a manner comparable to the United Nations Development Program.

CIAP is still viable and operative. Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations have sought to improve its standing and authority by giving it a more significant voice in the matter of U.S. activities supporting development in the hemisphere. Thus, pursuant to an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Washington has declared that bilateral development assistance to any particular country in the Western Hemisphere will be made in accordance with CIAP's recommendations. Also, the Nixon Administration has authorized CIAP to consider the United States' performance (mainly economic) as a leading contributor to the development process.

Unlike the OEEC, membership in CIAP is not limited to the assisted countries, but includes also a "United States member." While not in any formal sense a direct representative of the United States government, this member is commonly regarded as the spokesman for the developed country's viewpoint regarding the development process within the hemisphere as a whole and in particular countries. Thus, in CIAP as in other institutions concerned with development in the hemisphere, both the developed and the developing countries are "represented."

Within past years, a perhaps significant trend toward a closed regionalism of the developing countries began in the hemisphere. The Economic Coordinating Committee for Latin America (CECLA) met at Santiago, Chile, in 1969, without the United States, and formulated what has come to be called the Consensus of Viña del Mar.[2] The thrust of this document is mainly to claim better trading opportunities with the United States. The Consensus is lamentably short and inadequate insofar as development doctrine is concerned. Its underlying theme may well be thought to be a variation of the shibboleth "trade not aid."

There is, certainly, an intimate connection between improved terms of trade and exporting opportunities for developing countries individually, or in groups, and overall development. But as the Pearson Report[3] shows, it is extremely unlikely that even economic development can be attained on the basis of improved Latin American trade opportunities alone. CECLA seems to have motivated the Latin American countries strongly toward one aspect of development, and the United States has encouraged this new type of regional association from which she is excluded.

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[2] OAS Document, OEA/Ser. H/X.14/CIES/1403 (1969).

[3] Lester B. Pearson, *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development* (New York: Praeger, 1969), Chapter 4; see also Lester B. Pearson, *The Crisis of Development* (New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1969), pp. 80-84, and Willard Thorp, *The Reality of Foreign Aid* (Publication Summary, Council on Foreign Relations, 1971), *passim*.

It remains to be seen whether the CECLA approach will broaden to become by evolution something comparable to the OEEC. There are no technical reasons why this should not be. Latin America now has an impressively adequate supply of development technicians and wise counsellors. It might be possible, for example, to envision a "two-chamber" reorganization of CIAP. Under such an arrangement, the U.S. member would be present only on certain occasions. It is more likely, however, that CIAP will remain and that CECLA will develop an independent, *de facto* competence in the development fields that lie beyond trade alone.

I believe the CECLA development has great potential. In a world in which the gap between the poorer nations and the rich nations is widening, there is observable in the most "nonpolitical" of international development organizations an increasing tension between the representatives of the developed and the developing countries. In the international lending agencies, the weighted voting formula gives the power to decide about development matters to the wealthy nations. The United Nations Development Program remains completely handicapped in accumulating capital for development because the developed countries do not wish to have decisions regarding the allocation and use of capital supplied by them left to the equal-voting formula or any variant thereof, such as the fifty-fifty division of voting power (theoretically) in the UNDP.

The Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) arrangements were mainly oriented toward the achievement of a wider "home" market for the products of industrializing societies whose individual national markets were insufficient to support at necessary levels of production the industrialization sought in the name of economic development. Even as trading communities, these regional arrangements have been beset with problems; among the most difficult have been those stemming from the lack of effective systems for allocating the new productivity expected among the national states in the particular trading region. In general, CACM, LAFTA and the plans of the Presidents of the Americas announced at the end of the 1967 Punta del Este meeting saw development as the eventual result, not the specific subject, of a new regionalism.

More specifically linked to a direct regional approach to regional development than LAFTA is the newer Andean Group, juridically within the larger association. By agreement of the parties and their contributions to a regional development fund, the Andean Group has moved on paper beyond the conventional expectation that development will result from a zero tariff arrangement between the members, not to be shared with others, because the wider market thus obtainable will justify industrialization. The Andean arrangement, indeed, was born even before the meeting of the Presidents, out of realization by President Lleras of Colombia and President Frei of Chile that because the Latin American countries are at different stages of development, there cannot be, through LAFTA or otherwise, a swift and orderly march toward a Latin American common market.

Considering always, as must be done to see the problem correctly, not "old" but "new" production in Latin America, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which have attained to higher stages of modernity and efficiency, are ahead and will stay ahead of such countries as Venezuela (despite her rich returns from oil and iron ore), Colombia, Peru and Chile, to say nothing of their far weaker neighbors, Ecuador and Bolivia. Under these circumstances the economies of scale in a free market would go to the already better developed members for too long a time to be tolerable in terms of expectation and need in the other developing countries. No one who knows anything about either trade or development would ever have suggested a common market or a two-way free trade area between the United States and Latin America. Nonetheless, it remained for perceptive Latins to note that region-wide free trade between them alone presents problems of the same order, although at a lower level of immediate threat to growth within the less-advanced countries.

Although Venezuela has not yet joined the Andean Group, because her influential business community is fearful of lower labor costs for standardized articles produced in Colombia and elsewhere in the group, the group's formation is quite significant. It points up, for almost the first time, the wrongness in thinking of all of developing Latin America as essentially fungible.

The U.S. Interest in Regional Trading Structures

Professor Joseph S. Nye and others have detailed the patterns of early United States uncertainty about CACM and LAFTA. One might have thought, for example, that Washington would have supported unification in Central America, not only for trading reasons, but also as a parallel to its historical and Jungian hopes for political unification in Western Europe. As is well known, several of the constitutions of the tiny countries in Central America provide for an eventual return to political cohesiveness in that area. But leaving this speculation aside, after the United States belatedly became involved in the development process in the Western Hemisphere, she saw that the regional market attempts made first by CACM and later by LAFTA were relevant to the development process.

This may be explained, in part, by underlying assumptions regarding the nature of the development process. First, unless they are continuously and effectively corrected, thought and action about development tend toward the economic development center of gravity. Within the sphere of "pure" economic development, the purest kind is that relating to increasing exports from the developing country and bringing about import substitution. Trading area concepts of a regional nature strongly support this type of thinking. Second, it has never been possible for executive leadership in the United States to present the burden of development as a continuous and long-range claim on American capital. Operations, if not doctrine, have had to accommodate to the notion that "aid will end quite soon." Under these circumstances, and given the well-known American enthusiasm for finding structural solutions to problems (regardless of whether the structures actually solve the problem), strong U.S. support for regional trade organizations in the hemisphere becomes understandable. The Declaration of the Presidents in 1967 provided a *modus operandi* and a timetable for the creation of a "common market in the Western Hemisphere" and related the goals involved to the Latin American countries' achievement of development and modernization.

Yet the 1967 summit meeting did not weigh accurately the serious structural shortcomings of the LAFTA arrangement or the relatively small statistical significance of the volume of trade among the members of the CACM in relation to total trade of the constituent countries. The particular problem that gave rise to the Andean Group within LAFTA must not have been given much attention. When I served as United States Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting at Viña del Mar, Chile, later in 1967, I found the American experts dampening the expectations of the Andean countries that their group would be entitled to participate in the new U.S. development assistance specifically directed toward encouraging regional trade. I was able to reverse that attitude toward the Andean Group. (Throughout my tenure the highest executive authority over me showed continuous and consistent interest in encouraging regional trading structures of the common market variety in Latin America.)

President Johnson's expectations along these lines, however, were doomed to frustration. LAFTA continued to be unable to achieve substantial reductions through its common list procedure. The President then suggested that during the time the Latin American countries were attempting to adjust their trading relationships, regional development with American capital support could well proceed along lines relating to "physical integration" – improvement of the physical connections between the countries themselves, and beyond that, improvements in carriage of goods, by sea, overland or in the air.

The Latin reactions were curious. The proposal got nowhere. First of all, there were questions involving the structure for physical integration. There was fear that some new "key figure" or institution would be required. Related to this was the question whether the Secretary General of the OAS or the President of the Inter-American Development Bank, or one or the other of them through his delegate, should lead in the matter.

Additionally, the foreign offices of several key countries were suspicious of the proposal. In part their suspicions merely reflected the fact that in Latin America the foreign offices, on the whole, have neither the expertise nor much interest in the development process. One must turn to other ministries, the most prominent usually the Ministry of Finance, and sometimes the ministries of development (*fomento*). (Regrettably, I have always thought, the ministries of public works are not often involved.) Nations skeptical about the United States' interest in physical integration seemed to believe that regional physical integration would inevitably mean a serious decline in U.S. support for internal capital infrastructure projects or physical improvements regarding several countries alone. Thus, Brazil, as seen through foreign office eyes, was mainly interested in her own internal "physical integration." Argentina, for her part, feared that any emphasis on region-wide integration would detract from the Valley of the River Plata Project.

Neither the Johnson Administration's enthusiasm for a Latin American common market nor its willingness to support physical integration as a shorter-haul alternative has found much favor with the Nixon Administration. Regionalism of the CECLA variety has been accepted — although the Consensus of Viña del Mar was rather impolitely presented to the President. Nixon has replied that CECLA's "demand" for nonreciprocal exclusive preferences in the American market would be considered if the other developed countries (particularly those in the European Economic Community) did not abandon their discrimination against Latin America and include the region in their preferential systems. Not a word was there, in these exchanges, about the desirability for the Latins to try to improve, for the future at least, their own marketing relations with each other. Considering this silence about trading regionalism and the silent treatment deservedly given the Rockefeller Report's exaggerated call for a dramatic step-up in regional security arrangements, one is left with no clue to whether the present Administration has an interest in regionalistic organization, by the developing countries exclusively, directly for development. Perhaps the Administration is only waiting for someone in authority somewhere in Latin America to ask the question.

REGIONALISM AND THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT

The experience of the Central American Market (CACM) shows that the creation of a trading common market between small, developing countries, though laudable, by no means assures or appreciably speeds total development. A host of additional institutions beyond those relating to trade alone are highly relevant to development. To some extent, the Central American Bank for Economic Development (CABEI) can provide for the financing of the additional links needed. It cannot, however, at present levels of availabilities, go far with high-cost physical integration, and it is not in a position to finance common reserve and currency arrangements.

The Central Secretariat of the Central American Community (SIECA) is remarkably efficient and dedicated. The United States, in addition to maintaining assistance missions in each of the five Central American countries, has an aid mission for the region as a whole (ROCAP). Finally, the multinational development lending agencies, both universal and regional, stand by to lend support to regional development in Central America.

Despite these availabilities, however, the idea of improvement in Central America has remained largely trade-oriented. One reason for the slow progress along broader development lines is that the constituent countries rightly see the future as more important than the present. The big question is, which of the Central American countries is going to attain this or that advantage as related to new and productive installations?

Even when viewed from the narrow trading standpoint, the vital issue in Latin America as a whole is the future. Not much will be accomplished if the poor present is all that is to be integrated. The integration of forward-looking development plans for all of Latin America, or for discrete subregions thereof, must begin with a renewed recognition of the importance of regional, as well as national, planning. Also required, in my view, is an increased recognition in Latin America, the United States and elsewhere that the most immediate task of regionalism in the Western Hemisphere is the developmental one.

What are the prospects? So far as purely economic development is concerned, the technocratic skills required already exist and whatever lack there is in the number of skillsmen, rapid training can supplement. Funding of basic organization and planning operations, at least for the initial period, is manageable by the countries themselves. As regional programs are worked out (the technologically more advanced countries helping the others in the process), the funding of programs and projects will require capital transfers into the region. Despite the threatened drought in United States bilateral assistance, well-organized regional programs should meet with approval by the Inter-American Development Bank at both its hard and its soft loan windows. The World Bank's "regular" (harder) window would also find economic development projects to sponsor, especially those involving regional physical integration which parallel the World Bank's traditional preference for loans related to fundamental infrastructure.[4]

Beyond the purer forms of economic development, it would be psychopolitically useful for the regionalistic consortium envisioned to direct itself to the region-wide problem of distributive inequality. A uniformly low level of *social development* is a common characteristic of all Latin American national societies. The rich and powerful not only frequently evade taxes, but the tax systems themselves badly need reforming to incorporate the fairness criteria applied by any modern, developed, Free World state. Social welfare, education and health programs not only require more funds for operations but also must be updated with respect to doctrine, management, honesty and efficiency. Latin America as a region has a long way to go to produce a skilled corps to superintend social development comparable to those it has for foreign exchange management, national accounts administration, and the engineering of physical improvements (from highways to modern agricultural production). Outsiders (from the United States, the international lending agencies and occasionally Europe, Japan and Israel) have had from fair to good success in helping to induce economic development and modernization in Latin America on a country-by-country basis. So far external inputs for *social* development have been few, diffuse, ineffectual and often resisted.[5]

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[4] My text, including this portion dealing with the possible integration roles of the regional and worldwide international lending agencies, was written before the recent inaugural address of the new president of the Inter-American Development Bank, Sr. Antonio Ortiz Mena, delivered at Buenos Aires on March 1, 1971. In this address the incoming chief officer strongly supported regional integration, particularly physical integration, as a major development activity of the IDB, saying *inter alia*: "The Declaration of the Presidents of America underscores the basic importance of the physical infrastructure in the process of economic integration and the urgent need to complete and modernize it. The truth of this assertion is becoming daily more apparent and, in my opinion, has become the cornerstone for any future planning. This constructive task places an obligation on the IDB and provides an essential function for its activities." Inter-American Development Bank, mimeograph, *Press Information Series*, March 1, 1971, p. 4.

Why? A major reason is that social value-choice lies beyond the inevitability cycle which is accepted for cause-effect relationships arising from the purer forms of economic development activity. In the social field the weighting of preferences and priorities is open to more doctrinal and political options than accepted doctrine permits, say, foreign exchange resources management to enjoy.

There is, then, a challenge to regionalism for development in Latin America beyond anything the West Europeans faced through their highly successful Office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The Marshall Plan did not require social development inputs. Response to this challenge depends largely on the vision and the will of national leaders throughout Latin America. It is not amiss for a friendly and hopeful observer from outside to make the point, in the absence of his government's voice. If Latin America should respond regionalistically to its unmet needs for modernization and reform in the social field, the political effects would probably be marked improvements in the style and tone of popular participation in, and trust of, government.

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[5] Covey T. Oliver, "New Problems of Social Development," *Foreign Service Journal,* November 1970, p. 43 ff.

MARXISM IN CHILE: AN INTERIM VIEW OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

by David C. Jordan

WHEN the conference of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) was held in Havana in July and August 1967, a giant picture of Simon Bolívar formed its backdrop.[1] Bolívar's portrait indicated more than a symbolic identification between the Cuban revolution and the great liberator; it furnished a key to the strategic thesis of the revolutionary struggle within Latin America. In an essay on revolutionary strategy, communist theorist Régis Debray has argued that, if Bolívar did not consider Colombia free as long as Spanish power remained secure in Peru, the same principle is relevant to Cuba's security and, if there is to be one, to the Latin American revolution.[2] The implication is that communism is not safe in Cuba until it is installed throughout Latin America.

Much of the debate in Havana at the time concerned the means — peaceful or violent — for installing communism in the Latin American area. Soviet observers present at the conference apparently supported those, such as Chilean delegate Salvador Allende, who reportedly held that peaceful or legal means to power were desirable and viable, at least with regard to the conditions of Chile, Uruguay and possibly other countries. Some observers believed the Chilean delegation was led to repudiate the violent Cuban line because its political prospects and support were heavily dependent in its drive to power in Chile on the Communist Party, which was Moscow-dominated. During the conference a prominent communist and Chilean senator, Luis Corvalán, published a letter in *Pravda* criticizing Castro's brand of armed and violent revolutionary struggle.

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[1] For an excellent description and analysis of the meeting see "La Stratégie Révolutionnaire en Amérique Latine de la Tricontinentale à la conférence de l'O.L.A.S.," *Notes et Études Documentaires,* January 12, 1968, No. 3454, *Problèmes d'Amérique Latine,* No. VII, pp. 5-35.

[2] Régis Debray, "Latin America: Some Problems of Revolutionary Strategy," in I. L. Horowitz and John Gerassi, editors, *Latin American Radicalism* (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 502.

It had been widely accepted that the Soviet Union opposed the thesis that guerrilla movements should form the vanguard of revolutions. Recent revelations suggest that such movements, if Soviet-controlled, remain a tactic to the road to power along with the legal path. In March 1971, for example, five Soviet embassy officials were expelled from Mexico because of the discovery that they had helped in the selection and training of Mexican urban guerrillas. All the expelled "diplomats" were identified as members of the Soviet secret police (KGB). One had been expelled from Brazil (1963) and Argentina (1959) for organizing industrial rioting; another had been suspected of intervention in a violent labor dispute in Veracruz; and another is reported to have funded student agitators in the Mexican student riots of 1968.[3]

What are Soviet political and strategic objectives for Latin America? Political objectives are probably more important than commercial considerations since trade with the Soviet Union represents only 7.2 per cent of Latin America's total annual commerce. The principal political objective appears to be the neutralization and erosion of U.S. influence and prestige in what has been traditionally an American sphere of dominance. In seeking to encroach on the Western Hemisphere preserve, Moscow is no doubt responding to the general decline in Washington's influence around the world and a perceived weakening of America's will to use force, particularly in the Caribbean, to accomplish security objectives.

Also, for obvious political reasons the Soviet Union wants to remain the dominant influence in Latin American communism. Communist parties as well as governments tied to or biased toward the Soviet Union are extremely useful to Moscow. When the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia evoked widespread anti-Soviet sentiment among the world's communist parties, so that only fourteen parties supported Moscow's Czechoslovak policy, half of these were in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela and Uruguay.

The strategic objectives probably are best understood in geopolitical terms. Particularly critical may be the changing maritime relationship. Soviet sea power is gaining on the United States, and in some categories it is superior: there are more Soviet conventionally powered submarines, and more surface to surface cruise-missile systems. The Soviet Navy may soon pass the U.S. Navy in the category of Polaris-type ballistic missile submarines. It is gaining too in its efforts to challenge the United States in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Sea of Japan and the Pacific. Even the Caribbean — an American naval preserve — is within Soviet reach. The Cienfuegos base in Cuba provides a strategic asset for Soviet intelligence and subversive operations as well as a potential service and supply center for nuclear-armed submarines. Soviet activities may promote two objectives: (1) the erosion of the land base to America's sea power and (2) the buildup of a land base for worldwide Soviet sea power.

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[3] *The Times of the Americas* (Washington), March 31, 1971, pp. 1, 5.

In the U.S.-USSR power struggle Latin America's strategic importance is likely to be felt more in terms of sea power than air or land power. Since Germany undertook to erode Britain's influence and sea power in Latin America — beginning with a military mission to Chile in 1885 — the struggle to neutralize the bases of rival sea powers and to consolidate land and naval power in and around the Eurasian land mass has been the essential feature of modern power politics. In the era of nuclear parity the strategic superiority of American sea power has helped to prevent Soviet control of the heartland of Eurasia. Yet despite this U.S. asset recent events indicate that the Soviet Union is attempting to strengthen its position in Latin America and throughout the world not only through subversion and violence but also through seemingly legal and democratic channels. For the first time a major democratic nation of the Western Hemisphere has freely elected an avowedly Marxist president.

What are the implications of Salvador Allende's election to the Presidency of Chile? How will his administration change Chilean foreign policy affecting United States interests? How should the degree, speed and extent of Chile's move to the left be interpreted? What factors might accelerate this move toward dictatorship? What forces exist within Chile to retard or inhibit a move toward left-wing dictatorship? Finally, does the discussion of these issues suggest continuity in U.S. policy toward Chile and Latin America in the 1970's?

II

Historically, the Monroe Doctrine has been the key to America's response to events occurring in Latin America. The second part of the Monroe Doctrine proclaims that the United States "should consider any attempt on their part [European or non-American powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." The doctrine, rooted in a conception of U.S. security interests, pertains not merely to developments within Latin America but to the relation of those developments to the international distribution of power. It would be surprising, therefore, if the rise of pro-Marxist governments in Latin America did not stir more concern in Washington than the rise of pro- or semi-fascist governments in the hemisphere occasioned in the 1930's and early 1940's. At issue is not an instinctive distaste for what a country's domestic or foreign policies may be but the fact that these changes, when related to the international distribution of power, may be dangerous to the American interest in peace and security. The Cuban missile crisis underlined the contemporary potentialities of such internal changes to international security.

Initially, there are at least two aspects to the changes occurring in Chile which may prove harmful to U.S. interests and thereby provoke some response. One is the substantive foreign policy decisions a pro-Marxist Chilean president may make. If on the basis of the international distribution of power Chilean foreign policy options are conceived of as points existing on a continuum, from those more favorable to the United States to those unfavorable to it but advantageous to the Soviet Union, some Chilean positions close to the Soviet end might be regarded as extremely serious for the United States. In the pro-United States range, Chile usually votes with the United States in the OAS and the UN, seeks close commercial, cultural and other ties with us, shares an awareness of Soviet expansionist policy, appreciates the dangers of communism to constitutional governments, and cooperates militarily in the defense of the hemisphere. A gradual abandonment of these positions would move her toward neutrality in Cold War conflicts, something close to Perón's famous "Third Position." Beyond that she could move to "Third Worldism"; as typified by Algeria, this would involve the recognition of North Viet Nam, North Korea and other communist powers and allegedly place her in an active revolutionary camp. Finally, she might go all the way: join the Soviet bloc, vote with the USSR on most international issues, allow Soviet naval bases on Chilean territory (thereby furthering Soviet naval expansion in the South Pacific to complement Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean), disrupt the OAS, and develop close economic and other ties with Moscow.

President Nixon in his February 25, 1971 address on U.S. foreign policy had this to say:

> We deal with governments as they are. Our relations depend not on their internal structures or social systems, but on actions which affect us and the inter-American system.
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> The new Government in Chile is a clear case in point. The 1970 election of a Socialist President may have profound implications not only for its people, but for the inter-American system as well. The government's legitimacy is not in question, but its ideology is likely to influence its actions. Chile's decision to establish ties with Communist Cuba, contrary to the collective policy of the OAS, was a challenge to the inter-American system. We and our partners in the OAS will therefore observe closely the evolution of Chilean foreign policy.[4]

Chile is among the most nationalistic of nations. Raul Marin Balmaceda expressed this nationalism when he described his country thus:

> Formed by the bravest Indians of America and by the best soldiers that Spain had to send to the most rebellious of its colonies; forged as a race in an incessant battle against men, against nature, and against the poverty of the soil, a natural selection of men was formed that should make us the exception of America and an example to the world.[5]

Given this nationalistic disposition, it seems extremely doubtful that Chile will ever join the Soviet bloc or even interpret her foreign policy exclusively on the basis of the international distribution of power. Nevertheless, her Marxist foreign policy cast should lend itself toward placing her in the category of "Third Worldism." Already Santiago has recognized Havana and Peking and might be expected in view of President Allende's past activities (he flew back to Cuba with the remnants of Che Guevara's guerrillas) to harbor terrorists and subversives from neighboring nations. Debray, the French Marxist theorist and guerrilla who had accompanied Guevara to Bolivia, was welcomed by Allende in Santiago upon his release from a Bolivian jail in January 1971. It would be reasonable to expect Chile to claim an independent Marxist foreign policy line for herself which might for geographical and other reasons be militarily immune from direct Soviet control. She will nevertheless be extremely useful to the USSR as part of the dramatic erosion of U.S. prestige and influence in the southern cone of South America.

The other aspect of the change in Chile's government that may prove harmful to U.S. interests is its demonstration effect: the influence and example Santiago's postures and manifestoes will pro-

[4] President Richard M. Nixon, *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace,* February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 53-54.

[5] Raul Marin Balmaceda, *Derechas o izquierdas* (Santiago, 1943), p. 7.

vide to other nations and peoples. Since the French Revolution, most thoughtful observers have recognized the spirit of Jacobinism existing in their countries and have feared similar upheavals — not by conspiracy but by example — in their own or adjacent lands. Whatever occurs elsewhere has its influence, in one way or another, in our increasingly interrelated world. Thus, despite currently fashionable views that conflict is divisible,[6] Chile's Marxist experiment will transcend her boundaries and have wide-ranging and still unforeseen implications.

III

There is no agreed upon formula for interpreting when a regime becomes a dictatorship or totalitarian. Nonetheless, most analysts, even if they dislike the fuzziness that develops over definitions of totalitarianism, accept the classic possibility of dictatorship or tyranny arising within or against constitutional regimes; many would accept as a working distinction between ordinary dictatorship and totalitarianism the view that the former involves the unchecked control of traditional tools of power — army, police, bureaucracy, judiciary — whereas the latter involves these and the need to have dictatorial control *endorsed* by the whole population. A totalitarian regime controls education, the communications network, the economy, and even the private lives of its citizens. In modern nations the great thrust from simple dictatorship to totalitarianism arises especially from modern technology, from economic and social change, and from commitments to ideologies with conspiratorial theories of history. The conspiratorial ideology accepted by large numbers of people gives the leader the potential to bring about dictatorship if not totalitarianism. In Chile the new ideology will influence foreign policy and make for internal changes, and the course of developments will have implications for revolutionaries in other Latin American nations.

Franz Neumann has shown that anxiety is one of the key features in the totalitarian phenomenon.[7] The attraction of leaders over followers arises "when the situation of the masses is objectively endangered, when the masses are incapable of understanding the historical process, and when the anxiety activated by the danger becomes neurotic persecutory (aggressive) anxiety through manipulation."[8] The clue, according to Neumann, that a mass movement may become regressive is when its leaders employ conspiratorial theories of history. "Just as the masses hope for their deliverance from distress through absolute oneness with a person, so they ascribe their distress to certain persons, who have brought this distress into the world through a conspiracy."[9]

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[6] It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union does not think conflict is divisible. The *Pravda* article justifying the Czechoslovak invasion stated in part, "world socialism is the common gain of the working people of all lands; it is indivisible and its defense is the common cause of all communists."

[7] Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 276-278.

Consequently — as in Chile — a period of long drawn out and not entirely successful social and economic changes produces spiritual, moral and economic stress. In the Chilean case the resulting deep psychological dislocations have generated widespread anxiety throughout the population; symptomatic are the periodic land invasions and the occupations of unfinished housing projects. This state of affairs may be manipulated so that deliverance is thought to come through certain leaders and ideologies which identify other individuals or groups — particularly foreigners and their domestic agents: oligarchs, reactionaries and the like — as having brought about the people's distress through a conspiracy.

The chief characteristic of people supporting conspiratorial ideologies, Hannah Arendt observed, was that "They do not believe in anything visible, in the reality of their own experience; they do not trust their eyes and ears but only their imaginations . . . what convinces . . . are not facts, and not even invented facts, but only the consistency of the system of which they are presumably part."[10] This oversimplified, even mendacious but consistent world is apparently "more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself."[11] For Nazi propaganda, the ideological core was the notion of a Jewish world conspiracy; for the communists it is the capitalist plot.

In this context a Marxist regime in Chile poses not only a potential long-term threat to Chile's neighbors and the United States but a present threat to Chilean constitutionalism. There is a view that no dictatorial ideology is involved in the Chilean case. Claudio Véliz, a distinguished Chilean scholar, writes:

> The new Unidad Popular government of Chile is not a marginal result of a cold-war situation, nor is it geared to the satisfaction of this or that

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[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 279.

[10] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 351.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 353.

> global strategic demand; it is distinctively a national government come to power because of its domestic circumstances unparalleled elsewhere in Latin America. It is addressed to complex problems which it hopes to face with measures which could be described as conventional, but applied with a pragmatism functionally related to a distinctly Chilean definition of those problems.[12]

The evidence is contradictory. Allende's interviews and actions give more than a hint that he has a quasi-dictatorial mentality and that his methods are conventionally Marxist rather than pragmatic, except possibly in a tactical sense. True, Allende denies that he is a totalitarian and that his policies might lead to the erosion of liberty in Chile; he assumes man is freed when his material needs are satisfied. He will attempt, therefore, to change basic economic relationships to achieve this goal. Since he believes Marxism is a scientific method for interpreting history, he does not question its basic analysis of the economy. He plans to govern pragmatically, according to his own nation's conditions, without imitating Cuba, the Soviet Union or anyone else.

The fascinating aspect of this Marxist view is that it is blind to its own implications. The so-called popular masses in Allende's view become the nation, and the standard invoked bypasses the spirit of constitutional restraints. Allende noted that an elected socialist regime "has to respect the existing forms and work within them, [but] it has to seek new forms that the government of the Popular Unity proposes."[13] On the basis of finding "new forms" he suggested that his government might frequently hold national plebiscites if Congress rejected some of his proposals. With that statement, involving intimidation as well as the potential for undermining Congress, Chile may have been made ready to experience the preliminary indicator of the march toward dictatorship: plebiscitary democracy.[14] Tocqueville foresaw the plebiscite as a technique to sweep away representative institutions; in his opinion it would lead to plebiscitary dictatorship.[15]

In Chile the April 4, 1971 municipal elections registered a near majority for the Popular Unity coalition, which it interpreted as a mandate to continue its policies. When it is recalled that prior to the election prices on consumer goods and rents were frozen, low electric power rates were subsidized, and wages were raised between 35 and 60 per cent — with little regard to productivity or the competitiveness of the Chilean economy — it is not surprising that public support of Allende increased even though the ability of the government to sustain these measures is only temporary. Such policies are reminiscent of Perón's in Argentina. Perón used the nation's financial reserves to boost his political popularity and power within the forms but not the spirit of the system. In the process he damaged the long-term stability of Argentine democracy.

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[12] Claudio Véliz, "The Chilean Experiment," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1971, p. 443.

[13] *New York Times,* November 4, 1970.

[14] Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), p. 15.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 21.

Although Allende's administration has begun on a pacifist note, any frustration might trigger extreme reactions. Underlying his Marxist position is the belief that there is only one social truth, which excludes the possibility that other views may be not only honest but perhaps even accurate. It is a belief that is incompatible with the assumptions of constitutionalism and that ignores the complexities of economic reality. This limited economic understanding suggests little flexibility for changing course even if the signs are ominous — yet it should not be ruled out that Allende's economic approach may be astute from a revolutionary point of view. A deliberately created economic crisis could easily accelerate a state takeover of the economy.

There are several indicators of the scope and degree of the ideological threat to Chile's constitutionalism, economic development and international relations. Many of the decision-makers who will influence her course are members of Allende's cabinet. Several of the key men hold conspiratorial views of history and the world. Their presence indicates the potential for left-wing dictatorship.

Minister of the Interior José Tohá González, a member of Allende's Socialist Party and publisher of the left-wing daily newspaper *Ultima Hora,* has been described as a Peking-oriented Marxist, more revolutionary than the communists. The forty-three-year-old Tohá has control over the police force (*carbineros*) and is in charge of internal security. He also has jurisdiction over national, provincial and municipal relations. His principal lieutenant is Daniel Vergara, a strongly anti-United States communist. Dr. Eduardo Paredes, who was named deputy director of Chile's equivalent to the FBI, the Investigations Police, is a member of the Socialist Party's central committee and was head of the party's highly effective intelligence service.[16]

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[16] *New York Times,* October 28, 1970, p. 10.

A sign that constitutionalism may be bypassed might be signaled through promotions within the police force. The former chief under President Frei, General Vincente Huerta, was replaced by the number three man on the seniority list of generals. This is within normal practice, but note should be taken when Tohá dips below the top ten or promotes a colonel. Another sign would be the politization of the police, possibly by granting them a dramatic wage increase and the right to vote. The Chileans have long tried to keep their *carbineros* apolitical and any move to disturb this tradition may well be interpreted as an assault on the nation's free institutions.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Clodomiro Almeyda, a member of the Socialist Party's left wing, is considered pro-Maoist. He may prove a difficult man to deal with in this period of tension for the OAS. Early in February 1971, at the Special General Assembly on Terrorism, the OAS split three ways, and no small part of this division was provoked by Chile's soft attitude toward terrorism in the hemisphere. Because of Chile's soft line, in which Peru and Bolivia joined, the United States cooperated in a compromise resolution, calling for the protection of diplomatic personnel but not nationals. Argentina, Brazil and four other hemisphere nations[17] walked out, charging that the resolution was ineffectual and protesting the indication that Chile, Peru and Bolivia would grant asylum to terrorists from other nations when nondiplomatic personnel were involved as the targets.

It seems unlikely that Chile will change her attitude in this area under her present leadership unless terrorism should mount against the Allende government. On the other hand, moderates on the terrorism issue like to point out that yesterday's terrorist or revolutionary may be tomorrow's patriot-leader, and that the course the United States piloted between the hard- and soft-liners was appropriate since it essentially protected diplomatic personnel and avoided making judgments about internal political conflicts. Of course this position ignores the fact that much of the terrorism presently occurring in the hemisphere is closely linked to the international rivalry within Latin America and as such may not long be treated as a strictly internal matter.

Other members of Allende's cabinet include three members of Chile's Communist Party and Jacques Chonchol, a former Christian Democrat and author of Chile's agrarian reform law. Chonchol has made it clear that the government "will not make the agricultural workers owners of the land." In addition, he said: "I want you to understand that there will be no individual land distribution. Each family will have its house and garden; the rest of the land will be worked like cooperatives."[18] Formerly the government gave peasants individual title, as one option, to land expropriated from the large landowners.[19]

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[17] Paraguay, Ecuador, Haiti and Guatemala.

Pedro Vuskovic Bravo, the Minister of the Economy, is also a Marxist and bears watching. Vuskovic must take the lead in concentrating economic power in the hands of the government. There are political and economic reasons for substantial reforms but it is debatable whether the government's policies will lead to either development or freedom. Chile probably requires a continuing agrarian reform. An effort to increase the commercialization of farms in order to increase Chilean self-sufficiency in food production is important. So, too, is the need to cut down on internal migration to the cities. Strengthening the base of the rural economy should increase the demand for more labor-intensive products, such as textiles, processed foods and furniture — to which Chilean industry must give attention for political as well as economic reasons in order to absorb large numbers of unemployed urban workers.[20] It is not clear from Vuskovic's speech before the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), in February 1971, that Chilean manufacturing will become more labor-intensive, that agriculture will become more efficient, or that inflation and other ills will be alleviated or abolished.

The overall objective seeks to structure the economy under three types of ownership, public, mixed and private; to redistribute income; and "to accelerate, intensify and broaden the agrarian reform process." Nationalization is the accepted means to arrange for more public ownership; much of this process began under the Frei government, and it seems to have been working out on a gradual basis. The essence of the price policy aimed at controlling inflation is apparently to reduce, under government pressures, the rate of profit per unit produced. Industry has not responded enthusiastically to this. Factories have closed, and bankruptcies have increased. Efforts to develop a more "rational system of prices" under state control have not offset these failures. Santiago has said that foreign capital will be permitted in certain areas designated by the government, but no great rush to explore these opportunities can as yet be detected. The government's goal to stay within the law in its expropriations has raised difficulties even with those it seeks to help. Land invasions are occurring more frequently, particularly in Cautín Province where Indians have moved in and taken over many farms without legal sanction. Although there is speculation that Santiago may be back of these seizures,[21] Minister of Interior Tohá has branded the squatters as "counter-revolutionaries." The jury is still out on these reform efforts and the role of Economy Minister Vuskovic.

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[18] *The Times of the Americas*, February 24, 1971, p. 1.

[19] Under President Frei a serious agrarian reform effort was undertaken. Its objective was to expropriate and redistribute large and poorly managed estates. The system was based on an arrangement where landless peasants were settled on expropriated properties for a three-year transition period under the management of the reform agency, CORA. Upon termination of the transition period the type of title distributed depended on the settlers; some elected to receive individual title, others chose to operate the lands on a cooperative basis. Under Allende, all will be cooperatives. There was still much discussion in Congress and elsewhere on the effectiveness of Frei's program when Allende gained the Presidency.

[20] The number of people presently out of work is in the 80,000 range. This represents well over 8 per cent of the work force. In 1969 the unemployment rate was 5.4 per cent.

Another indicator of a drift to dictatorship will be the fate of Chile's free press. Nothing so crude as outright confiscation seems imminent. But as the government gains more and more control over the economy and an increasing monopoly of Chile's financial resources,[22] it will be able to manipulate the advertising on which all the nation's papers depend. If it withholds advertising or threatens to do so, most papers will have to fall in line and cooperate or face possible collapse. Many speculated that *El Mercurio,* the conservative and pro-Allessandri daily, would be confiscated but already its publisher is in "voluntary" exile in Connecticut and the new management has become far less hostile to Allende. Nevertheless, editorials indicate great concern that its independence may soon end.

With respect to other media, it has been reported that nearly thirty of the major Christian Democratic-owned radio stations were visited by a number of Congressmen who urged support of the Allende administration.[23] Perhaps the most important government acquisition to date is that of Zig-Zag, Chile's largest publishing house. Because of wage pressure from the Marxist unions and alleged financial mismanagement the owners have sold out to the government. The company publishes twenty magazines ranging from *Ercilla,* popular with the middle class, and *Vea,* aimed at the workers, to comic books for children. One of the editors of *Ercilla* has charged that the government wants to change the editorial viewpoint of *Ercilla* and *Vea.*[24]

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[21] "The *Associated Press* says that in these seizures, there is 'evidence of organized political direction.' The *New York Times* found some Popular Unity Deputies from the Federal Congress encouraging the seizures. The Buenos Aires daily *La Prensa* identified leaders of the student-based Revolutionary Left Movement as leading a few seizures." *Latin American Digest* (Tempe, Arizona), March 1971, p. 7.

[22] As of April 1971, eight private Chilean banks have been nationalized: Panamerican, O'Higgins, Israelita, Nacional del Trabajo, Continental, Regional de Talca, Banco Español-Chile, and Banco Osorno y la Unión.

[23] *Latin American Digest,* January 1971, p. 8.

On still another plane, the popular tribunal surfaced briefly in Chile. Should its authority be extended beyond the area of misdemeanors, an organ for popular terror could be unleashed. As of now, however, this seems unlikely. The Chilean Congress rejected government efforts to legitimize these tribunals and temporarily, at least, they have been withdrawn.[25]

Perhaps the main check on the government lies in the Chilean Congress, where there is still a majority in opposition to the Popular Unity coalition. If as a result of the Allende government's increased control over the communications media the next Congressional elections (in two years) should return an overwhelming vote for the socialist-communist alliance, Chile would then have another potential condition for dictatorship, a monopolistic state party eroding the substance of the Congressional check on the President. The constitution could be changed at will and elections thereafter could have a plebiscite-like significance only. Even if Congress and other institutions remained, they would merely serve to disguise the fact that the Chileans had submitted to slavery while being assured that they still had their traditional freedoms.

The closest parallel to keep in mind may be the Peronist regime in neighboring Argentina in the period between 1946 and 1952. Perón, although appearing to hold free elections, manipulated campaigns and the news media to exclude his opponents from mounting effective opposition. Thus, he reformed the constitution with the aid of his monopoly control of the constituent assembly and gained absolute dominance of the Congress, which then endorsed his every whim. In addition, Perón came to power as Allende has, with highly favorable foreign exchange holdings; he proceeded to spend them unwisely and wastefully. In the wake of his spendthrift and ruinous economic policies, Argentina's democratic parties which attempted to deal responsibly with the country's problems always appeared to be anti-labor or unpopular. Consequently, Argentine democracy never fully recovered. Chile might face the same fate. *Plus ça change plus c'est la même chose.*[26]

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[24] *The Times of the Americas,* March 10, 1971, p. 3.

[25] The "Neighborhood Courts" were to judge "anti-social conduct not appropriate for regular courts." Two of the judges were to be elected from the residential area and one appointed by the Provincial Government. *Latin American Digest,* March 1971, p. 7.

IV

A number of factors might accelerate Chile's move toward left-wing dictatorship and totalitarianism. An economic crisis might pose an acute dilemma for the Allende government. In this event it might collapse, call new elections and allow itself to be returned with a new mandate, or, if support were lacking, relinquish the seat of power to one of its rivals. More probably, however, it would decree a state of siege and move rapidly to consolidate power under the pretext of dealing more effectively with the crisis allegedly brought on by internal and external enemies. It is not inconceivable that the United States would aid the Allende government in order to prevent it from taking more drastic measures, but aid from the Soviet Union or the socialist bloc seems more likely and would appear to be more acceptable to Santiago. Although Allende inherited the best currency reserves in recent memory — some $500 million — his holdings are already down to $100 million. He will face an economic crisis soon. If he does not permit a rise of prices, the private sector will meet with ruin.[27]

Another event that might pressure Allende into a premature move toward dictatorship would be the breakup of his coalition of supporters. The extremist faction of his backers might call for more revolution, including stepped-up attacks on neighboring countries, and to maintain his following intact he might try to keep ahead of them. It seems more plausible, however, that he would crack down on them, at least until he had consolidated his position in Congress and the armed forces. Allende's first response to an apparently politically motivated hold-up was firm. When a group of young men calling themselves the Organized Vanguard of the People (VOP) robbed a hardware store in Santiago as an "expropriation," he characterized them as a "disorganized vanguard," asserting that "if they do not respect the law, the law will be on top of them."[28]

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[26] In some ways this saying has always been misleading. The most one can say about historical events is that they may recur. Many circumstances make this unlikely. One unique element in the Chilean case is that one of the best analyses of the Perón-led subversion of constitutionalism was written by a Chilean, Alejandro Magnet, who is back in Chile writing for the Christian Democratic paper *La Prensa*. Certainly Perón-like techniques will not escape his detection, but other means may be found to subvert the system and the presence of sophisticated critics may not be sufficient to protect Chilean democracy.

[27] Emilio Sanfuentes V., "Comentarios al Plan Economicó de la Unidad Popular para 1971," *El Mercurio,* March 27, 1971, p. 3.

Fragmentation of the democratic opposition might spur a move to the left. If the opposition parties demonstrated an inability to offer a united front in defense of democracy, the exciting vistas thus opened up might prove irresistible to Allende and his supporters. His victory in the municipal elections of April 1971 has led to speculation that many left-wing Christian Democrats will join his Popular Unity coalition. Should the opposition collapse and leftist pressures within his own party mount, Allende might move, though it still seems reasonable that he would hold back until the armed forces were secured.

While there is no sign at present of the threat of a coup from within his coalition, this cannot be completely excluded as a possibility. Also, public disorders of almost any type might be used to justify the employment of emergency powers. These and other events might accelerate a move toward dictatorship, but nevertheless there are forces within Chile that might retard, inhibit or even completely block it.

V

When Chile, under President Frei, undertook a gradual nationalization of major foreign-owned enterprises operating in the nation, this move was labeled "Chileanization." It cannot be ruled out that there will be the "Chileanization of communism":[29] the democratization of Marxism within Chile's republican institutions, traditions and practices. Chile has had a long tradition of democratic and cooperative political elites. Their cooperative role has led them to defend their system from internal and external attack and to guard their liberty jealously. An example of this elite concern may be seen in the concessions extracted from Allende through a series of political maneuvers.

During the presidential campaign the candidate of the Christian Democrats, former Ambassador Tomic, had declared that he would authorize his followers in Congress to vote for Allende if no one had won a majority but if Allende had the largest plurality. Some observers concerned with Chile's constitutional system believed this was unwise since it was permissible to vote for the candidate with the second plurality and keeping this freedom of action would permit the followers of Tomic and Allessandri alike to extract certain guarantees from Allende. Concessions were nevertheless obtained after the election when Allessandri offered to resign immediately if the Christian Democrats would vote him the Presidency in Congress. This was a real threat to Allende. Such a maneuver would permit Frei to run in the new elections called upon Allessandri's resignation. Frei was considered the most popular political figure in Chile and could be expected to regain the Presidency since the constitutional provision against immediate re-election would not be technically violated. To prevent this possibility Allende was forced to concede that:

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[28] *The Times of the Americas*, February 17, 1971, p. 3.

[29] This felicitous phrase should be credited to the Argentine Ambassador to the United States, the Honorable Pedro E. Real.

(1) All citizens are assured the free exercise of their political rights within the republican system.

(2) All Chileans can meet freely in political parties and the parties will enjoy the freedom to organize as they wish.

(3) Political parties will have free access to communications media, as well as state-controlled systems.

(4) Freedom of expression is assured, without censorship, in writing, verbally, or any other way.

(5) The right to meet without previous permission is guaranteed.

(6) There will be complete freedom of teaching and respect for university autonomy.

(7) Correspondence will be inviolate. The right to work any place one wants is assured.

(8) The Armed Forces and Police will be the only public forces.

(9) Promotion within the Armed Forces will be strictly according to regulations. All popular armed forces or militia are prohibited.

(10) Elections will be held periodically within a democratic system.[30]

This statute of guarantees was the price Allende's Popular Unity Party paid to receive Christian Democratic votes in Congress. It was incorporated into the constitution when Allende signed, and both houses of Congress approved.

There have been some reports[31] that Allessandri's activities were rejected among top Christian Democratic leaders, but the President of the Christian Democratic Party, Benjamin Prado, and other high officials drew up a document of guarantees as the party's precondition to vote for Allende which the Allessandri stand made credible.[32]

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[30] *The Times of the Americas,* January 20, 1971, p. 1.

[31] Alan Angell wrote, "Prior to the election, Alessendri said he would respect the choice of the electorate; afterwards, he attempted to block Allende by offering himself as an interim President who would immediately declare new elections in which Frei would be eligible to run. Frei ridiculed the idea; his party rejected it; and the left is incensed with the blatant dishonesty of the candidate who claimed to stand for probity." *Current History,* "Chile: From Christian Democracy to Marxism?," February 1971, p. 87.

The nation's bureaucracy also has had a long history of democratic behavior. To the point is a recent study revealing that bureaucratic officials prefer constitutional and republican values over dramatic socio-economic reforms.[33] It remains probable therefore that the Chilean bureaucracy would resist the shortcutting of legal restrictions on public policy, although the spoils system may erode this protection as Allende supporters replace top civil servants.

Another source of strength in the Chilean system is the voting pattern of the Chilean people. On the whole, the Chilean electorate votes for three or four major parties or coalitions which operate to check the excessive ambitions of each other. This balanced voting inhibits any party or coalition from dominating the nation by gaining uncontested control of Congress and the Presidency. Furthermore, the concept of loyalty to the system is apparently widespread. Yet the recent municipal elections indicate that the traditional voting pattern may be eroding under the new political climate of plebiscitary politics.

This political sophistication of elites and electorate has been aided by the news media. Generally informative, critical and combative, the Chilean periodicals and weeklies have kept the nation well-informed and alerted to real and sometimes fanciful dangers to its freedom.

Finally, the armed forces have been traditionally committed to democracy, and constitutionalism. In September 1970 President Frei told the military, "The armed forces have made of Chile an example of democracy and are the best guarantee that the country's progress and transformation will be carried out with full respect for freedom and dignity of the human person."[34]

The Chileanization of Marxism may occur. Internally, this might mean the rise of the lower-class authoritarian state, rather like the mirror image of the state created in the 1830's by Diego Portales. Instead of passing through the prolonged period of "caudillismo-militarism" that most Latin American nations endured following their wars of independence, Chile, under the influence of Diego Portales, established an authoritarian semimonarchial, but civilian and constitutional, regime which reflected the dominating interests of the new nation's upper classes.[35] In the words of Alberto Edwards, Portales established "a stable and strong Executive, superior to any caudillo or faction . . . he restored morally and materially the power of the monarchy, not in its hereditary sense . . . but in its spiritual source as a conserving force of institutions and order."[36]

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[32] *Cronica* (Santiago, Chile), September 1970, p. 9.

[33] James Petras, *Political and Social Forces in Chilean Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

[34] Isaac A. Levi, "Frei Reminds Chilean Army Job is 'to Preserve Freedom'," *The Daily Progress* (Charlottesville, Virginia), September 20, 1970, p. A6.

With political power increasingly shifting to the lower classes, a move to restructure Chilean politics so that economic benefits flow from political power — in this case the power of the less well-to-do and the déclassé — is not completely alien to this system founded on class and traditional Hispanic justifications. The fact that Allende is a product of Chile's upper classes suggests that he may be a man of conviction in the context of the formula, *religio regionis religio regis* (the ruler prospers who from fear or conviction adopts the religion of his subjects). He may have to create some new bottles for Chile's new wine, but the bottles made within the class-cultural tradition may well hold.

The implications for Chile's external relations could be no less traditional. The role of the upper-class civilian Chilean state was designed to maximize the nation's independence from great powers and to prevent any coalition or combination of Latin American states from gaining economic and political hegemony in South America. In this role Chile should be expected to shun permanent alliances with any side in great-power rivalries while maintaining an active interest in politics affecting the economic and political distribution of power in South America. Her activities here might put her in the forefront of those seeking confrontation with the United States, but there is the possibility that U.S.-Chilean relations could be quite good: because the Allende government has less need than any of its predecessors to establish anti-United States credentials, accommodations may be feasible. Should this turn out to be the case, we will have some evidence on how strong democratic nationalism may prevent the development of Cuban-like subversion, even if the nation adopts a Marxist ideology.

The resources are present to prevent a Marxist dictatorship in Chile and even to lead to the Chileanization of Marxism. But there is no precise way of knowing that dictatorship will be prevented or that the extreme left can be democratized. Much will hinge on future elections and some of the developments will depend on the U.S. response to Chilean moves.

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[35] Anibal Pinto, *Chile, Una Economia Dificil* (Mexico-Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1964), p. 156.

[36] Alberto Edwards, *La Fronda Aristocratica* (Santiago: Editorial Del Pacifico S. A., 1945), pp. 51-52.

VI

There are three principal variables relevant to an interim assessment of the implications of a Marxist regime in Chile for future U.S. relations with Latin America: (1) Soviet activities in Latin America and Soviet relations with Chile; (2) changes in Chile, irrespective of Soviet influences, which affect U.S. relations with Chile and other Latin American nations; and (3) the degree to which the United States will continue the foreign policy principles toward Latin America initiated in the 1970's.

From the American point of view Soviet activities in Latin America over the past few years have been disturbing. The Mexican expulsion of Soviet "diplomats" for attempting to instigate and support urban guerrilla movements and terrorism is only the latest incident. Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro has received extensive Soviet military support since his government backed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and he has declared that "Cuba has never, nor will it ever, deny support to the revolutionary movement."[37] The United States could hardly approve of Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's visit to Cuba in November 1969, of Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro's visit to Moscow in April 1970, of Soviet naval visits to Cuba in July 1969 and on three other occasions in 1970, of the arrival in Havana in 1970 of long-range Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft, and of the evidence that the USSR was constructing a service and repair base for nuclear submarines at Cienfuegos, Cuba.[38] After Washington's protests construction on the submarine base was halted. Nevertheless, a Soviet effort to press the erosion of U.S. influence and prestige in Latin America through legal or subversive means seems certain to continue.

The Soviet Union probably does not expect, or necessarily seek, to achieve naval parity with the United States in the Western Hemisphere in this decade. Nor does Moscow necessarily expect to obtain a naval base on Chilean soil in the immediate future, since the Soviets must recognize that it would take some time for American and Chilean public opinion to become accustomed to that idea. But while the Soviet navy may not pose a strategic challenge at present, it has its diplomatic uses. The Kremlin may hope to gain sufficient influence in the hemisphere to offer the United States some sort of regional sphere-of-influence exchange. A dramatic territorial (rather than nuclear) repeat of the Cuban missile crisis seems remote, but a quiet offer to neglect the Western Hemisphere and the Caribbean if the United States reciprocates by tacitly ignoring the Middle East (except for Israel) and the Eastern Mediterranean is not inconceivable. More likely, the Soviets may believe that they can have both predominance in the Middle East and, eventually, parity in the Western Hemisphere if they keep cautiously on their present course.

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[37] *United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970: A Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 115.

[38] *Ibid.*

As early as 1965, Moscow sent one of its best Latin American diplomats to Chile as ambassador.[39] He spoke fluent Spanish, had an attractive wife and entertained lavishly. By October 1965 Allende had received official communist backing for his drive to power. High Soviet officials attended the conference in Santiago at which he was endorsed; among them were A. P. Kirilenko of the Soviet Politburo and V. G. Korionov of the Kremlin's Central Committee. The Soviet Union has gone to great lengths to penetrate Chilean society and probably hopes to influence Chile in the future in a gradual way. The subtlety and extent of this influence, if it is exerted, will affect U.S. relations with Chile and with Latin America. Conversely, extensive Soviet activities elsewhere in Latin America will lead Washington to view Chilean activities under a Marxist regime with suspicion.

Perhaps the most difficult variable to evaluate is the implication for U.S.-Chilean and U.S.-Latin American relations if Washington considers the changes in Chile to be essentially nationalistic despite their bias. Present evidence favors the interpretation that Chile's foreign policy position will not go beyond "Third Worldism": a posture somewhat more pro-Moscow than Perón's "Third Position" which has been frequently followed, sometimes under other labels, throughout Latin America in periods of high nationalistic fervor. The United States will not like the Third World position — she did not like the "Third Position" — but she probably will tolerate it so long as the Chileans do not "violate the principles of the inter-American system, by intervening in the affairs of their neighbors or by facilitating the intervention of nonhemispheric powers."[40] The Third World position may flirt with crossing this line and if it does so it "cannot expect to share the benefits of inter-American cooperation."[41] Were "Third Worldism" to spread in the hemisphere, the United States would find the situation less tolerable, and one might expect Washington to watch carefully Chile's impact on and possible leadership of the Andes Pact nations.

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[39] Aleksander Anikin was the Soviet Ambassador to Chile from 1965 to 1968. One Chilean official was quoted as saying "He knew the subtleties of Chilean wines better than we do ourselves. He knew our poets and our whole way of life. And his wife! Superb. I wish all our diplomatic guests were like them."

If Chile moves domestically toward a Marxist dictatorship and attracts some imitators in Latin America her relations with the United States will be further strained. Although it has been asserted that there is only a remote "probability of repeating the Chilean experience elsewhere,"[42] the same writer noted that "there is at present a move to reproduce the Chilean electoral coalition scheme in Uruguay, with a view to fighting the November 1971 presidential elections on the basis of a coalition which would include the Christian Democrats, the Movimiento Battlista, the Movimiento Blanco Popular, and even the Tupamaros."[43] Should Argentina return to electoral politics, some such front involving Raimundo Ongaro and others is likely in that country, too. It remains debatable whether such tactics will succeed elsewhere in Latin America but hardly doubtful that they will be imitated. The popular front has a long and occasionally successful history.

There are other lessons that may be drawn from Allende's and Chile's experiment. If Allende remains within the nation's democratic structure, which he may well do, but fails to resolve the nation's economic problems, which can happen if he follows populist or Marxist economic techniques, he may reinforce those Marxists who argue that the only way to have a successful communist revolution is through violence. Should he show economic pragmatism and a continuing commitment to democracy, the United States could do worse than to assist him. Washington's reaction to Allende's policies will depend on the extent and nature of Chile's internal changes and any evidence of their external attraction and influence.

The Latin American policy announced by Washington for the 1970's indicates no desire to intervene in Latin America's domestic affairs and considerable tolerance on foreign policy matters. Since President Nixon's October 31, 1969 speech at the Inter-American Press Association, Washington has repeatedly stressed its intention to deal with governments as they are so that U.S.-Latin American relations will not depend on a consideration of internal structures or domestic social systems. The U.S. position essentially takes the view that it is ideology, not the internal structure, which affects foreign policy. Consequently it is the relation of ideology to foreign policy that will be closely watched.

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[40] *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, op. cit.*, p. 54.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Véliz, *op. cit.*, p. 443.
[43] *Ibid.*

Past experience suggests that maintaining this policy of "dealing with governments in the inter-American system as they are, regardless of their constitutionality or political orientation"[44] will not be a simple task. American public opinion influences U.S. policy and Americans will find it difficult not to show displeasure when democratic and constitutional regimes are subverted through military coups and populistic techniques. In past years the United States occasionally followed an explicit policy of differentiating between democratic and nondemocratic regimes and weighed assistance programs for Latin American nations in the context of their domestic budget allocations for the purchase of "sophisticated" weapons. Reports of officially sanctioned tortures, repeatedly made with respect to Brazil and Cuba, may also cause reactions in the United States. The latest report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission charges that there are between 70,000 and 90,000 political prisoners in Cuba and that many have been tortured. No government is ever completely indifferent to the internal politics of other nations, even though it may not feel public pressure or public indignation, or have the capability, to right a situation it considers wrong.

Moreover, the foreign policy principles with which the United States began the 1970's must be interpreted in light of her weariness with Viet Nam and general frustration and dissatisfaction with the results of foreign intervention. As this attitude wanes after disengagement from Viet Nam, America's selective retrenchment under Nixon may be reversed well before this decade is over. Indeed, even the Nixon Administration has shown its displeasure with the internal changes — or perhaps the ideology — of the Allende government. In March 1971 the goodwill visit to Chile of the U.S. aircraft carrier *Enterprise* was canceled.[45] The Secretary General of the Socialist Party, the leading party of the

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[44] *United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970: A Report of the Secretary of State,* p. 103.

[45] This comment is not meant to imply that the scheduling of the *Enterprise* visit in the first place was a good idea.

Popular Unity coalition, seized on the cancellation to charge that it was evidence of "political and economic aggression" against Chile.[46]

It is by no means certain that the United States will maintain or will want to maintain a policy that avoids scrutinizing internal structures and domestic policies. U.S. sensitivity in this area is likely to persist, just as the Latin nations remain sensitive to changes in America's moods, gestures, policies and public opinion. However, a major and desirable trend in U.S. policy has been asserted: Washington's decision to judge Latin American governments as little as possible reflects a refreshing realization of the limits of its capability to direct and shape events. One benefit will be recognition of the lessened U.S. responsibility if Latin America does not solve its own problems. One cost will be the possible dangers to the security of the United States that may result from her declining political influence. If democracy triumphs in Chile, it will be Chile's victory; if it fails, Chile and the United States may face unpleasant consequences. But in the last analysis the factor that may make hemisphere relationships complex and potentially difficult during the 1970's is the diminishing influence of the United States on the Latin American political scene.

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[46] *New York Times,* March 7, 1971, p. 3.

JAPAN'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

by Kazushige Hirasawa

STABILITY in the Asian Pacific region is inconceivable without a continuing, close, cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States. Reassuringly, this relationship has been basically solid for more than two decades. So far there have been no deep or enduring anxieties in any of the three areas that form its foundations: military, political and economic.

Nonetheless, the character of Japanese-American relations could be altered, subtly or substantially, by historic changes now taking place in the Asian Pacific. These include the rising power and international status of China, as well as Japan's own growing economic power, and the still uncertain strategic situation that will emerge as the Nixon Doctrine is implemented. The environment in which the Japanese-American relationship operates is being restructured.

It follows, therefore, that neither Japan nor the United States can afford to treat their relationship as automatic. Neglect in maintaining the viability of the relationship, or failure to adapt and adjust it to changing circumstances, could have adverse consequences for both countries and for their common interests in the years immediately ahead. If together they cope successfully with challenges that are already visible, there is every reason for confidence that the relationship will achieve a new and durable stability.

Relations between the two countries have already reached a delicate stage, entering a test period which could extend through the first half of the 1970's. By far the most troublesome test is the military problem centering on the security of the Far East. Another is the political problem centering on China. A third is the economic problem, which — despite the volatility of issues such as the current textile dispute — is probably the easiest for the two countries to work out.

The handling of this agenda is complicated by differences in priorities between the two partners. In her approach to preserving stability in Asia, the United States seems to place importance on military, political and economic affairs, in that order, while Japan reverses these priorities. Japan's forte is her economy, and this is the area in which she can make her greatest international contribution, especially toward the stability and prosperity of the Asian Pacific. She is least qualified to play a significant military role; therefore the military will be the most difficult aspect of Japanese-American relations to adjust.

II

In implementing the Nixon Doctrine, the United States is now withdrawing troops from South Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as from Japan proper and Okinawa. So far there has been no significant Japanese public reaction to the withdrawals, other than concern about the loss of jobs for Japanese workers employed at American military bases. Unlike the West Germans, the Japanese have not as yet showed apprehension over the exodus of American "hostages" to their own security. It is, of course, possible that this apprehension will emerge later, though I make no such prophecy.

The Japanese response to these developments has been philosophical. U.S. military withdrawal from Japan is in the "natural course of events," although some new arrangements would be welcome under which American troops would return to Japan's defense in the event of an emergency. Similarly there is no apparent unease over the departure of U.S. forces from adjacent areas such as Korea. This, too, is in the "natural course of events."

At the same time, however, Japan's Self-Defense authorities are attempting to offset the American pullout through the Fourth Five-Year Defense Build-Up program, to start in 1972 at an annual cost of $3 billion. As the pace of this military buildup quickens, it is likely to meet increasing public opposition. I thus expect the rearmament program to slow down, once the Fourth Defense Build-Up has been completed.

Stiffening public opposition to rearmament is likely because of the growing Japanese propensity toward neutralism. According to a public opinion survey conducted by *Asahi Shimbun*, Japan's largest-circulation newspaper, on January 14 of this year, 27 per cent of those polled favored "unarmed, unallied neutrality," a slogan of the Japan Socialist Party. Although less than a third of the electorate supports this utopian disarmament position, they, together with more practical neutralists, express the anti-military neutralist mood that prevails among a considerable majority of Japanese. An important key to this neutralist trend is the yearning of most Japanese to achieve, if it is at all possible, friendly relations with both the United States and China. This sentiment is clearly increasing.

As neutralism gains ground, the Japanese people will show diminishing concern for the probable weakening of the Japanese-American military relationship, and they will be increasingly unsympathetic to the Self-Defense Agency's plans to strengthen the nation's defense capacity, even as the implications of the Nixon Doctrine unfold.

Current popular Japanese attitudes toward defense go back to World War II, and to a number of concepts — right or wrong — that took firm root after the war. The most important of these is the persistent, if naive, aspiration for "peace at any price," which has been given symbolic expression in the "no war" clause of Japan's postwar constitution. This ideal is fortified by a vague sense of security based on Japan's insular geography, a helpless feeling that no amount of armament would be of any avail in a nuclear holocaust, and a faith that somehow no general nuclear war will occur.

Excluding extremists of the Right and Left, the Japanese national consensus has crystallized around the following principles related to defense:

(1) Japan should maintain a minimum self-defense capability, since the constitutional provision renouncing the right to belligerency is not in conflict with an independent nation's inherent right to defend herself.

(2) A minimum self-defense capability means sufficient conventional armament to control internal disturbances and to deter external conventional military intervention, or provocation of a "war of liberation."

(3) Japan should possess no armament beyond these requirements, and should not deploy troops abroad, or resort to military conscription.

(4) Japan will not employ military means to secure raw materials, to insure the safety of shipping lanes, or to protect her overseas economic interests. She will rely exclusively on diplomacy to prevent or resolve any international dispute.

(5) Japan rejects nuclear weapons for herself, relying instead on the American nuclear deterrent.

III

These principles present certain challenges in the future evolution of the Japanese-American military relationship. The critical question is whether American expectations of Japan in military affairs, and Japanese public attitudes on defense, can be brought to some mutual accommodation.

President Richard M. Nixon once said the United States had committed a mistake in forcing Japan to renounce arms in 1946. Then Vice President, Nixon expressed this view in a speech he delivered before the America-Japan Society in Tokyo on November 19, 1953. If it is an aim of American policy to see this occupation "mistake" redressed – for Japan to revise her no-war constitution and bolster her military capabilities to internationally significant levels – then I predict difficulties for the alliance. There are, of course, Japanese (as well as Americans) who favor restoration of Japanese military power. The late Yukio Mishima was one. The large majority of the Japanese people, however, oppose amending their constitution. Even those who dislike the flavor of foreign origin in its wording prefer not to tamper with it, rather than risk an amendment which could trigger full-scale rearmament. Amendment of the Japanese constitution, I am confident, is out of the question in the 1970's, if not indefinitely.

Short of constitutional amendment and large-scale rearmament, what military expectations does the United States have of Japan? Conceivably, these include the following:

(1) Rearmament with conventional weapons to the extent deemed appropriate for Japan to serve as a stabilizing force in the Far East.

(2) Effective Japanese cooperation with American military operations (short of constitutionally prohibited deployment of Japanese forces overseas) to insure the security of the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Indochina and other Far Eastern areas.

(3) Japan's pledge to forgo nuclear armament, accepting in its stead the American offer of nuclear deterrence.

As for the first point, I am convinced that Japan will not rearm sufficiently to become a stabilizing military force in the Far East. Americans have criticized Japan in the past for enjoying a "free ride" under the Security Treaty, in an apparent effort to pressure her into a larger military role in the region. This argument produces a negative reaction from the Japanese. Fortunately, we no longer hear the "free ride" complaint as often as we used to, partly because Japan's growing defense expenditures have now become seventh largest in the world. Japan's rejection of regional military responsibilities is based not only on the constitution, but also on a conviction of what she can do best. This is to show fellow Asian nations, by example and cooperation, that the best guarantees for national security are political stability and economic development, rather than military strength.

The second question – how much Japan can cooperate in American military operations for the preservation of stability in the Far East – will become a crucial point in future Japanese-American discussions regarding the revision or abrogation of the Security Treaty. There is already considerable doubt in Japanese minds about the ramifications of Article 6 of the treaty, which permits U.S. forces to use Japanese base facilities for the purpose, beyond that of Japan's defense, of maintaining the "international peace and security of the Far East."

The United States correctly understands that Japan's security is inseparable from the security of the Far East, and that maximum Japanese cooperation in this larger interest is also in Japan's best national interest. Moreover (in a variation on the "free ride" theme), Americans point out that, whereas the United States is obligated under the treaty to defend Japanese territory, Japan is treaty-bound only to protect American military installations in Japan, and has no obligation to come to the defense of American territory. In a spirit of reciprocity, the argument concludes, Japan should actively support U.S. peacekeeping efforts in the Far East.

Once again, the argument carries no weight with the Japanese man in the street. His wish is to see this "Far East" clause struck from the treaty before it is used to entangle a reluctant Japan in some future international dispute in this region. However selfish and short-sighted this view may appear to Americans, it expresses a neutralist-isolationist mood that is spreading among the Japanese people. In the face of this mood it is questionable whether the Japanese government can persuade its people to live up to U.S. expectations. Indeed, the way in which the controversial Far East provisions of the treaty are handled between the two governments over the next few years may determine whether Japan chooses to keep or scrap the Security Treaty.

On the third point, the Japanese people in general agree that they have no alternative but reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. A wavering in this conviction is conceivable, however, depending largely on American handling of the issue. A U.S. resumption of "free ride" pressures, or too patronizing a U.S. attitude in offering the "favor" of the nuclear deterrent, could provoke Japanese rejection of the offer. Or, if for some reason mistrust should creep into Japanese-American relations, the

Japanese people might lose confidence in the credibility of the American deterrent.

Under any of these circumstances I think it extremely unlikely that Japan would rush to arm herself with nuclear weapons. Deprived of the American umbrella, however, she could be expected to move more rapidly toward accommodation with China. In this connection, the Japanese are bewildered to learn that, although an overwhelming majority of them are firmly determined *not* to resort to nuclear armament, a vast majority of Americans are inclined to think that Japan will do so within ten years. According to a survey conducted last year for *Sankei Shimbun,* a Japanese daily, the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) found that 74 per cent of the American public expects Japan to go nuclear in this decade. I can only conclude that their thinking has been influenced by futurologist Herman Kahn's prognostication.

IV

Moving to the political field, the question that looms largest in Japanese-American relations is China. So far, the problem of China has been a cause of common worry, rather than a cause of friction. Japan and the United States have cooperated closely on China policies, as demonstrated by their joint support of successive annual proposals to treat the question of seating the Peking government in the United Nations as an "important matter," requiring a two-thirds vote of the UN General Assembly for consideration. Cooperation has been possible because both have taken a similarly negative attitude toward the China issue. The attitude stems from the special relationship (beyond normal diplomatic relations) each country has with Taiwan, a complication shared by no other nation.

On concluding a peace treaty with the Republic of China, Japan recognized Chiang Kai-shek's regime as the government representing China. However, in the exchange notes annexed to the treaty, the treaty's purview is limited to the "area now under the control of the Chinese [Chiang] government, or the area that may come under its control in the future." The treaty therefore applies only to Taiwan, the Penghus, Quemoy and other island territories administered by Taipei, and not to the Chinese mainland.

The United States has a mutual-defense treaty with the Chiang government but, unlike the peace treaty between Japan and

China, this pact contains no reference to whether the Chiang government represents all of China. American military obligations under the treaty, therefore, are limited to Taiwan and territories it actually controls.

Though different in character, these two treaties make it impossible for either Japan or the United States to recognize the Peking government — as Canada and Italy have done — without unilaterally abrogating their compacts with Taiwan. This special difficulty with which they are saddled has been their reason for acting in unison in the past on the China problem.

The international situation is changing, however, and there is a question how long Japan will continue maintaining a negative stance on this issue. On December 9, 1970 a new group was formed among the members of the Diet (Parliament) with the avowed purpose of promoting a rapprochement between Japan and China. At present the organization, officially known as the Dietmen's League for the Normalization of Relations between Japan and China, comprises 379 of the 736 members of both houses of the Diet. It includes 95 members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, out of a total LDP membership of 439. Close on the heels of this move, Komeito (Clean Government Party) inaugurated on December 13 the National Council for the Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations, comprising scholars, intellectuals and men of letters. More recently the Japan Socialist Party has inaugurated a "national council" aimed at the same objective.

As these developments suggest, the Japanese people are moving toward a reassessment of their China policies. Current opinions are divided, however, into three principal schools of approach:

(1) Severance of relations with Taiwan, recognition of Peking as the "sole legitimate government" of China, including Taiwan, which should come under its jurisdiction. This is the line advocated by the Socialists, the leading opposition party.

(2) Initiation by Tokyo of government-to-government talks with Peking, with the understanding that the latter is "the government that represents China." Handling of the Taiwan issue should be determined in light of the outcome of the proposed talks. This is the line advocated by Takeo Miki, leader of the liberal faction in the Liberal Democratic Party.

(3) Opening of ambassadorial-level talks with Peking on relevant subjects, including the establishment of diplomatic relations. This line was advanced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who represents the orthodox faction of the Liberal Democratic Party.[1] It is similar to Miki's in that it

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[1] In a press interview, January 1, 1971.

recognizes China as a "single national entity" and Taiwan as "China's domestic problem," but differs in that it does not recognize Peking as the "government representing China."

The political reassessment now under way is not merely a reflection of the changing international situation, including the lengthening roster of nations choosing to establish diplomatic relations with Peking, and Peking's own recent overtures in the direction of a more normal diplomacy. It is also an expression of a sense of mission that is spreading among the Japanese people — a conception that Japan can play her most effective political role in the world by helping to ease international tensions in the Asian Pacific region, and especially by helping to resolve the long-stalemated China problem.

A long-range strategy is developing, and it is working to enhance latent public consciousness of a new "national role" for Japan. Step one in the strategy is to improve relationships with continental China. Step two is for Tokyo to function as a medium for promoting mutual understanding and reconciliation between Peking and Washington. Step three is to encourage other Asian nations — some pro-China, others pro-United States — into an equally friendly relationship with both.

Japanese who share these hopes are aware that if they succeed no one will complain, although they realize that Americans may be skeptical of the prospects for success. There is also a fear that the United States may misinterpret Japan's initiatives, or may decide Japan is acting unwisely and will fall prey to Communist Chinese machinations. There is the possibility, in other words, that tensions could build up in Japanese-American relations over any shifts in Japan's China policies.

If the United States actively resents or resists Japanese initiatives in this direction, and if it exercises its diplomacy to keep Asia divided, political frictions will surely develop between Washington and Tokyo. In the delicate follow-up to ping-pong diplomacy, it is of the utmost importance that Japan and the United States maintain the closest consultation and mutual understanding on their respective China policies, especially if these policies begin — or appear — to diverge.

V

The China problem has three distinct facets: principles, realities and policy.

Principles. The government that rules continental China is, in fact, the "government that represents China"; therefore, the government of the People's Republic of China should occupy China's seat in the United Nations. Both the Peking and Taipei governments adhere to the principle that "Taiwan is part of China's territory." (Japan has long since renounced her claims to Taiwan.) However, the wishes of twelve million native Taiwanese (regardless of whether they are descendants of Chinese immigrants from Fukien, four centuries ago) should be consulted. Therefore, ultimate disposition of the island of Taiwan should be decided as a separate issue, through international procedures, a plan advocated by Great Britain and some other countries.

Realities. Effective jurisdiction of the Chiang government does not extend to the continent; nor does the Mao government's rule reach Taiwan. Both are still engaged in civil war. Moreover, neither on the Chinese mainland nor on Taiwan is the people's free will expressed in terms that are understandable in Japan and the United States.

Policy. The Taiwan aspect of the China problem presents the most difficult policy implications to the two principals involved, as well as to the United States and Japan. A settlement which recognizes Taiwan as an entity separate from the mainland would deny the contention of both Taipei and Peking that the territories are inseparable, and would entail at least the *de facto* recognition by each of the other's legitimacy. Taipei's claim to represent all China (in the United Nations or elsewhere) would be denied, its pretentions of governing Taiwan as a miniature of all China would become meaningless, and its ambitions to reconquer the mainland would be buried.

If Taipei were to entertain these terms, be willing to give up its permanent Security Council seat and settle for a seat in the General Assembly, Peking might then boycott the UN rather than abandon its "one China" principle. If, in reverse, Taipei refused to abandon its "one China" principle, insisting on China's Security Council seat or nothing, then nothing would probably be the outcome. Under whatever circumstances the separation of Taiwan and the mainland were ratified, Peking's fears that Taiwan might be used by American or Japanese "imperialism" as a base of aggression against the continent would be unassuaged, and the temptation eventually to "liberate" Taiwan might remain.

Maintenance of a separate status for Taiwan is obviously in the policy interests of both Japan and the United States – for Japan, a trading nation, to avert a possible threat from Peking to her trade routes to the south; for the United States, to prevent any increased perils to the defense of the Western Pacific arising from the extension of Chinese mainland power to the island.

Thus principles, realities and policy conflicts arising from incompatible state interests, all conspire to make resolution of the China problem exceedingly difficult. Nonetheless, the scenario of accommodation — in which Japan and the United States would have important initiatives — can be imagined.

The first order of business is the settlement of China's representation in the UN. Following this, Tokyo and Washington should each prepare for government-level talks with Peking, on the basis of the all-important understanding that the Peking government represents China. Thereafter, three separate but interrelated approaches should be carefully considered: (a) bilateral talks between the Peking and Taipei governments, leading at the least to termination of the civil war; (b) a conference of the powers concerned to discuss withdrawal of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and alternative collective-security measures for the Taiwan area; and (c) confirmation of the wishes of the people of Taiwan regarding their political future.

VI

International settlement of the China question, with the Peking regime finally seated in the United Nations in accordance with the principle of universality, should in some way stabilize the triangular U.S.-China-Soviet Union relationship, partly because of the mutual checks and balances among these three powers. It is in Japan's interest to exert her diplomatic energies in this direction, seeking the security of her own insular territories within that triangle — and at a relatively cheaper level of defense costs than, for example, that sustained by West Germany.

Such, at least, are the channels in which Japanese thinking is currently moving, with implications for future restraint in defense spending, and for greatly increased spending on foreign aid and investment, under a policy of building peace through economic activities. This is the global as well as regional role that Japan can most effectively and constructively perform.

It is not the unarmed neutrality advocated by the Japan Socialist Party. Rather it is a policy of minimum armament commensurate with the nation's actual needs, and a mobilization of surplus capacity into economic activities that will contribute to the relaxation of international tensions. It is also, at this stage, no more than an aspiration — a long way from realization, though the target is becoming clearer.

Prime Minister Sato, addressing the Twenty-fifth Commemorative Session of the UN General Assembly in October 1970, committed Japan to devote one per cent of her gross national product annually to overseas aid by 1975. One per cent of Japan's GNP in 1975 will be about $4 billion, equivalent to total U.S. foreign aid today. (Japan's defense expenditures by that time, as indicated above, are expected to be $3 billion.)

Aid-receiving countries are, I realize, less concerned about dollar amounts of aid than about the nature and effectiveness of that aid. Japan will need to increase the ratio of governmental and multilateral aid within her total aid package, and will also need to improve the content of her aid in relation to the development requirements of the receiving countries. Beyond such technical considerations, the philosophy of building peace through economic activities should be guided by far-reaching but realizable goals.

Of all the causes of international unrest, none is more insidious than poverty, the ultimate unequalizer among peoples. The driving goal of an economic strategy for peace must be to banish poverty from the globe. We shall have to invest boldly to defeat this common enemy. Additional goals should be related to international cooperation on ocean and space development, and control of environmental pollution, population growth, cancer, natural-resource depletion and other problems common to all humanity, regardless of nationality, race, religion or political ideology.

Japan sees her future world role on these challenging economic frontiers as a new Japan boldly investing in peace-building. On these terms alone will her emergence as the third-ranking world economic power have international significance, meriting the respect of the rest of the world.

Between the aspiration and the fulfillment, however, lie numerous obstacles for a nation such as Japan, poorly endowed with natural resources and largely at the mercy of her international trade. The nature of these obstacles is suggested by the current threat of a trade war between Japan and the United States. Yet, despite this volatile manifestation of our trading problems, I am confident these issues can be resolved, for economy is a far more rational arena than either military strategy or politics.

What is important for both countries is to keep their economic relations as free as possible of passion, nationalism and politics.

There are, I believe, three major sources of economic friction between Japan and the United States. One is the fact that Japan's economic competitiveness is approaching America's. In economic size, industrial sophistication and international trading competitiveness, Japan has surpassed all other U.S. competitors in the Free World, and the gap between the two economies is narrowing. These quantitative factors are bound to create frictions in bilateral and world trade.

A second source of friction is psychological: both countries have had too great expectations of each other. The United States has overestimated Japan's economic capabilities, taking her recent extraordinary economic growth rates at face value, without sufficient attention to the domestic costs of this rapid growth or to the unfinished business in the lagging sectors of Japan's uneven economy. Japan, in turn, has vastly underestimated the current serious difficulties of the United States, the world's only economic superpower. As a result of these miscalculations, each is now disillusioned with and critical of the other.

The third source of friction is the difficulty, in both countries, of adjusting private commercial interests to national economic interests — a problem inherent in free economic systems where the political process, rather than total government authority, is the determinant of policy. In both Japan and the United States, where private enterprise is politically autonomous, a rational foreign economic policy is impossible without deliberate efforts to reconcile the interests and rights of business and the general public, in the framework of a national policy.

Yet the consequences of failing to achieve this reconciliation can be dangerous, as the textiles and steel disputes demonstrate, when the two nations involved are each other's principal overseas trading partners. Since the United States and Japan are first and second, respectively, in the Free World in GNP, the consequences to the rest of the world could be disastrous if the bilateral dispute were to trigger a multilateral trade war. To avoid this is the transcendent obligation of Japan and the United States, their obligation as dominant Free World economic powers.

I believe the successful resolution of current economic issues, and the full restoration of mutual confidence and cooperation in the economic field, requires implementation by both countries of the following policy guidelines:

(1) No new protectionist trade measures on either side, whether tariff or nontariff, and instead a positive approach by both to further trade liberalization.

(2) Pragmatic acceptance of the principle of international specialization as a foundation for multilaterally beneficial trade, with due attention to the industrial advances and expanding market requirements of the developing countries.

(3) In their bilateral trade, avoidance by both of any sudden increases in exports that are directly competitive with domestic goods (such as textiles), and restraint in the use of domestic political power as a means of protecting competitive weaknesses in a particular industry. (In sensitive industries, binational committees of experts could perform a useful service in anticipating future import-competition problems on the basis of national-consumption projections, which in turn could lead to guidelines for estimating nondisruptive future import levels.)

(4) Closer attention to the extremely important problem of bringing into greater harmony the private commercial and public interests on each side, in the framework of rational policies and mutually beneficial economic relations between the two countries. Toward this end I strongly endorse the recently-created joint consultative committee, made up of private-sector representatives from both Japan and the United States, to advise the cabinet-level Japan-U.S. Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which meets annually.

The overriding concern of both Japanese and American policymakers, in the economic as well as the military and political fields, must be to maintain the viability of a partnership that is crucial to peace and stability in the Asian Pacific region, and to the continuing growth of an open, productive and increasingly prosperous international economy. It is not necessary to the effectiveness of this partnership that Japan and the United States be automatic allies, pursuing the same tactics and priorities. It is eminently desirable, however, that both understand that they share long-term strategic goals, and that they show mutual tolerance for the divergent ways in which each may contribute to better material prospects for all mankind and to the construction of a more stable world peace.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SOUTH ASIA AND UNITED STATES POLICY*

by Norman D. Palmer

IN his first annual foreign affairs message to the Congress, submitted on February 18, 1970, President Nixon devoted several paragraphs to the situation in South Asia and the interests of the United States in that part of the world. After referring to the desire of the United States to develop cooperative relationships with Japan and Indonesia, he stated:

> The United States has a similar long-run interest in cooperation for progress in South Asia. The one-fifth of mankind who live in India and Pakistan can make the difference for the future of Asia. If their nation-building surmounts the centrifugal forces that have historically divided the subcontinent, if their economic growth keeps pace with popular demands, and if they can avert further costly rivalry between themselves, India and Pakistan can contribute their vast energies to the structure of a stable peace. But these are formidable "ifs." We stand ready to help the subcontinent overcome them. These nations' potential contribution to peace is too great for us to do otherwise.[1]

The President's second annual review of U.S. foreign policy, submitted to the Congress on February 25, 1971, reaffirmed America's interest in South Asia, and placed that interest within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine:

> South Asia's progress is important to us. . . . We will do what we can to help the countries of the area meet their economic and social needs. . . . We will try to keep our activities in the area in balance with those of the other major powers concerned. . . . Our current posture in South Asia, therefore, accords with the restraint implied in the Nixon Doctrine.[2]

RELATIVE U.S. NEGLECT OF SOUTH ASIA

These perceptive comments show that the President is fully aware that South Asia is an inescapable focus of world attention and concern and that the evolution of the countries of the area will have a profound impact on the future of Asia, and indeed of the world. But thus far the policies of the Nixon Administration have not reflected the same order of priorities or awareness. South Asia, for all its size and importance, has been relatively neglected by the Nixon Administration, and even more so by the Congress and the American people. Even the terrible cyclone tragedy in East Pakistan—the worst natural disaster of the twentieth century and one of the worst in recorded history—made less impact on American hearts and minds than its magnitude would seem to warrant, although it did lead to frenzied activity in the government agencies most directly concerned and to a fairly generous response on the part of the American government and private individuals and relief agencies. The recent general elections in Pakistan (the first nationwide elections on the basis of universal adult franchise) and in India (the first since the Congress Party split in 1969) will profoundly affect the political evolution of the major nations of South Asia, and should be regarded as developments of worldwide concern; but these events were given little attention in the American press or in Congress, or apparently even in the top ranks of the Nixon Administration. Even the tragic developments in East Pakistan since March 25, 1971, which have reduced that area to what is hardly more than a conquered province, at the cost of thousands of lives, and which in all probability have marked the beginning of the breakup of the world's fifth largest nation, have not had a public or official impact in the United States in keeping with their importance or potential repercussions.

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*The nations considered in this article are those in the Indian subcontinent —India, Pakistan and Nepal—and the offshore island nation of Ceylon. The term "South Asia" sometimes includes Southeast Asia as well as the Indian subcontinent. Another article in this issue will deal with Southeast Asia.

[1] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace* (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 59.

[2] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace* (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 112-113.

The reasons for this relative neglect of South Asia are understandable, if regrettable. President Nixon has other problems and concerns, at home and abroad, to which he must give more attention and a higher order of priority. As far as Asia is concerned, most of his efforts are directed to the crisis areas of Indochina and the Middle East; to relations with Japan, the only really developed Asian nation, already the third most productive in the world and perhaps, in Herman Kahn's words, an "emerging superstate";[3] to the problem of developing a new and more flexible policy toward Communist China; and to a reorientation of the entire American approach to Asia in the light of the Nixon Doctrine and U.S. interests and priorities. In this context the countries of South Asia, and developments in that area, rate a lower priority than they perhaps deserve.

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[3] Herman Kahn, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

Two other considerations are also relevant. From the viewpoint of international relations, despite the internal crisis in Pakistan, South Asia is not a crisis area in an immediate sense, and hence does not command special attention. It is certainly an area of crisis, indeed of multiple crises, in the longer run; but, as John P. Lewis has pointed out about India,[4] the crisis is a "quiet" one and has not yet taken on apocalyptic dimensions, as it may in time. Second, U.S. relations with the countries of South Asia while officially correct and "good," are in fact rather cool and distant. There is little affinity in policies or in outlook between the leaders of the United States and those of South Asia. American economic assistance to these states has been declining. Military aid, with limited exceptions, has been cut off since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The South Asian states are developing new orientations in their foreign policies that involve fairly extensive relations with the Soviet Union and, except for India, with Communist China as well. Moreover, their internal orientation and policies have tended to widen the gulf between them and the United States and to stimulate anti-American feelings.

Political Changes in South Asia

As Nixon pointed out in his 1970 message, "Like the rest of Asia, India and Pakistan have changed significantly over the past decade."[5] According to the census of 1961, India's population was about 431 million; in 1971 it apparently exceeds 550 million. The comparable figures for Pakistan are less than 94 million and more than 130 million. Both countries have family planning programs, with international encouragement and assistance, but these programs have had only limited success, and population growth has largely counteracted the progress made in planned economic development. In each country the capabilities of government and bureaucracy have not increased in proportion to burgeoning demands being made on the political system. Political instability and the incidence of violence have increased, especially in recent years.

India

Since 1959 India has had a prolonged crisis with Communist

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[4] John P. Lewis, *Quiet Crisis in India* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1962).

[5] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace, loc. cit.*

China, including the border war of October-November 1962. Relations with Pakistan have worsened, and in 1965 these two unfriendly neighbors engaged in armed hostilities. India's great leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, died in May 1964. The change from a charismatic to a kind of collective leadership has been difficult. India has experienced three successions to the prime ministership since Nehru's death. In the first (1964) Lal Bahadur Shastri emerged as Prime Minister, and in the second (1966) and third (1967) Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, won the office.[6] In 1969 the Congress Party, the party of Gandhi and Nehru, which had spearheaded the independence struggle and had given India what was often described as a one-dominant party system for most of the twenty-two years since independence, split in two. Mrs. Gandhi's wing, the Congress (R), opposed by most of the top party bosses who were in control of the rival wing, the Congress (O), remained in control of the government, although lacking a majority in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament).

Within the past decade India has held three general elections, in 1962, 1967 and 1971. The fourth general elections in 1967 seemed to mark the end of the one-dominant party system,[7] for the ruling Congress Party lost many seats in the Lok Sabha and, for the first time, non-Congress governments, mostly unstable coalitions, came to power in a majority of the Indian states. The split in the Congress in 1969 gave the *coup de grâce* to the Congress Party in its historic form, and added greatly to the political instability the 1967 elections had accentuated. In the fifth general elections in 1971, however, Mrs. Gandhi's branch of the Congress won more than two-thirds of the seats in the Lok Sabha, thereby apparently arresting the trend toward increasing political instability at the national level. The political situation in most states remained confused and unstable.

In 1961 India's second Five Year Plan was completed, and the Third Plan was immediately launched. Because of two successive years of drought, which gave the Indian economy a great setback and led to near-famine conditions in some parts of the country, particularly Bihar, there was a considerable shortfall in its targets.

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[6] See Michael Brecher, *Succession in India* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), and "Succession in India, 1967: The Routinization of Political Change," *Asian Survey*, July 1967.

[7] See Norman D. Palmer, "India's Fourth General Elections," *Asian Survey*, May 1967, and Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 170-184.

The Fourth Plan, scheduled to go into effect in April 1966, was not initiated until three years later, and then on a reduced scale. These developments seriously retarded India's development efforts and led to food shortages, rising prices, a fall in exports, and other unfortunate consequences. Since 1967, however, the economic picture has brightened considerably. Partly because of favorable monsoons and partly because of the "green revolution" —which gives promise of revolutionizing Indian agriculture— food production has increased substantially since the grim years 1965-1967, and the prospects are good that within a few years India can be virtually self-sufficient in this essential. This will be a major breakthrough, one which a short time ago was thought to be impossible.

A most alarming recent development, raising grave questions of the capacity of the political system and of the political leaders to perform the basic functions of governance, has been a marked deterioration in the preservation of law and order and respect for authority. Violence is no stranger to the land of nonviolence. The excesses of the partition years, for example, linger in the minds of Indians whose memories extend back a quarter of a century. But the combination of many forms of violence, old and new, on a large scale, as a continuing phenomenon of Indian life, is an unwelcome novelty. "Violence, calculated, organized and brutal is the most disturbing feature of the contemporary political scene in India. Widespread and massive threats to public order and systematic destruction of public property seem now to have become a part of a society seething with discontent and frustration."[8] Strikes and riots, often accompanied by violence, by students, workers and other groups are becoming increasingly common. Among the peculiarly Indian forms of protest are *hartals* ("the voluntary cessation of business and commercial activity in support of the demands of others"[9]), *bandhs* (illegal political strikes), and *gheraos* or *ghera dalos* (throwing cordons around authorities).[10]

Two other forms of violence, one old, the other new, are particularly disturbing. The old form is communal violence, especially Hindu-Muslim communalism, which has increased in frequency and intensity in recent years after a long period of relative subsidence following the massive upheaval that accompanied partition. It has spread to parts of India largely free from it in the past, as in the tragic communal riots in Ahmedabad and elsewhere in Gujarat in 1969 and in parts of Maharashtra in 1970. The new form is that associated with left-wing extremists—more Maoist, more violent and more leftist than the left communists—known as Naxalites, who have become a major force for violence (including political assassinations) and defiance of authority in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and to a lesser extent in other parts of India. It has been taking its toll since the uprising of tribals and peasants, spurred on by the left communists of West Bengal and perhaps also by the Chinese communists, in the Naxalbari area of the Darjeeling District of West Bengal in 1967 (hence the name "Naxalite," which has become a new word in the English language). West Bengal, with a long tradition of violence, and especially Calcutta, whose conditions are about as bad as in any of the world's great cities, are the head centers of the activities of the Naxalites, of *bandhs* and *gheraos* and other violent forms of protest. Since the 1967 elections the situation in West Bengal has been particularly unstable. Neither United Front governments in which the left communists have been the majority group nor long periods of president's rule (direct rule by the central government) have been effective. The danger of a collapse of authority, of a widespread defiance of government, of a complete breakdown in law and order, is frighteningly real.[11]

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[8] S. P. Aiyar, editor, *The Politics of Mass Violence in India* (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967), p. 21.

[9] David H. Bayley, *The Police and Political Development in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 257.

[10] *Ibid.,* Chapter 10, "The Maintenance of Public Order."

While violence has increased greatly in many parts of India, the major threats of separatist movements, in Nagaland, Tamilnad and the Punjab, have markedly abated. India still maintains a large number of troops in Nagaland and is still faced with formidable opposition from the Naga "hostiles," aided, trained and supported by the Chinese communists, in a strategically vulnerable and unstable border area; but the Naga "hostiles" seem to be more divided, more leaderless and less effective now

[11] See K. K. Sinha, "A Direct Appeal to the People Needed," and Kautuhali, "The Second United Front Government in West Bengal: A Political Assessment," in ***Institute of Political and Social Studies Bulletin*** (Calcutta), July 1970. Many Indians are wondering whether the deterioration in West Bengal will continue, and if it does, whether it will spread to other parts of India. One of India's ablest political scientists has sounded this note of warning: "The most important problem before the leadership in this country in the coming decade is not merely the maintenance of law and order but the rehabilitation of the idea of Government in the minds of people and of Government as a great and reliable instrument for the improvement of the life of the common people. If this is not done, and if economic policies are not realistically modified, the coming decade will hold out little hope for democracy and political stability in India." Aiyar, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

than they were a few years ago. Chinese help seems to be less substantial, and many of the Chinese-trained Naga leaders have either been captured or are in Burma or China or elsewhere outside of Nagaland.[12] The demands for a separate Tamilnad or Dravidasthan, frequently voiced not long ago by the Dravida Kazhagam and even by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Madras,[13] have given way in recent years to demands for greater linguistic and regional autonomy, well short of separation; the DMK, which has controlled Madras state (renamed Tamil Nadu) since the 1967 elections and has twenty-three members in the Lok Sabha, has developed cooperative relations with the central government and is one of the parties that have given Mrs. Gandhi quite consistent support. At times in the past the Akali Dal, the leading political organ of the Sikhs in the Punjab, especially during the heyday of its greatest leader, Master Tara Singh, seemed to be demanding an independent Sikh state;[14] but the majority of the Akalis accepted the division of the Punjab in 1966 into the two states of Haryana (with a Hindu majority) and the Punjab (where most of the Sikhs live) as at least a partial fulfillment of their long-standing demands for a Punjabi Suba. Since then Sikh separatist demands have seldom been heard, even though the Akali Dal, or one wing of it, has become an important political force in the Punjab. Hence the crystal-ball gazers' forecast of an India being torn apart by separatist movements seems wholly unlikely.

Because of their necessary preoccupation with internal problems, India's leaders during the past decade have not given as much attention as formerly to foreign affairs, except for relations with Pakistan and China. Indian spokesmen have continued to describe their basic foreign policy as one of nonalignment, which they insist is even more relevant and successful than at the height of the Cold War; but it is obviously nonalignment with a difference—a general approach rather than a specific policy or policies. India's stature in the world has declined considerably as a result of such factors as the change from bipolarity to multipolarity and from Cold War to a limited degree of détente in superpower relations, her humiliation at the hands of China, her internal weaknesses and difficulties, and the death of her internationally known leader.

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[12] "Naga Underground's Strength Sapped by Indo-Burmese Moves," *The Sunday Statesman*, March 22, 1970.

[13] See Robert Hardgrave, Jr., *The Dravidian Movement* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965), and "The DMK and the Politics of Tamil Nationalism," *Pacific Affairs*, Winter 1964-65.

[14] See Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

Pakistan

In the early 1960's Pakistan had a high degree of political stability under the martial law regime of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, who depended mainly on the army and the higher bureaucracy for support. Political parties and political activity were forbidden, and Pakistan was almost a political vacuum. In 1962 Ayub Khan proclaimed a new constitution, creating a strong presidential form of government, and rescinded martial law, in effect since the "revolution" of October 1958. Ayub introduced a system of "basic democracies," which he relied upon to breathe new life into the lagging Village Aid program, to be an instrument for popular administration and participation, and to provide the basis of his system of democracy. The directly elected "Basic Democrats"—at first 80,000, then 120,000—were to serve as the electoral college to choose members of the provincial and national assemblies and the President of Pakistan.[15] In this period Pakistan was in its second Five Year Plan (1960-1965), and the economic progress seemed to be impressive: a well-informed American economist described it as Pakistan's "development miracle."[16]

In foreign affairs Pakistan was a strongly allied nation. An active member of SEATO and CENTO, she had especially close military ties with the United States. In an address to a joint session of the American Congress, in July 1961, President Ayub Khan told the legislators that Pakistan was America's most reliable ally in Asia, in fact the only Asian ally on which she could really depend. But even in the early 1960's, and especially after the Sino-Indian war in late 1962, Pakistan's devotion to alignment and her attitude toward the United States were beginning to cool.[17] In 1963 and thereafter she entered into a series of agreements with Communist China, and strong pro-Chinese sentiments were voiced in official and unofficial circles. Pakistan veered in the direction of a more balanced foreign policy, based on what Ayub Khan and

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[15] See Khalid Bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).

[16] Gustav F. Papanek, "Pakistan: The Development Miracle," address in New York, May 4, 1965, under the joint auspices of the Pakistani-American Chamber of Commerce and the Asia Society.

[17] Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 129-151.

Yahya Khan called "bilateralism," even though the country remained officially aligned with the Western powers.

In the early 1970's a different picture emerges. In both domestic and foreign affairs Pakistan's policies have undergone a marked reorientation. The apparent political stability of the early 1960's has given way to obvious instability. Ayub Khan, the strong man for a decade, was forced to bow out most unceremoniously in the spring of 1969. He turned over power to another military man, General Yahya Khan, who assumed the Presidency and restored martial law. Yahya insisted, however, that he would remain in power only long enough to arrest the deteriorating situation in the country, and that he would work out a program to turn the government over to elected representatives of the people as soon as possible. He has tried to live up to this pledge, even though the confused political situation—notably the impasse between East and West Pakistan and the weakness and irresponsibility of political leaders and parties—has greatly handicapped his efforts and raised doubts about the viability of any political system in Pakistan and even about the survivability of Pakistan as a single nation.

Yahya removed most of the bans on political activity and on political parties, and, true to his promise, scheduled nationwide general elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the first on a national scale in Pakistan's history. These elections, held on December 7, 1970 for the National Assembly and on December 17 for the provincial assemblies, went off quite peacefully, and produced a good voter turnout, even though there were many disturbances during the campaign and threats of secession from the East Pakistanis if a high degree of autonomy was not granted to them, and even though they were held not long after the cyclone disaster in parts of the coastal areas and offshore islands of East Pakistan.

As a result of the elections two men of divergent types and different background and orientation, one in East Pakistan, the other in West Pakistan, emerged as the most powerful political leaders. In East Pakistan the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who not long before had been in prison, under indictment for an alleged conspiracy against Pakistan (the so-called Agarthala Conspiracy Case), won nearly all of the seats in the National Assembly from that part of the country. In West Pakistan the Pakistan People's Party, led by Z. A. Bhutto, a former Foreign Minister, dominated the voting, winning eighty-two of the 138 seats in the West (the next largest party representation was only nine). Rahman campaigned on a six-point program that called for an extreme degree of autonomy for East Pakistan and would strip the central government of almost all powers and functions except foreign affairs and defense. Bhutto advocated "Islamic socialism" and offered an alternative to the "old leadership" and the vested interests. He is known to favor a strong central government, whereas Rahman wants a weak one. Bhutto is strongly pro-Chinese, anti-Indian and anti-American; Rahman has voiced reservations about Pakistan's ties with China, has favored reconciliation with India, and is thought to be at least mildly pro-American. Moreover, he does not favor socialism.

According to Yahya Khan's schedule, the next step was for the members of the National Assembly to convene and to function as a Constituent Assembly in drawing up a new constitution for Pakistan. In a Legal Framework Order, issued on March 30, 1970, he had decreed that "the Constitution shall be so framed as to embody" five fundamental principles, namely, that "Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic," that "Islamic ideology . . . shall be preserved," that "adherence to fundamental principles of democracy shall be ensured" by periodic elections and other means, that "the Provinces shall have maximum autonomy . . . but the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers," and that "the people of all areas in Pakistan shall be enabled to participate fully in all forms of national activities," and "within a specified period, economic and all other disparities between the Provinces" shall be removed. In the same order President Yahya reserved to himself the right to pass on the new constitution by providing that "The Constitution Bill, as passed by the National Assembly, shall be presented to the President for authentication." If he refuses to accept the constitution, the National Assembly "shall stand dissolved."[18] Presumably, in such an event, another general election will be called, and the new National Assembly will be given a chance to prepare a constitution acceptable to Yahya Khan.

Once Yahya approves a constitution, he has pledged to step aside and allow a new government to take over. If an acceptable constitution cannot be agreed upon, or if after the approval of the constitution no government with majority support in the Assembly can be formed, the martial law regime headed by Yahya Khan will probably remain in power.

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[18] The Legal Framework Order, 1970, Articles 20 and 25.

Yahya Khan's attempts to implement his program, following the elections of December 1970, led to a complete impasse. On March 25, 1971, after further talks in Dacca with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Z. A. Bhutto, he ordered the armed forces to take control of East Pakistan, and on the following day, in a broadcast to the nation, he condemned Sheikh Mujib as a traitor and banned the Awami League as a political party. The armed forces occupied the major cities of East Pakistan, killing thousands of people, but civil war raged in the countryside and an independent state of Bengal—Bangla Desh—was proclaimed by the followers of Sheikh Mujib. These events brought Yahya Khan's political experiment to an abrupt end and dimmed the prospects for the survival of Pakistan as a united nation.

Nepal and Ceylon

Important changes also occurred in the past decade in the smaller nations of South Asia, Nepal and Ceylon. In February 1959, King Mahendra of Nepal bestowed a constitution upon his country, providing for a system of parliamentary democracy. The national elections of that year—Nepal's first and last—gave a clear mandate to the Nepali Congress, which was permitted to form a government headed by B. P. Koirala. In December 1960, however, the short-lived experiment in constitutional democracy ended abruptly when Mahendra abrogated the constitution, dismissed the government, and imprisoned Koirala and other Nepali Congress leaders. After some delay the king, in December 1962, promulgated a new constitutional ordinance, providing for a system of "guided democracy," or so-called Panchayat democracy, with an indirectly elected National Panchayat and an advisory Council of State. The new system is presumably based on the principle of political decentralization, but it is highly authoritarian in character and the king is firmly in control.[19]

In his foreign policy Mahendra has been playing what might be called a masterly Himalayan balance-of-power game.

> There can be no doubt . . . that Kathmandu has developed an impressive repertory of responses to the unwelcome intrusions of external influences, whether these stem from India, China, the West, or the Soviet Union. The tactics utilized are classic in type: an intricate and careful balancing of external forces combined with a cautious tacking back and forth between the two most proximate of these powers, India and China. The

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[19] See Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, *Democratic Innovations in Nepal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), and Leo E. Rose and Margaret W. Fisher, *The Politics of Nepal* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).

objective has been to minimize the restrictions imposed on Nepal's freedom of action while at the same time maximizing the state's internal and external security.[20]

A major political change occurred in Ceylon in 1956 when, as a result of elections, power was transferred from the United National Party to the Shri Lanka Freedom Party, led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike.[21] The SLFP government changed the direction of both domestic and foreign affairs. It continued a policy of nonalignment, but shifted from a pro-Western to a slightly procommunist bias. At home, it inclined to more socialist and nationalist policies, appealing to the masses, especially in rural areas, instead of to the educated Western-oriented elites in the cities, and to the Buddhist and Sinhalese majority at the expense of the Hindu and Tamil-speaking minority. After Bandaranaike's assassination by a Sinhalese fanatic in 1959, his widow, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, carried on the same basic policies until 1965, when her government was defeated by the UNP. The more moderate policies of the UNP were largely counteracted by rising prices, widespread unemployment, numerous strikes and other economic maladies, and in the elections of 1970 it was again routed by the SLFP, supported by the Lanka Sama Samaj Party, a Trotskyite party, and the Moscow-oriented wing of the Communist Party.

Mrs. Bandaranaike proceeded immediately to redeem her numerous campaign pledges. Her government restored the rice ration and took steps to nationalize banks, control the export-import trade, draft a new constitution, and make Ceylon a Republic (it had remained a Dominion in the Commonwealth). It took an even harder line toward the Tamils of Ceylon than the previous SLFP regime had done. It suspended relations with Israel until that country withdraws from Arab territories, recognized North Korea, North Viet Nam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Viet Nam, entered into a new agreement with Communist China for additional imports of rice, and requested the United States Peace Corps and the Asia Foundation to wind up their operations in Ceylon. In general, the new government's domestic and foreign policies and orientation have been much more pleasing to communist than to Western states. Its "radical nationalism" seemed to have a great appeal to the majority of the people, who are Buddhist in religion, Sinhalese in race and language, live in rural areas, and are quite poor (although the standard of living has remained substantially above that of other South Asian states). But extremist groups charged that the government was not moving rapidly enough to implement its socialist pledges. In April 1971 a Maoist organization called the People's Liberation Front attempted to foment an armed uprising against the government. In response Mrs. Bandaranaike adjourned Parliament, declared a national emergency, imposed a curfew, and ordered the armed forces to crush the uprising. In spite of Ceylon's impressive record in providing for alternative governments through democratic procedures, its political stability is constantly jeopardized by radical movements and by the inability of the government to cope effectively with unemployment, inflation and other grave economic problems.

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[20] Rose and Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161.

[21] See W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 326-327.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE 1970'S

In considering alternative futures the past experience and orientation of the countries of South Asia must be kept in mind. So, too, must the nature of their societies and cultures, and the pertinent socioeconomic characteristics and statistics. It is also important to remember that these are transitional systems, moving from traditional to modern institutions and processes, with curious mixtures of tradition and modernity, great and growing inequalities and great differences in levels of development within each of the countries as well as between them. They are seeking in their own ways to achieve national identity, integration, development and survival in the complex world of the late twentieth century, but they are also heavily dependent on outside cooperation and support. In these efforts they are handicapped by their internal weaknesses and problems and by the pressures of the international environment. They are "soft states" in a hard world.

As Samuel P. Huntington and many others have pointed out on the basis of comparative and empirical studies and careful observation, the problems of "political order in changing societies," to use the title of Huntington's well-known book,[22] seem to be mounting and "the most dangerous decades," to borrow a phrase Selig S. Harrison applied some years ago to India,[23] lie ahead. Huntington reminds us that political development is by no means an assured course for these changing societies. Political decay, even from already low levels of development, is perhaps a more likely prospect.[24]

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[22] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[23] Selig S. Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

India

The most likely alternatives for India lie within the present political system, which is more flexible and offers a wider range of possibilities than was generally supposed. Because of the longstanding identification of a dominant Congress Party with the government and the entire political system, many Indian and foreign observers came to assume that the future of the system was inextricably linked with the future of the Congress. But the era of Congress dominance, in the historic sense, ended in November 1969, when the old Congress Party split into two factions, one—usually known as the Congress (R) or the New Congress—led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who was the Prime Minister, the other—known as the Old Congress, or the Congress (O)—dominated by the members of the "Syndicate" and other old-guard Congress leaders. Mrs. Gandhi's party commanded much wider support than did the other wing,[25] and she continued as Prime Minister; but her government was a minority one, and was dependent on regional parties and independents, with the Communist parties as potential supporters, in the event of a concerted challenge from the much divided opposition. This minority government was converted into a government with an overwhelming majority as a result of the fifth general elections, held in March 1971, when Mrs. Gandhi's party secured more than two-thirds of all the seats in the Lok Sabha. No other party got more than twenty-five seats (the Old Congress won only sixteen, whereas it had previously had sixty-five). The elections enhanced the prospects for political stability and gave India a government of unquestioned authority and support. In several key states, however, including West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the New Congress remained either in a minority or in such a weak position that it could form a government only with the support of other parties and groups.

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[24] See Huntington, *op. cit.*, Chapter 1, " Political Order and Political Decay," and Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, April 1965.

[25] There is no doubt that Mrs. Gandhi has been successful in branding the organization Congress as a group dominated by right-wing party bosses and creating an image of her group as favoring leftist policies and being more concerned with the welfare of the masses of the common people.

At the national level Mrs. Gandhi's Congress will probably be able to continue in power for an indefinite period, depending largely on its capacity to deal effectively with grave problems of law and order and economic distress, which constantly threaten to undermine any political system. If it loses its decisive majority, it will probably still continue in power, with the support of regional parties, independents, and, if necessary, the Communists as well. This might lead to more radical domestic and foreign policies. The prospect in most states is clearly for continued political instability, coalition politics, and shifting political alliances and policies.

It is hard to conceive of a non-Congress leftist coalition emerging within the present system, for this would have to be dominated by the Communists, who cannot agree among themselves. It is also hard to conceive of the formation of an effective conservative coalition, for the right-wing parties and groups are in disarray and India seems to be moving in a different direction. In 1970 the Old Congress leaders tried unsuccessfully to build at least a parliamentary coalition of this kind. In the fifth general elections in 1971 they formed a "grand alliance" —really an electoral "adjustment" — with the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra Party, and the Samyukta Socialist Party. This alliance proved to be anything but "grand": the cooperating parties held 150 Lok Sabha seats before the fifth general elections, and only forty-nine afterward. The elections again demonstrated that the prospects for any right-wing coalition, however well organized, are not good.

Many Indians believe that a strong presidential system would be more suitable for India than the present version of the parliamentary system. The relative merits of the presidential and the parliamentary systems are widely discussed in Indian academic and journalistic circles, so far with little practical impact.

Although a strong presidential system might be the disguise for authoritarian rule, all of the above alternative futures could occur within the present political system. Other alternatives would lead to a repudiation of the present system and to a radically different future for India. One of these would be a Communist takeover by nondemocratic and probably violent means. This would require greater unity and strength among the Indian Communists, and greater support from the Soviet Union and/or Communist China, than they have ever had. At present the Communists are split among three identifiable parties — the CPI, the CPI (M), and the

CPI (M-L) – and many factions and groups that operate behind the scenes in indeterminate ways. The real Communist division at the present time may be that which Mohan Ram has suggested, between the Maoists and the non-Maoists:

> The Indian communist movement now comprises four segments: two non-Maoist parties—the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), a Maoist party—the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), and a potential Maoist party which can consolidate the numerous Marxist groups which have chosen to keep out of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).[26]

The non-Maoist parties could conceivably function within the existing political system, although their goal is eventually to destroy that system. The Maoist parties and groups cannot cooperate with it in any way. They rely mainly on extraconstitutional and often violent means. This is particularly true of the various brands of Naxalites, who are most active in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Some of the Naxalites are extreme Communists, well to the left of the Left Communists; others repudiate the Communists and work through violence to destroy the existing framework of law and order and the authority of government generally. If the situation in India deteriorates drastically, the Naxalites and other extremist groups may have a field day; but they offer only a formula for destruction and anarchy, not an alternative system.

If a different political order comes into existence, it will more likely be created by rightist authoritarians than by leftist extremists. Various forms of right-wing reaction can be envisaged. One is a Hindu communalist takeover, destroying the secular democratic system and replacing it with a religiously-impregnated, ultranationalist, ultracommunalist order, allegedly based on Indian – i.e., Hindu – traditions, practices and institutions. But it is doubtful that a communal authoritarian system could be established, or could function for long even if it were temporarily in the ascendancy. A stronger possibility would be an authoritarian takeover of a noncommunal and nontraditionalist kind. This could be a military takeover, as in Pakistan in October 1958, or in Burma in 1958 and again in 1962, or it could be a takeover by civilian right-wingers supported by the military.

The question of the role of the military in India, and of the possibility of military intervention in political affairs, is much discussed, especially in view of the conspicuous role of the military in other developing countries.[27] India has, however, had a strong tradition of military subordination to civilian authority and, except possibly for some politically-ambitious generals either in opposition to or in collusion with V.K.Krishna Menon when the latter was Defense Minister, no Indian military leaders have shown either the capacity or the inclination to play a major political role. Should conditions in West Bengal or any other parts of India seem to be deteriorating to the point of undermining legitimate government and the framework of law and order, the military might conceivably step in. Certainly it would do so if ordered by the central government. Under extreme circumstances, and given strong leadership, it might do so if the central authorities seemed to be impotent, and even if they refused to sanction such a move.[28] This kind of drastic action would threaten the existing system, and might lead to its supersession by direct or indirect military rule.

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[26] Mohan Ram, *Indian Communism: Split Within a Split* (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969), p. 267.

Demands for an extreme degree of "democratic decentralization," such as those championed by Gandhi and contemporary Gandhians, are frequently voiced. Jayaprakash Narayan, for example, is an ardent champion of a party-less democracy which would invert the pyramid of power, leave the central government with little authority, give most authority to the villages and other decentralized units, and change the focus and functions of the political system so drastically that a new system would inevitably replace the present one.[29] It is conceivable that demands for local and regional autonomy would become so irresistible that the integrity of the nation would be jeopardized. Pakistan is presently undergoing a crisis of this kind, and India may face the same. Under these conditions the federation of India might give way to a much looser confederation, with no effective authority at the center.

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[27] See H. Daalder, *The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962); William F. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States* (New York: Praeger, 1965); John J. Johnson, editor, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* Chapter 4, "Praetorianism and Political Decay"; and Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review,* December 1970.

[28] "The future of the military will depend in part on the continued success of political leadership. It will also depend upon the conduct of political leaders toward the military. If politicians, instead of exercising self-restraint, yield to the temptation to strengthen themselves by developing friends or allies among military men they will inevitably draw the military into politics. . . . Violence and chauvinism could strengthen existing authoritarian tendencies and create opportunities for military heroes." Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Generals and Politicians in India," *Pacific Affairs,* Spring 1964, p. 19.

[29] See Jayaprakash Narayan, *A Plea for the Reconstruction of Indian Polity* (Kashi: Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, 1959), and *Swaraj for the People* (Kashi: Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Prakashan, 1961).

The pressures of economic deterioration, the continued breakdown of law and order, various conditions of internal war (such as India has been experiencing in still controllable form for some time, including Naxalite agitations and violence), a serious upsurge of separatist and insurrectionary movements, and other forces too formidable for a weakened public authority to resist, might even cause India to break apart and be replaced with a series of states or other fragments. It is hard to imagine that this will happen, however, or that if it does the numerous political units emerging out of a shattered Indian nation could be viable in the modern world.

Pakistan

While one can predict that the most likely future for India is a continuation of the existing political system, whatever the internal changes in its direction and control, the same prediction cannot safely be made for Pakistan. Actually, it is difficult to tell what the existing political system in Pakistan is; since the fall of Ayub Khan the country has had only an interim political arrangement and efforts to evolve a new system seem to have collapsed.

The country has been under martial law since March 1969, and since late March 1971 its most populous province, East Pakistan, has been virtually a conquered territory, harshly governed by the Pakistan armed forces, almost all of whom are West Pakistanis. The majority of East Pakistanis are in sullen submission or are engaged in guerrilla warfare against the occupying forces, openly demanding an independent Bengal nation—Bangla Desh.

President Yahya Khan had a carefully worked out plan "to restore democratic institutions in the country." This called for nationwide general elections for a National Assembly and provincial assemblies, the framing of a constitution by the National Assembly (within a period of 120 days), the "authentication" of the constitution by Yahya Khan, and the institution of a government on the basis of the election results. These steps were designed to achieve the announced democratic objective. Unfortunately, only one step was actually implemented—the nationwide elections in December 1970. The elections gave a majority in the National Assembly to the Awami League, a party based only in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The only other political leader who mattered was Z. A. Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party won over half of the seats for the National Assembly from West Pakistan. Negotiations among President Yahya Khan, Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto, after the elections, led to a complete impasse, with Sheikh Mujib's demands for almost complete autonomy for East Pakistan strongly opposed by Yahya Khan and Bhutto. The National Assembly was never convened, and on March 25, 1971, Yahya Khan ordered the armed forces to take control in East Pakistan. The major cities were speedily occupied, and "normal conditions" were declared to have been restored. In fact, thousands of lives were lost, and guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism, and other kinds of opposition continued throughout the province.

After these events it is difficult to conceive that Pakistan can survive as a united nation. The central government, controlling the instruments of coercion, can maintain military control of East Pakistan for an indefinite period, but it is hard to see how the bitterness and hostility occasioned by the massive application of force can be overcome. If the miracle of reconciliation occurs, and any system that is truly representative is established, East Pakistan will play a far more influential role in political, economic and social affairs than it has in the past, far more attention will be given to the problems and needs of East Pakistan, and a larger share of the national resources will be allocated to that part of the country. Such a miracle, unfortunately, seems unlikely to come to pass.

The refusal to implement the results of the general elections and the harsh treatment of the East Pakistanis will probably force the central government to resort to increasingly authoritarian rule in West Pakistan as well. It will be interesting to see whether Yahya Khan will continue to rule under martial law, or whether he will give way to some other military leader or leaders, or whether he and Bhutto will enter into some kind of agreement whereby Bhutto might become the head of a nominally civilian regime, supported by the military, or whether Bhutto will try to capitalize on the more radical forces which gave him an electoral triumph in the Punjab and Sind. In the latter event, Bhutto might try to thrust Yahya Khan aside, and he might openly challenge the Punjabi-Pathan military-bureaucratic-landowning elite that has been dominant in West Pakistan. This could lead to a bitter internal struggle in the West, with unpredictable results except for the certainty of political instability and mounting tensions. The possibility of friction between the various provinces of West Pakistan—the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the NWFP—and of separatist movements along the frontier, cannot be ruled out. If Bhutto gains effective political control, relations with India will probably become even more strained than they are at present—since the repressive measures in East Pakistan these relations have been at low ebb—and anti-American and pro-Chinese feeling, already strong in West Pakistan, will almost certainly be accentuated.

Some observers have speculated on the possibility of a Nasser-type leadership emerging in the Pakistan army, which would seek to gain control of the military and perhaps also of the government, either directly under one of its own leaders — a Pakistani Nasser? — or under a civilian leader acceptable and amenable to it. If Bhutto is not satisfied with the course of his own political fortunes, he might try to enter into some understanding with a radical Nasser-type leadership in the army, if such a group does in fact exist.[30]

If East Pakistan remains under military control, it will be unable to assert itself as an independent entity in national or international affairs. Sooner or later, however, the military domination must end, either in reconciliation or, as seems more likely, in independence for Bangla Desh. In the latter event, both the remnant of Pakistan — West Pakistan — and the new state of Bangla Desh will be faced with serious problems of survival. They will be two notable additions to the long list of "broken-back" states in the so-called Third World. They will need unusually enlightened and effective internal leadership, massive external assistance, and a long period of peace at home and with their neighbors, before they can hope to be really viable political units. Bangla Desh would be the ninth largest nation in the world, but it would be a weak and underdeveloped nation-state. The new state of Pakistan—West Pakistan—with some fifty-five million people, relatively few resources and a divided society, would have difficulty in finding the bases for viable existence and in forging a new national identity. Both it and Bangla Desh would be too weak to have much of an effect on the international system or on the Asian balance of power, but they would be factors in the overall political and strategic balance in the South Asian and Indian Ocean area and their political instability and internal weakness would make them tempting targets of opportunity for external pressures and possible arenas of great-power rivalries.

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[30] Girilal Jain, "West Pakistan Radicalism: Possibility of Alliance with Army," *The Times of India*, December 16, 1970.

Ceylon and Nepal

Alternative futures for Ceylon and Nepal can be predicted with greater confidence. In Ceylon, existing trends toward the radicalization of economic and political policies, based on the shift in power from the Westernized urban elite to emerging Buddhist, Sinhalese and rural leadership, and toward a radical nationalism that has given Ceylon's nonalignment orientation a different and more anti-Western flavor, will probably continue to dominate politics in the immediate future. The UNP, representing the former ruling elite and more conservative policies, may stage a recovery, especially if the economic situation fails to improve as a result of Mrs. Bandaranaike's leftist policies. The change from Dominion status to a Republic will have symbolic significance only. In any event, a more traditional and radical complexion seems to have been given to what has been a relatively stable, democratic and modernizing political system.

In Nepal King Mahendra will probably continue to keep the reins of power firmly in his own hands, combining a modest amount of modernization with more traditional monarchic authoritarianism. Apparently he has no intention of repeating the brief experiment in parliamentary democracy that followed the general elections of 1959. Based on a realistic approach to Nepal's limitations and vulnerability, his foreign policy will probably seek the maximum possible amount of security and independence, especially vis-à-vis India, concerning which he harbors many suspicions and reservations but to which he is bound by innumerable ties, and Communist China, which he hopes will act as an effective counterweight to India without putting undue pressures upon him. He will continue to deal cautiously with the superpowers, and to broaden his contacts with countries with which he has mutual interests and that pose no threat to him.

At present Mahendra seems to be firmly in control. But he is constantly faced with what Huntington has described as a "fundamental dilemma" of traditional monarchies attempting to grapple with modernization in the latter part of the twentieth century. According to Huntington,

> Three possible strategies are open to the monarch. He could attempt to reduce or to end the role of monarchical authority and to promote movement toward a modern, constitutional monarchy in which authority was vested in the people, parties, and parliaments. Or a conscious effort might be made to combine monarchical and popular authority in the same political system. Or the monarchy could be maintained as the principal source of authority in the political system and efforts made to minimize the disruptive effects upon it of the broadening of political consciousness.[31]

King Mahendra has clearly opted for the third strategy. In time he may have to consider trying the second or even the first option, but this will be only if he feels forced to do so as the price for keeping his throne. When he had a heart attack in 1968, the frailty of a political system built around a traditional ruler became glaringly evident. The king's successor will probably not be able to continue one-man rule. Thus Nepal's political system seems to be currently stable, but inherently and in the long run quite unstable.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FUTURE OF SOUTH ASIA

South Asia, with its "soft states," large and small, is an area characterized by a high degree of political instability, intraregional tensions and external penetration. It is, in a sense, to use Bhabani Sen Gupta's term, "the fulcrum of Asia."[32] No other part of the world has such multifarious relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China. The countries of South Asia are profoundly affected by the changing relationships among the three great powers, whom they obviously regard with mixed emotions.

Since 1959 relations between India and Communist China have been strained and hostile, in marked contrast to the situation during the *Hindi Chini bhai-bhai* era in the middle and late 1950's. Mrs. Gandhi seems to be especially interested in cultivating closer relations with Moscow, to such an extent that some of her critics at home and abroad accuse her of a pro-communist bias or worse. The Soviet Union is India's main external supplier of military aid, and is carrying on a wide range of activities in and directed toward India. Relations between the United States and India are officially good and correct, but there is little warmth in them. The differences in orientation, interests and style between the Nixon Administration and Mrs. Gandhi's government are wide.

[31] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 177.
[32] Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Fulcrum of Asia* (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

Since 1963 Pakistan has developed particularly close ties with Communist China, which has had by far the most favorable image in Pakistani public opinion. Disillusionment with the United States has been widespread. Until 1965 the United States was the major — and indeed about the only — external source of military assistance to Pakistan, and it is still the major source of economic aid. Since the early 1960's Pakistan has been developing closer, but still limited, associations with the Soviet Union; since 1968 it has even been receiving a limited amount of Soviet military aid.

When President Yahya Khan, in late March 1971, ordered the military takeover in East Pakistan, only China publicly supported the actions of the Pakistan government, and condemned the government of India for intervention in Pakistan's internal affairs. Both the Soviet Union and the United States expressed concern over the events in East Pakistan and urged Yahya Khan to try to work out a peaceful agreement with the East Pakistanis. These positions will undoubtedly increase the already strong pro-Chinese sentiments in West Pakistan, sentiments that will be further strengthened if Bhutto has a prominent role in West Pakistan's future. They will also strengthen the already ambivalent feelings toward the Soviet Union and the United States among the leaders of West Pakistan. If East Pakistan becomes independent, under an Awami League government, it will probably try to cultivate all the major powers, but China's staunch support of the harsh measures taken against the East Pakistani people will complicate her relations with Bangla Desh. If more extremist elements gain control in Bangla Desh, they will probably include Naxalites and other pro-Maoist groups, which will have an anti-Western and pro-Chinese orientation.

Under Mrs. Bandaranaike's leftist regime Ceylon's relations with both Communist China and the Soviet Union have been emphasized, and those with the United States and Britain have cooled off considerably. In Nepal King Mahendra has performed his balancing act between India and Communist China, while avoiding too close ties with either, and has also maintained good relations with the United States and the Soviet Union.

On the whole, the general trend of political development and political orientation in India, Pakistan and Ceylon has evoked relatively little enthusiasm in the United States. If Mrs. Gandhi becomes more dependent on the Communist parties or if she champions increasingly radical policies; if Mrs. Bandaranaike, supported by the pro-Moscow Communists, continues to emphasize radical and ultranationalist policies; if Bhutto, known for his pro-Chinese and anti-American sentiments, has much of a voice in Pakistan's future policies, or if the new leaders of Pakistan develop a radical nationalist orientation; if the government of an independent Bangla Desh is dominated by extremist groups, U.S. relations with all of these South Asian states will become increasingly difficult, although they will probably remain officially correct.

As President Nixon said in his foreign affairs message of 1970, the United States has a "long-run interest in cooperation for progress in South Asia."[33] This will involve a wide range of relations, and special attention to the political development, stability, economic growth and security of the countries of the area, including the reduction of intraregional tensions, especially between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Bangla Desh, if the former province of East Pakistan is able to gain its independence. It will involve such delicate and sensitive issues as those of economic and military aid and defense arrangements and commitments.

The President stated that the so-called Nixon Doctrine was based on a policy of "peace through partnership." As applied to Asia, toward which it was first directed, the Doctrine would signify continued American involvement, but a change in the character of that involvement and increasing Asian cooperation. "Our new cooperative relationship," he declared, "concerns primarily two areas of challenge – military threats and the great task of development." He repeated the "key elements" in the new "cooperative approach to the defense of our common interests" as he had outlined them in his speech at Guam in November 1969 – the speech that first publicized the Guam or Nixon Doctrine. These elements were:

> The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
>
> We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
>
> In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.[34]

An analysis of the application of these elements to South Asia would reveal some special problems and dilemmas. The only formal treaty commitments the United States has with a South Asian country are with Pakistan. These are both bilateral and multilateral in nature. They still exist, but in hardly more than form. Neither the United States nor Pakistan seems to attach much importance to them. For some time Pakistan has been a largely noncooperating member of SEATO and CENTO, and both Mujibur Rahman and Z.A. Bhutto advocate the termination of membership in both security arrangements.

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[33] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace, loc. cit.*
[34] *Ibid.,* pp. 55-56.

Pakistan entered into collective and bilateral security arrangements with the United States primarily to obtain military aid and to acquire greater security against India, and it has been bitter because Washington has not given it the support expected in its conflicts with India, especially in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The United States has gone officially on record to the effect that its commitments to Pakistan were directed against communist aggression only, and were in no way directed against India. India has repeatedly criticized the U.S. policy of entering into security arrangements, and especially U.S. sponsorship and association with SEATO and CENTO, and it has been vociferously opposed to American military aid to Pakistan. Mrs. Bandaranaike's government in Ceylon has also been quite critical of U.S. alliance policies.

The United States is unlikely to attempt to revive its mutual security arrangements with Pakistan. These seem to have become counterproductive and to have lost their importance. Pakistan is in any event apt to withdraw from SEATO and CENTO, and to maintain only its bilateral arrangements, mainly as a means of getting military aid. Since 1965 American military aid to Pakistan has been largely suspended, except for a limited amount of "nonlethal weapons" and a "one-time sale of a limited amount of military equipment"[35] in 1970. On the whole, the era of formal American military commitments and aid to Pakistan seems to be ending, though U.S. concern about the security of South Asia will continue.

Whether the United States considers the security and survival of Pakistan or India or the smaller countries of South Asia "vital" to its security may be a debatable question. Certainly these countries have some doubts about the extent to which they can rely on Washington in case of extreme emergency. The major immediate problem concerns the kind of "shield of nuclear power" the United States could, and would, provide if India became involved in a conflict with a nuclear-armed China. India realizes that it would be no match for China if the Chinese chose to use nuclear weapons against it. Thus India is faced with, and haunted by, a security problem beyond its capabilities of resolution. This is the principal reason why it refuses to adhere to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty so long as China will not be a party to it, and why there is strong, and growing, pressure in India upon the government to reverse its present policy and embark on a program of building atomic weapons.[36] Both the United States and the Soviet Union have exerted considerable pressure on India to adhere to the NPT and to its present policy of developing nuclear power for peaceful uses only; but neither superpower is willing to give a unilateral guarantee, or associate itself with the other in a joint guarantee of protection to India against a Chinese nuclear attack. And even were such a guarantee extended, Indians would question its effectiveness in time of greatest need and wonder about the price the superpowers would exact for it.

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[35] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace,* p. 113.

In "cases involving other types of aggression," to use President Nixon's words, the South Asian countries may well be dubious about the American President's promise to "furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate." They realize that the U.S. definition of aggression and its interpretation of "appropriate" assistance if aggression is recognized may be quite different from their own, and they are understandably skeptical of the reliability of such a vaguely worded promise in a crisis situation.

Until recently the South Asian countries were almost exclusively concerned with defense of the land frontiers of the subcontinent and with defense against each other. Now, as a result of the changed security situation in the Indian Ocean area, they have had for the first time to give serious attention to oceanic as well as continental defense. The nature of the new security problems is quite clear.[37] For many decades prior to World War II the Indian Ocean was virtually a British lake, and no other power even tried to challenge British control there. Thus the power that controlled the subcontinent also controlled the ocean access routes. From World War II until two or three years ago American and British sea and air power dominated the Indian Ocean, and since these countries were friendly and kept the visible evidences of their power at a discreet distance, the new states of South Asia had no real worries about oceanic defense or access.

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[36] See Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," *India Quarterly,* April-June 1965; "Nuclear Weapons and India's Security," *The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Journal,* July 1970; and "Nuclear Weapons for India—Four Views," *Indian Express,* May 16, 1970.

[37] See T. B. Millar, *The Indian and Pacific Oceans: Some Strategic Considerations* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 57, May 1969).

A number of recent developments have changed this picture. They include such major departures as the British Labour Government's announcement in 1968 of its intention to withdraw most of its troops and to abandon most of its commitments east of Suez by the end of 1971 (a decision modified but not really reversed by the Conservative Government which came to power in England in June 1970); the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine, heralding a considerable U.S. military disengagement from Asia after the Viet Nam war has ended; the growing Soviet interest and naval presence in the Indian Ocean; and, to a lesser extent, evidences of growing interest in the Indian Ocean on the part of Japan and Communist China.

India has been particularly concerned about the changed situation in the ocean that bears her name. She seems to be more concerned about British and American than Soviet activity, even though the two Western powers are reducing their activities in the area while the Soviets are rapidly increasing theirs. India has protested strongly against the announced British and American plan to build a joint air and radio communications base on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, about 1,200 miles south of the tip of India. Showing less wariness about the growing naval activity of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, she has welcomed visits to her ports by Soviet naval units, is developing a naval base at Visakhapatnam on the Bay of Bengal with Moscow's assistance, and is strengthening her own navy with Soviet aid.[38] India denies that she has given the USSR any base facilities on Indian territory in return for Soviet assistance to her own naval development.

India's main professed aim in the Indian Ocean is that the area will remain "a zone of peace." For that reason she would prefer not to have any foreign naval presence in the ocean, especially that of any major power. Since this is clearly an unrealistic and unattainable goal, the next order of preference would seem to be to have a Soviet as well as a Western presence in evidence, possibly to counteract each other and to prevent the domination of the sea routes to India by a single power.[39]

[38] Anthony Harrigan, "India's Maritime Posture," *Military Review*, April 1969.

[39] "Seventies Will See Triangular Big-Power Contest in Indian Ocean," *Hindustan Times*, April 3, 1970.

South Asian attitudes toward the United States and American attitudes toward South Asia are equally ambivalent. They will probably remain so during the 1970's and beyond. The South Asian countries are likely to expect larger amounts of American assistance in their political and economic development and in defense and security, with fewer restrictions and "strings," than they will in fact receive. They are sensitive to American criticisms and pressures and to real or imagined American intervention. Yet the one thing they seem to fear more is American disinterest and withdrawal.

The 1970's are certain to be difficult years for the South Asian states. The prospects are for increasing political instability and social tensions, inadequate economic performance, continued intraregional tensions, and almost unsolvable defense problems. These countries will need a great deal of help in coping with their basic problems of development and survival, even though they will not receive this help graciously or use it most effectively. Much of the needed external assistance can only come from the United States — through bilateral and multilateral aid programs, help in improving balance of payments and foreign trade positions, encouragement of measures to build up political stability by democratic means and to safeguard fundamental human freedoms, and a recognition of "their legitimate interests in self-defense," to use President Nixon's words, while at the same time expressing "serious concern over the waste of their limited resources in an arms race."[40]

In the present mood of America, suddenly preoccupied with internal problems, nursing the wounds, tangible and intangible, of the still-unfinished war in Viet Nam, disillusioned by the results of its aid programs, and tired of bearing what it regards as an undue share of the world's burdens, it is highly unlikely that the United States will respond adequately to South Asian needs. America's priorities lie elsewhere. The United States knows little of the real conditions in South Asia. She is not enamored with the leaders and policies and orientation of these states and regimes; she feels that her present efforts, including billions of dollars of aid, have not been sufficiently effective or appreciated; she is increasingly appalled by the magnitude of the problems facing the South Asian countries, problems which seem to be getting worse rather than better; and she is disturbed that their leaders spend so much time and waste so much of their limited resources and energies on internal rivalries and political maneuvering (in the case of India and Pakistan, in prolonged hostilities), showing little evidence of willingness to foster real regional cooperation.

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[40] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,* p. 61.

From the point of view of American national interests, in terms of Bernard Gordon's three categories,[41] South Asia represents a Level Two and not a Level One interest. That is to say, with respect to South Asia the United States has several kinds of special interests, but these are not vital in the sense that Washington would make an all-out commitment to go to war, if necessary, to support them. If the internal conditions in South Asia should deteriorate alarmingly, or if a major external attack, especially one threatening to upset the larger power balance, materializes, the United States might find that South Asia should be elevated to the Level One position. But under present and foreseeable circumstances this is doubtful, especially in view of the hard lessons Washington has learned regarding the limitations on its power and the consequences of "creeping involvement" and escalation of interests as well as operations.

The United States is going through a period of searching re-examination of her internal and external interests, priorities and objectives, and her basic values and goals. This re-examination, and America's reactions to the rapidly changing international situation, will probably lead to a considerable reordering of her foreign policies in the decade of the 1970's. In this process her relations with the countries of South Asia will be re-examined and possibly given a higher priority and a more realistic underpinning.

Developments in Asia will inescapably be of major concern to the United States. The Nixon Doctrine will be the basic framework of U.S.-Asian relations well into the 1970's. This Doctrine will involve a large measure of military disengagement from Asia, but it will not involve American withdrawal or a decreased American interest in the course of events in Asia. Hopefully, as President Nixon stated, "the changes taking place in that region enable us to change the character of our involvement." But, he continued, "we remain involved in Asia. We are a Pacific power. We have learned that peace for us is much less likely if there is no peace in Asia."[42]

While attention will continue to be focused mainly on crisis areas such as Viet Nam and the Middle East represent at the present time, in the long run U.S. relations with the three major states of Asia, Japan, China and India, will be of greater importance; and South Asia will deserve a higher priority than any other part of the continent except East Asia. For, to quote the President again, "the one-fifth of mankind who live in India and Pakistan can make the difference for the future of Asia"[43] — perhaps also for the prospects for peace in the world. Hence, a primary concern of American foreign policy should be the development of policies that will give meaning and substance to the President's words.

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[41] Bernard K. Gordon, *Toward Disengagement in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), Chapter Two, "Interests, Objectives, and Policies."

[42] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,* p. 54.

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND UNITED STATES POLICY

by Frank N. Trager

PREDICTABILITY in the policy sciences rests in the first instance on the accumulation and interpretation of data gathered from the recent past and the present. It rests in the last instance on what Santayana called "animal faith," an undemonstrable projection of expected repetitions and the possible range of emergents. Obviously, the margin for error increases with the temporal extension, and especially so with abrupt changes in the political cast of characters. This latter element can produce unexpected and unpredicted "happenings" even in the short run. When President A. Milton Obote of Uganda attended a British Commonwealth Conference in January 1971, or Prince Sihanouk left Cambodia in January 1970 for a "vacation" in a French clinic for reasons of health, few if any analysts were ready to predict, or would have expected, that the former would be a political victim of a coup (January 25, 1971) or that the latter would be legally deposed as chief of state on March 18, 1970.

Such considerations — gathering and interpreting data of the near-past and present, calculating the probabilities of future events, and exploring the ever-changing cast of actors — necessarily condition what is here offered as an estimate of alternative futures in the 1970's for Southeast Asia in relation to U.S. policy. The following examples in part illustrate the problem.

(1) The political and military defeat of the Sukarno-PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) collaboration ensuing from the attempted 1965 coup of the "September 30th Movement" ended the frenetic decade of almost fatal Indonesian policy dominated by Sukarno. That charismatic leader presented his *Konsepsi* or plan for "guided democracy" in a broadcast on February 21, 1957. By 1959 he had imposed on his country a bureaucratic dictatorship that increasingly required the willing support of the PKI. This was followed by Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in 1961 and the subsequent creation of a Djakarta-Peking axis known as the New Emerging Forces (NEFO), which included North Korea, North Viet Nam, and in a somewhat restrained manner, Cambodia, and then by the "Crush Malaysia" or *Kon-*

frontasi war launched in 1963. The failure of the attempted coup on the night of September 30-October 1, 1965 resulted in the army's rise to power with General Suharto emerging as leader. Afterward Suharto was elected President by the People's Consultative Congress. Between 1966 and 1968 Sukarno's charisma faded while he was stripped of all power and placed in "protective custody." He died on June 21, 1970.

President Suharto faces the 1970's burdened with the huge Sukarno-incurred external debt of almost three billion dollars, which is owed on a roughly fifty-fifty basis to the USSR and to a consortium of noncommunist states including the United States and Japan. The inherited domestic economy — a shambles of runaway inflation and near-bankruptcy — is being rebuilt by a combination of military and civilian "technocrats."[1] Suharto has sought to meet these problems by leading Indonesia back into the UN and dissolving the Djakarta-Peking axis. Furthermore, he has taken steps to allow the recreation of political parties, excluding the outlawed PKI. New general elections are scheduled for July 1971. Meanwhile the eclipse of the PKI leaves Indonesia under the control of the army, which sits astride a new political structure whose base is composed of secular nationalists, democratic socialists, moderate Muslims and Orthodox Muslims. These groups have not worked in constructive harness since the early 1950's.

Indonesia's domestic task of the 1970's is to achieve political stability whether under a continuance of the present benign military-civilian bureaucracy or under a democratic government freely chosen by the electorate. The passing from the scene of the chief actor, the charismatic Sukarno, who had dominated the Indonesian nationalist stage from 1927 when he organized the first Nationalist Party until 1966, imposes on Suharto and his colleagues the need to establish and sustain a public leadership acceptable to a large number — not necessarily a majority — of the 120 million Indonesians. This is no mean task.

(2) The Cambodian situation is even more complicated than that of Indonesia. Prince Sihanouk had been a puppet king in the French Protectorate of Cambodia. After independence,[2] he ab-

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[1] See, for example, "Indonesia: Plans and Prospects. Eight Talks on Indonesia's New Economic Outlook," *Asia,* Autumn 1970.

[2] It is pertinent to note that Cambodia was already a sovereign state at the 1954 Geneva "Indochina" conference. Her delegation, not the defeated French, signed the cease-fire agreement with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (Hanoi). But despite this agreement her integrity and sovereignty has been violated by the DRVN, not always without the consent of Sihanouk, until he, too, began in 1969 to be worried about Hanoi's encroachments.

dicated in favor of his father, organized a political party that in 1955 won all the seats in the National Assembly, one of the two houses of government, and became Premier. In 1960, the National Assembly amended the 1947 Constitution, and Sihanouk became chief of state until he was deposed in 1970. Until then, he was Cambodia's acknowledged leader and dominant political force. He tolerated no peer.

Although Sihanouk was not unopposed during his long rule, he overcame his opposition without difficulty, however eccentrically he seemed to pursue his foreign policies.[3] What can be said of him before 1970, whatever the final judgment, is that he sought to preserve Cambodia's territorial integrity and security by a series of moves designed to put her on the "winning side" in the Indochinese wars, thus assuring that she would at least have an independent future.

During 1968-1969 Sihanouk seemed once again to be shifting his policies, this time away from Peking and Hanoi. He and his Premier, General Lon Nol, issued statements[4] warning against and worrying about North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military invasions and installations in Cambodia. However, Sihanouk obviously thought he could safely leave for his vacation and medical treatment in January 1970 with Lon Nol returning from France (where he, too, had gone for medical treatment in late 1969) in February. The worsening events in Cambodia during the months of the dry season were reported to the absent Prince. But while Lon Nol became more worried about North Vietnamese aggression, Sihanouk seemed less so. Whether this came about because he thought his leadership was being questioned or because he once again switched his views while in France, or for some other reason, is not known. Clearly, Sihanouk in France rejected Lon Nol's advice from Cambodia, threatened to replace Lon Nol's government, and then announced that he was off to Moscow and

[3] For a sympathetic presentation of Sihanouk, see Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1965). Smith clearly indicates that "political power in Cambodia is concentrated in the hands of one individual, Prince Sihanouk" (p. 224). For an article recognizing some less than adulatory supporters, see Bernard K. Gordon and Kathryn Young, "Cambodia: Following the Leader?," *Asian Survey,* February 1970, pp. 169-176. General Lon Nol had long been in command of the army. Twice (during 1966-1967 and 1969-1970) he served as Sihanouk's Premier. However, his deputy, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak — one of the royal princes who held posts in the government — was not regarded as "close" to Sihanouk.

[4] For a brief summary of these see South East Asia Treaty Organization, "Red Khmer Activities in Cambodia," *Trends and Highlights,* October 1, 1969, pp. 16-17.

Peking once more to secure assistance in curtailing Hanoi's hostile operations in Cambodia.

As one follows Sihanouk to Moscow and Peking during those critical days, March 13-18 and later, the published news stories show that he got at most only sympathetic words; weeks later Peking agreed to his "leadership" in a new communist front to liberate Cambodia.

Sihanouk, as far as Cambodia is concerned, is a "finished" leader, a probability that he may genuinely understand. Even if all of former Indochina including Cambodia were to come under communist control, it is most doubtful that he would be restored to power. Yet, *vanitas vanitatum,* he appears to feel the need to persist in power, even as a communist "front."

Sihanouk's decade of diplomatic fence-sitting and fence-jumping proved to be a ruinous exercise for him and severely endangered his country. He thought he was buying time, territorial integrity and communist recognition of Cambodia's borders. For this he allowed and supported North Vietnamese communist "sanctuaries" within Cambodia from which South Viet Nam could be attacked; he permitted North Vietnamese military entry into Cambodia via the Ho Chi Minh trails and the port of Sihanoukville. Months before the Americans and South Vietnamese counterattacked the North Vietnamese in Cambodia in the spring of 1970 he publicly acknowledged the growing danger to his country from erstwhile North Vietnamese friends. But he failed to talk them into withdrawing peacefully.

In February 1971 Lon Nol suffered a stroke and, although he made a partial recovery under American medical treatment in Hawaii, he resigned as premier on April 20. The governmental crisis that followed was finally resolved when Lon Nol agreed to serve as titular premier while Lt. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, the former deputy premier, was given the principal executive power and asked to form a new cabinet. Sirik faces a formidable task in trying to build and sustain a government while the war in Cambodia continues. Cambodia cannot survive as a noncommunist state unless the North Vietnamese military forces are blocked at her borders. The assorted remaining Cambodian-Vietnamese communists inside Cambodia could then be worn down by an indigenous Cambodian government supported by friends and allies. Whatever else Cambodian elites may be, it may be prudently assumed that they are both anti-Vietnamese and anti-Thai. But in the first instance Cambodia must have a government that is capable of representing and protecting her institutions. Sihanouk's leadership, even more than Sukarno's, left little room for instant political development of capable alternatives.

II

These two much-abbreviated synopses of highly complex Southeast Asian situations are meant to suggest some of the variables with respect to domestic political stability involved in attempting an estimate of alternative Southeast Asian futures.[5] The other noncommunist states of the region face comparable tasks, as the following illustrations point out.

(1) South Viet Nam under its 1967 Constitution will hold its Presidential and National Assembly elections in the early fall of 1971. Half of the Senate was elected in a relatively peaceful and honest vote in the summer of 1970. A relatively peaceful and honest election, again in 1971, remains the key to the political stability and development necessary for any competent military leadership in South Viet Nam to achieve military security.

(2) Thailand, which alone among the Southeast Asian states succeeded in retaining her independence during the period of Western imperialism, changed from an absolute monarchy to a military-civilian bureaucracy following the coup of 1932. Her present constitutional monarch has more informal power today than either he in earlier years or his predecessors, since the coup, enjoyed. In 1969 Thailand adopted a new constitution — her eighth or ninth since 1932 — providing for a unicameral legislative body (a House of Representatives comprising 219 members) of limited powers elected by universal suffrage. The

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[5] For the purposes of this article I exclude treatment of other domestic issues that also profoundly affect estimates of the future, such as interethnic relationships and the economy. Concerning interethnic relations (e.g., between Malays and Chinese), see my "The Federation of Malaysia: An Intermediate Failure," in Thomas M. Franck, editor, *Why Federations Fail, An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1968), pp. 125-166. Every other Southeast Asian state has some ethnic problem to solve.

Regarding the economy, all Southeast Asian states, with the possible exception of Laos, have physical resource bases not only capable of sustaining their present and near-future average population densities, but also of producing modest (5 per cent per year) annual growth rates. Several, e.g., Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, have easily exceeded this. The basic economic issues for Southeast Asian governments involve wiser decisions on resource allocation, acquisition of skills and applied technologies, agreeable conditions for and utilization of domestic savings and foreign investment, and effective approaches for domestic and export marketing.

If the 1970's should fail to produce a single new economic development data paper on any or all Southeast Asian states (except perhaps Laos), the volume of still usable data papers produced during the past twenty years would suffice for the next twenty.

durable military-civilian bureaucracy, which arranges for its own internal succession and has committed itself to the political process of "party" elections, has been responsible for rather successful economic growth. There appears to be little threat to its continuation in office. It will make room for and otherwise accommodate a "loyal opposition." But Thailand faces an "ethnic" insurgency trained by the Communist Chinese and in part staffed by North Vietnamese. She no longer overlooks threats in the north and northeast provinces.

(3) Burma suspended her 1948 Constitution after the 1962 military coup, and dissolved her bicameral legislative bodies. Since the coup she has been ruled by a small military council with minor civilian participation. The "Revolutionary Council" has no intention at this time of resurrecting parliamentary democracy. It is moving at snail's pace toward one-party government in the name of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) and its to-be-adopted party constitution. This cadre party – to become a mass party under the constitution when it is finally approved – has combined elements of Marxism, Buddhism and extreme nationalism in its "program," known as the "Burmese Way to Socialism." The mixture, allowing for the differences between the Islamic culture of Indonesia and the Buddhist culture of Burma, is a rhetorical echo of Sukarno's vague and rhetorical "Marhaenism."[6] Neither the Revolutionary Council nor the BSPP has provided for any successor to General Ne Win, its chairman, whose active political and military career began in the early 1930's.

A short time ago Ne Win described the once growing national economy as a "mess." At this writing there is no reason to change that view, although the 1970 change-over from highly centralized state corporations to somewhat decentralized functional cooperatives, which in theory relaxes the extraordinarily mismanaged control, should bring about improvement. Additionally, the Chinese communists at the northeast Burmese

[6] A term Sukarno first used in a 1930 speech and used again and again in his postindependence agitations, "Marhaenism" is supposed to stand for a kind of peasant-worker socialistic or welfaristic theory of society. Unlike Marxism, it is not atheistic in principle and it is not based on a proletarian-capitalist class analysis of society. It embraces elements that include a nonclass, nationalist, socialist ideology, added to the basic religio-culture of the society in which it operates. See my "Burma 1968 — A New Beginning," *Asian Survey,* February 1969, pp. 104-114; also John Badgley, "The Union of Burma: Age Twenty-Two," *ibid.,* February 1971, pp. 149-158. Badgley, however, regards the BSPP as exclusively "Marxist." In a 1971 May Day message General Ne Win said he wanted to convert the country's political system from "centralism" to "democratic socialism," and also convert the cadre BSPP into a "popular organization."

border have provided a new center for training and inspiring an ethnically-based communist insurgency to replace the decimated Burmese-led one. Meanwhile, U Nu, the former Prime Minister who was deposed in 1962, also seeks through little more than propagandistic means to incite insurgency based on ethnic minorities. Despite all this the government has conspicuously facilitated entrance into and exit from Burma.

(4) The stability of Laos has little, if anything, to do with domestic politics, since according to one estimate a thousand members of elite families constitute the leadership of the country, and most of them now support Premier Souvanna Phouma. The problem presently facing Laos is the aggression of the North Vietnamese in league with the local communist variant, the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), headed nominally by the Premier's half-brother Souphanouvong. Her defense is primarily maintained by the United States. Whether this situation will lead to a divided nation or to the retention of territorial integrity is at this time moot. The weakening of Laos began shortly after her neutrality was presumably guaranteed by the signatories to the Geneva Declaration in 1962.[7] North Viet Nam was one of those signatories. The North Vietnamese-NLHS attack – which assumed the name of the Lao People's Liberation Army – began in the late spring of 1963 after the NLHS withdrew from the Geneva-created coalition government.

(5) Malaysia and Singapore have weathered the political crisis of the latter's "eviction"[8] from the Federation of Malaysia. Singapore has gone on to an interesting variant of democratic "one-party" stability and prosperity. Malaysia's internal security and prosperity, which primarily rest upon the sustained harmony of the Malay-Chinese communities, were markedly upset once again by the 1969 "racial" clashes, as they are called in Kuala Lumpur. The emergency police powers then imposed on the country were lifted by the new government of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, who replaced Tunku Abdul Rahman when he retired in 1970, but the price for an enduring constitutional democracy is now based on constitutional restrictions against incitements to "racial" conflict. The central task of Tun Abdul's government is to find a way to execute such restrictions without

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[7] For background see my "Laos and the Defense of Southeast Asia," ORBIS, Fall 1963, pp. 551-582.

[8] Singapore uses the word in its account of the separation that occurred on August 9, 1965.

violating due process. Given conditions of domestic and external peace, both Malaysia and Singapore can thrive.

(6) The Philippines in 1969 re-elected President Marcos to a historically unprecedented second term – an event that is unlikely to solve any of the seemingly intractable difficulties of sociopolitical life in that country. Philippine governments since independence in 1946 have been making social policy promises to the people and have been unable to keep them. The consequent frustration of the public, when added to what one author has described as the "heavy weight of personalization" in political life, "leads to disillusionment and despair."[9] In the first months of 1970 serious student and other rioting erupted in Manila, directed against the President and the oligarchic system. Some of the disorders were inspired by a relatively new student left of Maoist type known as the *Kabataang Makabayan,* but even after the government arrested the chairman of this revolutionary group the fundamental noncommunist factors which had created unrest remained. Frustration also feeds the re-established Communist Party of the Philippines and its Maoist military arm, the New People's Army, led by Commander Dante (Bernabe Buscayno). These forces have easily displaced the older Huks whose leader, Pedro Taruc, was shot in the process of being captured (the second-in-command Sumulong had been captured a month earlier).[10]

Presumably the Filipinos are now placing future hopes in the newly elected Constituent Assembly that meets in June 1971 to draft a more suitable constitution; this will be submitted to a national referendum in 1974.

III

In the brave new world of postcolonial independence in Southeast Asia three states, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaya/Malaysia, joined Thailand as constitutional monarchies; five, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, South Viet Nam and Singapore, became constitutional republics; one, North Viet Nam, became a communist "Democratic Republic." The foregoing section has served to suggest the fragility of these political arrangements. Military-civilian bureaucracies, more or less benign, in fact rule in Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand. South Viet Nam is in a transitional state; her chances for a democratic future depend mainly on the outcome of the war. A communist dictatorship still holds North Viet Nam. Excluding the latter, Southeast Asian states at the time of independence clearly opted for that type of democracy where the rule of law obtains; where citizens as electors freely choose and can replace their leaders; where the courts support "due process"; where the military — frequently a proud sector of the anti-colonial movement — is initially a modest self-defense and internal stability force; most importantly where a high resolve exists to transform the raw material-extractive economies into developed or diversified ones sufficiently potent to raise living standards for the farm laborer, the peasant holder of small lands and the city worker.

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[9] Jean Grossholtz, *Politics in the Philippines* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), p. 282.

[10] See *New York Times,* October 17 and 19, 1970. The old Moscow-oriented Huks had been substantially defeated by Defense Minister and then President Magsaysay. Pedro Taruc's uncle, the better known communist leader, Luis Taruc, surrendered in 1954. It is generally accepted that the younger Taruc and Sumulong had in recent years become a kind of bandit gang. Huks — Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan — can be read as People's Liberation Army.

Sometimes all this was called democracy, or social democracy, or socialism, or "Marhaenism," even constructive capitalism. The name meant little or nothing. However, the commitment to the options outlined was as real in its initial phases as anything I know — and I was there in the midst of it at the start of the 1950's. I knew by acquaintance and by study a wide circle of the political and bureaucratic leadership in many of the Southeast Asian countries and traveled widely and frequently throughout the countryside. The importance of the "countryside" — a concept singularly neglected in urban America — in lands that then reflected an 80-20 per cent rural-urban demographic ratio was frequently downgraded by eager, urbanized nationalist planners despite their much-touted slogans concerning land reform, peasant welfare and rural uplift. Economic development in these states in this early period unfortunately usually meant an emphasis on industrial development at the expense of the rural sector, which was actually the indispensable factor for any long-range development.[11]

What appeared to be a brave new world at independence has barely survived. Every state in the area has experienced the shattering of its domestic peace. In Indonesia this occurred during two brief and bloody communist rebellions. In the Philippines and Malaya civil war initiated by communists lasted for periods as long as seven and twelve years respectively; now the Philippines is suffering a serious renewal of insurgency under new pro-Peking leadership. Meanwhile, the remnants of the old communist insurgency led by Chin Peng continue to give trouble at the Malaya-Thai border. In Thailand episodic communist insurgency, barely noticed in the 1950's, became a problem to consider in the 1960's. In Burma communist insurgency, now fully supported by Peking, has remained a disruptive factor from 1948 to the present. Then there are the communist wars the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam wages against its Indochinese neighbors. Every communist insurgency effort has been openly endorsed and overtly or covertly supported by the communist parties of the USSR and the People's Republic of China. Sometimes they have worked in concert, at other times separately, under policies adopted initially at the organizing meeting of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in Warsaw in 1947, and since then reaffirmed and restated at one or another of their respective party conclaves.[12]

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[11] See my *Towards a Welfare State in Burma, Economic Reconstruction and Development 1948-1954* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954). The second edition (1958) is entitled *Building a Welfare State in Burma.*

As if communist insurgency were not enough of a burden to bear, several states have also suffered from severe forms of ethnic or religious strife which sometimes assumes the character of an insurgency: the Karen and Shan problems of Burma, the Malay-Chinese conflict in Malaysia, *Darul Islam* in Indonesia, all represent challenges to domestic stability. Though most Southeast Asian states have an indigenous ethnic majority population with a well articulated culture, all are ethnically pluralistic and commercialistic. Building and maintaining national unity while preserving the values of ethnic, racial and cultural diversity is as difficult for these newly independent states as resolving similar problems is in such long-established polities as Belgium, Canada, Northern Ireland, the United States or the Soviet Union.

A further complication in their search for domestic stability and improved living conditions has occurred because all Southeast Asian states have been reaching for a foreign policy that would offer some guarantees of external peace. With the exception of the two Viet Nams, all have sought and achieved membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The first optimism that accompanied such membership has long since dissipated. In

[12] See Frank N. Trager, "The Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia," in William Henderson, editor, *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 134-164; and Frank N. Trager with Robert F. Bordonaro, "The Ninth CCP Congress and the World Communist Conference: Their Meaning for Asia," ORBIS, Fall 1969. At the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress convened at the end of March 1971, the Soviet Politburo stood firm on giving material support to Egypt and North Viet Nam and endorsed its general policy on "wars of national liberation."

the case of Burma, Indonesia and, to a certain extent, Cambodia, each has taken refuge in a variant of neutralism or nonalignment, seeking what Prime Minister U Nu called "good" and "powerful allies." Burma has remained what I have elsewhere called an honest neutralist,[13] that is, her various governments since the early 1950's have clearly and openly avoided any "leaning to one side." Indonesia and Cambodia have gone through the gyrations noted above.

Other states have placed their faith in "collective security." In the latter case, Thailand, the Philippines and the Republic of Viet Nam each elected to share in collective security agreements and treaties with the United States. Malaysia and Singapore until recently have apparently been content with their roles in the British Commonwealth defense system. Laos had been "covered" by the Protocol of the U.S.-sponsored South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), but was withdrawn into neutrality by the Geneva Conference and Agreements of 1962. All Southeast Asian states have tried some form of participation in regional associations designed to initiate or extend intraregional cooperation. As of this writing only Burma, Cambodia and North Viet Nam are not members of any intraregional association; Laos technically has "observer" status in one.

Obviously, in the more than twenty years of independence neither domestic stability nor external peace has been achieved.[14] Neutralism, regionalism and treaty alignments with Moscow, Peking or Washington have failed to provide the Southeast Asian states with the peace they need and want. It is no mean achievement that each of the noncommunist states has survived through decades of externally stimulated and supported insurgency or, in the case of Indochina, limited conventional warfare. The chief victim of such warfare has been and continues to be mainland Southeast Asia. In the island and archipelago countries insurgency is less widespread, chiefly because the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have no contiguous borders with a communist state.

In terms of this background, what of the 1970's?

IV

Any future for Southeast Asia beyond that of survival must take into account the new roles of several major actors on the Asian scene. The unlamented demise of Western colonialism brought about the forced departure of France and Holland. England finally, and with some grace, gave up her imperial past in the area and more recently has withdrawn from any significant defense contribution to the Asian-Pacific Commonwealth states. These three formerly powerful actors have been replaced by the Soviet Union, Communist China and the United States.

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[13] See my *Burma from Kingdom to Republic, A Historical and Political Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1966), Chapter 10.

[14] Only Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore have experienced a sustained economic growth and consequently sustained improvements in conditions of living.

Russia/USSR has been a major Asian-Pacific power for well over a century. As one of the two superpowers, the USSR recently has significantly extended her presence in the Indian Ocean, seeking to fill a naval vacuum created by the British departure. The People's Republic of China (PRC) does not presently pose a direct challenge to the superpowers, even if she were so inclined, but her growing nuclear capacity in addition to her large conventional forces represents considerable power in Asia, and all other Asian states are aware of this. However Moscow and Peking may regard each other, both — and their Asian communist satellites — continue to advertise their support for "just" and "holy" wars of "national liberation" or "people's war." There are strong probabilities that this communist policy in support of protracted war will persist. In this sense, therefore, one may conclude that there will be no peace in Asia in the 1970's.

The other superpower, the United States, is currently disengaging herself from the Viet Nam war under the guidelines of a policy known as Vietnamization. The latter is a specific element in a much broader range of Asian policy, the Nixon Doctrine.

Besides these three, Japan, though not yet a nuclear power, has acquired the kind of substantial and growing interests in Southeast Asia that she once sought as part of her "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," and for which she went to war against the United States. What she has acquired and will continue to gain by peaceful trade investments will surely not be sacrificed to Peking's blackmail, nuclear or otherwise. When Japan must inevitably choose between maintaining her policy of post-World War II "pacifism" and retaining the third largest gross national product in the world, she will transform the former into a suitable defense posture to assure the growth of the latter.

The fifth actor, of less capacity than Japan but operating with a clear geopolitical understanding of Southeast Asia, is Australia. Australia is a senior, although frequently neglected, defense ally of the United States. In ANZUS, the Australia-New Zealand-U.S.

Defense Treaty signed in 1951, she is also a military ally in the active defense of South Viet Nam. Independently of the United States, she has carried a substantial burden of Commonwealth defense in behalf of Malaysia against Sukarno's *Konfrontasi* war; and she currently cooperates in a loose Commonwealth defense arrangement with Malaysia, Singapore and New Zealand in response to the loss of power occasioned by the major British withdrawal from the area.

Perhaps India should also be considered as one of the possibly significant actors in Southeast Asia, but I mention this idea merely to dismiss it. Whatever the domestic outcome of Mrs. Gandhi's overwhelming success in the recent elections may be, India under her leadership will continue to lean toward Moscow in foreign policy matters. Moscow holds a variety of economic and defense mortgages on Indian policy decisions, and these will help the Indian Prime Minister to maintain her generally pro-Moscow behavior. For the Western economic consortium to continue to support India in this context would be political masochism. Additionally, though India may succeed in pulling herself up the economic development ladder during the decade, the task will be so all-consuming as to leave her little maneuverability in Southeast Asia, where her welcome in recent years has substantially declined.

V

For the future of this region of the world the Nixon Doctrine, as it relates to Asia in general and Viet Nam in particular, merits special consideration. President Nixon's foreign policy represents a break with that of the recent past. For him, the post-World War II period in international relations "has ended." He asserts that "today" the facts of international life have sufficiently changed to warrant a change in policy. To support his thesis he cites the economic and political recovery in Western Europe and Japan; the "new spirit and growing strength of independence" among the ex-colonial states; the "shattering" of the "monolithic communist world"; the alterations in the nature of the military balance which no longer assure the United States of "superiority" (perhaps not even of parity); and the declining "vitality" of what he calls the "isms," the nineteenth-century "ideological accessories of the intellectual debate."[15]

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[15] The quotations in these paragraphs are from Richard Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,* The White House, February 18, 1970, pp. 2-7, and *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace,* The White House, February 25, 1971, pp. 3-17.

Offered in this context, the Nixon policy relies on partnership, (military) strength to protect our vital interests, and a willingness to negotiate. Its central thesis, first enunciated on July 25, 1969 during his visit to Guam, is that

> the United States will participate in the defense and development of its allies and friends, but that America cannot — and will not — conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.

He adds that we will maintain our commitments but require "more responsible participation by our friends in their own defense. . . . we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security."

It would be difficult on any objective ground to fault the general thrust of this Nixon Doctrine. At its best, it calls for a long overdue re-examination of our recent past and states our willingness to work out a new set of relationships with allies, friends and erstwhile foes on the basis of perceived interests. The worldwide network of American-led alliances designed to implement the Truman Doctrine certainly requires overhaul. Some are decrepit (CENTO); others (SEATO) have become sieves through which member states have withdrawn in part or in whole. In still others (NATO) our allies have persistently failed to meet planned force levels in support of the alliance even after they were economically able to do so. Above all, the currently parlous state of the military balance based on parity, which Secretary of Defense McNamara deliberately sought during the Kennedy-Johnson years, underlines President Nixon's reference to the need for military strength to protect our vital interests in an "era of negotiation."

We know that the President has either continued or begun negotiations with adversaries so that his representatives now meet with the North Vietnamese in Paris and with the Soviets in Helsinki and Vienna. Furthermore, he has cautiously made overtures for a new beginning with Communist China. We know, too, that he has reaffirmed a U.S. commitment to NATO, and that, partially on the basis of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, scheduled for 1972, he has agreed to continue the Japanese Defense Treaty on a year-to-year basis. Finally, we know that he has taken some steps to repair our deficiencies in the military balance by means of developments in ABM, MIRV, and

R&D funding. But what has been done to carry out the Nixon Doctrine in these important issues, all of them requiring time and patience, is like the "spring tryouts" in the pre-season baseball warm-up — to use a sports analogy in the President's mode. Some of us are anxiously awaiting the regular "big league" season with its long competitive strain.[16]

Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos represent a special case within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine. In their particularities they can be regarded as independent of that Doctrine. In their general impact, they have raised serious questions about the Doctrine itself and about the future of Southeast Asia.

When Richard Nixon took office he, as President, had only three basic options with regard to the situation in Viet Nam: he could end the war in a unilateral withdrawal that would tacitly or overtly acknowledge a U.S. defeat; he could mount a military effort based upon classical "principles of war"[17] to impose defeat on Hanoi; or he could find some way to withdraw from Viet Nam in order to ease domestic American difficulties connected with the war effort while simultaneously attempting to insure the United States' original objective of safeguarding a noncommunist South Viet Nam. He opted for the last and labeled it "Vietnamization."

Perhaps Vietnamization is a poor word to describe the strategy being carried out in Viet Nam. Actually President Johnson had already adopted that strategy in the summer of 1968 when he assigned General Abrams to replace General Westmoreland as Commander in the area. Abrams' mission, among other things, was to retrain and re-equip the regular, regional and popular forces of South Viet Nam so that they could assume the onus of combat operations along with the American and allied forces. Up to that time, more particularly from 1965 on, the American military had constituted the main offensive combat forces, while the armed forces of Viet Nam (ARVN) were largely engaged in situational defense. The latter's good showing during the 1968 TET and spring campaigns contributed to the decision to launch Vietnamization.

President Nixon seized on the foregoing set of circumstances to fashion his strategy for the protracted Vietnamese war. If a rejuvenated, retrained, re-equipped ARVN could take to the field and prosper, it would be possible to reduce and eventually withdraw U.S. combat forces. Such a policy would reduce pressure at home and conceivably insure against defeat in Viet Nam. Nixon has accordingly announced successive withdrawals — some 260,000 troops, roughly 50 per cent of the total, will have been withdrawn by May 1971 — while he has bet on the success of the ARVN. He has won his bet.

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[16] In the President's 1971 report he draws up "the record of implementation," pp. 17-20, to counter the charge that "the Nixon Doctrine [is] a formula for heedless withdrawal." If the qualification "heedless" is employed, the President easily justifies his position. But the policy of "withdrawal" nevertheless remains open to critical inspection.

[17] The principle is to use the necessary amount of military power in the briefest time-frame, with the least noncombatant casualties, to incapacitate the enemy for *further war.* See my "What Is Security in Southeast Asia?," *Air University Review,* November-December 1968, pp. 103-112.

The combined ARVN and American attack on the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong troop sanctuaries in Cambodia in April-May 1970, and the ARVN attack supported by American air power on the Ho Chi Minh trails near Tchepone, Laos, in February-March 1971, were long overdue self-defense measures for South Viet Nam. The final military reckoning on them has yet to come; however, the incursions have severely inhibited the continuance of North Vietnamese military aggressions against southern Laos, Cambodia and South Viet Nam while the U.S. combat forces are withdrawing. These measures have also paid substantial dividends *in* South Viet Nam. Saigon has been able to proceed with pacification, improvement in the countryside (land reform), and politicization.[18]

But our main concern here is with the general impact of the Nixon Doctrine on Asia. We are left in no doubt that the Doctrine from its Guam sketch in 1969 to the present includes these essential elements: (1) Vietnamization as described above; (2) assisting allied states under nonnuclear types of aggression, with the requirement that they take primary responsibility for their own defense; (3) providing a shield if friendly or allied states are threatened by a nuclear power; (4) maintaining our treaty commitments; and (5) withdrawing American forces in these processes so as to help further the kind of partnerships — rather than domination — the President seeks. In executing the "withdrawal" part of the Doctrine, the Nixon Administration has closed down or reduced scores of military installations. By the spring of 1971 it was withdrawing the already mentioned 260,000 military from Viet Nam and had promised (on April 7) to withdraw another 100,000 by December. Additionally, 20,000 troops have been or are in the process of being withdrawn from Korea, 16,000 from Thailand, 12,000 from Japan, and 9,000 from the Philippines. In November 1970 Nixon requested and later received from Congress approximately $500 million in *supplementary* military and economic assistance grants to Viet Nam and Korea to help cushion the economic costs of these withdrawals and the increased military spending in the Cambodian operation.

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[18] To pursue this theme the reader may be interested in the following: Allan E. Goodman, Randolph Harris, John C. Wood, "South Viet Nam and the Politics of Self-Support," *Asian Survey*, January 1971, pp. 1-25; Bernard Gordon with Kathryn Young, "The Khmer Republic: That Was the Cambodia That Was," *ibid.*, pp. 26-40; and Brigadier General F. P. Serong, *The Future of South Viet Nam* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Strategic Papers No. 8, 1971).

The Doctrine with respect to Asia thus amounts to a "lower profile" approach; we are in effect to become *unum inter pares* rather than *primus inter pares,* while honoring our commitments. We are encouraging and requiring our allies and friends to do more to defend themselves as the price of our doing less — a curious kind of bargain. The President is aware of this contradiction. He has indicated that in our "reductions," as applications of the Nixon Doctrine,

> we cannot move too fast without sapping the Asian sense of confidence and security which it is our purpose to sustain and nurture. And we cannot cut our own contributions to Asian security without providing for their assumption by our Asian friends. Thus, the decision to reduce our presence carries with it the obligation to help our allies create the capacity to carry the responsibilities we are transferring.[19]

This is an extraordinarily complicated and delicate task which will involve orchestrating the varying interests and energies of a supporting American public, the U.S. Congress, the countries allied with us by treaty commitment in Asia (Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Republic of Viet Nam), as well as several other friendly countries with which we presently hold bilateral-type, direct agreements (Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia), and still others with which we maintain indirect agreements.[20] And all this must be accomplished within an uncertain policy context conditioned by the generally recognized and continuing adversaries — the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam. One cannot assume that what is the "end of an era" for us is also an end of an era for them. Nothing in the immediate past or present of any of these communist powers suggests that détente is imminent or that the subversion, infiltration and insurgency which are still supported from and approved by their respective capitals will cease tomorrow. The so-called Cold War has for the past twenty-five years never been cold in Asia. In fact, its temperature has risen continuously — from the Bay of Bengal to Bali, from South Korea to South Viet Nam, from 1947-1948 to the present.

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[19] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace,* p. 95.

[20] See Earl C. Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1971, pp. 201-217. Ravenal, a former senior civilian on McNamara's and Clifford's staff, is obviously an unfriendly critic of this Administration. However, the criticism he offers of the ambiguities in the Doctrine cannot be disregarded.

While we are faced with orchestrating various tasks and interests, the Asian reaction to the Nixon Doctrine constitutes a "mixed bag." During the summer of 1970, I interviewed several scores of military and civilian Asian leaders in Burma, South Viet Nam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines; likewise at least three academic colleagues spent some time between the summer of 1970 and January 1971 in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia and Thailand. All of us sought out Asian views concerning the Doctrine, to which we are not antagonistic. The fact that we four have spent all our post-World War II professional lives in Southeast and East Asian specialization may not guarantee the correctness of our summaries, but it suggests the basis on which such Asian views were gathered. Here is a general summary of them in my words:

(1) Whereas the Doctrine is not a return to America's pre-World War II isolation, it does, except as regards the role of Japan, constitute a downgrading of American interests in and appraisal of the Asian mainland, archipelago and islands.

(2) The reported U.S. decision to shift the Seventh Fleet — the main, in-position U.S. Asian force — from Yukosuka to Sasebo corroborates the above opinion. So does the policy of partial withdrawals from Korea and Taiwan.

(3) Military and economic assistance in support of those countries willing and able to defend themselves in a nonnuclear attack (other than from Communist China's conventional forces to which they are of necessity not equal) is an attractive aspect of the Nixon Doctrine. But it is an uncertain one in terms of what might be required in quantity and speed of provision, in light of U.S. domestic pressures.

(4) Relations with Moscow and even with Peking may now be required of those governments which had avoided them because of earlier U.S. treaty commitments. If such relations are established, this will undoubtedly be only at the price of further diminishing America's position in these countries while enhancing the positions of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

(5) The United States should reduce her role in Viet Nam but should not withdraw "in defeat" or "in humiliation." North Viet Nam must be made to pay a public price for her aggression. The futures of Cambodia and Laos must be safeguarded.

(6) Hopefully, Asian regionalisms will find reasons to prosper because of the Nixon Doctrine.

(7) The Nixon Doctrine may satisfy current moods and needs in America, especially for the 1972 elections; it may be, however, as unsettling for the 1970's as was Dean Acheson's "Crisis in Asia" speech for the 1950's. "Withdrawal" at that time led to more war.

(8) The oft-referred-to "commitments" in the Nixon Doctrine require more than reaffirmation; they require redefinition and, on certain key issues, renegotiation.

(9) Asian sovereign pride, or bravado, or in certain instances true growth, cannot in the short run make up for more than two decades of widespread warfare and destabilization, or fill vacuums in the Indian Ocean or elsewhere. To expect instant miracles in an age of uncertain faith offers too many temptations to the abiding devils.

VI

There is no single course for the whole of Southeast Asia in the 1970's. At least three possible futures may take shape for mainland Southeast Asia, where contiguity to aggressive communist states is a critical factor, and there are a like number of possible futures for island-archipelago Southeast Asia. These six futures may be modified by the actions of the five major actors (the Soviet Union-Communist China versus the United States-Japan-Australia). I shall leave the permutations of these possibilities to those who are quantifiably interested and sketch only the main outlines, as follows:

Futures for Mainland Southeast Asia

(1) Protracted, lower-level insurgency that continues testing and probing for successful communist takeovers. In this context Laos is most susceptible. Without big-power guarantees for her sovereignty and territorial integrity to replace the failed 1962 Geneva Agreement she will remain at best a *de facto* partitioned country. Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and South Viet Nam can continue to receive assistance. The Nixon Doctrine here will be sharply put to the test.

(2) An improbable big-power agreement (including the Soviet Union, Communist China, Japan and the United States), which would guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the six mainland Southeast Asian states, could eventually replace the fading Paris negotiations.

(3) An unlikely but desirable U.S.-Thailand-Japan-Australia decision to speed the process of "Vietnamization" so as to insure the sovereignty of Laos as well as Cambodia and South Viet Nam. This in effect would be a declaration by the Free World to defend the Southeast Asian mainland against communist aggression. It

would implement the original American SEATO concept which has long since been disregarded.

Futures for Archipelago and Island Southeast Asia

(1) Protracted lower-level insurgency in Indonesia and Malaysia may decrease while it increases in the Philippines. If Indonesia succeeds in solving her economic problems (and these call for some major population shifts out of Java to the other islands), and if Malaysia can ease her "racial" problem, these states can contribute to the stability of their surrounding area. However, the Nixon Doctrine, which inherits a kind of "special relationship" with Manila because of our past tutelage, will be heavily taxed in helping to maintain stability in the Philippines. The Philippine oligarchy reminds me increasingly of eighteenth-century French Bourbons before the Revolution.

(2) A "Cuban"-type revolution in the Philippines cannot be discounted.

(3) The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) consisting of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, with assistance from Australia (especially for the Commonwealth countries), Japan and the United States, can grow in effectiveness. When Adam Malik and Thanat Khoman, Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Thailand respectively, agreed to its creation a new element for development and potential collective security in the area came into existence. The Association has now concluded its fifth year, and its not unclouded future can be better than its past. It has more vitality, though not more ultimate potential, than the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). Asian regionalisms are here seen as the necessary correlative to the Nixon Doctrine.

One cannot say that the Nixon Administration — over and above the particularities of its Vietnamization policy — has ignored Asia. On the contrary, the references to Asia in the President's two reports of 1970 and 1971 equal in extent and detail the attention given to Europe. But Nixon does not define the Asian interests as clearly as he does the European ones. For Asia, he puts his clauses conditionally. Only if there are American interests will new commitments follow. The question thus arises, what factor makes item x an "interest" or denies to it that precious if unclear qualification? In this connection, what of the old formal treaty commitments? Do they remain on an "as is" basis? Will they be improved?

Despite Nixon's dramatic "end of an era" statement, I submit that since June 1950 the United States has had three major Asian interests — vital in the sense that we have fought two long wars for them. These are: (1) To assist the independent states of free (i.e., noncommunist) Asia to maintain their security and stability, and to improve their conditions of living. (2) To deny the countries and peoples of free Asia to communist aggression and subversion (defined respectively as overt war across boundaries and warfare by proxies — guerrillas, insurgents, "liberators"). (3) To encourage these Asian and Pacific states in *all* forms of cooperative endeavor designed to promote their security, stability and living standards (e.g., Asian regionalisms such as ASEAN, ASPAC, ADB, Commonwealth defense agreements, SEAMES, Mekong River Valley Development).

If one adds a fourth interest — also vital as defined above — it would be the traditional U.S. interest in preventing any one country — be it Japan as previously or now Communist China — from imposing hegemony over most of Asia.

In terms of world population and world resources any defense of these four U.S. interests in Asia seems to me to be justified. They are not focused narrowly on the 66,000 square miles and eighteen million people of South Viet Nam. Viet Nam happened to become a battlefield because of the larger interests it represented. Unhappily we chose to fight that war badly, and the President is extricating us from it. But it is not enough for the United States to withdraw from the Viet Nam situation; nor is it enough to spell out, as the President frequently has done, the "elements of new partnership" (treaty commitments, nuclear shield, and assistance to those prepared to help themselves in nonnuclear battle). Since he has also stated that "our interests must shape our commitments rather than the other way around," he must define for Americans and for actual or potential allies what these interests are in Asia. Otherwise the ambiguities, doubts and confusions will remain. If it be argued that these definitions are so serious as to require inquiry, time and patience — and they are serious — the start on them should be indicated clearly. The existing Asian treaties and agreements are unclear or uncertain or both. SEATO, for example, was hailed as a crowning achievement when President Eisenhower ratified it, but Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon have rarely used the SEATO treaty in connection with Viet Nam, which it specifically covered. What, then, is the SEATO commitment?

VII

It is proposed, therefore, as a conclusion to this analysis of Southeast Asian futures, that a speedy examination of U.S. interests, commitments and policy with respect to that region be undertaken, independent of the considerations of the war in Viet Nam, in order to delineate what cooperation with our actual and potential partners will signify. If the focus on Southeast Asia is regarded as too narrow, the examination can be enlarged to embrace our interests and those of our partners in the arc of still-free Asia, from Korea to the Indian subcontinent.

As we, at the "end of an era," terminate our unilateral assessment of and decision-making on Asian issues, it should be proper to explore the replacement of doubtful or uncertain commitments mostly negotiated between August 1951 and September 1954. This could lay the foundations for a true partnership in a Pacific and Indian Ocean Defense Agreement (PIODA). Such an agreement, which would include the United States as one among equal or mutually interested partners, could remove the doubts and confusions in Asia and lead to the new era heralded by the President. He can usher in the new era if the principle of the mutuality of interests is recognized and implemented at the beginning.

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

by Michael Curtis

IN the post-Stalin period, relations between the United States and her allies and the Soviet Union have fluctuated in warmth, intensity and scope. A touch of warmth was present at the 1955 Geneva meeting, the 1959 Camp David talks, the 1967 Glassboro conference, and when the treaties were signed between the USSR and West Germany in August 1970 and between Bonn and Warsaw in December 1970. Attitudes were hardened by the U-2 episode of 1960, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the continuing war in Southeast Asia, the anti-ballistic missile systems issue, the closing of the Berlin air corridors, the Cienfuegos base and Soviet duplicity during the Middle East cease-fire in August 1970.

Both superpowers have come to accept the policy of peaceful or competitive coexistence, "a form of intensive struggle, economic as well as political and ideological," as formulated by Khrushchev. Steps, some giant, some faltering, have been taken to end the coldness that existed from the end of World War II to the death of Stalin. Agreement between the two states has been reached, bilaterally or unilaterally, on a number of issues: the independence of Austria in 1955, the neutralization of Laos in 1962, the limited nuclear test ban treaty in 1963, the pacific use of Antarctica, the demilitarization of outer space, and direct flights between Moscow and New York. Both powers have urged support for the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both have been earnestly involved in arms control and disarmament talks over a period of years, and more recently in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Both have supported arms control over the seabed and ocean floor and control over biological and chemical warfare.

The superpowers, it seemed, had recognized the danger and folly of continual and automatic confrontation, and accepted the idea that world peace depended on their collaboration. Both have been troubled about Chinese nuclear development and the extent of Chinese influence in South and Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union has proposed a European security conference since the principle of mutual and balanced forced reduction by East and West was discussed at Reykjavik in 1968. The NATO countries have been exploring with the USSR and other East European countries which concrete issues can lead to useful negotiation and resolution. Moscow has avoided any direct involvement in the Viet Nam war, has not taken advantage of revolutionary situations in Latin America, and has been ambivalent toward the new African countries. It has reached substantial trade agreements with West Germany and, in practice, has recognized the economic and legal relationship of the Federal Republic to West Berlin.

Only in the Middle East has the Soviet Union, by her startling behavior, called into being a situation in which her forces are actively engaged in hostilities, confronting the United States as well as Israel, and produced a crisis that threatens world peace.

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, like that of any great power, has been based on a complex mixture of ideology and national interest. Since Lenin in 1920 argued for the support of foreign national movements and the necessary sacrifice of local communist parties, Soviet tactical considerations have been more prominent than transformation of the world, conversion to communism or irreconcilable conflict with noncommunist countries. The USSR's support of the Islamic nations is in ironic contrast to her treatment and subjugation of her own Islamic minorities.

Soviet policy in the Middle East has been wholly tactical in nature. In 1947-1948, in her eagerness to remove British influence from the area, the Soviet Union strongly supported the creation of Israel. Her representative, Andrei Gromyko, argued on November 26, 1947 that "the Jewish people has been closely linked with Palestine for a considerable period in history" and that the decision to create Israel "will meet the legitimate demands of the Jewish people."[1] The Ukrainian delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Tarassenko, was the first to refer to Abba Eban as "the representative of the State of Israel."[2]

As Western influence diminished, the Soviet Union began in the mid-1950's to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East; her political influence has been reinforced by both economic and military aid. Since 1955, when she promoted the $350 million arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, she has supplied Egypt alone with over $3 billion in military weapons and more than $1 billion in economic aid, including the funds for the Aswan Dam which has now been completed. Soviet engineers and technicians are helping to expand the Helwan steel works south of Cairo. By 1965 Egypt had obtained $1.5 billion out of a total of $4 billion in military aid disbursed by Moscow, and about one-sixth of the total Soviet economic aid — with respect to economic aid the Arab countries in all have received about one-quarter of the whole. Egypt's economy is now heavily dependent on the Soviets who purchase 65 per cent of her cotton crop and about 25 per cent of her total exports, and who provide her with machinery, chemicals, iron and steel and wheat. President Nasser, once proud of freeing his country from subservience to Britain, ended by subjugating it to the USSR.

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[1] United Nations General Assembly Plenary Session, November 26, 1947, UN Doc. A/PV 125, p. 1360.

[2] United Nations Security Council Official Records, May 28, 1948, p. 16.

In the Six-Day War, itself partly resulting from deliberately false Soviet information on Israeli intentions, Moscow suffered a vicariously humiliating defeat of enormous proportions when Egypt lost some $1 billion worth of military equipment. After June 1967 the Soviets were anxious to restore the military capacities of the Arab countries. They succeeded in eliminating from the November 22, 1967 UN resolution a proposed restriction on arms exports to both the Arab states and Israel. Nasser confessed that on June 12 — two days after the cease-fire — the Soviet leaders, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny, conveyed a message to him that the Soviet Union would supply weapons free of charge to replace those lost. The first dramatic demonstration of the fulfillment of that promise came on October 21, 1967, when the Israeli destroyer *Elath* was struck by a Styx ship-to-ship missile given to Egypt by Moscow.

Since 1967 the Soviet Union has given the Arabs an impressive amount of hardware. Soviet military aid to Egypt alone in 1970 amounted to $2.5 billion.[3] As of June 1970 the total expenditure of over $4 billion included 2,000 tanks and 800 fighter aircraft. Egypt has obtained 55 MIG-21C's, 44 MIG-21D's, 86 Sukhoi Su-7 fighter-bombers, 550 artillery rockets, 800 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, 73 tactical helicopters, 300 SA-2 Guideline missiles and 160 SA-3 Goa missiles.

At the end of 1970 the 250,000-man Egyptian army had 1,200 tanks and was supported by over 400 combat planes (the comparative figures for Israel are 950 and 350, respectively) and by overwhelming superiority in artillery, including 122 mm. guns and 203 mm. howitzers. Four of Egypt's five destroyers and all of her twelve submarines have been built by the Soviets. Soviet naval officers train the Egyptian navy.

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[3] *Strategic Survey 1970* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).

The Egyptian air force also has been equipped and trained by the Soviets. Before June 1967 there were 21 operational airfields in Egypt west of the Suez Canal. By 1970 there were 30, with about 500 aircraft shelters. Egypt is wholly dependent on the USSR for replacements and spare parts.

Soviet Escalation

The Kremlin's realization that Egypt might unwittingly waste its costly investment and provoke another humiliation of both Egyptian and Soviet leaders transformed the whole Middle Eastern picture. The possible downfall of the Egyptian regime, with which the Soviet Union is familiar and reasonably comfortable, as a result of Israel's deep penetration air raids, the loss by Egypt of 91 planes, the Israeli commando raids and capture of Soviet equipment, led Moscow to take its boldest gamble since Khrushchev, believing that President Kennedy had lost his nerve in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, assumed that the United States would not oppose the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba.

For the first time since World War II the Soviet Union has directly intervened with her own personnel in a conflict in a non-communist country. The Soviet buildup has been piecemeal but logical. It was known that the Soviets had been training Egyptian pilots and had been involved in tactical planning. Their role changed with the installation (in the canal zone and elsewhere in December 1969) of SA-2 Guideline missiles with a range of 30 miles and capable of hitting planes flying up to 80,000 feet. When Israel nevertheless was able to bomb the Guideline system, the missiles were improved so that they can be fired in salvos rather than singly and thus can be more accurate. In March 1970 the Soviets began to construct SA-3 missile sites: by the spring of 1971 there were 85 such sites. The SA-3 surface-to-air missiles, short ranged but accurate and sophisticated against low-flying aircraft, and the ZSU 2-34 low-level anti-aircraft system are manned by Soviet crews. Egypt is the only foreign country, other than East Germany, in which these Soviet missiles have been installed.

In April 1970, Soviet combat missions began. For some time, 80 Soviet personnel have been flying TU-16 bombers on surveillance over the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Soviet squadrons also began flying MIG-21J fighters from three airfields in Egypt on combat intercept missions in the Nile Delta. By July the Soviet Union had become an active participant in the Middle East hostilities. There are now over 12,000 troops manning missile sites, 4,000 advisers and over 200 MIG pilots in Egypt. A Soviet instructor is reported to be posted to every Egyptian battalion. New missiles on the Suez line are not the conventional four- or eight-rocket installations, but smaller two-rocket, highly mobile units. The installation of radar stations, ground-air control apparatus and anti-aircraft guns near the missile sites, and the highly mobile surface-to-air missile system suggest that the USSR has assumed a major part of the burden of Egyptian defense. The Soviet air squadrons now controlling six airfields may expand from the present three to ten, with 150 planes and 300 pilots. There are more Soviet pilots in Egypt capable of flying the supersonic MIG-21's than there are Israeli supersonic fighters. With the delivery of a number of the new MIG-23's, the supersonic fighter whose speed is Mach 3, and SU-11 jet interceptors in the spring of 1971, Egypt has one of the most modern, sophisticated and extensive air defense systems in the world.

The Soviet presence is both defensive and offensive in nature. By tacit agreement Israeli pilots did not penetrate beyond the canal zone in order to avoid direct conflict with Soviet pilots. The Soviet squadrons protect both the Egyptian heartland and the SA-3 sites, threatened by the new Israeli tactic of low flying at Mach 1 speeds at night. But the improved defense had also allowed the Egyptian forces to participate to a greater extent in the proclaimed war of attrition against Israel. With her rear protected by the Soviets, Egypt has concentrated against 30,000 Israelis about 250,000 troops, including missile and artillery batteries, along the 109-mile Suez line, and holds another 100,000 troops in reserve. Egypt's air force has become more aggressive, with both Sukhoi Su-7 strike-fighters and Ilyushin 11-28 bombers capable of hitting Israeli positions.

Not only is Israel's air superiority, on which her very existence depends, in question for the first time. Soviet protection has fed Egyptian ambition. In Moscow in July 1970, Nasser asked for offensive weapons such as advanced MIG-21's, amphibious tanks and land craft, as well as for SA-3 installations near the canal. Amphibious five-man boats for commando raids have been received, and Egyptian troops have practiced landing operations aided by the Soviet fleet. The crossing of the canal has therefore become a real possibility.

The Egyptian position was immeasurably strengthened by violations of the cease-fire agreement of August 7, 1970. On that day only 16 missile batteries were stationed within the 31-mile cease-fire zone, the closest one being 19 miles from the Suez Canal. During the cease-fire period some 50 batteries of four to six missiles each, manned by 3,000 Soviet soldiers, were placed in the area. Over 30 of these batteries, mounting operational SA-2 and SA-3 missiles with an effective range of 20 miles, are within 19 miles of the cease-fire line. Together with new artillery batteries, amphibious craft and equipment to build bridges, MI-8 troop-carrying helicopters and the new Frog and Katyusha rockets (ground-to-ground missiles with a range of 50 miles), this advanced missile system has dramatically altered the strategic balance in the area.

Soviet Support of the War of Attrition

Soviet behavior has always defied simple explanation. The view that the spectacular Soviet involvement is a response to the Israeli penetration of Egypt may be valid, but the causal relationship is not self-evident. It was Nasser who on September 14, 1968 outlined the three successive stages of Egyptian strategy: steadfastness, deterrent defense, and liberation, which meant "the battle of purification to purify Palestine." After unilaterally repudiating the cease-fire agreement on May 1, 1969, Nasser decided on the "war of attrition" on July 24, 1969, with the objective of forcing Israel to withdraw from the canal zone or to sue for peace.

The Six-Day War is now in its fourth year. From time to time Nasser made some pacific pronouncements, depending on his audience, but the general burden of his remarks was the continuation of hostilities against Israel. When the vast superiority of Egyptian artillery and heavy mortar firepower in the canal zone — presented and encouraged by the Soviets — began to take an increasingly unacceptable toll of Israeli forces, the Israeli response was logical. It was to limit the serious casualty rate by reducing Egyptian firepower along the canal: in July 1969 there were 115 casualties, in December 1969, 30. Israel tried to deter Nasser from pursuing the war of attrition, or even further adventure, by fortifying the east bank of the canal (the Bar-Lev line), neutralizing the Egyptian front to a depth of 15 miles, destroying radar facilities and the installation of the new missiles, and making clear, through her deep penetration raids, that Egyptian miscalculation would lead to another military disaster. The war of attrition boomeranged. The Egyptians lost large numbers of men and a great amount of military equipment, and the success of the Israeli counterattack led Cairo to turn once more to Moscow for greater military assistance. The USSR's involvement thus became self-reinforcing. She could not see her chief Middle East client collapse; she stood to lose her vast investment.

The Soviet-Egyptian communiqué of July 17, 1970 stated that "the Soviet Government declares its complete readiness to support the just struggle waged by the Arab people. . . . and offers them the necessary aid in this struggle."[4] Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev has vowed that the Soviet Union would continue to give "all support" to the Arab cause. The Soviet presence has thus changed to a Soviet commitment to the Arabs. Western abstention from the Middle East would not now lead to equivalent abstention by the USSR. The Soviets have encouraged aggression by extending the missile system into the canal zone to prevent Israeli harassment of the Egyptian artillery offensive.

With her airfields and squadrons in Egypt, her increasing personnel, her construction of SA-3 Goa missile sites along the canal, deployment of Tupolev TU-16 reconnaissance aircraft to Aswan, training of TU-16 bombers in firing air-to-ground missiles which present a threat to Israeli planes in the Sinai, and her destroyers off the Sinai coast, the Soviet Union has virtually gained control of the Suez Canal and thus risks a direct confrontation with Israel.

Soviet Motives

There are many ways in which Soviet behavior in the Middle East may be explained. The least likely explanation is that hostility to Israel is a logical extension of behavior toward Jews in the Soviet Union. These two and one-half million Jews have not obeyed the order to assimilate, dissolve or disappear among other peoples even though they have no schools in the Hebrew or Yiddish language and are not allowed to be taught their own history. Israel has become a magnet for them, and the June 1967 victory enhanced the attractiveness and emotional ties. By her pro-Arab position and harsh treatment of her Jewish population, the Soviet Union is both trying to diminish the appeal of Israel and issuing a stern warning to internal dissenters.

Another possible explanation is that, to meet Chinese criticism of her weakness and to rebut the Chinese description of her policy as "social imperialism," the Soviet Union has shown the world that she is capable of swift and effective military action in the Middle East, as she was in Czechoslovakia in 1968. China, like the United States, is well aware of Soviet military might and efficiency. Despite the recent exchange of ambassadors and a new trade treaty between the two countries, ideological rivalry, differences on border problems and competition for influence in the Third World ensure that tension will remain acute between Moscow and Peking. It became obvious during the hijacking incident of September 1970 that Moscow was unhappy about China's growing influence on the Palestinian terrorists.

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[4] *Soviet News* (Moscow), July 21, 1970.

A third view is that the Soviet Union is simply imperial Russia writ anew, flexing her political muscles and engaging in the newest form of old-fashioned big-power gunboat diplomacy. The present Soviet leaders are following in the footsteps of Bestuzhev, Gorchakov and Sazonov. Historically, Russian expansion south has been prevented by the Ottoman Empire, France and Britain. During and after World War II, Stalin attempted to take advantage of the weakness of the West. The captured German Foreign Office archives revealed the 1940 secret agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, by which the latter was accorded a sphere of influence in the Arab world. After the war Moscow's attempt to control Iran and to obtain bases in the Turkish straits failed, as did its effort to gain the trusteeship of one of the former Italian North African colonies which would provide an entrance into the Mediterranean.

Today, blocked on the east by China and on the west by the NATO countries, the Soviet Union has probed the soft spot in the Middle East that fortuitously allows her to extend her influence over a larger number of countries and peoples. For the first time, to quote the statement of the Supreme Soviet on July 15, 1970, the USSR "can have a direct bearing on the destinies of the peoples of all the countries of Asia and Africa."[5] At a moment when the British Labour Government decided to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by 1971 and thus from any real influence in the area, and when the United States was involved in Southeast Asia and torn by internal strife of an unusually extreme nature, the old Russian dream — of a strong Mediterranean fleet, outlets to warm water, control over Suez and a potential link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean — came within reach of fulfillment.

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[5] *Ibid.*, July 15, 1970.

With Greece and Turkey reluctant Western allies and an Italian political system in constant turmoil, NATO's southern flank is now opposed by a formidable adversary.

An equally satisfactory explanation may be the simple opportunism of the Soviet Union, in her Middle East policy as in her support for Spanish annexation of Gibraltar. The withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone in April 1955 and the inability of the West to form a Middle East security organization fed Soviet ambition. Since the 1955 Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal and the consequent U.S. decision not to aid the building of the Aswan Dam, the USSR has increasingly identified herself with the actions of Egypt, the strongest Arab nation, becoming her protector and exercising the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council to block any resolution distasteful to the Arabs.

The USSR's Czechoslovakian adventure in 1968 has made the Kremlin more opportunistically aggressive. It has sensed a reluctance on the part of the United States to be directly involved in the Middle East. In his speech of February 18, 1970, President Nixon stated that the United States would regard Soviet predominance in the Middle East as a matter of grave concern, but his overt actions have not always been in consonance with his words. Washington's overdeliberation and equivocation about selling aircraft to Israel and its lack of immediate response to the installation of the SA missiles encouraged Moscow to continue its involvement. Nixon decided in March 1970 to withhold delivery of the desired Phantoms and Skyhawks while the Soviets were introducing their own combat pilots. The Nixon or Rogers policy that aid to Israel should be contingent on immediate needs — on supplying replacements for Israeli aircraft lost as a result of the Soviet presence — and the concept that in return Israel should limit her attacks on Egypt, hardly suggest a strong posture. Moscow has supplied not only Egypt, but also Syria, Iraq, Yemen, South Yemen, Libya and Algeria, and has offered Jordan antiaircraft and long-range artillery weapons.

For reasons of her own the Soviet Union, cynically talking of Israel as a racist state based on religious fanaticism, is wholly committed to the Arab side. She agreed overtly and covertly to Egypt's breaking of the cease-fire and has encouraged both the war of attrition and the Arab refusal to negotiate without the setting of conditions unacceptable to Israel. Moreover, she has acquiesced in the Arab distortion of the Israeli and American positions, as she upheld the false claim in June 1967 that U.S. planes were engaged in the Six-Day War.

This is a far cry from the view of Gromyko in the UN on May 28, 1948, that the world body could not tolerate a situation in which the Arab states, primarily responsible for the hostilities in Palestine, were deliberately flouting its decisions. Premier Aleksei Kosygin has stated that the Soviet Union supports the struggle of Egypt against "imperialism in all its forms." Yet Soviet behavior has nothing to do with communist ideology, support for radical movements, parties or regimes, love for the Arabs or hatred of Israel.

The Explosive Crisis

The Middle East conflict is now inextricably connected with the struggle between the great powers. The Soviet Union's behavior threatens not only Israel's security and existence, but also the stability of the Middle East and world peace. In world politics, there are really only two problems sufficiently inflammable to be capable of igniting a worldwide conflagration. One is Germany, the other is the Middle East. The Soviet Union has upset the balance of power in the Middle East. The area is now, as President Nixon said on July 1, 1970, "terribly dangerous like the Balkans before World War I."[6] Equally alarming is the fact that the Soviets have penetrated the whole Mediterranean expanse and parts of Africa and Asia. The Mediterranean has become a contested arena in which they possess a number of naval bases as well as the air base at Mersa Matruh in Egypt. Even Spain has allowed them facilities at her ports.

The Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean protects the Arabs and weakens the Turks. In 1970 it was composed of 30 combatant ships and 10 submarines, compared with five combatant ships and five submarines in 1965. This powerful fleet is armed with Shaddock missiles, and its submarines with the Serb missile. It has increased its steaming days in the Mediterranean from 750 in 1965 to over 17,000 today. Based in Alexandria, it can be given cover by aircraft operating from well-defended land bases. The growing Soviet penetration of North Africa raises the nightmarish possibility of Soviet-manned air bases and missile sites along the whole Mediterranean.

In addition, the USSR has rapidly been filling the power vacuum left in the Indian Ocean by British withdrawal from that area. Moscow has mixed motives for its interest in the Indian Ocean: control of the Suez Canal, possible aid in the containment of China and the monitoring of Chinese nuclear progress, influence over Arab oil supplies, general trade, use of the area as an emergency center for returning Soviet spacecraft, limitation of noncommunist influence, and ability to influence the politics of India and Pakistan.

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[6] *New York Times,* July 2, 1970.

Not only do the Soviets have a growing Indian Ocean fleet of seven surface warships, four submarines and nine supply ships; they also have the use of harbors at Aden, Mogadishu and Berbera in Somalia, and the Seychelles Islands, military facilities on the island of Socotra, and port facilities in Tanzania, Mauritius (together with landing rights for planes), Ceylon, and along the west coast of India and Pakistan.

Moscow has concluded military aid agreements with Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, Sudan and South Yemen as well as with Egypt. In the new state of South Yemen the Soviets already have a large number of instructors training the local army, which is equipped with Soviet weapons, and pilots flying transport aircraft. They have intervened in the Sudan conflict with military advisers as well as with arms. In the Maghreb, at least Libya and Algeria fall into Moscow's embrace. The countries of the 1955 Baghdad Pact and the 1959 CENTO group – Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan – are now less committed to the United States. They have become susceptible to Moscow's pressure to the degree that Turkey has now allowed Soviet trucks to cross her country into Syria and Iraq.

The growing Soviet military involvement in the Middle East has disturbed the moderate Arab states. If Israel is crushed these states will not long survive. Regimes friendly to the Soviet Union will be installed, and the oil of these nations will be subject to Moscow's decision. Soviet control of the Red Sea endangers the Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The regimes in Jordan and Lebanon are precarious if Moscow provides more support for the guerrillas.

Soviet intervention has escalated the whole conflict. Because of the Soviet missiles in Egypt, the Israeli air force has become dependent on the more powerful Phantoms. Israel refrained from bombing the harbors of Port Said and Alexandria where the Soviets unload their equipment, or the Soviet military advisers in the Egyptian desert, but may be tempted to do so in any future fighting. Rather than face destruction as a nation, she may be forced to resort to atomic weapons or warheads for her French-built surface missiles — which she may now have the capacity to assemble.

The Soviets have not acted as moderators. On the contrary, they have inflamed Arab enmity toward Israel through overt anti-Semitism, as shown by the Leningrad trials and many attacks on "Zionism" which can barely be distinguished from anti-Semitism. If the Soviet government approves the existence of Israel as it maintains, it is difficult to understand why Moscow does not resume diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. By her actions and false statements on the concentration of Israeli troops on the Syrian border in 1967 the Soviet Union helped to bring on the Six-Day War; by her behavior throughout 1970 she produced an international crisis of formidable dimensions.

APPEASEMENT IS NO ANSWER

How can the danger of a wholesale conflagration be reduced and ended? There must be two simultaneous actions, the start of meaningful negotiations toward a just and lasting peace, and the removal or control of the Soviet presence in the Middle East.

The basis for a permanent settlement is the November 22, 1967 United Nations resolution in its entirety: a cease-fire, withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories, and the acceptance by all of Israel's sovereignty and security. But as Arthur Goldberg said in his speech of May 15, 1969, "The Resolution is not self-executing . . . it states general principles and envisions agreement on specifics; the parties must put flesh on these bare bones."[7]

Israel has proclaimed her willingness to enter into negotiations. From insisting at first on direct negotiations with the Arab nations, she has now qualified her position to allow other approaches such as that expressed by Abba Eban on July 13, 1970, that Egypt and Israel send emissaries to "determine jointly . . . the arrangements, framework and agenda without prior conditions by any of the parties for official negotiations."[8] Reluctantly Israel agreed to the cease-fire on August 7, 1970 in the hope that the indirect talks under Ambassador Gunnar Jarring might lead to a real settlement.

This hope was frustrated by Nasser's ambition, the Palestinian guerrillas, whose terrorism has been exalted into a pseudo-nationalist ideology virtually devoid of content or direction, the intransigence of Syria and Iraq, which have refused to accept the November 1967 resolution or any cease-fire arrangement, and Moscow's support of any and all Arab actions.

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[7] Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, May 15, 1969 (AJC Institute of Human Relations).

[8] *New York Times,* July 14, 1970, p. 6.

Nasser was the center of the various meetings of Arab leaders, planning a role for each of the fourteen Arab countries in a potential war against Israel. He uttered many belligerent statements such as that on July 23, 1968, "no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no peace with Israel. . . . We aim at the destruction of the state of Israel" — which repeated the resolution of the Khartoum Arab Summit Conference of September 1967. It is difficult to reconcile this kind of statement and approval of guerrilla terrorism with the professed desire for peace, unless the violent rhetoric is assumed to be for internal consumption only and devoid of substance. President Anwar Sadat, while apparently more anxious than his predecessor to seek a political solution, has also argued that his country will abide by "no commitment other than the liberation of all the occupied lands."[9]

The Western world in general, and the United States in particular, must now be engaged to a greater extent in the resolution of the Middle East problem. Appeasement by the Western nations in the Arab world has never proved successful.

The original U.S. aid to Egypt, intended to limit Nasser's pan-Arabism as well as to improve the country economically, allowed him to become a charismatic figure to the Arabs. President Eisenhower's insistence in 1956 on Anglo-French withdrawal from Suez boosted Nasser's standing. President Kennedy's guarantee of a three-year supply of grain to Egypt allowed the Cairo government to engage in foreign adventures in Yemen and South Arabia.

In 1969 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was prevented from selling Harrier jump jets and from allowing the delivery of ordered Chieftain tanks to Israel by the fear that Arab withdrawal from the sterling bloc would precipitate another flight from the pound.

France, under both the de Gaulle and the Pompidou presidencies, has been trying to increase her influence and prestige among the Mediterranean Arab countries and protect her oil interests. By refusing to deliver the Mirages for which Israel had already paid and by agreeing to sell 110 Mirages to Libya — a country that until 1969 had only two Lockheed T-33 trainers, one twin-engined Dakota and perhaps a dozen trained pilots — between 1971 and 1974, Paris dramatically demonstrated its reversal of political friendship. Yet, despite the deal with France, Libya has been negotiating with the Soviet Union, and in July 1970 received her first shipments of Soviet tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks and other vehicles. After insisting that the United States withdraw from Wheelus Air Force Base in 1969, Libya is allowing Soviet tanks to use the base. Though Libya's left-wing regime has allowed the Western oil companies to remain, it has confiscated the property of Italians as well as of Jews.

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[9] *Jerusalem Post,* February 9, 1971.

France had hoped to maintain some influence in Algeria. But the Algerian regime, an enthusiastic supporter of the Palestinian guerrillas, has made a secret treaty with Moscow which will supply its army of 53,000 and its 170 combat aircraft. Algerian troops and pilots will be trained by the Soviets, who will have access to the former French naval base at Mers-el-Kebir. Algeria, moreover, has nationalized a number of foreign concerns, has unilaterally increased the tax payments French oil companies will have to pay, and has forced the French companies to keep larger shares of their profits in Algeria. The fear of further action by the Algerians explains the failure of the French government to condemn the Palestinian hijackers in September 1970. Nevertheless, Algeria has assumed 51 per cent control of French oil companies and nationalized their assets in natural gas and gas pipelines. France's privileged position in Algeria has ended.

The Western attempt to appease the Arabs has, to a considerable degree, been based on a concern to safeguard oil supplies. The Arab nations control 70 per cent of the noncommunist world's known reserves of oil. In 1969 Western Europe imported 53 per cent, and Japan 90 per cent, of its crude oil from the Middle East. Europe is now dependent on Libya alone for 31 per cent of its crude oil supply. But Middle East supplies are not vital to American security or to the American economy, though investment in the area is considerable. U.S. oil imports from the region have been steadily decreasing and now constitute less than 3 per cent of the total U.S. oil. The American oil industry accounts for an investment of $18.9 billion out of a total $64.7 billion overseas investment. Of this amount, interests in Arab oil account for $1.6 billion or 2.5 per cent of the total U.S. foreign investment.

The profits derived by the United States from these Arab oil investments amounted to $1.6 billion in 1969. But the tax and oil royalties going to the Arab nations in 1970 was over $5.8 billion. The loss of these oil receipts would bankrupt the Arab states, for they constitute the vast proportion of both their foreign receipts and national incomes and have been the basis of their economic development. Indeed, for the Arab states oil commerce transcends politics. For over a year Israeli chartered tankers have transported oil from the Persian Gulf via Eilat and Ashkelon in Israel to Eastern Europe with the tacit consent of the Arab and Soviet governments. The United States would be harmed only slightly by surrender of her oil investments. Oil deficiencies would be quickly supplied by the oil-producing states in this country, and oil quota arrangements could be speedily changed.

Appeasement because of oil has worked against rather than for U.S. objectives. Countries where U.S. oil interests predominate have been subsidizing Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian guerrillas with about 20 per cent of their income from oil. Restriction on oil from these countries would stimulate research and production in more friendly countries.

Moreover, Arab oil threats have not usually materialized. Libya has warned that it will end American oil contracts if the United States supplies Israel with aircraft, and Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states have hinted that they may also be forced into suspending their contracts. But it is worth remembering that Iraq was obliged to give up the idea of nationalizing the Compagnie Française des Pétroles during the Algerian war, and that the proposed Arab embargo on oil shipments to the West in 1967 was ended after a week. Furthermore, the Arab nations are aware that anticipated Western oil needs for the next decade will increase at the annual rate of 5 per cent rather than the 12 per cent-a-year increase in consumption by Western Europe which took place between 1962 and 1967. Nuclear power is likely to provide an increasing part of the energy needs of the West in the 1970's. In the United States plants with a capacity of 7,500 megawatts are already in operation, and the AEC has predicted that 150,000 MW will be available by 1980.

Unlike Western Europe, the United States, therefore, has no need for Arab oil. Nor have the Soviets, who are not only self-sufficient in oil but are also competitive with the Arab countries. But the Soviet Union's entrance into Libya — the major source of oil for Western Europe since 1967 — has posed a direct threat to the West.

The Arab nations have also been appeased by Western acquiescence in their economic boycott which extends to any companies that maintain investments or long-term agreements or set up subsidiaries in Israel, or that allow their trade names to be used there. Most Western countries are prepared to trade with Israel but not to invest there. But Japan has made a special effort to gain entrance into Arab enterprise by not trading with Israel.

In 1970 the United States was providing 75 per cent of all foreign investment in Israel, compared with 48 per cent in 1967. It is in the interests of both countries that the other major industrial and commercial nations of the world be persuaded that investment in Israel will not jeopardize their economic health.

A firm U.S. policy can make three things clear. First, that the Arab nations need the friendship and assistance of the United States more than she needs them. Second, that an anti-Israel policy does not benefit the United States since this would not perceptibly reduce the apparent anti-Western attitudes of the Arab populations. Such a policy would be a gratuitous act from which little or nothing significant could be gained. Nor would it help in the resolution of the other disputes between the Arab states and between different factions within the individual Arab nations. Third, the United States should make apparent to the Arab nations, which have been well assisted economically and militarily by her in the past, that their posture of internal nationalism and external neutralism is not necessarily coincidental with, and may be antithetical to, the tactics of Soviet supposed anti-imperialism.

THE U.S. RESPONSE

The United States has vacillated in its attitude to the Middle East crisis, and a policy of firmness is now required. Israel cannot become another Munich. The "evenhanded" policy of Secretary of State Rogers, with its parallel refusal to supply planes to Israel, is tantamount to acquiescence in Soviet domination of the area. It is similar to the "evenhandedness" of the Western nations in the Spanish Civil War which led to Franco's victory.

There are a number of ways in which Washington can act:

(1) The United States can provide military equipment on an assured long-term basis to Israel to maintain the balance between the contending parties. In the asymmetrical Arab-Israeli rela-

tionship Israel must be kept sufficiently strong to deter the Arab nations, which can afford much heavier losses. Part of the explanation for Soviet intervention may have been the evident reluctance of the United States to become Israel's chief supplier. Not until 1963 did Washington enter into a major agreement by supplying Hawk missiles. Subsequently it provided the aircraft, the powerful long-range Phantom F-4 jets and the Skyhawk A-4 attack bombers, that gave Israel its vital first line of support.

To meet the powerful weapons given Egypt by the Soviet Union, Israel now must obtain long-range artillery, electronic countermeasure equipment, tank transporters, and Shrike air-to-ground missiles and Walleye guided bombs to use against the SA missiles. The supply of 180 M-60 tanks, which carry a 105 mm. gun and are superior to the Soviet T-72 tanks, and M-48 tanks allows Israel to counterattack in the Sinai Peninsula, to transfer older tanks to the Syrian-Jordanian borders, and to limit the front line to 60,000 men.

(2) The United States should issue strong warnings to the Soviet Union of the danger of further involvement. Firmness in the past has been successful. In 1946 Moscow was obliged to remove its troops from northern Iran under British and American pressure. In 1947 Soviet attempts to overthrow the Greek regime and to gain control of the Turkish straits were frustrated. In 1970 communist attempts to disrupt air traffic and access to West Berlin were circumvented, and the Soviets were obliged to remove equipment for a possible base to serve missile-carrying submarines at Cienfuegos.

The Soviet Union has been guilty of duplicity in Hungary (1956), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), and Czechoslovakia (1968). Her behavior during the Middle East cease-fire of August 1970 was particularly flagrant. Though the agreement provided that "both sides will refrain from changing the military status quo" in the Suez zone and from "introducing or constructing" new military installations, and though Brezhnev on August 28 called for "an honest observance of the agreement,"[10] the Soviets moved the missile system forward. It is possible that they believed Israel did not genuinely want a political settlement and military pressure was necessary. Conceivably the Soviet military could have acted without consent from their political leaders. But it is most likely that Moscow, aware of American indecision and

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[10] *New York Times,* August 29, 1970, p. 1.

Washington's refusal to admit there had been any violations, and miscalculating the impact of internal demonstrations against American intervention in Cambodia, decided to take military and political advantage of the situation. Though the United States called for a "rectification," Israel was obliged to give way on her demand that Egypt withdraw the missiles before she again took part in the Jarring talks.

The United States acted more appropriately during the brief civil war in Jordan in September 1970 when she clearly signaled her intentions by diplomatic and military activity and by publicizing the movement of the augmented Sixth Fleet.

(3) The United States should bolster the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and strengthen her position in the Indian Ocean. The Sixth Fleet must maintain both its surveillance of the Soviet ships, submarines and aircraft in the Mediterranean, and its show of force of aircraft carriers with their Intruders, Corsairs and Phantoms. The Sixth Fleet is not only a highly effective combatant force but, as Lincoln Bloomfield has pointed out, a most sensitive, pliable and diplomatic tool, as was shown in the fall of 1970.[11]

To counter the strong Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean it is vital, because of Britain's withdrawal from Aden, for the United States to maintain a presence in that area. This will be facilitated by the projected Anglo-American naval, air and radio communications base to be built on the Diego Garcia atoll. It will be helped even more if the Asian and Australian members of the Commonwealth concern themselves with the danger of a Soviet presence in their vicinity.

(4) Washington should make clear that it will not prod discussions about a European security conference for which Moscow has been pressing since 1968, and which would certainly lead to a troop reduction in Central Europe, if the Soviets prevent a pacific settlement of the Middle East and Berlin problems. Western interest in a détente must not be equated with acquiescence in Soviet domination of the Middle East.

(5) The United States must urge the strengthening rather than the reduction of NATO. She should make known her determination not to reduce her present commitment of 285,000 troops to the alliance or to implement the Mansfield Resolution which calls

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[11] Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, "Arms Transfers and Arms Control," in J. C. Hurewitz, editor, *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 60.

for substantial troop reductions in Europe. This would both prevent the weakening of NATO and keep the Soviet Union from withdrawing troops from her western flank to the Chinese border.

Since 1956 Soviet military capacity has increased in arresting fashion. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries have increased their expenditure on defense in both absolute terms and as a proportion of their gross national product. Between 1965 and 1969 Soviet defense expenditures rose by over 5 per cent a year, while comparable expenditure in the European NATO countries fell by 4 per cent. In the same period the quality of Soviet weapons vastly improved, as illustrated by the supersonic strike version of the MIG-23 fighter which flies at a speed of Mach 3.

In Europe there are currently available 20 NATO divisions facing 56 Warsaw Pact divisions which could be rapidly expanded to 79, and some 5,500 tanks compared with the Soviets' 14,000 battle tanks. NATO has 2,160 aircraft opposing 3,900 possessed by the Warsaw Pact nations, and 350 interceptor aircraft to the Soviets' 2,000. Increasing cooperation among the forces of the seven Warsaw Pact countries has led to greatly improved training as well as weapons.

Moreover, the Soviet Union has made her navy, no longer an extension of the Red Army, into a force in its own right. Its efficiency and strength was apparent in the large-scale maneuver, OKEAN, a coordinated operation in the Atlantic, Pacific and Mediterranean in the summer of 1970. Admiral Gorshkov, navy Commander in Chief, has said that it must be able to fight in any sea at any time. With an active Soviet navy of 660 vessels, a building program of Y-class submarines and a present roster of 370 submarines — compared with the 200 possessed by the United States, Britain and France — this ambition can now be fulfilled. The potential political influence of the Soviet navy is enhanced by its ability to establish a blockade, to mount combined operations and to keep surveillance over other fleets. The historic position of the USSR as a defensive-minded power with a dominant army has shifted in the last decade to that of a global power.

The Soviets have benefited by other factors. Over the years Western enthusiasm for greater contributions to NATO, in men and money, has been declining amid a growing eagerness for détente. French forces are outside the NATO integrated command. Canada has cut her forces by half, and Denmark and Belgium are contemplating cuts. The ban imposed by COCOM, the NATO committee, on the sale of strategic goods to communist countries has been virtually removed in practice. And the Soviets have been developing strong trade links with some of the NATO nations. The Fiat factory at Togliattigrad and the Daimler-Benz-Renault project for the world's largest truck factory on the banks of the Kama are only the most striking instances of these links. Moscow has used the carrot as well as the big stick and has been assiduous in its cultivation of nations friendly to the West such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

It is essential that the NATO countries should review their posture in the light of the Middle East crisis and Soviet Mediterranean power. The British Conservative Government is currently reviewing the Labour decision to withdraw the 6,000 troops, naval and air units from Bahrain, Qatar and the seven Trucial Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf by July 1971. If the contemplated federation, the Union of Arab Emirates, seems unlikely to come to fruition, the two British battalions at Sharjah and on the island of Bahrain are likely to remain. In any case British officers will still be attached to the local forces and British warships and aircraft will remain in the area.

The danger of the Soviet strength has been acknowledged in NATO by the creation of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, consisting of three infantry battalions, artillery, engineers and air support. It was also belatedly recognized at the NATO meeting of December 1970, which concluded that the alliance's overall military capacity should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions, balanced in scope and timing. To this end the European nations decided on a Defense Improvement Program, due to cost more than $450 million over the next five years for increases in national forces, and $420 million in improving the NATO infrastructure, communications and bases. Since 1949 the United States has spent about 75 per cent of the total for defense spent by all the NATO countries: in 1970 she was spending $76.5 billion out of the total of $102.86 billion. In 1970 the defense ministers of Europe agreed on a target of $300 million to help defray the costs of American troops in Europe, and West Germany has hinted that she will help pay the costs of the troops in Germany.

(6) The United States should propose that Israel become a member of NATO if the Soviet Union remains intransigent. In previous years Israel has tried to stay apart from the Cold War, but she may now feel the need for protection by the West. The West

European nations could help in this regard by inviting Israel to become an associate member of the Common Market.

(7) The United States should provide economic aid in view of Israel's serious financial problems. The Israeli military budget for fiscal 1971-1972 constitutes over 40 per cent of the national budget and some 24 per cent of the gross national product. About 55 per cent of the total national budget will go to military needs and debt repayment. The tax burden on Israel is now the highest in the world, with over 41 per cent of GNP going to the government at the national and local level. Heavy overseas expenditure on military equipment means a continuing drain on the country's hard currency reserve. Only if the United States makes military equipment available on a credit basis can this financial need be alleviated. Israel must not be forced to become the Sparta of the Middle East because of concentrating all of her resources on defense.

(8) The United States must make clear to the Soviet Union that she does not accept the extension to the Arab nations of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," the claim that Moscow has the right to intervene in communist countries to maintain or restore regimes of which it approves.

(9) The United States must be prepared to use her veto in the Security Council of the United Nations if a Soviet-Arab solution unacceptable to Israel is proposed.

(10) Above all, the United States must exert all her efforts to ensure a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict by trying to moderate the behavior of all the parties. Israel has acknowledged her intention to withdraw from occupied territory once a satisfactory agreement has been reached. But if Elie Kedourie is right in his view that the Muslim theory of international relations recognizes two possible situations only[12] — war on the infidel or his subjugation to the faithful — considerable effort is needed to moderate Arab intransigence. If the path to peace leads through Moscow as well as Washington, the United States must convince Moscow that peace is essential and that Israel is not a "spearhead of American imperialism." Peace is dependent on active U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

The United States might emphasize six themes:

(1) The tone of Arab rhetoric must be lowered and the constant threat of battle stopped. The Arabs must be persuaded to

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[12] Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 11.

deal with reality, not fantasy, and be convinced that the form of things is not more important than the substance. They must admit the idea of peace to their thinking and reject the idea of Israel as demonological. They must be convinced that war is unprofitable and that nothing can be gained by further hostilities.

(2) All parties would greatly benefit economically by a settlement. Between 1948 and 1970 the Arab states and Israel spent $20 billion for military purposes. Currently Israel and Egypt are spending $2 billion a year on arms. Development programs for the area would not stop at individual frontiers.

(3) A settlement is in Soviet interests since the present uncertainty and appeals to violence allow the Chinese to gain greater influence over the Arab revolutionary movements. The Soviet Union is aware that the people of the United States are not divided on the Middle East as they are on Southeast Asia and that Moscow's moves have checked a growing mood of neo-isolationism.

(4) It is in the general interest to avoid the risk of a greater conflagration. Both superpowers recognized this by using the hot line between Washington and Moscow for the first time in June 1967.

(5) The refusal of the Soviet Union to cooperate would lead to lack of progress in other issues such as the SALT negotiations or access to American technology.

(6) The reopening of the Suez Canal after a peace settlement will benefit all. For the West, oil will become cheaper since the large tankers of 100,000 tons or more carrying oil around the Cape of Good Hope are a satisfactory but expensive alternative: some economists have estimated that the closing of the canal cost the United States, Europe and Japan over $3 billion in 1970. The embarrassing political problem for Britain of providing military aid to South Africa in order to protect the oil route will have been eliminated. For the Arab nations and the Soviet Union the reopening will be of particular importance. Egypt will gain substantially by the revenue provided — before the Suez closure this amounted to $550 million a year — though she may then lose her present subsidies from Arab states. The Soviet Union will gain both economically and geopolitically: the journey from the Black Sea to Southeast Asia will be halved and a link will be provided between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The distance from Black Sea ports through the canal to Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean is much shorter than the present lines of com-

munication from Vladivostok. In addition, the Soviet Union is aware that Chinese exports to the Persian Gulf countries have increased from less than $100 million in 1967 to over $200 million in 1970.

THE ESSENTIALS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

A political settlement in the Middle East revolves around three issues: territory, security and the Palestinian refugees.

Contrary to Arab and Soviet rhetoric, Israel has no desire to annex territory for its own sake or to act as a colonial power. She seeks only adjustments vital to her existence. All conquered territory should be open for discussion, but special attention must be given to the key areas, the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, parts of the West Bank and Sharm el Sheik. Secure and recognized borders are essential – not a return to the status quo of June 4, 1967. Secretary Rogers' view that only "insubstantial alterations in frontiers" should be permitted was not particularly helpful for a flexible negotiating position. Nor is the idea of an imposed solution.

A settlement of the territory concerned in the Arab-Israeli problem will also provide opportunity for the settlement of other boundary disputes in the area, such as those between Yemen and Saudi Arabia and between the Maghreb states.

The essential elements of a final secure settlement are a permanent cease-fire, unconditional acceptance by the Arabs of the existence of Israel and the Jewish right to self-determination, free navigation in international waterways, demilitarization of certain areas, nonaggression pacts between the contending parties and an international supervisory force in which the United States will participate.

Israel was proved rightly reluctant to accept a limited cease-fire for fear that the Soviet Union and Egypt would make military use of it to strengthen their position on the canal. She therefore must be given unequivocal assurance by both the United States and the United Nations that the settlement is not merely an interlude between wars.

It is understandable that Israel should be cautious about guarantees of her security when the international community has left her to fight three wars alone, when the cease-fire violations went without reprimand, when the combination of communist and Arab countries is virtually sufficient to obtain a majority in the United Nations and when no resolution in the Security Council can be passed contrary to Arab wishes. It is easy to see why she is skeptical about guarantees of freedom of navigation when those guarantees in the Straits of Tiran proved worthless in 1967 even though seventeen nations had provided them. Yet Israel must live with some trust in international assurances as well as in her own strength.

Israel must obtain sufficient security to prevent her from resorting to military action, and the Arab nations must be accorded enough dignity and sense of worth to remove any feeling of inferiority. The intransigent countries, Syria and Iraq, must be persuaded to accept a cease-fire. All states in the area must be convinced that mutual cooperation and development of the region will benefit them, as the creation of the European Economic Community has helped the West European countries.

It is necessary to use both indirect and direct negotiations, the offices of the UN and the major powers, and the inevitable intermediaries, to reach a settlement. Yet if the negotiations begin in an informal and indirect manner, all parties must be reminded of the words of Jacob Malik on November 15, 1948, that "the wisest and most expedient proposal would be to offer the parties concerned the opportunity to try to settle all outstanding questions by direct negotiations or negotiations with the assistance of the acting mediator."[13]

The most difficult and troublesome issue is that of the refugees, which over the last year has been partly transformed into one of Palestinian nationalism. Clearly the refugee question can be solved only by a delicate mixture of repatriation, compensation and resettlement. A viable Israel could not accept the principle of individual choice of each refugee before negotiations were begun. Only an international conference can find a solution to this emotional problem, exacerbated by the manner in which the Arab nations have used it as a political tool. In such a conference the United States is entitled to play a large role. Of the $695 million spent by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency on the refugees since 1948, the United States contributed $455 million. The Soviet Union contributed nothing. Since 1967 Israel has contributed over $2 million.

The Arab people themselves must settle the question of a Palestinian identity and the form Palestinian self-determination should take. The Palestinian nationalist movement is a small one, divided into squabbling factions. Its objectives are precise only in their rejection of Israel in her present form. At its most moderate it puts forward the specious call for a unitary, democratic, nonsectarian state, all of which is denied by its fanaticism, intransigence, terrorism and deliberate indoctrination of hatred of Israel. The very meaning of "Al Fatah" in Arabic is "a conquest of a non-Muslim country by Muslims." At its most extreme it calls for the destruction of the Zionist-imperialist enemy and for a revolution that will be a part of a worldwide revolution: the emblem of the hammer and sickle is combined with the star and crescent.

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[13] United Nations Security Council Official Records, November 15, 1948, p. 18.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to devise a method by which a Palestinian group, especially the neglected notables, can be brought into any process of negotiation. Two essential requirements are that the Palestinians temper their hostility and that the Soviet Union and the Arab governments, which have given them military, economic and moral support, control their activity. In the prewar period the Arab extremists under the fanatical leadership of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem were prominent. For the peace of the world the Palestinian tail must be prevented from wagging the Arab dog and obstructing an overall settlement.

In *War and Peace,* Tolstoy suggested that the war of 1812 occurred because it was bound to happen. A similar mood of fatalism and hopelessness pervades the Middle East issue. The essence of tragedy is present in a setting given over to a conflict between opposing forces — each of which is convinced of the rightness of its position — of such implacability that it has already led to three periods of war. With the entry of the Soviet Union on the stage the scenario has altered from tragic conflict to high drama. In this new scenario the United States must play a strong role in ensuring that the drama does not end in catastrophe.

THE "BACK BURNER" REVISITED: AMERICA'S AFRICAN POLICY

by Ross K. Baker

DURING the late 1960's a fashionable cliché among U.S. policymakers was that African questions had been "moved to the back burner." In official Washington, a policy of "benign neglect" toward Africa had replaced the sometimes frenzied U.S. activity noted earlier in the decade. For a while, superficial evidence supported the thesis that Africa was undergoing a calm, sorting out period. Recent events, however, herald a new turbulence — which American policymakers may dread but which will require innovative responses from Washington. The overthrow of Milton Obote in Uganda, the upsurge of guerrilla activity in Eritrea, southern Sudan and Chad, the invasion of Guinea and the consequent turmoil in that country — all of these suggest that policy avoidance and relinquishment of initiative are inadequate responses to African problems. Old situations, if left to fester, often reassert themselves to challenge American policies that have been deficient. Concerning Africa, the belief that ignoring incipient problems inhibits their eruption into full-blown crises could prove to be disastrous.

Amid the pageantry and euphoria of independence, the African continent appeared to Washington to be an arena of challenge and promise. As a score of new states came of age, the United States viewed their development with unusual cordiality and optimism. Although the New Frontier, with its attendant glamour and dynamism, has often been criticized as a public relations *tour de force,* it identified President Kennedy's America, in the public mind, with the aspirations of the developing nations. Whether or not the emphasis was justified, the impression was that America cared about Africa. According to Theodore Sorensen,

> Many Africans had a special regard for John Kennedy — because of his civil rights efforts, his Senate speech on Algeria, his lead-off appointment of the crusading Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, his initiative to achieve better treatment and housing for their diplomats in Washington, his enthusiasm for the African independence movements, and his bold support of Adoula in the Congo, the Angolans against Portugal, and the Volta Dam project in Ghana.[1]

[1] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 533.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., pointed out that

> In 1960, for the first time in American history, Africa figured prominently in a presidential election. Kennedy charged repeatedly (there are 479 references to Africa in the index of his 1960 campaign speeches) that, "we have lost ground in Africa because we have neglected and ignored the needs and aspirations of the African people," . . . Once elected, Kennedy moved forward swiftly to lay the groundwork for a new African policy.[2]

Kennedy, the man and the politician, wished to identify with the vision and aspirations of the new generation of African leaders, and the nature of the East-West confrontation in the early 1960's underscored the political realism inherent in the President's wish. Africa was "up for grabs." The possibility that Moscow and Peking might win the friendship of these new states made it easier to "sell" American involvement to Congressmen and Senators otherwise inclined to regard Africa as unimportant in terms of U.S. foreign policy goals.

The problem of financing the Akosombo Dam on the Volta River illustrated the new urgency in U.S. policy. Members of the Eisenhower Administration, notably Secretary of State Christian Herter, had thought of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's President, as aligned with Moscow. Nkrumah's support of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and his rage against the European interests he considered responsible for Lumumba's death, further exacerbated relations between him and the West. Within this context, Kennedy vowed to press on with U.S. funding of the Volta Dam. As Schlesinger put it:

> If the United States were now to pull out . . . the Africans would regard it as an attempt to use financial power to dictate the national policy of independent African states; the Russians would move in; and cancellation might have the same consequences in West Africa that John Foster Dulles's repudiation of the Aswan Dam had in Egypt in 1956. But, if the West backed the Volta Dam, it would be convincing proof to the Africans, who were tending to regard the Soviet system as particularly well designed to bring about industrialization, that industrial development could be combined with freedom.[3]

In those days Africa was deemed as vital to the Soviet Union as it was to the United States. Stressing the solidarity of all revolutionary peoples and the constancy of Soviet assistance, the USSR characterized her aid to Africa as being

> founded on agreements, including long-term agreements, signed between

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[2] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 554-555.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 527-573.

> governments. This enables the Asian and African countries to plan production for several years ahead. Moreover, the planned nature of the Soviet economy and the absence of crises and production recessions in the Soviet Union make the developing countries firmly confident that there will always be a market for their exports. . . . The experience of the Asian and African peoples has shown them that the stronger the economy of the Soviet Union the greater will be its assistance to the developing countries, and the greater its military might the sounder will be the rocket and nuclear shield protecting them against the threat of another world war.[4]

The Soviets sent armored cars, small arms and artillery to Guinea in 1959. During the next two years, Mali, Ghana and the Sudan as well as Algeria and Morocco received weapons. In 1964 and 1965 arms were shipped to rebel elements in the Congo. By mid-decade Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia and Congo (Brazzaville) had also received Soviet arms.[5] With the advent of the Sino-Soviet split these weapons were sent as much to neutralize Chinese influence as they were to checkmate the West. This was especially true of the clandestine arms transfers to liberation groups operating against the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola and to such ethnic and irredentist groups as the Eritreans in Ethiopia.

The Chinese, for their part, saw Africa as part of the world "countryside" destined to challenge and overthrow the "cities." Regarding herself as the developmental model for African countries, China initiated in 1958 an aid program of over $1 billion, $400 million of which was earmarked for Africa. In 1960, largely as a concomitant of the Moscow-Peking rift, her interest intensified. The Chinese supported both sides in the civil strife in Burundi and supplied funds for Oginga Odinga in Kenya in his challenge to Jomo Kenyatta. Peking intervened in the political quarrels in Zanzibar in 1963 and supported the Simba faction in the Congo in 1964. In Ghana the Chinese financed training facilities for freedom fighters who prepared themselves for overthrowing the Portuguese regimes and even independent governments at odds with President Nkrumah.

Although the Chinese occasionally supported constituted governments such as those of Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Mali and Tanzania, guerrilla and liberation groups were the most regular recipients of their assistance. The Soviets, on the other hand, were more anxious to support those nationalist regimes they regarded as being worthy and "progressive."

Thus, in the early 1960's the United States, the Soviet Union and China were optimistic regarding their chances of influencing events in Africa. Much of this optimism and its attendant outpouring of aid was based on a mixture of naïveté, ignorance, a significant quantum of good will, and the prospect of being able to invade untouched preserves. Each of the three powers tried to be "more anti-colonialist" than the others. For Washington this meant infusing prestige and resources into the new Africa Bureau within the State Department at the expense of the European Bureau. The latter had previously been the source of knowledge and expertise on Africa because the colonial powers had been West European.

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[4] *The U.S.S.R. and Developing Countries* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House [n.d.]), pp. 81, 82, 87.

[5] "Moscow Steps Up Arms Diplomacy," *New York Times*, September 5, 1967.

A minor revolution occurred within the State Department's hierarchy. It became fashionable for an ambassador to receive an African assignment. Schlesinger discloses that

> In selecting his own ambassadors for the new African nations, [Kennedy] made a special effort to find men who embodied the spirit of the New Frontier. He used to say that Africa was the exciting place for a diplomat to be; London and Paris hardly mattered any more — everything could be done by telephone from Washington — but in Africa a man was on his own. After Robert Kennedy and Chester Bowles had blocked the dying administration's attempt to equip the new African states with Foreign Service Officers on the verge of retirement, the President sent to Africa in the next years a group of younger Foreign Service Officers, like his old friend Edmund Gullion (to the Congo), leavened by journalists like William Attwood and Edward Korry of *Look* (to Guinea and Ethiopia), scholars like John Badeau (to Egypt) and liberal Democrats with government experience in Truman days like Philip Kaiser, John Ferguson and James Loeb (to Senegal and Mauritania, Morocco and Guinea).[6]

Paralleling the new diplomatic emphasis was the establishment of the Peace Corps, for which Africa was a prime focus. From Dakar to Dar-es-Salaam, thousands of America's teachers, agricultural experts, mechanics and museum curators moved out to fulfill the promise the New Frontier offered for the developing countries. If there was a revolution in the American perception of Africa and its importance for U.S. foreign policy, it was an *official* revolution, sanctioned and cultivated by President Kennedy and reflecting his eclectic and charismatic activism in world affairs. Moreover, it was a revolution in style and emphasis more than in substance and fundamentals. It came not from the demands or desires of an authentic constituency but from an amalgam of idealism, Cold War gambits and Presidential histrionics. It was intertwined with the glamour of nascent African nationhood rather than with the abiding and ongoing problems of African development. As Schlesinger noted, "The President's interest was not widely shared in the United States, except by African specialists and, to an increasing degree, by Negro leaders. No one in Congress, for example, showed the concern for Africa that Kennedy himself had shown as Senator."[7]

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[6] Schlesinger, *op. cit.,* p. 556.

For these reasons, in the main, the infatuation was both coterminous and congruent with the Kennedy Administration. Even before November 1963, however, the complexities of Africa proved impervious to mere zeal and good will: the period of optimism had nearly ended. One observer wrote in 1963:

> The Africa policy achievements of the Kennedy Administration's first year may be summed up as a positive contribution which injected a new and much needed spirit into our relations with Africans, and carried further several trends of the last eighteen months under Eisenhower. The Kennedy team soon found, however, that it was only moving from old dilemmas to new. In place of choosing between Africa and Europe, it soon had to decide whether it wanted to choose Adoula or Tshombe, Morocco or Mauritania, and the Casablanca or Monrovia group. One wonders if Secretary of State Dean Rusk did not look back with nostalgia on the "good old days" when, as undersecretary to Dean Acheson, the only African dilemma he had to worry about was our fence-sitting on the colonial question.[8]

This first phase of U.S. foreign policy toward independent Africa was a happy one for all its briefness. Washington manipulated all the positive symbols of postcolonialism without becoming deeply involved in internal complexities. Independent African regimes, per se, were desirable except for those, such as Katanga, that threatened the larger sovereignty. We leaned, although not too obviously, on the lingering European presences and identified satisfactorily with the idea of independence in the abstract. Our early embrace of Africa was dictated to some extent by the view that the continent was a Cold War zone requiring aid not only for undergirding the new sovereignties but for neutralizing communist penetration. In a sense, both Africa's adversaries and ours were foreign forces: for the Africans they were the European colonialists; for us they were the Chinese and the Soviets.

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Such simplicity hardly marked the second phase. The linear and incremental models of development posited in the late 1950's had already revealed their limitations, both as theories and strategies. Questionable correlations between economic development and political stability were reassessed in the academy and in the field. Underdevelopment came to connote not merely a paucity of capital or a narrow educational base but a set of social, ethnic, educational, economic and political interactions not amenable to topical economic treatment. Increasingly, the nature and essence of the new sovereignties were being examined and re-evaluated in terms of what constituted a viable nation-state. The ethnic agglomerations with their capriciously-drawn colonial boundaries, their patterns of asynchronous development and resistant traditional sectors, resembled states but nothing more. Above all, in the matter of U.S. foreign policy, Washington officials began to realize that physical modernization and political development were not conjunctive. As Edward Shils observed:

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 556-557.

[8] Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 359.

> A modern society is not just a complex of modern institutions. It is a mode of integration of the whole society. It is a mode of relationship between the center and the periphery of the society. Modern society entails the inclusion of the mass of the population into the society in the sense that both elite and mass regard themselves as members of the society and, as such, as of approximately equal dignity. It involves a greater participation by the masses in the values of the society, a more active role in the making of society-wide decisions, and a greater prominence in the consideration of the elite.
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> Like all states, the new states rest on a pre-political matrix of institutions, beliefs, and solidarities. In the case of the new states, the pre-political matrix is in a most rudimentary condition. The constituent societies on which the new states rest are, taken separately, not civil societies, and, taken together, do not form a single civil society. They are scarcely able thus far to produce a polity that can supply the personnel necessary to run a modern society. They lack the affirmative attitude toward rules, persons, and actions that is necessary for a consensus. They are constellations of kinship groups, castes, tribes, feudalities — even smaller territorial societies — but they are not civil societies.[9]

By the mid-1960's scholars and political leaders in the United States had sensed the gravity of the developmental crisis. The crisis was neither superficial nor circumstantially imposed: it inhered in the new sovereignties, going to the heart of their social and family structures. In Myron Weiner's assessment, missing was "The readiness of individuals to work together in an organized fashion for common purposes and to behave in a fashion conducive to the achievement of these common purposes. . . ."[10] The necessity for integrative behavior or what James Q. Wilson has called "the community-regarding ethic"; the imperative to establish stable horizontal institutions to constitute what Samuel Huntington calls "institutionalization" – these desiderata of development were either deficient or lacking in African societies.[11]

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[9] Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States," in Clifford Geertz, editor, *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 21-22.

Given the profundity and pervasiveness of this condition, how could any advanced society, no matter how well-intentioned or richly endowed, provide more than piecemeal support for the development effort? It could finance infrastructural improvements such as roads, hydroelectric plants and transportation facilities. It could make certain capital equipment loans and furnish technical assistance funds and personnel to upgrade health and education. It could even, on a short-run basis, supply dietary supplements to a population. It might attempt to support and encourage desirable political trends by tying these forms of assistance to vague political reforms. But all of this considered, the centrality of the developmental syndrome eludes both the good will and the financial infusions of the developed states.

It is possible to see, in the pattern of U.S. government assistance to Africa, the declining level of commitment to bilateral aid as a device for fostering African development. In 1962, at the height of the Kennedy Administration's African effort, the AID programs in that continent cost $356 million. This declined to $307 million in the following year, to $202 million in 1964, to $166 million in 1965. The next two years saw a slight increase, to a high of $203 million, but aid costs dropped to $159 million in 1968 and to $154 million in 1969. Although $186.3 million was asked for fiscal 1970, $20 million of this went for special relief to Nigeria. The amount asked for 1971 came close to $161 million, less than the actual commitment for 1965.[12]

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[10] Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in Claude E. Welch, editor, *Political Modernization* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1969), p. 163.

[11] Although the extreme type of "amoral familism" or "amoral individualism" described by Edward C. Banfield in *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958) characterizes only certain African societies, it is indicative of a species of family- or clan-wide solidarity that precludes society-wide action to attain developmental goals. Artificial, paper-thin organizations which have only the form of modernity and only aspire to be society-wide tend in their evanescence to create the crisis of "institutionalization" treated by Samuel Huntington in "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics,* April 1965, pp. 386-430.

[12] See Darrell Randall, "U.S. Aid in Africa," *Current History,* July 1966; Anthony Astrachan, "Aid Reslices the Pie," *Africa Report,* June 1967; *Statement of the Honorable Samuel C. Adams, Jr., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, A.I.D., Before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee,* Washington, November 25, 1969 (mimeo.).

However, the downward trend in economic assistance reflected more than periodic reassessments of the efficacy of foreign aid in promoting development. Other forces were at work. Our involvement in Viet Nam grew massively after 1964. As President Johnson's Great Society programs got underway, Africa receded in importance as a point of American interest. Emphasis on aid also diminished because Chinese and Soviet interests in the area were waning. Where previously the Executive branch could cite communist activity when pressuring Congress for funds, this rationale for their provision had become less convincing. As the nature and loci of the Cold War changed, Africa became less important in East-West maneuverings.

While policymakers in Washington were pondering the inelastic and refractory elements of African political life, planners in Peking and Moscow were arriving at similar conclusions. According to a recent observation of the changes in Soviet policy:

> By the end of 1964 . . . experience had revealed to the Soviet leaders several problems connected with their assistance program. These problems revolved around three questions: the choice of recipients, the choice and implementation of projects, and the recipients' ability to repay. In the first ten years of the Soviet assistance program, the criteria for choosing beneficiaries were almost exclusively political: aid was pledged wherever it might most effectively and most rapidly encourage politico-economic tendencies externally anti-Western and internally anti-capitalist in character.
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> It gradually became apparent, however, that a developing country's "progressive" political orientation was by itself not a suitable yardstick for choosing it as a recipient of aid; that such an orientation was no indicator of a particular country's ability either to absorb aid effectively or even to prevent a general decline in its economy; and that unless economic factors were taken into account together with political ones, Soviet aid would tend to be misdirected, so that its ineffectiveness would minimize both its potential economic benefit to the recipient country and the political credit gained by the U.S.S.R. in originally offering its assistance.[13]

Moscow's new approach to the developing world, which resulted from a re-evaluation of assistance policies following Khrushchev's downfall, was based on more pessimistic projections for short-run political gains for the USSR, especially in Africa. It was also based on the Soviet Union's domestic needs, some of which Khrushchev had been accused of neglecting. Briefly stated, the new strategy was:

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[13] R. A. Yellon, "Shifts in Soviet Policy Towards Developing Areas 1964-1968," in W. Raymond Duncan, editor, *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries* (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p. 242.

(a) In general, maintain the Afro-Asian policy as a major element in Soviet foreign relations, but reduce its short-run priority until the economic system in the U.S.S.R. and the alignment pattern in the socialist system allowed the C.P.S.U. to focus greater attention on Africa and Asia, or improved prospects of substantial revolutionary gains in these areas merited fresh Soviet initiatives, or both.

(b) Within the context of (a) to broaden the base of Soviet relations with Afro-Asia along lines oriented towards achieving possible revolutionary gains in the long run, as opposed to in the near future.

(c) Reduce the backlog of unfulfilled aid commitments by holding new pledges to a minimum, while fulfilling previously granted credits at a rate faster than before 1964, and increase the effectiveness of the assistance program by channeling aid to countries best able to utilize it successfully.

(d) Subtly use the more detached attitude towards Africa and Asia implicit in (a), (b) and (c) as a tacit reminder to African and Asian leaders that the Soviet Union's economic support should not be taken for granted, but demanded somewhat more of a *quid pro quo* than had so far been forthcoming.

(e) Recover the ideological initiative concerning the evolution of the national liberation movement by developing a clear and consistently held ideological position based on more penetrating and realistic analysis of Afro-Asian developments.[14]

Foreign aid had never been one of Peking's principal policy weapons. Chinese involvement in Africa has been characterized by the manipulation of Third World symbols: support for liberation groups and modest technical assistance. As of 1968, it was estimated that Chinese economic assistance amounted to less than $400 million for the previous eight-year period. Domestic problems — most notably the Cultural Revolution initiated by Mao in 1966 — constrained Peking to narrow its activities in Africa and concentrate its efforts on those countries where the revolutionary potential appeared most promising. This selective assistance policy, governed not only by the hospitable nature of the incumbent regime but also by the recipient's proximity to areas of possible revolutionary action, reflected a "southern strategy" with major attention to states contiguous to the residual colonial or white-dominated areas. Accordingly, the Chinese granted a preferred position to Tanzania, Zambia and Congo (Brazzaville).

At about the same time, then, and for many of the same reasons, the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China began to reassess their roles in Africa, especially in regard to the amount of resources they were willing or able to expend. For the United States, the culmination of the policy of selective disengagement came with the completion of the Korry Report in 1966. This document recognized that the process of African development would be a protracted and difficult one; that some of the new states would "make it" while others would fall by the wayside, so riven by internal problems or so steeped in economic stagnation that continued bilateral assistance to them could not be justified. On this assumption, it made the following recommendations:

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

(1) Bilateral assistance should be accorded only to those African states whose size, resource-base, population and performance would allow them to profit from such assistance. (2) As much as possible, American aid should be channeled through international multinational, regional and cross-national functional groupings within Africa, not only to foster the growth of these agencies but also, in effect, to place the burden of resource allocation on them rather than on the United States. Institutions such as the World Bank, for example, were deemed better able to coordinate and distribute resources. Both intermediate donor and intermediate recipient would in that case be transnational authorities. (3) Specifically worthy of funding should be projects in agricultural and rural development, programs to strengthen the private sector, and projects designed to improve infrastructure and allow the developing states to make better use of assistance. (4) Economic assistance by the United States should be increased as the desired institutions grew and prospered. As if the Korry Report were not a strong enough instrument of retrenchment, Congress in 1966 imposed an absolute limit on the number of developing states to be given U.S. economic assistance.[15]

Modifications were in order. Broad dispersal and lack of emphasis on potentially successful projects had characterized the U.S. assistance program. Small grants to some countries had often served no purpose other than to evince American concern. The recommendations for dispensing aid on a multilateral basis provided Washington with an opportunity to render aid "without strings." Unfortunately, the greater selectivity, closer scrutiny, and new channeling procedures for aid occurred in the context of a declining commitment. According to Waldemar Nielsen, "the proposals [put forward in the Korry Report] seemed little more than a clever attempt to deflect congressional opposition and to lay down a smokescreen — through talk of regionalism and multilateralism — behind which to carry out an American cutback."[16]

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[15] Astrachan, *op. cit.,* p. 10; and Edward W. Brooke, "A Perspective on Africa: African Objectives and American Policy," *The Congressional Record,* 90th Congress, 2nd Session, April 29, 1968 (Xerox reprint), p. 7.

III

The continuing interest of the former colonial powers in Africa provides a convenient crutch for the United States in an era of retrenchment. It has been argued that the decline in American interest, as defined by a decline in aid, is not as catastrophic as it might be due to their significant residual concerns and their continuance of assistance. Western Europe has, it is said, "much greater economic and political ties with the [African] continent."[17] Implicit in this view is the belief that the policy goals of our European allies will be either identical or largely compatible with ours, or that, at least, the policies likely to be pursued by the French or British will be acceptable to the United States. The Suez adventure is a good example of the fallacy of this reasoning. Moreover, it should be stressed that Britain and France have substantial private investments in Africa and that London and Paris are more supportive of these private-sector investments. American aid has tended to favor the public sector. But, though Washington encourages corporate investment through the use of investment guarantees and incentives, only 3.8 per cent of all U.S. foreign investment is directed toward Africa (of this nearly 30 per cent is invested in South Africa).[18]

The trend in the direction of making American assistance harmonious and compatible with that of Britain and France has been noted by Nielsen, who charges that "The U.S. aid program . . . does not constitute a fully independent assistance effort. In effect, the policy adopted has led to a tailoring of American assistance in most African countries to accommodate existing European activities."[19]

In 1964 Secretary of State Rusk said that "the foreign aid program . . . is planned and administered to serve the vital interests of the United States. [It is] a prime instrument of U.S. foreign policy, [and] U.S. foreign policy and security would be in great jeopardy without the aid program."[20] If all this is true, then American leverage in Africa is indeed diminishing judged by the recent aid commitments. It is, of course, necessary to distinguish between those states, such as Ethiopia, where overriding political and strategic exigencies form the basis for financial assistance and those, such as Ghana or Nigeria, where aid is either specifically developmental or supportive of American corporate interests. It is also crucial to differentiate between states in these categories and modernized states that do not receive economic assistance but are perceived to be vital to U.S. interests because of the magnitude of American private investment therein and their strategic location — for example, South Africa and Rhodesia.

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[16] Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 394. Nielsen attributes these sentiments to "skeptics." He asserts that the Korry Report, in fact, represented a radical attempt to make the long-term development of Africa a central element in United States policy.

[17] Department of State, Agency for International Development, *U.S. Foreign Aid in Africa, Proposed Fiscal Year 1970 Program* [n.d.], p. 1.

[18] U.S. economic assistance to Africa has been characterized as being basically supportive of American private investment. Green and Seidman argue that although the largest amount of American assistance has gone to the public sector, most of this is for the development of local infrastructure, "needed to make private investment profitable." Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, *Unity or Poverty* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 175.

[19] Nielsen, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

Yet, in the areas of aid policy and overall political and strategic planning, U.S. behavior toward Africa has tended to be imitative, reactive and vicarious. Washington has never had a reasoned or independent African policy because African problems have never ranked as one of America's policy priorities. Even during the New Frontier's infatuation and identification with the aspirations of Africa, U.S. policy exhibited form without content and style without substance. U.S. diplomacy for the most part operated on a purely symbolic level, with little understanding of the profound problems of political development. Overall, the approach to the new nations has been somewhat spasmodic and haphazard. Relations between the United States and such countries as Guinea, Zambia, Tanzania and Gabon have swung from warm cordiality to icy aloofness.

In the change of scene that unfolded in Africa in the early 1960's — the creation of new national units and the quest for solidarity and modernization — even a spasmodic policy had some value. To a degree, problems could be treated on a topical and interim basis since they mainly involved the allocation of symbolic and material resources. Washington could hardly have opposed the new sovereignties or denied them material assistance. The United States stood firm on the principle of territorial integrity for the new states, as in the case of the Congo and Nigeria. These policies were capable of fulfillment because, in large measure, they were harmonious with the positions of the former colonial powers. In supporting the goals of independence, development and territorial sovereignty the United States was at one with Great Britain and France, and with the Soviet Union and China as well.

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[20] *Hearings* (on House Resolution 10502), Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, March 23, 1964, p. 9.

But this new decade of African politics may not be as kind to those who engage in the symbolic use of politics. Immanuel Wallerstein has referred to the first phase of the African metamorphosis as the politics of independence and to the second phase as the politics of unity.[21] Africa is now at the threshold of the politics of liberation. This cannot be cultivated by resorting to symbols or abstractions. Nor will it elicit a consensus among the United States and her allies, because it deals with the explosive issue of *Africa irredenta* – the future of the white regimes of Southern Africa.

For many reasons – some endemic to the new African states, some internal to the United States, some inherent in the strategic relationship between the United States and the USSR, and some in the internal conditions of the white-ruled states – the fate of Africa south of the Zambesi has become an international issue. America's policy toward this area, perhaps even more directly than her policy toward the former colonies of tropical Africa, has tended to be shaped by her relations with her allies in NATO and by the Cold War. If American assistance planning in Black Africa is couched in a developmental matrix established by the former metropolitan powers, its overall political strategy toward the "White Redoubt" is dictated by constraints and limitations imposed in London, Lisbon, Brussels and Paris. If questions can be asked about the desirability of following European policy initiatives in Black Africa, even more serious ones should be raised regarding the autonomy of U.S. policy in Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique and Angola.

IV

Ever since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Ian Smith Government in Rhodesia in 1965, Washington's basic response has been dictated by the manner in which London has coped with the secessionist regime. Rather than relying on our power and influence to function independently, we have looked to our weaker ally for policy initiatives and tactical responses. Rather than scrutinizing the easily-circumvented British and UN sanctions against the Salisbury government and urging stronger measures, we have accepted them as the limits of practical action on the Rhodesian issue. The United States closed her consulate in

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[21] Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (New York: Vintage Press, 1967) and *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (New York: Random House, 1967).

Salisbury only after the Rhodesians so circumscribed the actions of her consul that he could no longer carry out his duties. He was inoperative for fully six months prior to the formal closure, yet we clung to the illusion that somehow he could influence events in Rhodesia. By the time the facility was shut down, even those marginal symbolic gains that might have accrued to this country had vanished.

In the case of the Portuguese overseas territories, the record of U.S. diplomatic influence is lamentable because American policymakers have accepted many of the myths the Portuguese have propagated to legitimize their unyielding colonial rule. The chief myth is that the strategic capabilities of the Western alliance will somehow be seriously eroded if the Portuguese are compelled to withdraw from Africa; that the loss of U.S. facilities in the Azores, on NATO's western flank, will create strategic deficiencies in the alliance; or that the loss of friendly port facilities in Mozambique will convert the Indian Ocean into a Soviet lake. The Portuguese play on these themes with great virtuosity. As the Soviet naval buildup continues and as Soviet maritime power is introduced in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, Portuguese leverage increases commensurately. The fact is, however, that the single Air Force installation in the Azores and the isolated geographical position of Portugal in NATO have never been as important as either the Portuguese or certain elements in the State and Defense departments contend. Viewed objectively, they are not important enough to be determinants of America's Africa policy.[22]

Nonetheless, the limitation of Washington's influence on Lisbon, because of Portugal's "strategic position" is, in part, rationalized by another myth: that Portugal's colonial policy is somehow more humane and reasonable than the racial policies of South Africa and Rhodesia and that she represents a third force that might be split off from the other white-dominated states. This view is expressed in a recent article by Michael A. Samuels, who argues that:

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[22] An example of Portuguese artfulness with respect to NATO's strategic insecurities can be found in Marcello Caetano, *Guidelines of Foreign Policy* (Lisbon: Secretaria de Estado Da Informacao E Turismo, 1970), p. 8, in which the Portuguese Prime Minister warns: "At a time when the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean is daily growing and when Russia is seeking to set up military bases and cement alliances in the Middle East and North Africa, no one can be blind to the importance of Cape Verde if it were in the power of those friendly to Russia. Europe is being surrounded. Nowadays, the security of countries cannot be defended on their frontiers. Nations are integrated into vast blocs, whose common fate they share. The liberty and independence of the countries of Western Europe is at stake in Europe itself and in Africa. This is why we must defend [Portuguese] Guinea: in its own interest, of course, but also on behalf of the West, of Europe, and even the Americas."

> The Portuguese may be searching for a positive concluding chapter to their colonial epic. Present Portuguese policies to spread social, educational, and economic benefits in Africa, actively pursued as a result of nationalist pressure, can be seen as something beyond a mere counter-insurgency technique. These policies have begun to bring changes in Angola and Mozambique. For African states to deny the existence of these changes may give moral support to liberation movements; to admit realistically their existence may assist the Portuguese in gaining recognition for their difficult path toward decolonization.[23]

Samuels admits that the Portuguese have no schedule for leaving Africa and might not even be considering one, but he suggests that a pullout is a possibility. There is little evidence of it in recent Portuguese practice. The apparent attempt on the part of Portugal to support an invasion of Guinea is hardly the behavior of a state about to disengage itself and assume a low profile.[24] Within Mozambique and Angola, moreover, there seems to be no conscious attempt to train an elite to assume leadership in an independent state except for the slow-moving educational reforms on behalf of the Africans and the putative rise of the *mestiço,* which in Mozambique represent a minuscule 0.5 per cent of the population. For even these more favored subjects of mixed blood, high-level posts in government are unobtainable. Power quite simply resides in the hands of the resident Portuguese. Whatever reforms they have yielded have aimed at conciliating nationalist demands.

Portugal's primitive industry and backward economy are peculiarly vulnerable to pressure, yet the United States applies none. Instead, the Portuguese do the pressuring. They appear to have convinced Washington that its interests are best served by assuming a passive role on the question of the "overseas territories." U.S. abstention on a Security Council vote in December 1969 and withdrawal from the UN Committee on Colonialism in January 1971 may reflect a policy commitment giving Lisbon a free hand in Africa. The most significant limitation placed on the Portuguese seems to be their pledge not to use American weapons on the nationalists in Angola and Mozambique.

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[23] Michael A. Samuels, "Facing Some Southern African Realities," *Interplay,* December 1970, p. 14.

[24] The inclination of the Portuguese to remain in Africa can be detected in a recent speech by Premier Caetano to the Portuguese National Assembly in which he rejected any possibility that Portugal would relinquish her territories. *New York Times,* December 3, 1970.

V

The Portuguese and Rhodesian cases, however vexing, pale when compared with U.S relations with the Republic of South Africa. Since 1948 South Africa has pursued a policy of internal colonialism which has steadily become more rigid, more punitive and more repressive. There is no question here of political rights for Africans except in the context of a meaningless local autonomy within wholly artificial ethnic enclaves. None of the enclaves has a potential for industrial development or even agricultural self-sufficiency. They are reservations contiguous to the industrial and mining areas, designed for the easy exploitation of African labor. The policy of *Apartheid* envisions no rights for Africans within areas reserved for whites. In areas designated as white-only, a rigid job system prevails whereby certain categories of employment are restricted to Europeans, and there is rigorous social control based on an elaborate pass system buttressed by curfews. Political activity by Africans and people of mixed blood — the "coloreds" — is forbidden outside the "homelands" or "Bantustans" from which the Africans derive their nationality. The entire *Apartheid* system is welded together by a bewildering array of statutes regulating virtually every aspect of life for Africans and coloreds.

For these practices, the South African government has been condemned and castigated by virtually every international organization, a preponderant number of individual states, and an impressive array of private, humanitarian and religious organizations. The United States has contributed more than her fair share in this moral reaction, but while condemning South Africa she carries on a $750 million-a-year trade with her and maintains a favorable balance of trade to the extent of $250 million.

In the case of South Africa, even more than in the case of Black Africa, there is a serious gap between Washington's pronouncements and its performance. In return for material assistance, the states of tropical Africa may be willing to suffer American rhetoric. For Africans and coloreds in South Africa, American indignation is cold comfort. With this issue as with others in Africa, the United States marches to someone else's tune. The Republic of South Africa is powerful, wealthy and entrenched. She is neither a backward, autocratic state with imperial pretensions like Portugal nor an isolated international pariah like Rhodesia. She can claim a significant domestic constituency in the United States by virtue of her corporate ties to this country. She produces a major portion of the gold for Western economies. She occupies a strategic position at the tip of Africa, and has advanced herself as one of the principal anti-communist states of the world.

Despite the condemnation, her international position has, if anything, been strengthened, and her control of internal dissidents has increased. She occupies an enviable defensive position surrounded by a *cordon sanitaire* of client states, the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia. This makes the Republic of South Africa all but impenetrable by liberation groups based in Tanzania, Zambia and the Congo — groups which have thus far failed to penetrate the surrounding safety zone. The Pretoria government, moreover, has adopted a forward strategy in dealing with these liberation groups by assigning elements of the South African police to the Rhodesian forces engaged in combat in northwestern Rhodesia. Internally, the Special Branch of the South African police has successfully neutralized African opposition by infiltrating African nationalist groups and either exiling or imprisoning their leaders.

South Africa's diplomacy has proved to be uncommonly adept at probing the weak spots within the Black African community on her periphery and using her superior economic position to hold out concrete rewards for cooperative, nonbelligerent states. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are the most vulnerable to her offer of profitable relationships in return for nonmilitancy. Malawi and the Malagasy Republic have also proven "soft" due to their precarious economic situations. Beyond the vulnerable states are the "pragmatic" regimes: the Ivory Coast and, to a lesser extent, Ghana and the Congo (Kinshasa). Both Kofi A. Busia, Prime Minister of Ghana, and Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast have recently discussed the possibility of "co-opting" South Africa by permitting the exchange of diplomatic and commercial personnel.

It is ironic that in this mutually cautious process of feeling-out, each nation is talking about co-opting the other. For the black states, co-optation means penetrating the isolation of South Africa with the hope of influencing her and, as a beneficial side-effect, obtaining certain valuable considerations. For the South Africans, the object is to de-fuse African militancy and drive a wedge between the militant states and those more amenable to accommodation. Given the power asymmetries that prevail, the advantage lies with the South Africans. They correctly perceive the economic vulnerability of the African states to the north. They clearly assess the diminishing interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the developmental problems of these states and recognize where leverage can be applied. To a considerable degree, the aid retrenchment of the United States has left many African states no alternative but to deal with South Africa — at great cost to their self-respect. Although it is difficult to establish a direct relationship between the decrease in American assistance and the acceptance of South African overtures, the unavailability of development money in Black Africa has resulted in a desperate casting about for help.[25]

Other factors have also been operative in the independent states' reassessment of relations with South Africa. There is reason to believe, for example, that the emergence of France as a major arms supplier for South Africa has conveyed a message to France's erstwhile colonies to tread softly on the South African issue. President Houphouet-Boigny's call for a conference of African states to reconsider relations with South Africa may represent such an influence. For France's part, the decision to supply arms may stem not only from the desire for a lucrative market but also from a re-evaluation of South Africa's strategic location in the context of new Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean. In the case of Great Britain, this geopolitical factor looms large. The Heath Government appears convinced that a major Soviet strategic threat exists and it has announced the sale of naval weapons to South Africa. Following the Commonwealth meetings in Singapore, Prime Minister Heath stated that if the South Africans used these for unauthorized (i.e., internal) purposes, no more weapons would be sold them. Washington's silence on this decision appears to imply agreement with London on both the nature of the threat and how best to deal with it.

Fearful of the consequences of a British pullback from bases east of Suez, and apprehensive of the implications of increased Soviet naval strength, the United States appears to have bought the argument that the only bulwark to Soviet might in the Indian Ocean is the naval facility at Simonstown, South Africa. The Soviet threat, as the *Washington Post* pointed out recently in an editorial, is neither as portentous nor even as manifest as the British depict it to be.[26] What, for example, do the Soviets plan to accomplish in the Indian Ocean? Do they plan to interdict oil shipments from the Persian Gulf? If they did, where would the oil sheikdoms and

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[25] Ghana's problems with regard to repaying her external debt, which increased enormously under Nkrumah, are discussed by Ruth Weiss in "Ghana: Where Everyone's Arithmetic Went Wrong," *Interplay*, December 1970, pp. 17-19.

[26] January 17, 1971.

Iran sell their oil? Surely not to the Soviet Union, which could not absorb it. The only losers would be the Arab states which the Soviets wish to cultivate. If the USSR were to cut off oil to Western Europe, such an action would probably constitute a *casus belli* from the NATO view: in this case deliverable missiles rather than deliverable oil would be the problem. Yet the vague geopolitical threat posited by Great Britain has received implicit endorsement by the United States. Meanwhile, even accepting the notion that Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean are malevolent does not explain why the compromise solution offered by President Kaunda of Zambia at the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference was summarily dismissed. The Kaunda Compromise suggested that the United States and Great Britain could build a new naval facility in Mauritius to supplant Simonstown; or that, if this solution were deemed threatening by India, Pakistan and Ceylon, the United States could use her influence to call a conference of Indian Ocean nations with a view to declaring the ocean a neutralized zone.

VI

On the whole, we have operated in Africa on a consistently symbolic level — condemning in principle while condoning in practice; acting supportively in the abstract while withholding on the concrete level; occupying ourselves with interim fantasies instead of long-range planning. We envision peaceful solutions and reform but fail to consider the potential for violence. We forgo influence within the forces of change in Africa in order to garner short-run benefits by effectively identifying with the status quo. We equate the corporate good of American enterprises operating in South Africa with the overall advantage of the United States — an identification which is by no means self-evident. In our fear of making moral judgments about the desirability of allowing these investments to persist and increase, we make a moral judgment by doing nothing. We reinforce this ethical equivocation by arguing that a disengagement of American investment would ultimately harm the Africans more than it would the practitioners of *Apartheid*. This presupposes a kind of "percolator effect," according with a concept fashionable in the early 1950's, which held that the infusion of capital into an economy eventually impacts proportionally as hard on the poorest as it does on the richest and that the withdrawal of such capital would be harmful to the poorest elements. Although more research must be done on this question, the economic marginality of Africans in South Africa and their exclusion from real participation in the economy would seem to argue that they cannot really be much worse off than they are now.

Both morality and long-term national interest, broadly defined, dictate disengagement from South Africa and a concentration of American developmental resources in multilateral and international agencies which are capable of advancing modernization without exploitation in the independent states of Africa. Perhaps, as Christian Bay has suggested, every political question is ultimately reducible to a philosophical one. If one makes implicit moral judgments by persisting in his current policies, he cannot object if moral judgments are offered in favor of changing them.

The greatest shortcomings of U.S. African policy are that it is derivative rather than original; that it reacts rather than initiates; that it imitates rather than innovates. Our entry into Africa in the early 1960's was basically out of fear of communist penetration. Our economic assistance policy was designed to adjust to residual colonial influence. Our policy toward South Africa implies that "what's good for General Motors is good for the country." American policymakers, moreover, seem to be largely unaware of the foreign policy consequences of the increasing interest in African problems on the part of black Americans, some of whom have already taken positive steps to influence corporate policy on South Africa and may be expected to apply political influence as well.[27]

The Republic of South Africa is the linchpin of the entire "White Redoubt." It is the moral and political mentor of both the "overseas territories" of Portugal and Rhodesia. It is the conduit for goods otherwise embargoed to Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. In short, South Africa is the keystone of obdurate white supremacy, and the manner in which Washington deals with her will be the key problem for America's African diplomacy in the 1970's. At this point, the question remains officially ineffable. In terms of the changing perceptions of Black Africa's leaders, the nature of the American assistance policy — be it bilateral or multilateral — may become academic and secondary when compared with our stand on South Africa. In that event, our failure to consider authentic policy alternatives will result in catastrophic reversals for the United States in a continent where real gains can be achieved.

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[27] See Robert C. Maynard, "Polaroid's Challenge: Racism or Morality," *Washington Post,* Outlook Section, January 17, 1971.

Books Received

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I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Alliance in International Politics. Edited by Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970. 383 pp. $5.95 (paper). Readings about alliances, past and present, and theories of alliance cohesion. Included are selections on the nature of alignment and realignment, stochastic modes of war alliances, an economic theory of alliances, the problems of measuring alignment, the characteristics of neutralism, military alliances and the United Nations Charter, and alliances within the context of a multipolar or bipolar international system.

Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World. Edited by Francis A. Beer. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 384 pp. $4.95. A collection of essays on alliances and international conflict, the nature of cooperation in such alliances as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the South East Asia Treaty Organization, the Arab League, and the Organization of African States, and the characteristics of alliance disintegration.

An Atlas of World Affairs. (Sixth revised edition.) By Andrew Boyd. New York: Praeger, 1970. 176 pp. $5.00 ($2.25, paper). This useful reference book contains basic information on important problems of contemporary world affairs and 76 maps of regions currently in the news. The atlas clarifies each country's vital resources, finances, population, alliances and political trends. A detailed index gives valuable cross-references to related subjects.

Concepts of International Politics. (Second edition.) By Charles O. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 314 pp. $7.50. A study of the nature of foreign policy, national capability analysis, modes of conflict and adjustment, international law as a limitation on state action, the role of trade, aid and development, and the state as a political unit in transition.

Contending Theories of International Relations. By James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971. 416 pp. $9.95 ($6.25, paper). An overview and synthesis of international relations theory. Extensive discussion is given to theories of conflict, war and revolution, realist theory, pacifism, imperialism, balance of power, man-milieu relationships, international systems theory, theories of international integration, decision-making, theories of conflict and deterrence, disarmament and arms control.

Democracy. By Dorothy Pickles. New York: Basic Books, 1970. 200 pp. $5.95. A lucid analysis of the complexities involved in trying to come to grips with a satisfactory definition of "democracy." In her final chapter, the author assesses prospects for the future of democracy, observing that much depends on the ability of democratic systems to discover within themselves the intellectual and moral resources to recreate active faith in democratic government.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Future of the International Legal Order. Volume II: Wealth and Resources. Edited by Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 343 pp. $11.00. Four writers focus on the capacity of the international legal order to cope with the course of international economic development in an environment influenced by rapid technological change, and attempt to relate some of the possible critical issues to international legal requirements. Two chapters devote particular attention to the problems associated with the future exploitation of ocean resources and the trends in space law.

How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. By Louis Henkin. New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1970. 324 pp. $7.50 ($3.50, paper). An examination of the varieties and limitations of international law, the motivations of states to observe or violate international law, and the impact of technological change, international organization and the emergence of new states on the international legal order.

Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race. Edited by B. T. Feld and others. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1971. 379 pp. $12.50 ($2.95, paper). This is the record of the 10th Pugwash Symposium, an outgrowth of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Participants came from the United States, the Soviet Union, England, France, West Germany, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Israel and India, and topics discussed include the possible military significance of the superheavy elements, nuclear weapons technology, technology and the arms race, reconnaissance and surveillance as essential elements of peace, ocean technology, performance of anti-ballistic missile systems, and growth characteristics and political implications of military R&D.

International Law and the Social Sciences. By Wesley L. Gould and Michael Barkun. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 338 pp. $9.75. Concerned that international law has been artificially and wrongly separated from the social sciences, the authors attempt to restate international legal materials in terms of system theory, viewing them as a kind of social science lingua franca. They then set forth what they view as the reciprocal relationships between international law and the findings, perspective and literature of the social sciences, and assess the utility of social science materials for the comprehension, teaching and practice of international law.

The Logic of Images in International Relations. By Robert Jervis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 218 pp. $8.50. An examination of the ways in which nations seek to transmit desired images and to influence the images of themselves held by other nations. The author assesses the uses of ambiguity, the substantial acts of nations, and signals of various kinds in the development of images. His analysis is applied to U.S.-Soviet relations and the Viet Nam war.

Peace and Counter-Peace: From Wilson to Hitler. By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 585 pp. $12.95. These memoirs of the editor of *Foreign Affairs* since 1928 provide a firsthand account of his meetings with famous personages who have shaped history during the past 50 years, among them Briand, Clemenceau, Poincaré, Thomas Masaryk, Eduard Benes, Venizelos, Bukharin, Paderewski, Austen Chamberlain, Count Sforza and King Alexander. He also describes two interviews within a single week in 1933 with Hitler and Mussolini which, for the author, foreshadowed a recognition of things to come.

Soldiers without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping. By Larry L. Fabian. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971. 315 pp. $7.50. An exploration of the need to bolster the United Nations' peacekeeping capabilities and the problems and prospects of doing so. The author, research associate at The Brookings Institution, discusses political impartiality, noncoercion and other principles of peacekeeping; the experience of the League of Nations; the role of Hammarskjöld and the Middle Powers, and especially the "Nordic response"; the improvisation of various UN peacekeeping institutions in the face of intense political controversy; and the feasibility of restructuring and strengthening these institutions.

II. UNITED STATES

America the Dutiful: An Assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy. By Philip W. Quigg. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971. 223 pp. $6.95. Largely a defense of American foreign policy since World War II, in which the author attacks many of the oversimplifications and accepted truths voiced by current critics and calls for a more balanced appraisal of the complex issues involved.

The Mexican-American People: The Nation's Second Largest Minority. By Leo Grebler, Joan W. Moore and Ralph C. Guzman. New York: The Free Press, 1970. 777 pp. $14.95. This massive study of the position in urban areas of the nation's second largest minority—more than 5,000,000 people—is a product of the Mexican-American Study Project at UCLA. The authors explore the milieu of the Southwest, the ebb and flow of immigration, distinctive population patterns, the education gap, income differentials, occupations, earnings, housing conditions, residential segregation, social classes and mobility, the family, intermarriage and assimilation, the tenacity of ethnic culture, the role of the Catholic and Protestant churches, contacts with governmental agencies, ethnic organizations and leadership, political views and voting behavior.

Off Course: From Truman to Nixon. By Rexford G. Tugwell. New York: Praeger, 1971. 326 pp. $7.95. Written by a member of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Brains Trust," this work represents a personal assessment of the Presidents of the last 25 years. Tugwell charges Roosevelt's successors with having allowed the nation to go "off course" because of such factors as emotionalism and inexperience and criticizes the Senate, the Vice-Presidency and the U.S. Army as training grounds for the highest office in the land. He sees Nixon in the ironic role of having to reverse containment policies he had advocated for over two decades, but believes Nixon, as the first national political professional since Roosevelt, accepts the need to return to the Rooseveltian concept of coexistence.

The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy Making: A Reader. Edited by Douglas M. Fox. Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1971. 353 pp. $7.95. A collection of essays about the principal considerations influencing the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, including domestic structure, public opinion, nongovernmental groups, and the official bureaucracy, with special emphasis on the role of Congress, the military, and the National Security Council. Included are case studies on the escalation of the Viet Nam conflict, the U.S. policy reversal of 1968, and President Nixon's decision to eliminate communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.

The President Steps Down. By George Christian. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 282 pp. $6.95. The former press secretary to Lyndon Johnson recounts the crowded events of the last three crucial months of the Johnson Administration. He describes a President determined to leave office not as a "lame duck" but as a chief executive commanding the full powers of his office until replaced by his successor. We learn of the President's disappointments during this period—on such issues as farm policy and the gun laws as well as efforts to initiate negotiations in the Vietnamese conflict. From his unique vantage point, Christian has contributed yet another insider's view into the workings of the Johnson

Administration which should interest those concerned with the problems of Presidential power.

Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life 1941-1969. By Chester Bowles. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 657 pp. $12.95. Setting forth his views on his service to six American Presidents, in a variety of posts both at home and abroad, Bowles often comments critically on the course of U.S. policy between 1941 and 1969. In particular, he recounts his persistent opposition to U.S. involvement in Indochina, charging that this country has often failed to understand and act on the forces shaping the non-Western world.

Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy. Edited by George W. Shepherd, Jr. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 238 pp. $6.95. Nine American scholars attempt to assess the effects of racial tensions on the formulation, execution and reception of U.S. foreign policy. Their papers are from a series of conferences held between 1967 and 1969 on the problems of race in international relations at the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies.

Roots of Involvement: The U.S. in Asia, 1784-1971. By Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971. 336 pp. $8.95. Kalb, CBS diplomatic correspondent in Washington, and Abel, Dean of the Columbia School of Journalism, seek to place the Viet Nam conflict in the perspective of nearly 200 years of U.S. involvement in Asian affairs. The authors "found no substantial evidence that the United States was driven by imperialist motives in Vietnam. Instead, we found a rich, generous, and powerful nation stumbling, step by downward step, into the longest, most costly, and most disruptive war Americans have ever fought, in the misguided belief that when things go wrong anywhere in the world the commitment of sufficient American dollars and—if need be—of American soldiers, must surely put them right."

III. WESTERN EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism, 1919-1945. By Alastair Hamilton. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 312 pp. $7.95. Hamilton examines the intellectual foundations of fascism, with special emphasis on the theories of society propounded by such men as Marinetti and Maurras, and attempts to account for the appeal of fascism to European intellectuals in the interwar period. Included is a detailed scrutiny of the development of fascism in Italy, Germany, France and Britain and the writings of its principal proponents and intellectual theoreticians.

Britain in the Nineteen Thirties. By Noreen Branson and Margot Heinemann. New York: Praeger, 1971. 358 pp. $11.00. In a social history of Britain, the authors assess the impact of the Depression on class structure and local communities and describe the way ordinary people lived, their educational system, housing, jobs and wages, health services, and response to world affairs. The volume also elaborates on the development of trade unions, the major political movements of the period, and the growth of mass media of communications.

Deterrence and Persuasion: French Nuclear Armament in the Context of National Policy, 1945-1969. By Wolf Mendl. London: Faber and Faber, 1970. 256 pp. $9.00. An assessment of the place of French nuclear strategy in the context of foreign policy and defense policy during the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Special emphasis is placed on the civilian and military aspects of the program of atomic development, and its implications for French domestic politics.

Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918. By Frank G. Weber. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 284 pp. $9.75. The author focuses on the conflicts between Germany and

Austria in the formulation of their policy toward Turkey, and examines the war aims of the Central Powers in the Near East. He also describes the tensions created by the Turkish Alliance between the German diplomatic service and the Army High Command and between German and Turkish leaders.

Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community. By Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 314 pp. $6.95 ($5.50, paper). The authors present a conceptual framework for the study of European integration and examine in detail the development of the European Economic Community.

A Foreign Policy for Europe? The External Relations of the European Community. By Gordon L. Weil. Bruges, Belgium: College of Europe, 1970. 324 pp. n.p. In a study of the framework established by the Rome Treaty for the conduct of relations with countries outside the EEC, the author examines the nature of the association agreements between the European Community and African states as well as those with Greece and other nonmember European states. Included is a comparison between the EEC's selective approach toward the lowering of trade barriers with respect to the less developed countries and the global approach of UNCTAD.

Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1918. By Oleh S. Fedyshyn. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971. 401 pp. $15.00. An in-depth, fully documented treatment of the German occupation of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian independence movement toward the end of World War I. The emphasis is on the German plans for the Ukraine, the chief prize of Germany's drive to the east, and for the Crimea, an important secondary prize; attention is also given to German plans and policies in the Baltic area, Byelorussia, the Caucasus, and to German-Soviet dealings, German dealings with the Russian monarchists, and the Polish problem. Dr. Fedyshyn, Professor of Political Science at Richmond College of the City University of New York, bases his study principally on German and Austrian archival materials captured by the Allies during World War II.

National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise: Tensions among the North Atlantic Countries. By Jack N. Behrman. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 194 pp. $8.50 ($4.95, paper). An analysis of the impact of multinational business enterprise on governments and on economic relationships within the North Atlantic area.

The Place of Fascism in European History. Edited by Gilbert Allardyce. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 178 pp. $5.95 ($2.45, paper). Essays on fascism as a reaction against liberalism and modernism, as a form of totalitarianism, and as a radical form of traditional political protest. Included are writings by Erich Fromm, Peter F. Drucker, Carl J. Friedrich, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Hannah Arendt, Eugen Weber, Seymour Lipset and Barrington Moore.

Le "Plan Fouchet" et le Problème de l'Europe Politique. By Robert Bloes. Burges, Belgium: College of Europe, 1970. 542 pp. n.p. A detailed and amply documented study of the development of the Fouchet Plan for European political union. Emphasis is placed on the conferences of heads of government held in Paris and Bonn in 1961, the contrasting negotiating styles of European governments, the discussion of the Fouchet Plan in the European Parliament, the implications of the British Common Market application, and the author's assessment of the principal obstacles to, and prospects for, European political integration.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Political Influence of the British Monarchy, 1868-1952. By Frank Hardie. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 224 pp. $6.95. A study of the political influence, exercised for the most part in private, by British monarchs from Queen Victoria to King George VI. Special attention is given to the role of Edward VII and George V in the constitutional crises of 1909-1911; George V in the Irish Question before and after World War I; and the relationship between George VI and Churchill during the Second World War.

The Rebirth of Europe: A History of the Years since the Fall of Hitler. By Walter Laqueur. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 434 pp. $8.95. This study represents the first attempt to trace in one volume the major political, economic, cultural and social developments in Europe since 1945. Included are chapters on the new European balance of power, the quest for unity, the nature of European communism, the modernization of economies and the expansion of trade, the principal cultural movements such as modernism and existentialism, the evolution of East-West relations, Gaullism, and efforts toward Russification in Eastern Europe.

Student Politics in France. By A. Belden Fields. New York: Basic Books, 1970. 198 pp. $7.95. In this study of the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France (UNEF), Dr. Fields, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, compares the kinds of student organizations in existence, especially in Europe and North America; traces the history of student organization and activism in France up to the end of World War II, the student syndical experience and the factors conducive to student activism since the war; and describes problems of formal organization, participation and leadership, the sociology of UNEF and its relations with the government, and the future of student syndicalism.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

COMECON: Challenge to the West. By R. E. H. Mellor. New York: Van Nostrand/Reinhold, 1971. 152 pp. $3.50 (paper). Created as a Soviet counterstroke to the Marshall Plan, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) is the least studied and understood of the supranational European organizations. The major aims of the author, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography, University of Aberdeen, are to show why COMECON was formed and to review its main organizational developments and unfolding policies in relation to changing ideological views, communist bloc economic conditions, and pressures and influences from outside the bloc.

The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe. (Second revised edition.) By Richard F. Staar. Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1971. 304 pp. $3.95 (paper). A substantially revised, expanded and updated edition of a basic introductory text and guide to source materials on Eastern Europe. The first eight chapters are devoted to a description of the political, foreign, military, economic and cultural affairs of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. The last three chapters deal with military cooperation, economic integration and intrabloc relations.

The Czechoslovak Experiment 1968-1969. By Ivan Sviták. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 243 pp. $10.95. A former lecturer in modern philosophy at Charles University, Prague, and a member of the group of intellectuals associated with *Literární listy* during the Dubćek reform movement, Professor Sviták presents selections of his own writings during the Dubćek era. The writings illustrate the fundamental philosophical and practical issues for which he and others sought solution during this volatile period of Czech history.

Planning for Economic Growth in the Soviet Union, 1918-1932. By Eugène Zaleski. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971. 425 pp. $15.75. This scholarly work on the development and functioning of the Soviet planning system is a translation, with some revisions, of a book originally published in France in 1962. Dr. Zaleski, a director at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, examines the general concept of a planned economy, the formation of the Soviet Five-Year Plan system, the formulation, execution and adjustment of the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932), the problems of setting priorities and of devising social and economic measures to stimulate production, and the results of the First Five-Year Plan.

Politics and History in the Soviet Union. By Nancy Whittier Heer. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1971. 319 pp. $12.50. A detailed analysis of the historiography of the CPSU after Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin, covering the period 1956-1966. Dr. Heer, Assistant Professor of Government at Wheaton College and an Associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, examines the functions and structure of Soviet historiography; shows how Soviet historians of the CPSU of varying personal and professional backgrounds and viewpoints interpreted their assignment in the years after 1956; traces the development of group consciousness among them; suggests a typology of historians; treats of key ongoing political aspects of the system, such as bases of party legitimacy, limits of political opposition, the infallibility of the party, and the role of the individual leader in a socialist state; and briefly considers Soviet historiography as an image of both the past and the future.

Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807. By Norman E. Saul. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. 268 pp. $8.75. The author explores the factors that led to the emergence of the Mediterranean as the focal point of Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the 19th century. Included is an examination of Russia's relations with other major powers, notably France and Turkey, the role of key personalities and ideology in policy formation, and the implications of Russian internal affairs for foreign policy.

The Russian Revolution of 1917: Contemporary Accounts. Edited by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 320 pp. $8.95. Twenty-three original accounts and analyses by participants and eyewitnesses of the conflicting issues, forces and parties to the Russian Revolution. Some of the accounts are by major actors, including Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kerensky and Wrangel, while the remainder are by ordinary citizens caught up in the chaos of revolution and representing a wide spectrum of political views—Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, Cadets, Octobrists and loyal monarchists.

The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma. By Roman Kolkowicz, Matthew P. Gallagher and Benjamin S. Lambeth, with Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Peter W. Colm. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 212 pp. $8.00 ($2.95, paper). An analysis of the perceptions, incentives, motivations and constraints that shape Soviet arms control policies. Included are chapters on Soviet policy and nuclear proliferation, the issue of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), and Soviet arms control policies toward China and Western Europe.

V. MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

The Founding Fathers of Israel. By Gershon Winer. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1971. 289 pp. $7.95. An examination of the ideas and values that have contributed to the contemporary intellectual makeup of Jewish society in Israel as articulated by a dozen leading figures whose efforts culminated in the creation of that state. Among them are Moses Hess, Theodor Herzl and Micha Berdichevsky.

Freedom and Socialism. By Julius K. Nyerere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 422 pp. $2.95 (paper). A collection of major speeches and writings by Tanzania's President Nyerere from 1965 to 1967 on such topics as non-alignment, socialism, African liberation and unity, democracy, relations with the West, Rhodesia, economic nationalism, agricultural policy and the role of universities.

Israel: A Society in Transition. By V. D. Segre. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. 227 pp. $9.95. A study of the evolution of the Jewish community in the Holy Land from 1917 to 1957, during which time the "Yishur" developed from an agrarian society into a modern industrial state. While in many respects the story of Israel has been that of other developing countries, the paradoxical and unique aspects of Israel's situation are stressed.

Middle Eastern Political Systems. By Dankwart A. Rustow. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 114 pp. $5.95 ($2.75, paper). This latest addition to the Comparative Asian Government series assesses the political systems of the Middle East (the United Arab Republic, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant) not in a country-by-country approach, but employing the system of analysis common to the series. Also in keeping with the corresponding volumes, a wealth of information is presented, often in tabular form.

Planning for Development in Libya: The Exceptional Economy in the Developing World. By Rawle Farley. New York: Praeger, 1971. 351 pp. $18.50. While scarcity of capital distinguishes the typical developing world economy, oil-rich Libya is clearly an exception. This study is an analysis of the effects of planning on a capital-surplus economy and an assessment of successes and failures in the Libyan economy as a whole. While the overthrow of Idris and some resulting changes are incorporated, the bulk of the study involves the period ending with the expiration of the First Five-Year Plan in 1968.

Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change. By Edward J. Cohn. New York: Praeger, 1970. 212 pp. $12.50. This volume of the Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development analyzes the principal facets of Turkish economic, social and political change since the end of World War II. The author also estimates the outlook for future development and discusses possible constraints on orderly growth.

The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939. By Roger R. Trask. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1971. 280 pp. $11.50. An analysis of Turkish-American relations from the start of World War I to the advent of World War II. The neutrality of 1914, the hostility of 1917 and the gradual improvement of relations thereafter are examined as they bore on the diplomacy of the interwar years of isolation, the balance of power and the war and the Cold War which followed.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific: A Handbook. Edited by Charles Osborne. New York: Praeger, 1970. 580 pp. $18.50. A comprehensive reference work on the government, economy, foreign policy, social patterns and culture of Australia, New Zealand and the many islands of the South Pacific.

The Economic Development of Thai Agriculture. By T. H. Silcock. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 250 pp. $11.50. A thorough and pioneering study of Thai agriculture, including such aspects as the impact of a rapidly developing rural road network, the trend toward commercial farming, the record of government policies, problems of measuring agricultural produce and the rate of growth, and individual crop analyses.

The Political Economy of Communist China. By Jan S. Prybyla. Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Company, 1970. 605 pp. $10.25 ($6.95, paper). In this economic history of Communist China, the author, Professor of Economics at Pennsylvania State University, describes the methods and instruments of reconstruction and reform, 1949-1952; agricultural and industrial reforms and social, fiscal, monetary, foreign trade and related political measures of the First Five-Year Plan, 1953-1957; the liberal interlude and Great Leap Forward of 1957-1960; the period of readjustment, of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and of the socialist education campaign of 1961-1965; the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969; and the prospects for the Chinese economy after Mao.

The Politics of Nepal: Persistence and Change in an Asian Monarchy. By Leo E. Rose and Margaret W. Fisher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 197 pp. $7.95. This study of Nepali politics is divided into chapters on the political and social heritage, the monarchy and representative institutions, administrative and judicial systems, political forces, modernization of the economy, foreign policy, and the problem of modernizing Nepali politics. Both authors are lecturers in the Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley.

The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest. By Richard S. Wheeler. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 346 pp. $11.00. In this political history of Pakistan, Dr. Wheeler, Associate Professor of Political Science at Claremont Men's College, examines the emergence of a national identity, the social and economic setting, constitutional dilemmas, institutional continuity and experimentation, parliamentary politics, political forces and organizations, and national problems, especially that of unity.

The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam: Policies and Programs. By the Joint Development Group. New York: Praeger, 1970. 552 pp. $19.50. A detailed master plan for the reconstruction and development of postwar South Viet Nam, financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Vietnamese government, and formulated by the Joint Development Group, consisting of American and Vietnamese experts. The American side was represented by the Development and Resources Corporation of New York, whose chairman and president is David E. Lilienthal. The report examines such topics as economic growth; monetary and fiscal policies; employment, manpower and skills; strengthening governmental institutions; agriculture, forestry and industry; development of the infrastructure; education and public health; and development plans for specific regions of South Viet Nam.

Traditional China. Edited by James T. C. Liu and Wei-ming Tu. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 179 pp. $5.95 ($1.95, paper). These 16 selections on traditional China treat of social change and mobility, integrative factors, noncapitalistic economics, city life, government and law, peasant rebellions, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.

VII. LATIN AMERICA

Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1994-1966. By Richard Newbold Adams. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970. 553 pp. $10.00. The purpose of this book is to examine the structure of Guatemalan society and "how it relates . . . to the peasant, provincial, and general lower-sector population that still comprise the great mass of the nation, and how it relates to the world at large. . . ." The author, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Texas at Austin and Latin American program adviser to the Ford Foundation, writes on such topics as the social structure, economic development, demography, and resource base; the organization of power; the development of the military; the renaissance and political power of the Church; the expansion of upper-sector interest groups; and the maldistribution of wealth. Chapters on "The Stunted Growth of Campesino Organizations" and "The Social Organization of Low-Income Urban Families" have been contributed by Brian Murphy and Bryan Roberts.

Economic Development of Latin America. By Celso Furtado. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 271 pp. $10.50 ($2.45, paper). This volume in the Cambridge Latin American Studies series provides a socio-economic profile of Latin America. Professor Furtado of the University of Paris probes the historical roots of the basic economic and social institutions that still prevail, describes the foundation of national states and the impact and course of the industrial revolution, and analyzes the problems of foreign trade, external dependence, regional integration, agrarian reform, economic planning and social modernization.

From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969. By Eric Williams. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 576 pp. $10.95. The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, in the first comprehensive history of the Caribbean, examines the nature of colonialism and the anti-colonial movement, the West Indian sugar economy of the 19th century, the slave trade and the abolition of slavery, the growth of American influence and Manifest Destiny, the rise of modern nationalism, the phenomenon of Castroism, and the future prospects for the Caribbean.

Political Groups in Chile: The Dialogue Between Order and Change. By Ben G. Burnett. Austin: University of Texas Press, for the Institute of Latin American Studies, 1970. 319 pp. $8.50. A study of the confrontation in Chile between those forces desirous of maintaining the status quo or admitting only of gradual change and those demanding deep structural alterations in the nation's social fabric. Dr. Burnett, Professor of Political Science at Whittier College, analyzes the sources of alienation, the styles and objectives of the political participants, and the relative ability of groups to gain satisfaction of their demands. Three major chapters are devoted to a treatment of political parties and five interest groups: the military, clergy, students, management and labor.

Student Politics in Chile. By Frank Bonilla and Myron Glazer. New York: Basic Books, 1970. 367 pp. $8.50. In the first part of this study of students as an organized force in Chilean society, Bonilla, Professor of Political Science at M.I.T., offers a systematic sociological analysis of the student movement by focusing on "the Agitators" of 1918-1922, the "Party Militants" of 1936-1940, and the "Guildsmen vs. the Political Activists" of 1956-1957. The second section contains an examination of the Chilean university student during the 1964 Presidential campaign by Professor Glazer, a sociologist at Smith College. The authors provide a brief summary and conclusions in which they argue that the readiness of students to attack injustice and resist political aggression has helped to keep Chile within the bounds of political moderation and legality.

The United States and the Caribbean. Edited by Tad Szulc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, for The American Assembly, 1971. 212 pp. $2.45 (paper). The essays in this volume, by American and Caribbean journalists, diplomats and scholars, trace the social and political development of the multicultural, multiracial and multilingual Caribbean area, and consider social, political and economic relationships between the United States and the Caribbean lands.

Contributors to this Issue

William R. Kintner, Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Editor, ORBIS; Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; author of *Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense* (Hawthorn, 1969), *Peace and the Strategy Conflict* (Praeger, 1967); co-editor of *Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1968).

Harvey Sicherman, Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.

Philip E. Jacob, Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii; co-author of *The Dynamics of International Organization* (Dorsey Press, 1965); co-editor and co-author of *The Integration of Political Communities* (Lippincott, 1964); principal investigator, International Studies of Values in Politics; member, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace.

Barry Goldwater, U.S. Senator from Arizona; Republican Presidential candidate in 1964.

Hubert H. Humphrey, U.S. Senator from Minnesota; Vice President of the United States, 1965-1969.

Foy D. Kohler, Professor in the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami. Formerly U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1962 to 1966 and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1966 to 1968.

Stefan T. Possony, Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University; member, Research Council, Foreign Policy Research Institute; member, Editorial Board, ORBIS; co-author of *The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War* (Dunellen, 1971).

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Donald G. Brennan, a sometime mathematician; member and former president, Hudson Institute; editor of the journal, *Arms Control and National Security,* and of *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (Braziller, 1961).

Benjamin J. Cohen, Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University; author of *Balance-of-Payments Policy* (Penguin, 1970) and *The Future of Sterling as an International Currency.*

General Robert Jefferson Wood, USA (Ret.), member, Presidential Task Force (Peterson Commission) on Foreign Aid, September 1969-March 1970. Formerly, Director of Military Assistance under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; recalled to active duty from February 1968 to April 1969 to head the State-Defense Study Group on overseas bases for the next decade.

Morton A. Kaplan, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago; member, Research Council, Foreign Policy Research Institute; member, Editorial Board, ORBIS; author of *On Historical and Political Knowing: An Inquiry into Some Problems of Universal Law and Human Freedom* (University of Chicago Press, 1971) and *Dissent and the State in Peace and War: An* Essai *on the Grounds of Public Morality* (Dunellen, 1970).

Charles Burton Marshall, Professor of International Politics, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; author of *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), *Crisis Over Rhodesia: A Skeptical View* (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) and *The Exercise of Sovereignty* (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965).

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